Over the course of two days in mid-April, Greek authorities rescued more than 300 migrants off the coast of Crete, highlighting the growing resurgence of a long-dormant smuggling corridor between eastern Libya and Greece.

In just a short time, the route has eclipsed the other major corridors for migrants entering Europe, including those through the Western Mediterranean and the Canary Islands, as well as pathways through the Western Balkans.

More than 25 000 people attempted the journey in 2025, a sharp rise from the 5 161 arrivals recorded in 2024 and the mere 815 in 2023. Early indications suggest that numbers will increase further in 2026, and there is a credible possibility of a substantial surge.

Given the serious protection risks associated with movement between Tobruk and Crete, and the potential strain on Greek response capacity, it is critical that plans are put in place to manage these expanding flows.

A corridor comes back to life

The route between eastern Libya and Greece, as well as a related passage targeting Italy, is not entirely new. Before Libya’s 2011 revolution, a number of small smuggling networks operated in the eastern part of the country, organizing regular clandestine departures. Activity continued after 2011, but it was sporadic and on a very minor scale. Most human smuggling in Libya centred on the western coast, where fractured security control, dense networks of smugglers and proximity to Italy’s Pelagic Islands combined to fuel movement.

However, from mid-2022 onwards, human smuggling through eastern Libya began to change, with a sharp rise in departures from Tobruk and the surrounding area towards Italy. These often involved large boats carrying 400 or more migrants. In June 2023, a vessel sank off the coast of Greece, resulting in the deaths of over 600 people, which substantially increased international visibility of the situation. At the same time, diplomatic engagement was accelerating between the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), an armed group that exerts de facto control over eastern Libya, and authorities in Malta and Italy. These two dynamics appear to have prompted the LAAF to crack down on smuggling activity bound for Italy, particularly high-volume departures.

Movement resumed towards the end of 2023, however, with altered tactics. Smugglers began using small craft in order to operate more discreetly, and many eastern Libyan networks shifted their routes from Italy to Crete.

While numbers rose in 2024, there was a noticeable spike in 2025, with almost 21 000 migrants either successfully landing in Crete or being rescued by the Greek authorities. LAAF maritime units, meanwhile, intercepted around 4 600 people. At least 397 migrants died on the route in 2025, with dozens more missing.

From January to mid-May of this year, just over 6 000 migrants departed from Libya for Greece, with around 65% arriving successfully. This figure is roughly 1 000 higher than that recorded during the same period in 2025, and there are signs that the pace is accelerating.

A system primed for expansion

Contacts in Crete and Libya indicate that networks are expanding their capacity and scaling up their operations, thereby driving up crossings. A significant proportion of human smuggling in eastern Libya is reportedly linked to a small number of families with a long-standing history of goods, vehicles and drug trafficking, who have diversified into the movement of migrants due to its high profitability and low risk.

Notably, competition between these parties has led to a sharp drop in prices. In 2024, migrants interviewed stated that they had paid between €2 100 and €3 500 per person. In April 2026, Greek authorities reported fees ranging from €340 to €1 450, which is consistent with GI-TOC research findings.

There has also been a knock-on effect for ancillary industries in eastern Libya. While boats were previously mainly sourced from Egypt, more are now being built in local facilities. The number of migrants awaiting departure in nearby houses and apartments has increased, even though processing times have shortened. There have even been reports of severe overcrowding, particularly in and around the city of Tobruk.

The appeal of this route has also been reinforced by current security approaches. Although the LAAF has conducted some high-profile crackdowns on smugglers, boat builders and migrants gathered in advance of embarkation, these operations have been selective. Interventions appear to have been intended to demonstrate action to foreign stakeholders in order to secure diplomatic benefits, while avoiding the risk of causing unrest among key tribes. This dynamic has generally led smugglers to limit the visibility of their operations, rather than curbing them altogether.

Rising movement, rising risk

The risks on this route are numerous. In eastern Libya, contacts have reported that departure zones are often controlled by armed men in masks, who intimidate migrants and sometimes force them onto boats, even during bad weather. The vessels used are often barely seaworthy, and frequently experience engine failures. According to Greek officials, smugglers usually provide only enough fuel to reach Crete, meaning vessels that veer off course are in danger of being stranded. Compounding this, smugglers have sought to limit both costs and risks to themselves by using migrants to steer, handle the GPS and refuel the vessel, often in return for a reduction in the cost of passage, further heightening risks.

These factors have resulted in an increase in incidents at sea. On 19 February, a boat carrying 50 migrants capsized around 20 nautical miles from the coast of Crete, resulting in 30 deaths or disappearances. On 21 March, a vessel from Tobruk drifted for six days, leaving its passengers without food or water. It was eventually rescued south of Crete, by which time 22 of the 48 migrants on board had died. In total, at least 177 deaths have been recorded this year.

Once the boats reach Greece, the migrants involved in piloting and manning the vessels face potential long prison sentences on migrant smuggling charges. This is reflected in the growing number of Sudanese – the nationality most often selected by smugglers for these roles – imprisoned in Greece.

What next in 2026: expansion, collapse or surge?

Predicting how Libya’s human smuggling ecosystem will develop over time is a challenging task, given the large number of variables at play and the often unexpected shifts in departure operations and security pressure. Nevertheless, three possibilities can be outlined for the rest of 2026.

The most likely scenario is that high levels of movement will continue, with arrivals slightly exceeding those in 2025, reflecting the ongoing expansion of networks in eastern Libya. Smugglers would continue to operate under a low profile, kept in loose check by the LAAF.

Slightly less likely, but still possible, is a collapse in human smuggling due to a significant increase in enforcement by the LAAF. This could occur if senior officials deem these activities to be a threat to their efforts to secure international backing, or as part of a deal with external stakeholders in exchange for materiel or diplomatic benefits. In this scenario, while smuggling would not be eliminated, it would probably revert to levels seen in 2023 or 2024.

The final possibility is a substantial increase in activity. Senior defence officials in western Libya are currently stepping up efforts to control and limit smuggling, which could lead to a displacement of flows to the east in the coming months. While there are various reasons to be sceptical about the likelihood of this, even partial enforcement success in the west could result in a spike in departures from eastern Libya to Crete.

With such a broad range of potential outcomes, it is essential for all international stakeholders – both governmental and non-governmental – to base their planning on the likelihood of continued high levels of movement between eastern Libya and Greece.