Having detected a steady increase in state-directed instrumentalization of organized crime and criminal actors abroad to achieve foreign and domestic policy priorities, the GI-TOC has introduced the concept of geocriminality. This special issue will explore the concept and its wide-ranging ramifications for crime and crime prevention. While state instrumentalization of crime in general is as old as statehood itself, the forces of globalization and adversarial geopolitical conditions have led to an evolution in its form. Just as rapid progress in fields of communication, travel and technology have underpinned development in business, so too has it nurtured capacity in state-crime relationships. This increased capacity for cooperation with criminal elements is utilized by states beyond their own borders to pursue a range of objectives, for example, resource acquisition, intimidation of opponents, and cultivation of elites. Moving beyond more isolated state use of crime associated with clandestine diplomacy, some examples from the state-crime nexus now evidence far greater scale, entrenchment and integration. This call for papers therefore seeks to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon of geocriminality – clarifying its definition, elaborating case studies, documenting its impact, and identifying potential responses and challenges. 

Though any state is capable of geocriminality, we tend to witness it in conditions where there is low constraint on regime activity domestically alongside elevated constraint on state activity internationally. 

What does this mean? First, “low constraint on regime activity domestically” refers to conditions where those in power are able to instrumentalize criminal elements abroad with less risk of penalty for such actions. Penalties might involve, for example, censure by an effective judiciary or criticism from an independent media. The absence of such constraints on power makes the type of deeper, longer-term state-crime geocriminal relationship more likely. Second, “elevated constraint on state activity internationally” refers to conditions that make more conventional modes of state activity abroad less feasible. This includes material constraints, for example the effect of sanctions, international law, and a lack of conventional means. But it also refers to perceived constraints, for example situations where the state employs criminal actors to maintain distance between the activity and the state itself. 

With greater scope for the regime to use criminals towards state objectives in an environment of mounting constraints on a state’s conventional international activity, that state’s calculus tilts towards geocriminality. 

The concept was first deployed in a GI-TOC report published in May 2024, and the article “Of kingdoms and crooks: The rise of geocriminality” offers more detail about the phenomenon. Recent GI-TOC research discusses activity that could also be considered geocriminality, such as the Kremlin’s integration of organized crime into statecraft and Iranian state reliance on criminal networks to smuggle oil and launder money. While the longer-term state-crime entrenchment associated with geocriminality may be more widespread in countries that lack well-established political, journalistic and judicial scrutiny of government, the phenomenon is not necessarily limited to these countries. With no sign of conditions conducive to geocriminality dissipating, it promises to be an increasingly prominent feature of the geopolitical landscape. 

Contributors are invited to submit pieces on geocriminality, crime-linked clandestine diplomacy, and wider research into the state-crime nexus (both contemporary and historical). Submissions may include (but are not limited to) further examples of apparent geocriminality, individual aspects of geocriminality (for example, the enabling dynamics), appropriate responses to geocriminality, the future of geocriminal collaboration, the (extent of the) centrality of the state in geocriminal networks, and wider activity from the state-crime nexus. 

In order to offer a broad empirical, qualitative approach, we welcome contributions from various disciplines, including (but not exclusively) sociology, economics, criminology, anthropology, history and international relations, as well as policy analyses from activists, NGO leaders, or practitioners. We particularly encourage submissions by women and contributors from countries and regions not frequently represented in academic journals. 

For more information, refer to the full Call for Papers. 

Planned date of publication: fall 2025. 

Deadline for submission of Letters of Intent (LOI), including abstracts (250 words maximum): 21st April 2025.