The Lobito Corridor, which links the copper and cobalt mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia to the port of Lobito in Angola, is one of the largest infrastructure investments under way in Central and Southern Africa. Backed by the European Union and the United States, it offers a direct rail route to the Atlantic for minerals essential to the energy transition, electronics and defence industries, whose supply chains are largely controlled by China. It also promises investment in agriculture, energy and industry that could benefit the populations of Angola, the DRC and Zambia.

However, the corridor runs through one of the mining regions most exposed to transnational organized crime, including smuggling, corruption and elite capture. Securing the corridor cannot be separated from the security and governance of the mines that feed it, or from respect for the rights of those who work in them. Organized crime already operates widely in these mines, and illegally mined critical minerals already enter legal supply chains. If nothing changes, the same networks that control extraction may also come to control how those minerals reach the market. This policy brief examines how the corridor could impact the region’s illicit mineral economy, mapping the risks from mine to port. Those risks include illegal extraction on industrial concessions, protected by members of the security forces and the political elite; a growing reliance on private security contractors with unclear accountability; organized hijacking and extortion on roads; misdeclaration of cargo at borders, and influence campaigns by state actors seeking to discredit the project.

These risks are growing as the context shifts. In Washington and Brussels, the language of the energy transition has given way to that of supply security: the corridor is now tied to bilateral minerals deals, while due diligence rules are being eased. Competition with the China-backed Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA) prioritizes speed over scrutiny. Unless integrity is built in while the DRC and Zambian sections are still being financed, the corridor risks becoming a faster, Western-backed route for minerals of compromised origin into the very supply chains that Europe and the United States seek to secure. If these risks are left unaddressed, producing countries, some already under heavy debt, would meanwhile lose the revenue they need, but also the opportunity to turn the corridor into a driver of development – processing more of their minerals locally, creating jobs and building a more solid tax base.