Posted on 11 Nov 2026
Against the backdrop of longstanding resistance to addressing the shortcomings of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) in October produced two positive outcomes that have the potential to reinvigorate the instrument and enhance its impact.
In a significant milestone for the international community’s efforts to combat organized crime, a clear majority of member states voted in favour of establishing a negotiation process for a new protocol dedicated to crimes that affect the environment. Also unexpectedly, but crucially for the success of this new protocol and for the convention as a whole, a process to reform the review mechanism was passed by consensus, in a resolution tabled by the US.
For many years, there have been serious questions raised about the effectiveness of the UNTOC review mechanism, and there has been growing recognition among civil society and academia that the implementation and impact of the treaty must be addressed. However, until recently, it was the elephant in the room: member states and the UN Secretariat were unwilling to tackle these shortcomings head on.
During the COP, the issue was candidly discussed at several side events, including one organized by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), where ambassadors from the EU and Mexico outlined their perspectives and recommendations for reform, alongside a representative from Canada who discussed how progress could move faster and further than the official review process currently permits.
Just a few weeks before COP13, the same community of diplomats and officials, gathered in Abu Dhabi for the 15th UN Crime Congress, had adopted an outcome declaration that made no mention of the UNTOC’s failures. And in her opening statement to COP13, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Executive Director, Monica Juma, did not identify UNTOC reform as a top priority for the week. While she welcomed discussions on ‘strengthening’ the convention’s review mechanism, she also referenced member states’ ‘continued belief’ in its ‘value and relevance’.
It was thus not through the initiative of the UNODC that the reform process was set in motion. The impetus came directly from the US, and was brought to a head by a long-standing but rarely acknowledged recognition of the failures of the review mechanism and the need for change.
By the end of the week, the resolution to launch a potentially wide-ranging overhaul of the review mechanism and the broader infrastructure of the COP, including the involvement of civil society, had been adopted.
The start of change
In the lead-up to the COP, the Secretariat began to acknowledge the UNTOC’s challenges, albeit late in the day. It noted that only a handful of reviews had been completed since the launch of the mechanism in 2020, resulting in a lack of actionable outputs for technical assistance. It also recognized that there was little evidence that the convention was facilitating meaningful international cooperation.
The new resolution, however, takes these developments further. It opens with the striking acknowledgement that organized crime has become ‘more pervasive’ since the UNTOC came into force, and that there is an ‘urgent need’ to implement the convention more effectively. It also expresses concern about the lack of progress in the review mechanism and calls for stronger international cooperation. While these points may seem obvious to those who have followed the process for many years, states parties’ pronouncements on the UNTOC have never before reflected this level of concern or urgency.
The resolution addresses a number of issues that have largely been absent from the debate. It emphasizes the importance of diverse perspectives to ensure the effective functioning of the review mechanism, including the involvement of law enforcement, the judiciary and ‘other relevant experts’. This is a clear recognition of the value of external expertise and the contribution of civil society, which has largely been excluded from the formal review process.
The document encourages states to take a more targeted and action-oriented approach when proposing resolutions at the COP and establishes an agenda item for reviewing the implementation of resolutions from the previous sessions. It also calls for the COP to be used as a platform for engagement between parties and authorities.
The most consequential element of the resolution, however, is its proposal to launch a formal process to reform the review mechanism. To support this effort, the UNTOC Working Group on Technical Assistance will be renamed the Implementation Review and Technical Assistance Working Group. It will convene twice in 2027 to examine the rules and procedures of the review mechanism, and put forward recommendations at a special COP session before the end of the year.
Importantly, the review mandate includes an evaluation of the ‘structure and timing’ of the constructive dialogues – the only part of the UNTOC mechanism to provide detailed engagement with civil society. This creates a rare opportunity to bring the process closer to the communities and societies it was designed to serve.
Funding also features prominently. All UNTOC COP working groups will now meet every two years instead of annually, easing some of the resource pressure for both member states and the Secretariat. The resolution also calls for a review of the budget, including the potential adoption of a mixed funding model that draws partly on the UN’s regular budget.
Although it is promising, the final resolution reflects a series of compromises. Earlier drafts set out more ambitious plans for civil society participation and financial matters. One proposal would have restructured the constructive dialogues to ensure that civil society was consulted before the working group meetings. Instead, the final text limits itself to a review of their structure and timing. The language on funding was also scaled back, with stronger references to increasing support from the UN regular budget being deemed unacceptable by countries committed to a policy of restraint.
From recognition to reform
This resolution has ushered in an opportunity for realistic reflection, but it is just the beginning. The process that will take place throughout 2027 will require hard thinking, creative engagement and leadership from key member states and the Secretariat. Some countries may be reticent about the greater scrutiny that a more effective review mechanism would bring. A coalition of states, the UNODC and civil society will thus be needed to maintain momentum for reform.
While states have taken a significant step by recognizing the problems within the current system, the solutions will require engagement on politically sensitive issues, and some big changes. The review mechanism is hindered not only by resource constraints, but also by limited political will and weaknesses in its design. Three main challenges will need to be addressed.
First, the review process remains highly bureaucratic and time-consuming, with no direct incentives or sanctions to encourage timely completion and insufficient support to keep participating states moving at the same pace. Second, the constructive dialogues, the mechanism’s main channel for engagement with civil society, take place without a meaningful evidence base from the review process itself, and only once the working group meetings have taken place.
Finally, the guiding principles and characteristics of the review mechanism depart from the vision of the convention. Rather than encouraging the exchange of data, analysis and expertise across sectors, they prioritize state control of the process and shut out the uncomfortable, but often necessary, evidence that may come from civil society.
Member states have collectively put the issue on the table and started a process for change. Leadership from the highest levels of the UNODC and the UN, which has largely been absent as the convention has drifted and its review mechanism has failed, will be essential to galvanize action. States willing to lead on implementation must do so, while strengthening support for civil society efforts to generate the data needed to inform any review. The GI-TOC will draw on its networks and partners to produce detailed analysis and recommendations to support this process.
