The 15th UN Crime Congress opened on Saturday in Abu Dhabi with the adoption of this year’s declaration. Following a lengthy negotiation process, which began in 2025 and concluded in July 2026, the document was agreed by consensus by the UN member states. The declaration sets out member states’ priorities for the years ahead, providing insight into the future direction of the UN on crime and justice issues. But will it lead to meaningful action? 

At 11 pages, the document is the third longest in the Congress’s history, after the last two editions. However, despite the broad range of issues covered by the 2015 Doha and 2021 Kyoto declarations, their expansiveness did not translate into clarity of action. In particular, the Kyoto Declaration fell short in two key areas: the gravity of the organized crime challenge was not adequately recognized and the role of civil society in the response was undermined.  

The nature of transnational organized crime 

Compared to the Kyoto Declaration, the Abu Dhabi text more clearly acknowledges the complexity and harm caused by illicit markets, as well as the use of new technologies by organized crime groups. In the opening paragraphs, member states express that they are ‘deeply concerned about the impact of crime on our societies and further concerned that various criminal activities are becoming increasingly complex, adaptive and interlinked, and transcend borders, sectors and jurisdictions’.  

The declaration recognizes the convergence of economic, environmental and social challenges alongside instability and institutional vulnerabilities, such as corruption. It also acknowledges that the consequences of organized crime ‘disproportionately affect … persons in vulnerable situations’. The focus on crimes that affect the environment is welcome, and although this section has some caveats, it reflects a growing momentum towards recognizing these as serious crimes, as well as designating them as money laundering predicate offences.

The Congress was notable, too, for the high number of events dedicated to environmental issues. It remains to be seen whether states will take a more concrete step forward at the UNTOC Conference in October, through the adoption of a new protocol. 

States also highlight the threats posed by the misuse of new technologies, cyberinfrastructure and cybertechnology in relation to various forms of crime, stating: ‘We express our concern about the evolving and increasingly complex criminal landscape, in which criminals and criminal groups … utilize new technologies to expand, professionalize and diversify their operations’. Artificial intelligence does not get a mention in terms of criminality, despite its growing use by criminal groups, but is mentioned as a tool in law enforcement.

Notably, the text addresses scam centres and telecommunications fraud, which were not mentioned in the Kyoto Declaration. It calls for increased cooperation and efforts to ‘dismantle’ scam centre operations, as well as for the application of the non-punishment principle for victims of trafficking. The document also mentions ‘crime as a service’, another growing phenomenon. The dark web is recognized as a platform used for criminal activities, and the declaration calls for stronger forensic capacities in this regard.  

While the inclusion of these concerns is welcome, as are the references to the many other forms of criminality facing societies today, the real test lies in what the declaration promises to deliver.  

The UN response 

The world has changed since the 2021 Congress in Kyoto, which was marked by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic may be over, but its legacy remains, and the world has been plunged into further crises, marked by conflict, fragmentation, and the ongoing growth and shifts in organized crime. However, the UN’s response to organized crime has not adapted to meet these challenges. The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) – the body’s primary legal instrument to counter organized crime – is a case in point. Since the launch of the review mechanism in 2018, only three country implementation reviews have been published.  

The latest declaration clearly outlines an organized crime landscape that requires a more urgent and concerted response. However, the text lacks clarity in this respect, failing to take a position on the state of the implementation of the UNTOC. Earlier in the negotiations, it was proposed that concern be expressed about the lack of achievements in the UNTOC review mechanism. Ultimately, however, the declaration fell back on the usual recollections and commitments to implement existing instruments. It is unclear why states could not agree on wording to address this issue.   

When discussing other forms of organized crime, the declaration repeatedly calls on states to meet their obligations under UNTOC, yet does so without acknowledging the persistent shortcomings in implementation. It states: ‘We reaffirm our commitment to our obligations under applicable international legal instruments, including … the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the three international drug conventions and the international instruments against terrorism, and welcome the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime.’

New to this declaration is the reference to the Cybercrime Convention, which did not exist at the time of the last Congress, and the accompanying call for member states to sign and ratify it. By the time of the next Congress, it should be clearer whether the convention has had a meaningful impact on addressing the technology-enabled threats highlighted in the declaration.  

In comparison to previous declarations, the Kyoto Declaration featured a downgrading of the role of civil society. The Abu Dhabi Declaration represents an improvement, more clearly emphasizing a ‘multistakeholder’ approach to implementation. States commit to promoting ‘partnerships with stakeholders to support our efforts to prevent and counter all forms of crime, [including] engagement with local authorities, civil society, the private sector, academia and affected communities’. 

Unfortunately, the declaration was once again drafted behind closed doors, without systematic input from civil society, and was agreed before discussions at the Congress took place.   

The way forward

Despite today’s geopolitical challenges, the declaration recognizes key UN principles, such as those set out in the UN Charter (which is not mentioned in the Kyoto Declaration), as well as human rights, fundamental freedoms and gender equality. However, the funding crisis at the UN, which is very much part of the challenge facing the UNTOC, is not referenced, highlighting another vulnerability in the prospect of follow-up action.  

The document refers to significant changes in the global illicit economy, and places greater emphasis on the participation of civil society in the response. The next step is to ensure that these elements are reflected in practice at multilateral and national levels, to ensure that this declaration is more than just words on paper. This objective must be a key focus of the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC in October, at which key decisions on reform and new priorities will be made.