On 18 October 2026, four Salvadoran soldiers serving with the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) disappeared in gang-controlled territory in metropolitan Port-au-Prince while reportedly returning from an errand. At the time of writing, their fate remains unknown. The episode captures the predicament at the heart of this paper. More than a year after the UN Security Council authorized the force to neutralize Haiti’s gangs, criminal groups still control most of the territory in which that force operates, shaping and controlling daily life for a large share of the population. One in 10 Haitians is still internally displaced, and more than half the population face acute food insecurity. Elections, first planned for August 2026 and then for 13 December, have been pushed back to 18 July 2027 for the first round, with a run-off scheduled for 4 October 2027.

In this context, the GSF has become more than a security operation. While it is expected to push back the gangs, restore the presence of the state, make elections possible and open the way to social recovery, the force that exists today cannot yet carry that weight. Its mandate is narrow: to neutralize, isolate and deter gangs. Its strength is still partial, with just over 2 000 personnel deployed against an authorized complement of 5 500, and full operational capacity is not expected before December 2026 at the earliest.

The GSF architecture has no precedent. It is authorized by the UN, supported by a UN office (the UN Support Office in Haiti, UNSOH) and staffed in part by former UN personnel, yet it is not led by the UN. Strategic direction rests with a Standing Group of Partners, funding is spread across several mechanisms and the force’s legal status has had to be negotiated piece by piece. Building such a force from scratch takes time, but every month of delay gives criminal groups another month to observe it, test it and adapt. That adaptation is already under way while the force’s own operations generate responses it cannot always contain. In Gros Morne, gang members massacred around a dozen civilians only hours after a GSF operation killed three of their members.

The gap between what the GSF is expected to deliver and what it can deliver is therefore more than a problem of perception. It places the force under a dilemma: if it holds to its plan, it risks appearing absent when communities come under attack, as the calls for its deployment to Kenscoff in August made clear. If it answers every crisis, it disperses its limited capacity, drifts into areas it was not designed to hold, and delays the build-up on which its impact depends. Its decision to establish a base near Gros Morne after the massacre shows how quickly that second path can open.

Criminal groups have every incentive to exploit this, using violence against civilians as a lever to push the force towards static protection and to turn public frustration against it. The experience of the GSF’s predecessor, the Multinational Security Support Mission, shows that the gap will not close on its own. The GSF received a stronger mandate and greater capabilities precisely because its predecessor fell short, yet the promise of a more robust force has only raised expectations. For the GSF, managing expectations has become a condition of operational success. None of this is intended as an argument against the GSF. Parts of Haiti have deteriorated to such an extent that the country must be pulled back from the brink before durable change becomes possible, and no other instrument is currently available to do so. But a force designed to restore security cannot, on its own, sustain it. Its legacy will depend on what follows it: a national police force able to hold cleared ground, a justice and detention system able to process those arrested, a credible pathway for those who leave the gangs and funding that outlasts the current wave of international attention.

On each of these fronts, preparations lag well behind the force itself. This policy brief maps the institutional landscape in which the GSF operates and examines the four challenges that will shape its trajectory: how to coordinate a crowded, hybrid operational architecture; the logistics of building a multinational force without, but in parallel to, UN machinery; the gap between its mandate and the expectations placed upon it; and the tension between restoring security and maintaining it. It concludes with lessons for future operations of this kind, which, in a constrained multilateral system, are likely to become the default response to crises such as Haiti’s.