Since the victory of ‘people power’ in 2018, when Armenians peacefully ousted the government of Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia has remained resolute in deepening democracy and sustaining reform. Focusing on democratization and anti-corruption, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has accomplished a great deal. In a sharp break with Armenia’s past, it has overcome the legacy of decades of authoritarian rule and flawed elections, has implemented a new framework to reduce state corruption and moved to tackle organized crime.   

In terms of leadership and governance, the Armenian government has significantly restored public trust in the state and its institutions. As the reform programme continued since 2018, efforts have been made to strengthen the rule of law, apply a legal framework to pursue and prosecute corruption cases, and reform the country’s judiciary.  

This progress is reflected in the country’s resilience levels, as measured by the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index. The Index resilience indicator that measures political leadership and governance was 7.0 for Armenia, a notable increase of 1 point since 2021, when the previous edition of the Index was published. Such progress represents a significant improvement in state capacity and public trust in institutions, even amid political crisis and conflict. 

But the picture is uneven. Armenia has also experienced serious setbacks and obstacles to its reform drive. In particular, the implementation of the country’s anti-corruption campaign was at times dangerously arbitrary, marred by lack of transparency and a perception of realpolitik. In cases involving members of the former political elite, there was a degree of vendetta politics, with anti-corruption measures seen as instruments of political retribution rather than as part of a sound legal framework. 

Nevertheless, the reign of Armenia’s oligarchs has largely come to an end. With the change of government in 2018, the authoritarian old guard lost their state patronage and protection. Their ousting contributed significantly to the decline in procurement fraud, money laundering and related financial crimes. This has strengthened the country’s broader efforts to combat organized crime and paved the way for doing business in a more open and competitive economy without state interference.  

For a country that lost a war in 2020 following Azerbaijan’s attack on the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has exceeded expectations. Bolstered by a fresh victory in early elections in 2021, the Armenian government moved forward with much greater confidence on defence reform. This has been particularly important in rooting out corruption within the armed forces, most notably in terms of procurement fraud.    

Subsequent security sector reforms also sought to force the modernization of an institution that was too close to Russia and seen as incapable of dealing with emerging threats. This reform strategy sought to distance the state from Russian influence and develop new capabilities to combat emerging challenges, such as cybercrime, drug trafficking and human smuggling, among others.  

Progress – but more to be done  

However, despite its reform programmes, Armenia faces several serious challenges. First, a pattern of arbitrary enforcement and lack of accountability has emerged as an obstacle that threatens the course of law enforcement reforms and the implementation of the anti-corruption campaign. This has been evident in trends of police violence and excessive use of force. This, in turn, has led to a serious decline in public trust in the police and even prompted civil society organizations to end their cooperation with the state in formulating reform measures. Statistically, the police reforms have also failed to meet expectations, as the overall crime rate has consistently increased, with officially registered crimes doubling between 2017 and 2023.  

A second challenge was the sudden and unexpected increase in the trafficking and sale of narcotics in Armenia, particularly heroin, which the Organized Crime Index shows to be the most prevalent illicit drug market in the country, with a score of 4.50. With a near doubling in drug trafficking cases in 2023, the Armenian police were ill-equipped to deal with this issue, which was attributed to the influx of thousands of Russian citizens who fled to Armenia after the invasion of Ukraine. Although this is now seen as a one-off crisis, the situation revealed deficiencies in Armenia’s capacity to counter drug-related crimes. 

A third issue is the recent surge of gun-related crime. Armed robberies, shootouts and other firearm-related crimes increased sharply in 2023 and continued to rise through the first half of 2024. 

Against this backdrop, Armenia remains resolute and committed to democratization and reform. The country holds a strategic advantage in the longer term, which stems from the rare commodity of legitimacy, based on its democratic credentials and free and fair elections, as well as a hard-won degree of greater stability. But these gains, however impressive, are in danger of being undermined or even reversed. This risk of backsliding stems from inadequate law enforcement reform, insufficient measures to address rising crime and incomplete efforts to sustain the country’s anti-corruption campaign.  

As the first step in addressing these shortcomings is to recognize the problem, there is still an opportunity to maintain the momentum of reform in Armenia, underpinned by political will and reinforced by public support. Only in this way can the gains made in Armenia’s fight against crime and corruption be sustained and deepened.  

Among the measures the Armenian government would do well to consider, firstly, civil society should be given greater powers to participate in and monitor the anti-corruption process. Independent reporting by civil society would promote greater transparency, especially as the legitimacy of the Armenian government depends on highlighting the contrast with past corrupt practices.  

Simultaneously, it should strengthen standards of ethics and integrity, with coherent and enforceable measures to establish a code of conduct for government officials, monitor conflicts of interest, and use financial disclosure and asset declarations.  

It should seek to prevent undue and improper influence by introducing stricter disclosure and reporting requirements for contacts with outside lobbyists, business groups and other third parties in the public policy process and in relation to government legislative and regulatory activities. 

The state procurement process could be streamlined by introducing new measures for open bidding for contracts and abolishing the closed public procurement procedures related to ‘ceremonial expenses’ of senior Armenian officials. 

Finally, the government needs to restore public confidence in law enforcement through new requirements for disclosure and publication of information, rulings and decisions on complaints received, actions taken and sanctions imposed against police officers, while respecting the anonymity of those concerned. This can best be supported by a civilian advisory body (composed of civil society and human rights monitors, in coordination with the Armenian ombudsman’s office) to contribute to the monitoring of relevant information concerning the police, with the aim of enhancing transparency and public confidence in the police. 

This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective.