Illicit gold and associated financial flows are a growing concern across Latin America and the Caribbean. These two reports examine how criminal, political and economic dynamics shape the gold sectors in Guyana and Suriname, tracing illicit supply chains from mining areas and regional smuggling routes to international trading and refining hubs.

Guyana

Recognizing the threat, this report examines the criminal, economic and political dynamics surrounding Guyana’s gold sector. It first examines the relationship between gold, criminality and politics, considering the broader political and geopolitical context of Guyana’s gold sector. It then explores the relevant gold supply chains, traces the regional networks through which gold from Guyana moves, and analyzes financial flows. Finally, it examines the export destinations of Guyanese gold. The report concludes with recommendations for the major actors involved in Guyana’s gold sector.

Guyana’s gold sector is embedded in a political system historically characterized by weak oversight, systemic impunity and organized criminal exploitation. Illicit gold flows remain largely unaddressed, and at times are facilitated by state actors and institutions, contributing to regional and transnational organized crime while eroding Guyana’s governance and fiscal revenues. These issues are not unique to Guyana; systemic vulnerabilities in gold supply chains globally enable illicit gold trading writ large to continue, with implications for global gold markets.

Despite record world gold prices and reports of more miners entering the sector, Guyana’s declared gold exports fell by 32 per cent between 2019 and 2024, a decline attributed primarily to systematic under-declaration and organized smuggling. Between 2018 and 2024, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reported importing 12.6 tonnes more Guyanese gold than Guyana declared in exports, suggesting parallel unofficial flows. Gold is also being smuggled to Brazil and, in some cases, onwards to Venezuela, reversing the historical direction of regional flows. Boa Vista, in Brazil, has become a critical logistics hub, where local officials and Brazilian criminal groups purchase and process gold for Venezuelan military buyers. Tether, a stable coin, is being used to settle some payments for smuggled Guyanese gold, entirely bypassing the formal banking system.

Suriname

Suriname is one country where these dynamics converge. The Surinamese National Risk Assessment classifies gold as a high money-laundering threat, one of six predicate offences rated as such. In December 2025, Brazil, French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname conducted Operation Guyana Shield, supported by INTERPOL, during which they apprehended 198 people connected to illegal gold mining in the region, with seizures of mercury in Suriname and along its borders, including the Maroni River.

Suriname’s gold sector, which has represented 70–80 per cent of the country’s total export revenues in recent years, has been defined by concentrated control, political protection and the fusion of licit and illicit power. Convergence heightens these risks. A handful of licensed operators dominate the export of gold produced by artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM). These networks have reportedly been sustained by the gatekeeping power of figures such as former president Dési Bouterse (deceased) and former vice president Ronnie Brunswijk, both of whom were convicted in absentia of cocaine smuggling, although both denied the charges. In turn, a small elite uses control over gold flows to accumulate wealth, consolidate political influence and shield criminal networks from accountability, with consequences for national security and governance.

Gold flows in and out of Suriname have changed in recent years. Between 2021 and 2024, more than 90 per cent of gold from Suriname was exported to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Switzerland, with the former absorbing most ASGM output and the latter typically receiving gold from large-scale mining. However, official gold exports have continuously decreased since 2013. This should not be attributed to a decline in ASGM production, which is thought to have remained stable – there are no reliable figures on ASGM production in Suriname – but rather to a shift in regional illicit supply chains. There is evidence that the practice of importing illicit gold and recording it as Surinamese production may have decreased, while the illegal export of gold mined in Suriname may have increased. Consequently, it is believed that Suriname’s role as a gold transit hub was more significant in the early 2010s than it is today, though some gold routes and destinations remain unclear.