Author(s)

Zobel Behalal

Posted on 30 Jan 2025

On 27 January 2025, the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed rebel group operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), announced it had captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. Despite the latest ceasefire agreed to in July 2024, fighting between the DRC army and M23 has intensified since early January, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region. Since the beginning of this year, the UN has recorded 700 000 displaced people as a result of the conflict. 

But while the crisis has taken a turn for the worse, conflict in eastern DRC is by no means a recent phenomenon. For over 20 years, the national and international actors fuelling the violence have been driven by the same motives: the financial gains they reap from illicit economies. To create the conditions for peace, stakeholders must address the root causes that sustain the long-standing conflict – organized crime.  

A profit-driven agenda 

Since re-emerging in 2021, M23 has occupied large swathes of North Kivu province and, more recently, South Kivu, seizing economically strategic towns in the process. Wherever they settle, the rebel group’s fighters set up systems of parallel criminal governance and prey upon the economic system.  

For example, before M23 occupied Bunagana, a trading hub on the border with Uganda, trade flows between Uganda and the DRC generated an average of US$2 million a month (although most of the goods were undeclared), according to a DRC customs officer. Since M23’s takeover of the town in 2021, these flows have diminished considerably, but they still provide the rebels with sizeable financial resources, primarily through illicit taxation of goods. Although the Ugandan government has officially banned vehicles from crossing into the DRC, many violate the ban – with the complicity of some border officials – in order to supply fuel to Bunagana, among other towns.

M23’s economic agenda also dictated the May 2024 seizure of Rubaya, a strategic mining town near Goma that produces 15 per cent of the world’s coltan, a key component in the manufacture of electronic equipment. Since then, the armed group has enjoyed a lucrative income from controlling mineral production and trade. By capturing Rubaya, M23 was also able to reorganize its territorial control, facilitating the arrival of economic actors loyal to the group (such as collectors, brokers and traders) and building a road to assist in the transfer of minerals to neighbouring Rwanda, where they are laundered. This is achieved by disguising the minerals among Rwandan production and then declaring them as sourced in Rwanda.  

M23 now control strategic economic hubs in eastern DRC, including Bunagana, Rubaya and Goma.
M23 now control strategic economic hubs in eastern DRC, including Bunagana, Rubaya and Goma.

 

The crime–conflict regional ecosystem 

M23’s military victories highlight the DRC’s internal security weaknesses, but also indicate that the armed group is not alone in benefiting from an economic system dominated by transnational organized crime.  

There are widespread accusations that Rwanda supports M23, although the Rwandan government has repeatedly denied this. This support is partly linked to the government’s desire to defeat the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group present in the DRC and founded by former leaders of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, while the FDLR poses some threat to Rwanda’s security, this argument fails to justify the Rwandan government’s long-standing provision of troops and military equipment to the DRC.  

It is more likely that the Rwandan government’s involvement is motivated by financial considerations. The regime has made no secret of its ambition to turn Kigali into a regional hub for the processing and trading of natural resources. To achieve this, it aims to secure privileged access to Congolese mineral resources, establish a trade corridor between Kigali and the main towns in eastern DRC, and make the Rwandan border the primary point of entry and exit for Congolese commodities.   

In response to the rebels, the Congolese government has forged alliances with partners who themselves profit from organized crime. Increased cooperation between Burundi’s National Defence Force and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) has led to the protection of networks of Burundian nationals involved in the illegal trade in gold and other precious metals. The FARDC also works with FDLR militias that control the illegal trade in charcoal and timber. These criminal activities contribute heavily to the destruction of the environment, including Virunga National Park, one of the last remaining habitats of the critically endangered mountain gorilla.  

To combat M23, the FARDC also relies on a number of local armed groups, which they have equipped and funded. These militias have not only helped slow the M23’s advance but, more importantly, they have gained legitimacy among entire communities. Having established themselves as the new masters, they continue to profit from the exploitation and trafficking of natural resources. 

There is no shortage of international outlets for gold and other illegally traded minerals. International and regional networks specializing in money laundering and mining take advantage of the weak control systems around minerals that allow those involved in the conflict to extract revenue. At the same time, the complacency of the destination markets for minerals transiting through the DRC’s neighbouring countries, including Rwanda, provides the various actors involved in the conflict with the financial resources to continue their criminal activities.  

Rethinking peace 

The peace processes initiated over the last three years to resolve the M23 crisis were doomed to failure, as they ignored the conflict’s underlying economic motivations and the predominance of transnational organized crime networks. There is now an urgent need to adopt innovative measures that – while recognizing the sovereign inviolability of the DRC’s borders – address illicit economies and the financing of conflict actors. 

Given the role of criminal networks in prolonging the crisis, international mobilization is essential if law enforcement systems are to act in concert. Punitive measures must be imposed on powerful elites and entities –in the region, the Gulf, Asia and other areas – that directly or indirectly profit from the illegal economy in the DRC. This could include sanctions aimed at the political, security and economic players involved. So far, sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UN – driven by the search for compromise – have targeted actors with no real influence on the ground. Policymakers should also consider leveraging anti-money laundering measures against those involved to trigger a legal response.  

Another critical priority is to implement measures that would allow stakeholders, including key players in the conflict, to ultimately operate within a decriminalized economic framework. The economic potential of eastern DRC must be transformed into licit investment and employment opportunities. It is time to put the DRC at the centre of the international agenda, identify and quantify opportunities for disrupting criminal economies, and restore hope to the Congolese people.