Private military companies (PMCs) and mercenary groups have become increasingly visible in conflicts worldwide, raising urgent concerns for human rights and international security. This report documents how weapons and military equipment intended for Mali’s armed forces were rerouted to the Wagner Group between 2021 and 2025, a practice that undermines global arms control regimes and enabled serious human rights abuses.

The UN and the African Union have repeatedly warned about the growing use of mercenaries and PMCs in conflict situations. Key concerns include their involvement in transnational organized crime, human rights violations, and the re-routing of weapons originally intended for a state’s military to mercenary groups. This diversion undermines both international and domestic arms control regimes, which are designed to prevent arms from being used to commit war crimes or fuel instability.

Since the military junta came to power in 2021, Mali’s security and political landscape has shifted dramatically. The junta invited the Wagner Group into the country, severed ties with former security partners, oversaw the withdrawal of French and UN forces, and eventually left Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this new environment, Wagner emerged as the junta’s ally, playing a central role in combat operations.

Wagner’s presence in Mali was characterized by grave human rights abuses and war crimes, including massacres, torture, rape, and looting. Violence against civilians escalated sharply: civilian casualties per incident doubled between 2021 and 2024.

The Wagner Group did not arrive in Mali with a full arsenal. Instead, it sourced weapons locally through seizures on the battlefield and by taking stock from the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMa). From 2023, joint Wagner/FAMa operations declined, and Wagner increasingly operated independently while using FAMa-owned equipment. Evidence presented in this report shows that FAMa’s armoured vehicles, technicals (vehicle-mounted machine guns), and possibly attack drones were rerouted to Wagner. These instances likely breached commitments under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), to which Mali and several exporting countries are parties.

In June 2025, Wagner announced its withdrawal from Mali, replaced by the Africa Corps —an entity controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence that continues to employ many Wagner personnel. Although rebranded, Wagner’s operational model in Mali endures, raising concerns that the rerouting of arms to PMCs may persist.

The study also examines the broader implications of these practices for international arms control. End-user certificates –a cornerstone of the ATT– were undermined when equipment transferred to Mali’s armed forces was used by Wagner. Exporting states, manufacturers, and international organizations now face new challenges in preventing the diversion of arms to PMCs.

This report highlights how Wagner’s operations in Mali represent not only a local security crisis but also a test for global arms control frameworks. Strengthening governance against the diversion of weapons to PMCs is essential for protecting civilian lives and upholding international law.