Recent sessions of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) have displayed, in different ways, how the multilateral approach to drugs is fracturing and straining. With a lack of consensus now the norm, the CND has also become the primary outlet for geopolitical tensions on drugs and crime issues at the UN, in comparison to other bodies like the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ).

The mood in the Vienna conference rooms and corridors in the run-up to and during this year’s CND, was one of realism, and hopes for tangible progress in tackling the growing challenges posed by synthetic drugs and pushing forward system-wide reform were low. As expected, the week was marked by geopolitical division, with no resolutions achieving consensus, and growing uncertainty around the future of international drug policy. Furthermore, these visible disagreements overshadowed the more serious threat posed by the UN’s current funding crisis and its implications for the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including on its ability to implement the mandates it is given.

Despite the lack of consensus, there was a sense of mild relief among delegates. Resolutions were adopted by clear majorities, demonstrating ongoing commitment by shifting coalitions of member states to work across borders to address issues under the CND’s mandates, including synthetic drugs, and in incorporating both health and enforcement responses. With different prominent member states both supporting and opposing different resolutions, the move away from consensus does not mean that progress within the CND framework is not possible; rather, it signifies that groups of countries are willing to coalesce and make progress around shared issues, and are searching for new models of cooperation, including at the regional level, and with a diversity of different partners.

Ongoing disagreement – even on the fundamentals

All five resolutions tabled at this year’s CND were adopted by vote, as was the case at last year’s session. For a body that has traditionally adopted resolutions by unanimous agreement – known as the Vienna spirit – this is an indication of the dramatic shift in geopolitical dynamics in recent years. National interests are increasingly being prioritized, while the traditional focus on multilateral instruments appears to be diminishing.

Addressing growing illicit synthetic drug markets was again a major topic of discussion. Three resolutions were dedicated to the issue, in recognition of the fact that these substances are challenging the established drug policy landscape. Despite the apparent common purpose displayed in addressing the threat, the negotiations exposed the extent to which Member States are diverging in their positions on drug policy and even their attitudes towards core UN concepts.

References in resolutions to the Sustainable Development Goals and UN agencies like the World Health Organization are also no longer universally accepted. Their inclusion triggered objections, particularly from the US, leading to votes on several resolutions, including those concerning alternative development, public health responses, and early warning mechanisms for new synthetic drugs and psychoactive substances. The US ultimately voted against these three resolutions, with the support of Argentina, while most states voted in favour and only a few abstained.

Most striking was the US’s opposition to the inclusion of harm reduction language in the public health responses resolution tabled by Norway, with the US (under the previous administration) having previously supported this language in its own resolution, which was adopted by vote in 2024.

Among the synthetic drug resolutions, two other voting dynamics stood out. One major source country, India, voted alone against a resolution tabled by Bolivia and Mexico on preventing the diversion of equipment and materials used in illicit drug production. India argued that the text exceeded the mandate of the CND and the three international drug control conventions, and failed to address the issue of affordability of controlled medicines for medical and scientific purposes. Similarly, another major source country, China, which sparred with the US in their plenary statements throughout the week, was the only country to oppose the adoption of a resolution on enhancing supply chain integrity, presented by the US and Bolivia. China raised similar objections regarding scope, and argued that the resolution would not protect the legitimate trade in these substances.

Despite the clear changes in US policy, Washington’s continued engagement – including co-sponsoring a resolution with Bolivia – suggests an ongoing, but very differently framed, programme of international action to address drugs, including through the multilateral mechanism of the CND.

New hope for reform?

A notable area of broad agreement was the resolution on alternative development. Traditionally led by Thailand, Peru and Germany, a long-standing example of an issue-focused but diverse coalition of countries, the resolution was this year tabled by these three countries together with Bolivia, Brazil and Cyprus (on behalf of the European Union).

The text promoted, through an appendix to complement the 2013 UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development, support for licit livelihoods in communities where drug crop cultivation and trafficking is prevalent, and passed with wide support. Only the US and Argentina voted against it, deeming it outside of the CND’s core mandate. Burkina Faso and Qatar abstained. While there remains some disagreement about the future direction of alternative development, its continued position on the annual CND agenda provides a framework for continued focus and programmatic support into the future.

Also on the agenda was the recently established high-level expert panel, which was set up to examine the mechanics and implementation of the UN drug treaty system. The panel was created last year, following a resolution tabled by Colombia, but its membership and co-chair were only confirmed at this year’s CND, after an earlier attempt to reach a consensus failed. For the reform-minded – including Colombia, whose president travelled to Vienna to address the CND in person – the panel represents a long-awaited opportunity to open up the debate on drug control and seek a root and branch review of the current global approach, linking it to ongoing debates around UN system-wide coherence, development and human rights.

But the final composition of the panel has pushed it in a more conservative direction. Singapore’s candidate was elected unopposed as co-chair, after the US and Morocco withdrew theirs, joining the Canadian co-chair appointed by the Secretary-General. It now looks unlikely that the panel’s leadership will produce the major reformist outcomes that Colombia and others had hoped for. Instead, a hard-fought debate between conservative and reform-minded members seems a more probable outcome.

Entering unchartered waters

The UNODC’s incoming executive director, Monica Kathina Juma of Kenya, is expected to take office in the coming months. She will inherit an institution under serious pressure from all sides. Chief among these is the financial crisis confronting the UN system, and the structural reforms that are need to address it, in a context of uncertain and shifting global politics.

Across several events during the CND, UNODC representatives outlined a wide range of future programming efforts, including early warning systems for synthetic drugs, precursor monitoring, technical assistance and laboratory support, and regional training and capacity-building initiatives. But the question remains as to whether the organization’s current and projected budget and capacity can credibly sustain such an ambitious list of commitments. In the past, consensus on a way forward in resolutions attracted funding by demonstrating broad buy-in. The absence of the Vienna spirit further weakens the link between adopted resolutions and the ability of UNODC to attract funds to implement the outcomes.

The funding crisis therefore exacerbates the political challenges for the UNODC and, by extension, for the multilateral architecture through which it has long been assumed that the international community’s collective response to illicit drugs must be organized and delivered.

Over the years, many from civil society, with tacit support from some Latin American states, have called for the UNODC’s central role in international drug policy to be dismantled, and for greater focus on health, human rights and harm reduction approaches instead of expanded law enforcement initiatives. The will of member states, by consensus, has long upheld a ‘balanced approach’ incorporating various elements of the drug policy spectrum. And states have also stuck fast to the principle of the central role of the CND and the UNODC to lead the multilateral response to the world’s drug-related challenges, including the growing toxicity crisis in synthetic drug markets.

That assumption is now starting to fall away, but not for the reasons that some had hoped, Rather, it is because the system set up to implement its mandates seems unable to deliver on what is expected of it. A new era beckons, which will require innovative coalitions of states, international organizations including the UNODC, civil society and other stakeholders to achieve impact in this new multilateral and drug policy world.