The rise of global autocracy threatens liberties everywhere, undermining the very institutional principles that hold government to account in democratic societies. Across the Mekong region, governments are systematically restricting civil society through surveillance and persecution, creating a ‘closed’ civil society space in which citizens cannot freely express their opinions, access information or organize.

Civil society organizations, when empowered and free from repression, play an important role in documenting and exposing crime throughout the region, but their voices are increasingly being stifled. From sporadic campaigns of repression in Thailand to more consistent and aggressive pressure targeting independent civil society actors in Cambodia and Myanmar, ‘closed’ civil society space is becoming the norm. In Laos and Vietnam, the historical restriction of activist groups has effectively prevented a robust, independent civil society from developing in the first place. Alleged cross-border assassinations and disappearances, such as the abduction of Thai political dissidents in Laos and Cambodia, highlight the kinds of risks that activists face.

Besides direct repression, governments have also employed structural measures to prevent new civil society initiatives from forming. Whether intentionally designed or simply an outcome of broader policy neglect, opportunities for education and professional development in critical fields, such as criminology or human rights, have been restricted. This limits the development of local expertise in addressing organized crime, corruption and human rights abuses.

Rolling back freedoms

According to this year’s Freedom in the World report, global freedom has declined for the 19th consecutive year, with 80 per cent of countries and territories worldwide classified by the report as either ‘partially free’ or ‘not free’. All of the Mekong countries are once again labelled as ‘not free’.

Myanmar ranks as the most restrictive country in the region, especially since the February 2021 coup, which led to severe crackdowns on dissent, widespread displacement and renewed civil war. Thailand, by comparison, is the freest of the region’s ‘not free’ nations. Although civil society in Thailand faces substantial constraints, suppression is neither constant nor entirely predictable. Crackdowns usually occur during large protests, when powerful individuals or institutions come under criticism, social boundaries are challenged, cultural norms are defied or dominant political narratives are questioned.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of legal and bureaucratic methods to silence dissent across the region. These include  Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suits, which are used to deter people from speaking out on important issues, and the threats of new repressive legislation, such as proposed NGO laws. The extensive use of lèse-majesté laws, which criminalize criticism of the monarchy, particularly in Thailand and Cambodia, as well as surveillance tactics targeting activists across borders, have created additional barriers to independent civil society work.

Zones of impunity

The Mekong region has numerous ‘zones of impunity’, which prevail particularly in border areas, conflict-affected territories and increasingly within special economic zones. Characterized by limited state oversight, blurred boundaries between political and business interests, and minimal accountability, these hubs of impunity create an environment in which criminality flourishes. They emerge as a result of weak governance, opaque regulatory frameworks and strategic neglect by political elites, facilitating illicit activities including drug and human trafficking, illegal logging and cyber scams.

In Myanmar, ongoing armed conflict and weak state control in border states such as Shan and Kachin have enabled organized crime groups to increase the production and trafficking of heroin and synthetic drugs, with illicit operations thriving in areas where civic monitoring is severely restricted. Organized crime is also allegedly present in junta-controlled areas of Myanmar, with military elements accused of participating in the running of scam centres and other illicit economies. Similarly, Cambodia’s special economic zones, particularly those around Sihanoukville, have reportedly become hubs for organized crime and alleged corruption due to close ties between political elites and criminal enterprises. The arrest of investigative journalist Mech Dara in September 2024, alongside the expulsion and persecution of many others, shows the scale of retaliatory repression faced by civil society actors attempting to expose illicit dealings.

The limited civic oversight in zones of impunity has not only allowed organized crime to prosper unchecked, but has also discouraged journalists, activists and whistleblowers from publicly confronting criminality, despite substantial evidence identifying some of the main actors and networks involved. The risk of arrest, prosecution, or even assassination or enforced disappearance is simply too great.

Safeguarding civic space

The importance of protecting civil society actors, particularly whistleblowers and journalists, cannot be overstated. Various mechanisms, from secure reporting channels to emergency response protocols and global advocacy networks, are essential for ensuring their safety. It is crucial that the international community speaks out when activists or journalists are persecuted for exposing corruption and organized crime, and offers safe havens to those forced to flee persecution.

Without safe civic spaces, transparent reporting mechanisms, and national and international support for courageous individuals confronting organized criminal networks, illicit economies across the Mekong region will continue to thrive, further eroding the rule of law, stability and security in communities already at risk.