The recent surge in Somali maritime piracy has closely coincided with the broader deterioration in regional maritime security following the outbreak of war in Iran and the resulting crisis in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Since 24 March, Somali pirate groups have hijacked several dhows, as well as three commercial vessels – the Honour 25, Sward and Eureka – across a wide operational area spanning the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. Data from automatic identification systems shows that the three vessels are currently being held off the eastern Somali coast, between the towns of Gara’ad and Hafun.  

The seizure of the Eureka is particularly noteworthy. The tanker, managed by Royal Shipping Lines, a company based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was hijacked on 2 May while anchored 2–3 nautical miles off the Bi’r Ali oil terminal in Yemen’s Shabwa governorate. Unconfirmed reports from maritime sources suggest that Yemeni nationals based in Shabwa may have provided information about the vessel’s movements and intended destination, and that some of the nine-man boarding team may be Yemeni. If substantiated, this would be the first known case of direct Yemeni participation in modern Somali piracy, indicating a potential shift in the structure of pirate networks. 

The Eureka’s proximity to Yemen and its connection to the UAE have fuelled speculation of Houthi involvement, given the UAE’s long-standing role in the Yemen conflict. A Yemeni military intelligence report from June 2026, obtained by the GI-TOC, provided some support for these assertions. It assessed that a group allegedly involved in the hijacking of the Eureka – as well as a planned attack on a liquefied natural gas tanker near Balhaf port – had met with Houthi officials in Rada’a district in mid-June to coordinate the targeting of commercial vessels. While these claims could not be independently verified, any form of tactical cooperation, however limited, between Somali pirate groups and Yemeni actors – Houthi or otherwise – would be a significant development, given the increased importance of maintaining secure transit through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea corridor. 

It has also been suggested that the spike in pirate attacks may be linked to the redeployment of international naval assets further north in response to the Hormuz crisis. In early May, the commander of Operation Atalanta, the EU’s counter-piracy initiative in the region, warned that the crisis in Iran and the Gulf was ‘indirectly’ contributing to an increased risk of piracy in the Horn of Africa by exacerbating wider regional instability and diverting maritime security resources.  

But other factors are also at play. Counter-piracy officials have pointed to several more immediate factors contributing to the resurgence. One is the unusually calm sea conditions for this time of year, a result of the delayed onset of the south-west monsoon season in the Indian Ocean, which are conducive to pirate operations. 

Officials have also suggested that the hijacking of the illegal Chinese fishing vessel Liao Dong Yu 578 in January may have helped catalyze the current crisis. After the vessel’s release in early March, the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu issued a statement announcing that it had been ‘safely rescued’. However, counter-piracy officials noted that a ransom of between US$1.2 million and US$1.5 million had been paid. The same vessel was previously hijacked in 2024, when a reported US$2 million ransom secured its release. The Liao Dong Yu fleet, owned by Liaoning Daping Fishery Group, has a documented history of illegal fishing in Somali waters, as well as alleged labour and environmental abuses, and has historically operated under the protection of a senior Somali politician with close ties to Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni. 

The Hormuz crisis may also have direct implications for counter-piracy operations in one key respect: the stance of the Indian navy. The Indian navy played a central role in suppressing the resurgence of Somali piracy in 2023/24, which coincided with Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. During this period, Indian naval forces conducted a series of successful hostage rescue operations involving hijacked vessels, freeing the crews without any civilian fatalities. However, the Hormuz crisis appears to have forced India to deploy a significant proportion of its naval assets northwards to protect Indian-linked tanker traffic and secure critical energy supply routes. As over half of India’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, New Delhi has sent several warships to the Gulf region since March to escort commercial shipping and reinforce maritime security operations. 

A retired senior Indian naval officer observed that, although India still has the political will to combat piracy, the strategic mood has shifted since the surge in attacks in 2023/24. At that time, India largely saw itself as part of a coalition of like-minded states committed to freedom of navigation and maritime security. However, the officer stated that the perception of the US acting unilaterally in launching military operations against Iran has prompted a rethink on the extent to which India’s naval resources should be used to support broader regional security efforts. ‘For us, energy security is paramount,’ he said. ‘There is the feeling that if we deploy our resources, it should be for national interests and not for any fuzzy wider regional or international maritime security initiatives.’ 

Although shifting geopolitical considerations have not occasioned New Delhi’s complete withdrawal from counter-piracy operations – the Indian navy reported disrupting an attempted pirate attack as recently as 27 May – they may nevertheless create a more permissive operating environment for pirate groups along the Somali coast. In particular, the reduced likelihood of rapid military intervention means that hijacked vessels are more likely to be held for long enough to allow ransom negotiations to succeed. Consequently, the captivity and suffering of affected seafarers are likely to be prolonged. Indeed, ransom demands have reportedly been made for all three of the recently hijacked vessels, with the amount demanded for the Eureka reported to be a staggering US$10 million.  

The findings of the Global Organized Crime Index reveal that Somalia has (perhaps unsurprisingly) consistently ranked among the countries most affected by extortion and the activities of mafia-style groups. This reflects not only piracy in northern Somalia but also the extortion activities of the militant group al-Shabaab, which controls swathes of territory in the south of the country. Following a significant decrease in the country’s overall criminality score between 2019 and 2021, criminality has increased steadily, with the 2025 data indicating that organized crime in Somalia has reached its highest level ever recorded by the Index. 

Should ransom payments for hijacked vessels become commonplace again, piracy risks re-emerging as a highly profitable business model. This would give pirate groups the capital they need to expand their operations and mount increasingly ambitious attacks, perpetuating cycles of organized criminality in the region. 

This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective.