In the early hours of 25 April, Mali experienced arguably its most consequential security shock since 2012, when an offensive in the north sparked the 14 years of conflict that have since engulfed the country. In a series of coordinated attacks, several locations were struck simultaneously by the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the violent extremist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), including Kidal and Gao in the north, Sévaré and Mopti in the centre, the capital of Bamako, and the adjacent army stronghold of Kati in the south.

The attacks in Bamako and Kati were largely repelled, with the Malian armed forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps holding key installations, including the airport. But the state suffered important casualties, including the death of the defence minister. On 28 April, JNIM announced a blockade on Bamako, and has since continued to disrupt entry and exit routes into the capital, leaving hundreds of vehicles stranded.

In the north, the outcome was more decisive. The FLA and JNIM took Kidal on 25 April, and moved into other towns and military camps, including Tessalit and Tessit, in the following days. The takeover was carried out with limited fighting: FAMa and Africa Corps either negotiated surrender or left the towns and camps before the arrival of JNIM and the FLA. The group now claims to control 80% of the Kidal region.

These attacks should be read as part of JNIM’s efforts to put pressure on the government in Bamako, with the now explicit goal of bringing it down. The group increasingly appears to be positioning itself not only as an insurgent force but as a political actor seeking to shape the future state order. Within this rapidly changing security landscape, two key questions emerge: how will these developments affect the lucrative illicit economies in northern Mali and the financing of violent extremist groups? And what impact will they have on the future role of Africa Corps?

Northern Mali’s smuggling corridors: A return to the previous order?

Since the attacks, FAMa and Africa Corps have communicated extensively, presenting the image of an active response. They claim to have carried out several airstrikes in retaliation, killing hundreds of fighters, and continue to conduct patrols. And while they probably lack the resources to launch a counter-offensive and retake the military camps and towns in Kidal for now, they are making it clear that this is not the end of the story.

FAMa has stated that the army is reorganizing to reconquer lost ground, and that reinforcements are being sent to Anéfis, one of the force’s last remaining camps in the north. The landing of a Russian military aircraft in Bamako on 6 May, carrying materiel and personnel, suggests that Moscow is not stepping back either. However, if the FLA and JNIM retain their influence over the region, previously prominent illicit arrangements could re-emerge, benefiting both groups.

Before the August 2023 offensive by FAMa and the Wagner Group, Kidal had experienced limited violence and offered a stable environment for illicit economies. JNIM and the FLA predecessor groups (including the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP), a coalition of rebel and pro-government armed groups from northern Mali) maintained informal agreements and taxation systems over trafficking routes used to move migrants, fuel, foodstuffs, cannabis resin and cocaine. They also controlled or taxed artisanal gold-mining activities and used the mines as resource and trading hubs. Key roads and economic hubs in Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao were divided between groups in ways that served everyone’s economic interests, and together they formed a significant breadbasket.

The resurgence of conflict in the north in 2023 disrupted these arrangements, due to high levels of violence and insecurity along key corridors. Some major hotspots, such as former arms and drug hubs like Tabankort and Ber, saw business collapse.

The FLA’s return to Kidal means strengthening the Tuareg networks that have historically connected the region to northern Niger and Libya, and could enable a resurgence of previously active trafficking routes. This would likely provide northern Mali with a better connection to the growing movement of arms from the Sudanese conflict, feeding demand across the region.

If the FLA and JNIM stabilize their positions in the north, they will need to secure ongoing financing and resources – and for this, they are likely to once again rely on artisanal mining. The N’Tahaka mine, the largest in the region, and the many smaller sites across Kidal are likely to be prioritized. Control of this sector serves a triple function. Revenue is gained through the taxation of miners and traders and, as gold spot prices soar, this financing stream seems set to grow (with any shocks to the Mali–Dubai gold supply chains resulting from the Iran conflict likely to be temporary).

Governance of these sites through access regulation and protection also provides an opportunity to build legitimacy with communities, many of whom rely on artisanal mining for their livelihoods. Before 2023, JNIM and the CSP gained significant local buy-in through their control of N’Tahaka, framing it as security provision rather than predation.

Mining areas also function as resourcing hubs, where goods, people, arms and cash circulate. This makes them central to the logistical strategy of any armed group seeking to sustain a long-term campaign. Although JNIM has consistently secured a share of revenues from N’Tahaka, even during periods of dominance by pro-government forces, with the FLA as a close ally they may now be able to negotiate better terms.

Cocaine trafficking: The future of Bamako and Africa Corps

The reestablishment of FLA and JNIM influence over Kidal may gradually enable their affiliated networks to move larger quantities of cocaine, thus reversing the trend of small-volume trafficking observed since 2023, which arose due to instability and a lack of trust between the main armed groups.

However, the sheer profitability of the cocaine economy means protection is more closely linked to power in the capital than in borderland areas like Kidal. For example, while the August 2023 offensive in northern Mali caused some disruption to the trade, Niger’s 2023 coup had a far more lasting impact, as it disrupted the centralized protection infrastructure on which trafficking networks depend. It is this kind of political shock, rather than shifts in territorial control in the north, that poses the greater threat to the market.

Developments in Bamako will therefore prove more important in shaping the cocaine trade than power-sharing in the north. Crucial nodes in the protection ecosystem have been damaged with the death or injury of notable junta leaders, including within the national intelligence services, an institution central in the protection of this illicit economy for decades. Moreover, the volatility of the current situation makes new deals difficult and movement riskier in the short term. But whatever happens next in the capital, trafficking will not be permanently disrupted. The handful of major drug lords at the centre of Mali’s cocaine ecosystem have been operating since the early 2000s, surviving coups, political upheaval and the emergence of new armed groups. They are not ideologically driven and have no lasting allegiance.

What next for the regime?

Meanwhile, the future of the military regime remains unclear. JNIM continues to pursue its downfall, as emphasized in their 30 April communiqué, in which they called on political parties, the armed forces, religious authorities and traditional chiefs to unite to take down the ‘terrorist junta’ and join them in establishing a peaceful transition.

Recognizing the critical role of Africa Corps in the regime’s survival, JNIM and the FLA have sought to drive a wedge between the allies. Both have directly addressed Russia, urging it to stay out of the conflict. However, as Assimi Goïta, the leader of Mali’s military government, signalled by hosting a Russian delegation during his first public reappearance after a conspicuous four-day absence, there are no indications that Russia is planning to leave the country. Instead, Africa Corps has stated that it is fighting alongside FAMa, and that Russia’s commitment to Mali remains unchanged.

As the dust settles on April’s attacks, the future of powerholders in Bamako and elsewhere remains uncertain. While JNIM continues to exert significant pressure on key trading routes, illicit economies in the north are likely to gradually revert to established patterns. Ultimately, however, the fate of the capital will determine which actors shape Mali’s cocaine trafficking landscape.