This report looks to evaluate the effects of drug market enforcement, and broader external disruptions, through case studies (Sky ECC in the Netherlands, criminal gangs in Ireland, criminal gangs in Cape Town, the dissolution of FARC guerrillas in Colombia, COVID-19 policing shocks in Rio de Janeiro, and the collapse of the Beltrán-Leyva cartel in Mexico) which shed light on their impacts from two lenses.

First, the efficacy of enforcement at undermining and suppressing these markets. Second, the impact of these enforcement efforts and subsequent market disruptions on the societies in which they take place. The findings are stark. In no single case we evaluate have major external shocks or disruptions through enforcement, or lack thereof, been shown to have any demonstrable lasting impact on drug markets either locally or globally. Even in major successful enforcement cases, such as Sky ECC, spikes in seizures typically abate as criminal markets adapt and broader drug markets were largely unaffected. While we observe some potential short-term displacement of trafficking routes and disruption of operations, we expect limited, if any, long-term trend shifts in drug supply or demand.

We find clear evidence in case studies with limited underlying societal resilience and state capacity that enforcement often serves to worsen underlying violence and societal disruption dynamics, imposing significant human costs in terms of lives lost and socio-economic upheaval. Meanwhile, each case study attests to the remarkable resilience among criminal actors and organisations in the face of market disruptions and enforcement. This reiterates a well-articulated policy precept that policing drug markets can, at best, shape and manage these markets. Enforcement often operates from a basis of chasing unhelpful, short-termist metrics and indicators, for example seizures or arrests. Moreover, the pursuit of these goals often comes at the expense of underlying state building and socio-economic development initiatives required to fundamentally alter the conditions which allow criminals and drug markets to become embedded in the first place.

The case studies do point to a clear role for drug market enforcement in preventing criminal impunity and the establishment of corrosive-hegemonic market actors. Moreover, enforcement has a key role in demonstrating the rule of law and state presence, when strategically targeted against high-level criminal actors. However, if the goal of drug law enforcement is to substantially reduce or eradicate entrenched drug markets, we have little evidence it can or does succeed.

This report was produced as part of MASIF (Monitoring and Support Project for the Global Illicit Flows Programme) implemented by RUSI Europe