Critical raw materials (CRMs) are indispensable to the energy transition, as well as to the digital and defence sectors. As a result, competition for access to these resources has intensified, enhancing the strategic importance of regions with significant mineral wealth. This is particularly true in Central Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the world’s leading producer of cobalt and coltan, Gabon is the second-largest producer of manganese, Chad produces antimony and Cameroon cassiterite, while the Central African Republic (CAR) possesses substantial untapped mineral potential. Even so, the full extent of these countries’ mineral endowments remains underexplored, meaning that their significance will probably continue to grow.

Global powers, seeking to secure their strategic mineral supply chains, are increasingly re-engaging in Central Africa. China, the US, the EU, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and others are competing for the same limited resources, offering a range of political, economic and infrastructure initiatives in exchange. In this context, Central African nations endowed with CRMs have an opportunity to capitalize on their resources, increase their influence and redefine the terms of their engagement with external partners to drive employment, public revenue and economic development. More broadly, as the global order is being reshaped by the race for critical minerals, this moment offers an opportunity to reconsider Central Africa’s place in international affairs, not as a mere supplier of raw materials but as a region able to turn its resource wealth into diplomatic leverage and a stronger voice in shaping the rules that govern these strategic value chains.

At the same time, however, the expansion of the CRM market and the substantial revenues it generates may create new opportunities for criminal interference. Structural vulnerabilities within the sector raise concerns that illicit practices long associated with gold and diamonds, including conflict financing, trafficking and corruption, will permeate further into CRM supply chains. These vulnerabilities include weak oversight, limited state presence in mining areas and barriers to the formalization of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). Moreover, the increasing prioritization of supply security may come at the expense of transparency and traceability requirements, creating a more permissive environment for illegal activities.

Criminal interference in CRM supply chains is already a reality. In some areas – notably eastern DRC, where the coltan trade has long been controlled by armed and criminal groups – the extraction and trade of many critical minerals is already captured by illicit networks. The concern now is one of scale. The rapid expansion of the CRM market and the growing appetite of foreign actors competing for access to these resources are likely to intensify and extend these dynamics.

Particular concerns include the growing appetite for rents and political advantage among ruling elites, the instrumentalization of organized crime for geopolitical ends, and the capture and exploitation of mining sites and trade routes by organized criminal networks. In the CAR and Cameroon’s CRM sectors, the presence of actors previously associated with organized criminal practices in other sectors has already been observed, while in Chad and the DRC, documented cases of organized crime practices associated with mineral extraction and trade are already present.

The relationship between organized crime and the boom in the CRM sector has only recently begun to attract expert and policy attention and remains underexplored. Studies have either approached the issue from a global perspective or focused on specific geographical settings and manifestations, such as the involvement of armed groups. This report is the first attempt to examine the nexus between organized crime and CRMs across Central Africa. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the structural vulnerabilities that facilitate criminal involvement in the region’s CRM sector, while documenting a range of emerging criminal dynamics. It also sheds new light on the elite capture of Chad’s growing antimony industry and on Russian geocriminal activities targeting the Western-backed Lobito Corridor.