In late 2025, a group of Chinese nationals arrived in Belgrade on a commercial flight. Their papers were in order and their passports stamped; their entry was entirely legal. Within days, however, they were on the move again, attempting to cross the Danube River illegally into Croatia with the help of a local facilitator. Their boat capsized mid-river, resulting in one fatality. Nine others were rescued.

This is not an isolated case. Every year, hundreds of Chinese nationals travel legally into the Western Balkans before turning to human smuggling networks to enter the EU – a method known as hybrid smuggling. This form of movement is becoming increasingly prevalent globally, and is expanding rapidly across a wide range of routes.

Hybrid smuggling is not a new phenomenon in the Western Balkans. In the early 2020s, there was a considerable increase in the number of migrants flying into Belgrade airport, mainly North African nationals, who were then transported across land borders into the EU. In the years since, both the volume and variety of nationalities have increased, with people from Türkiye, Bangladesh, India, Cuba and Jordan, among others, now regularly using hybrid smuggling services in the region. This growth reflects the adaptability and professionalization of local smuggling networks, as well as the development of more complex forms of criminality along the Balkan route.

Hybrid smuggling in the region differs from conventional irregular migration in that it hinges on the strategic misuse of legal entry frameworks. It combines three main entry channels – work permits, visa-free regimes and tourist visas – with traditional cross-border smuggling methods to facilitate onward movement to western and northern Europe.

Foreign criminal networks play a central role in these operations, and usually oversee the entire route. They coordinate the most lucrative aspects of the business, including route planning, document fraud, fees and handover points. While senior leaders are often based in their countries of origin, mid- and lower-level facilitators operate within the Western Balkans to manage cross-border movements.

Local actors provide logistical support, including transport and accommodation, as well as assistance with obtaining visas and residence permits. These activities may involve private companies and, in some cases, corrupt officials. The process is highly organized, with individuals performing specialized roles across different segments of the route.

Violence is deployed as a means of control, both in the form of competition between rival groups, particularly in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and against migrants who attempt to avoid smuggling networks altogether.

Licit labour migration schemes are the first key pathway. Western Balkan economies continue to experience labour shortages, with thousands of foreign workers, mainly from Bangladesh, the Philippines, Nepal and India, recruited each year. Organized criminal groups have become embedded in this process, often collaborating with intermediaries and private companies in both migrants’ countries of origin and locally to secure visas through fraudulent employment contracts and documentation.

Once in the Western Balkans, groups of migrants are quickly smuggled onward to Croatia, Hungary or Greece, indicating a high degree of coordination and pre-arranged movement. In April 2025, the Albanian Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) concluded an investigation into 27 members of two criminal groups accused of facilitating the smuggling of around 650 foreign nationals, mainly from Bangladesh and Cameroon, through Kosovo and Serbia towards the EU.

There are also cases of less structured movement, mainly involving foreign workers recruited through legitimate channels, who then abscond from their workplace to seek irregular onward passage. In these instances, migrants usually wait several months to accumulate savings, before enlisting the help of smuggling networks.

The second major factor enabling hybrid smuggling in the region is the misalignment of visa-free regimes with EU policy. As part of the EU integration process, Western Balkan countries are expected to impose entry visas for third-country nationals, according to the list adopted by the EU. However, as visa alignment is not an immediate legal obligation, Western Balkan governments sometimes adapt their policies to reflect their own political and economic interests. Citizens of Türkiye, China, Russia and Belarus, for instance, require a visa to enter the EU but can travel to parts of the Western Balkans without one. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and several EU member states have emphasized that these exemptions contribute to irregular migration flows into the EU.

This regulatory environment has also contributed to the emergence of secondary illicit markets, including the sale and reuse of visa-exempt passports. In December 2025, police in Kosovo arrested a Jordanian and a Turkish national suspected of involvement in human smuggling to the EU, and seized 53 Jordanian passports allegedly being used for criminal purposes.

The third factor enabling hybrid smuggling in the region is the availability of tourist, sporting and educational visas. These are generally easier to obtain than other visa types, as they involve less extensive documentation and verification requirements. Using this route, migrants typically arrive in countries close to EU borders, stay for a few days, and then travel irregularly to their intended destination with the help of smuggling networks. Between 2021 and 2025, more than 3 190 visas in these categories were issued in North Macedonia and 1 460 in Kosovo.

As demand for foreign labour grows and visa regimes remain only partially aligned with EU standards, the governments in the Western Balkans should strengthen measures to prevent smuggling networks from exploiting this. Addressing this threat requires a shift away from a focus on border crossings and towards the broader ecosystem that enables human smuggling.

While visa policy alignment with the EU is a precondition for the accession process, more comprehensive efforts are needed to improve screening and risk assessment in visa issuance and enhance oversight of labour migration channels to prevent the involvement of organized crime and the exploitation of foreign nationals. Particular attention should be given to the role of local and foreign companies in facilitating fraudulent employment contracts. A more integrated enforcement response is also necessary, especially through labour inspections. The creation of multidisciplinary investigative teams would enable closer cooperation between law enforcement agencies and relevant institutions, strengthening the ability to detect and disrupt the exploitation of legal entry systems by increasingly sophisticated organized criminal groups.