Author(s)

Flore Berger

Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

Mouhamadou Kane

Posted on 23 Jul 2025

On 1 July 2025, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the most powerful violent extremist organization in the Sahel, launched a series of coordinated attacks on seven towns along Mali’s borders with Senegal and Mauritania. Since 2022, JNIM has doubled the frequency of its operations in southern and western Mali, and this simultaneous action indicates a clear escalation of intent.

The Kayes region, the target of the July attacks, and the neighbouring Sikasso region, which is also experiencing growing insecurity, are key source areas for maritime smuggling to Spain’s Canary Islands. This route has seen unprecedented levels of migration in recent years, and as JNIM intensifies its activities, demand is expected to rise.

A growing proportion of those travelling on the Atlantic route are Malian nationals displaced by conflict and instability. These circumstances mean that their demand for smuggling services is increasingly inelastic: those seeking to travel on this route are less responsive to risk, price changes or deterrents, and thus more vulnerable to exploitation. In addition, security crackdowns are intensifying at departure points, particularly in Mauritania, resulting in higher levels of violence. As embarkation points on this route shift further south, to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, those undertaking what is estimated to be the world’s deadliest maritime smuggling journey will be forced to face longer and even riskier journeys.

When migration becomes a necessity

The surge in activity on the Atlantic route – where the number of crossings doubled in 2023 and stayed at these unprecedented levels in 2024 – has partly been driven by displacement from the Central Mediterranean route, due to heightened enforcement, conflict and human rights abuses in the Sahel and North Africa, and a spike in demand from Malian nationals.

The security situation in central and northern Mali continues to deteriorate, and at the end of 2024, 360 000 people were internally displaced. While most of those displaced stay in Mauritania, a growing number are opting for onward movement, including to the Canary Islands. Meanwhile, JNIM’s expanding operations in southern and western Mali, which have reached a new high with the July attacks in Kayes, are disrupting economic activity and driving displacement.

As a result of these levels of violence and insecurity, many Malians now view irregular migration as a necessity rather than an opportunity. In such cases, the ‘choice’ to migrate is made in the narrowest sense of the word. The dangers encountered en route or the risks associated with return become largely irrelevant when weighed against the threats migrants and refugees face at home. Indeed, many Malians who endure difficult journeys and are expelled from Mauritania decide to attempt the journey again.

The increasingly low elasticity of demand on the Atlantic route must be recognized and taken into account when formulating counter-smuggling responses. For instance, programmes aimed at raising awareness of the risks of the journey in order to deter movement, already considered variable in their effectiveness, are highly unlikely to succeed in this situation. This highly inelastic type of demand also makes migrants more vulnerable to exploitation, particularly when interventions focus on enforcement against smugglers, as outlined below.

Unintended consequences of crackdowns

In response to the shifting scale and nature of demand, the networks operating at longstanding departure nodes in Senegal and Mauritania have professionalized their services. Smugglers have improved their departure logistics and are now advertising the Atlantic route more aggressively.

In turn, the Mauritanian authorities ramped up enforcement in the first half of 2025, carrying out several large-scale expulsions of irregular migrants in the country, mainly involving Malians, Senegalese, Ivorians and Guineans. Over 30 000 migrants were intercepted between January and April, and efforts are ongoing, with further incidents reported in late June. Hundreds of people have been arrested, and 88 smuggling networks were dismantled. The actions drew regional condemnation for their severity and alleged abuses, particularly from Senegal and Mali.

Most likely as a result, departures from the Mauritanian coast decreased, and there was an overall 50% decline in movement on the Atlantic route from January to June 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. However, this lull is expected to be short-lived, while the enforcement operations appear to be having broader unintended consequences.

Crackdowns on irregular migration are known to increase the risk that smuggling operations will exploit the situation, especially professionalized and criminalized networks, which are typically more resilient than smaller, community-led organizations. Thus, enforcement plays a role in driving the overall criminalization of the market, and the resulting rise in associated violence. In Mauritania, there is growing evidence that Malian nationals are being targeted for exploitation, including being coerced into paying for smuggling services and kidnapped for ransom.

Market reactions to counter-smuggling enforcement action.

New hubs, greater risks

In parallel with these developments, embarkations have been tracked moving southwards. In Senegal, sources close to fishing communities report that migrants and refugees expelled from Mauritania are departing from Senegalese coastal points, and that a growing number of Malians are travelling directly to Senegal in order to make the journey to the Canaries. Interviews with community members in Mbour also revealed that, since the beginning of 2025, would-be-migrants have sometimes been paying deposits for their journeys before travelling, rather than at the point of departure – a method not previously observed on this route. This may indicate that demand currently exceeds supply on the Senegalese coast. Moreover, heightened law enforcement pressure in Senegal could contribute to displacement even further south.

In April 2025, new launch sites emerged in Guinea, with two departures from Kamsar, a port city on the northern coast, being intercepted. Analysis indicates that some of these movements are being coordinated by Senegalese networks, indicating a shift in activity southwards, rather than a proliferation of embarkation points. Departures have also been reported from Guinea-Bissau, and preliminary evidence suggests that the Bijagós Archipelago, off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, is used as an embarkation point. These trends, however, require further corroboration.

Implications

As insecurity spreads to previously stable regions of Mali and remains high in established conflict zones, the Atlantic route is increasingly becoming a critical pressure valve for populations facing violence and instability. It is likely that demand will remain high, leading to a smuggling industry that is increasingly sophisticated, and dominated by specialized criminal networks rather than informal community initiatives. In addition, desperation makes those on the move more vulnerable to exploitation, as has been observed in Mauritania. The growing criminalization of the smuggling industry, caused by crackdowns and robust demand, compounds the risk of abuse, and favours more professionalized networks.

Sustained expansion of the Atlantic route also has humanitarian implications due to the dangers at sea. The Atlantic route is the world’s most perilous migration journey, with over 10 000 deaths recorded in 2024 alone. As departure points shift further south, travel times will increase and risks will escalate.

Responses must consider the potential displacement impacts of enforcement action at key smuggling hubs and avoid merely driving movement towards more dangerous routings. States further south of traditional departure points – such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau – should also be prepared for the plausible increase in departures and their humanitarian consequences.