Author(s)

Emadeddin Badi

Posted on 01 Dec 2025

The war in Sudan has transformed far more than its own frontlines. It has reshaped the security economies of its neighbours, activating new supply nodes and embedding weapons and combatants into cross-border markets that now function as self-reinforcing “collateral circuits.” 

As seized stockpiles from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) entered circulation – alongside new external transfers moving into Sudan – these circuits fused manpower mobilization, convoy protection, fuel, communications technology and arms distribution. In doing so, they rewired the conflict economies of Chad and Libya. 

As the report shows, Sudan’s descent into civil war accelerated the spread of weapons and spurred the mobilization of mercenaries. Far from being peripheral, mercenary leaders coordinated convoys, negotiated access, escorted shipments and kept arms flowing despite shifting frontlines. In effect, they built and managed the logistical networks that sustained the war, creating two interlinked circuits – of mercenaries and of weapons – that reinforced one another and gathered their own momentum. 

The analysis traces how pre-war networks in Libya and Chad were revived and repurposed once the Sudanese conflict erupted in April 2023. In southern Libya, units aligned with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), including formations in Sebha, Kufra, Murzuq and Qatrun, adapted to new demand by securing infrastructure, escorting flows and managing access to desert corridors. In northern Chad, rebel remnants and ex-combatants embedded in goldfields and border regions operated as brokers, escorts and intermediaries, grounding arms circulation in commercial and kinship-based arrangements. 

As fighting intensified, supply routes evolved. Initial RSF resupply through Kufra was disrupted by the loss of the Chevrolet base, forcing convoys onto harsher desert tracks and constraining high-volume deliveries. From mid-2023 onward, Amdjarass emerged as both a logistical and political pivot. Cargo flights disguised as humanitarian assistance, convoy marshalling and coordination with local stakeholders transformed the town into the backbone of RSF resupply into Darfur. Mercenary mobilization followed this realignment, with Chadian fighters and rebel splinters entering transactional relationships that linked eastern Chad to RSF positions. 

By 2024, mounting pressure from SAF-aligned factions along the eastern Chadian routes pushed operations back toward Libya. The refurbishment of Ma’aten al-Sarah – a previously disused airbase near the tri-border zone – turned it into the epicentre of a new corridor linking Chad to southeastern Libya. From this hub, weapons and vehicles were aggregated, stockpiled and pushed directly into Darfur, creating a revitalized supply route designed to bypass interdictions and sustain the flow of materiel to the RSF. 

The study also traces outbound proliferation. Weapons moved through Chad and Libya via diversion, resale and spillovers shaped by brokerage networks, local tensions, price signals and the involvement of mercenary and auxiliary forces. These flows deepened a regionalized economy of insecurity in which arms markets and armed labour sustain each other. 

The report’s forward-looking assessment highlights four principal risks: the durability of collateral circuits, the regionalization of instability, escalation from localized disputes and the politicization of logistical hubs. Recommendations include integrating mercenary dynamics into disarmament planning, draining surplus weapons, targeting brokerage networks and embedding arms management into any future Sudanese political settlement.