

UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ILLICIT ECONOMIES WATCH
2023 SERIES



**GLOBAL
INITIATIVE**
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME

ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL



Summer Walker

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INTRODUCTION

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) researches the political economy of organized crime in many countries, including those on the United Nations Security Council's agenda. The GI-TOC also analyzes how the Security Council responds to illicit economies and organized crime through its agenda, including through an annual review of resolutions that tracks references to organized crime. We use the term 'illicit economies' here to include the markets and actors involved. This series, UN Security Council Illicit Economies Watch, draws on research produced by the GI-TOC regional observatories and the Global Organized Crime Index to provide insights into the impacts of illicit economies for Council-relevant countries through periodic country reports.

As the United Nations develops its New Agenda for Peace, there is a need to consider the impacts of illicit economies in the search for sustainable peace and preventing conflict. The UN Secretary-General called for a New Agenda for Peace in his report *Our Common Agenda*, saying that to protect peace, 'we need a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict, a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks'.¹ One of these key underlying drivers is illicit economies and a more effective response will need to account for this. The Security Council will play a critical role in any renewed effort.

This brief provides an overview of how the Council addresses illicit economies and offers ideas for advancing the agenda. It first examines how specific crimes are addressed by the Council, expands into a wider analysis of the dynamics of illicit economies and conflict, and offers thinking around how illicit economies can be considered in the context of the New Agenda for Peace.



Photo: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

BACKGROUND

The relationship between illicit economies, conflict and instability has been long debated among academics, practitioners and the international community. From Afghanistan to Colombia to Ukraine, illicit economies have a serious impact on conflict, and by extension peace operations, peacemaking and peacebuilding. As UN Security Council members have emphasized, the New Agenda for Peace is a critical opportunity to take a fresh approach to preventing conflict and sustaining peace, and thus to consider the impacts unresolved illicit markets have on disarmament, building state institutions, forging sustainable peace and establishing security for communities harmed by crime and conflict.

According to the findings of GI-TOC’s Global Organized Crime Index, countries assessed as having the highest criminality scores have all recently experienced or are currently experiencing armed conflict or fragility. Instability attracts organized crime, and organized crime deepens instability. The lowest-scoring countries for resilience also reflect this paradigm: those experiencing conflict, including Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya, all have low levels of resilience.² Meanwhile, trends suggest that countries that have high fragility scores, as measured by the Fragile States Index, are ranked with low levels of resilience to organized crime in the Global Organized Crime Index (see Figure 1).³ The crime–conflict and resilience–conflict correlations are evident.




FIGURE 1 Global Organized Crime Index resilience scores vs. Fragile States Index scores for 2021.

SOURCE: Global Organized Crime Index, GI-TOC, 2021



THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The Security Council addresses transnational organized crime in three main ways: within mission mandates and resolutions on specific countries; as a thematic topic of relevance to the Council's agenda; and through the sanctions regimes as listing criteria or via sanctions violations. There are many examples of where the Council has directed action on illicit markets in conflict zones: drug trafficking in Afghanistan; human trafficking by Islamic State in Iraq; natural resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The well-known Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on the illicit diamond trade and its role in armed conflict was initiated by African diamond-producing states and actually came into effect in 2003 with UN Security Council Resolution 1459.⁴

Sanction committees' panels of experts conduct research and analysis that contribute to a greater understanding of conditions on the ground, including organized crime. Sanctions listing criteria can penalise individuals and groups who use illicit finances or proceeds from trafficking to disrupt peace. Beyond calling attention to harms caused by specific markets in resolutions, mandate renewals for missions have included specific items related to organized crime. These are often technical responsibilities as part of the larger mandate.

Thematically, in recent years, human trafficking in conflict settings, the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and piracy and maritime security have been key policy agendas at the Council. Most attention to illicit markets falls under the purview of specific country resolutions and sanctions committees (see table at end for listing criteria regarding illicit economies). As the interactive tool indicates, the Council has considers many forms of organized crime under numerous agenda items.

The Security Council approach to specific crimes

The GI-TOC annually reviews Security Council resolutions for references to forms of organized crime and presents its findings in the form of an interactive research tool (see below).⁵ This shows how over the period of the study, increasing attention is being given to the impacts illicit economies have on peace and security, particularly within country-specific resolutions on the Security Council's agenda. Based on

our analysis, specific crime types were mentioned in 55 per cent of all UN Security Council resolutions in 2022. We also found in our research that 22 per cent of resolutions made direct reference to organized crime actors, using language that includes gangs, illicit networks and transnational networks, for instance.




FIGURE 2 Charting organized crime at the UN Security Council, 2000-2022.

Arms trafficking remains the most referenced crime type, mentioned in 18 resolutions last year. This tracks with research done by the GI-TOC in West Africa, which identifies arms trafficking as a key accelerant market in connection to instability.⁶ Human trafficking, financial crimes and kidnapping were also in double digits for the last two years, with environmental crimes including resource trafficking and wildlife trafficking referenced across nine resolutions in 2022. Below is an outline of some of the illicit markets and associated agendas that arise more frequently on the Council.

Illicit arms

Arms trafficking has been the most referenced crime type at the Council in most years across the period of the study. Illicit arms fall under the Council's various sanctions regimes, and more specifically arms embargoes, as well as within mission mandates under small arms and light weapons control. The topic also recurs as a thematic discussion in the Council, both under small arms and light weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. In our research, arms trafficking is one of the most referenced crime types in the resolutions.⁷

The Council first adopted a thematic resolution on small arms in 2013, the same year the Arms Trade Treaty opened for signature, with a subsequent resolution in 2015. Both resolutions focus on the destabilizing impact of illicit arms transfers. Resolution 2220 draws clear connections between transnational organized crime, illegal arms transfers, links to other illicit markets and the collective impact these have on fuelling conflicts. Since 2007, the Secretary-General has submitted a biennial report on the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which is then followed by a Council debate.

Among the Permanent Five members of the Council (P-5), Russia, China and the US have resisted the thematic approach on this in the past. In 2006, Argentina tried to pass a resolution on the topic but was stopped by US objections arguing that it was best addressed within the General Assembly.⁸

In 2015, Russia and China abstained from Resolution 2220. During the February 2020 debate, both the US and Russia, while generally supportive, raised concerns over different aspects of the Secretary-General's report. Meanwhile, actions by states to circumvent arms embargoes bring into question the Council's effectiveness in the area of transnational firearms control. For instance, in March 2021 the UN Panel of Experts on Libya called its arms embargo 'totally ineffective'.⁹ Arms trafficking remains one of the most relevant and vexing issues for the Council, not least because arms sales and transfers remain an integral part of geopolitics.




FIGURE 3 UN Security Council references to illicit firearms.

Human trafficking

Human trafficking is often addressed at the Council as a subcomponent of other agendas – such as women, peace and security, and counterterrorism – or as a form of organized crime within a mission mandate. Several sanctions regimes list recruitment of children by parties to a conflict as listing criteria. Following severe displays of violence against women and cases of human trafficking perpetrated by groups such as Islamic State and Boko Haram, the issue of human trafficking in conflict was elevated at the Council.

In December 2016, the Council passed Resolution 2331 on human trafficking in conflict, with a focus on Islamic State.¹⁰ This provides an expanded definition of what constitutes human trafficking in conflict, recognizes that sexual violence and trafficking of women and girls can be part of terrorist groups' strategic objectives and recruitment. The Council followed this with Resolution 2388 in 2017 which again condemns acts of human trafficking, including the sale and trade of people, and continues to ask the sanctions monitoring team to collect information on these acts.¹¹ In June 2018, the UN Security Council Libya Sanctions Committee chose to list four Libyan and two Eritrean nationals to its Libya sanctions regime for playing a leading role in human trafficking and smuggling, imposing on them a travel ban and asset freezes. It was the first time that anyone had been placed on a sanctions list for human trafficking.




FIGURE 4 UN Security Council references to human trafficking.

Financial crimes

Financial crimes in Security Council resolutions are often referred to as illicit financing of armed groups or terrorist groups; the use of illicit proceeds to fuel insecurity or fund non-state armed groups; or a need to disrupt illicit financial flows in relation to a security situation. Peacekeeping missions do not often have mandates to tackle money laundering or restrict illicit financial flows – this is primarily the responsibility of the sanctions committees. In establishing asset freezes within sanctions regimes, the Council stipulates new financial restrictions and provides for monitoring of potential violations. Economic sanctions can be targeted at states, listed individual actors and groups.

The most recent sanctions committee that the Council established was in October 2022 on Haiti, targeting criminal gangs and their sponsors in response to extreme levels of gang violence in Haiti amid a political vacuum and a humanitarian crisis. This marks a departure for the Council, in that it is the first time the Council has made criminal groups the main focus of sanctions, recognizing their role in undermining peace and security.¹² Its creation was a rare showing of unanimity,¹³ and in 2023, the committee was assigned a panel of experts and is expected to begin its work. However, it should be mentioned a second resolution proposed at the same time called for a UN sanctioned security operation, which failed to gain traction, and to this day has not been revisited publicly by the Council.




FIGURE 5 UN Security Council references to financial crimes.

Environmental crimes

In the charting tool, the GI-TOC tracks wildlife and natural resource trafficking as separate activities. Natural resource exploitation is the main environmental crime addressed by the Council. Illicit mining of minerals and precious stones have been major funding sources for parties to conflicts and non-state armed groups, and this dynamic has been recognized by the Council in its mission mandates. Supporting armed groups through illegal mining is a listing criterion for some sanction regimes, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. Providing material support through the illegal wildlife trade is also noted in the CAR sanctions regime. Wildlife trafficking is referred to primarily in country-specific resolutions, and is usually listed among other natural resource commodities.

There has been lack of consensus on whether climate change as a security threat should be addressed by the Council. There are divisions among the P-5 over whether climate, scarcity and wider environmental issues constitute security risks, with Russia and China resisting addressing these issues at the Council, while the US, UK and France welcome it.¹⁴ There was a presidential statement in 2011 recognizing the risk climate change poses to security, but most meetings since have not resulted in resolutions guiding any work on the subject. In 2021, Ireland and Niger attempted to advance a thematic resolution on climate and security, but this was vetoed by Russia.¹⁵ Despite these differences, the Council has held a number of briefings on the linkages between the environment and security and conflict, ranging from overarching themes (discussed in February 2021) to more specific debates such as an Arria-formula meeting¹⁶ on illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes Region in July 2020.





FIGURE 6 UN Security Council references to environmental crimes.

Drug trafficking

Drug trafficking is acknowledged in several mission mandates as a means of financing non-state armed groups and for fuelling conflict, examples being Afghanistan, Mali and formerly Guinea-Bissau. For instance, in Afghanistan, as of 2019 the UNODC had spent US\$25 million on alternative development programmes.¹⁷ Using proceeds from the illicit drug trade to support sanctioned individuals is a listing criterion for sanctions regimes for Afghanistan, Mali and Guinea-Bissau. The Council has held briefings on drug trafficking, often with a regional focus, such as West Africa and the Sahel. In June 2019, the Council held an Arria-formula meeting – Transnational Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean Region as a Threat to International Stability. Within the organized crime–terrorism nexus debates, Latin American countries often raise objections to the conflation in rhetoric between drug trafficking and terrorism, opposed to policy overlap that would impose counterterrorism frameworks in combating drug trafficking.




FIGURE 7 UN Security Council references to drug trafficking.

Piracy

Piracy is not frequently referenced in resolutions, but it has been a key thematic issue on the Council agenda for over 10 years. The Council has continued a focus on maritime security and piracy in recent years. It has addressed piracy off the coast of Somalia for over a decade, authorizing an international patrol working in coordination¹⁸ with the Somali government.¹⁹ This was renewed in 2021, but only for three months. After that extension the Council did not renew it further, thus ending international patrols off the Somali coast.²⁰

In May 2022, the Council passed Resolution 2634 on the Gulf of Guinea, which emphasizes the need to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to investigate, prosecute or extradite perpetrators of such crimes, as well as those who finance them. The Council encouraged bilateral and regional partners to provide legal and operational support to achieve this. During a Council meeting on the issue, some cautioned that other forms of crime, such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, are important to address, as they have a more significant impact on coastal populations and local economies.

Therefore, it would appear there is a willingness to widen the scope of maritime crime from piracy to other forms of organized crime at sea. For instance, an Arria-formula meeting in February 2020 chaired by Equatorial Guinea addressed a number of linked crimes – piracy, armed robbery, human, weapons and drugs trafficking, terrorism, fisheries crime and smuggling of migrants. In 2021, India led a presidential statement on maritime security and a subsequent debate that addressed state-based aggressions, threats to global maritime trade and the threats posed by organized crime.²¹ The presidential statement encourages cooperation and for states to build their capacity to counter terrorism and all forms of transnational organized crime on the sea by means of existing mechanisms and organizations.²²




FIGURE 8 UN Security Council references to piracy.

Transnational organized crime and counterterrorism

The transnational organized crime–terrorism nexus debate rumbles on, yet it remains very general in character, with a primary focus on the financing of terrorism through illicit trades.²³ When these debates are held at the Council, they tend to lack clear focus, with speeches touching upon many topics but not necessarily the relationships between them. Alternatively, one finds a general conflation of shared risks of terrorism and organized crime without clarity of what and how. While the debates remain overarching in nature, Resolution 2482 (July 2019) on the linkages between organized crime and terrorism provided direction to UN agencies, calling on the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to ‘identify and examine Member States’ efforts in impeding terrorist groups from benefitting from organized crime’ and to ‘integrate consideration of linkages of terrorism and organized crime, whether transnational or domestic, into its country assessments and analyses and identify emerging trends and gaps’. It also requested a report by the Secretary-General on actions taken by member states and the Global Compact entities to address the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime, which formed the basis of discussion for the August 2020 meeting.



ORGANIZED CRIME AND CONFLICT: AN ENTRENCHED RELATIONSHIP

An analysis of how the Council debates and deals with certain crime types helps reveal the priority areas and identify key markets that impact conflicts – though there is a need to recognize this is always contingent on context. For instance, in Colombia the illegal drug trade is of key concern, whereas in the Central African Republic it is natural resources, such as diamonds and gold, that are the major drivers. Furthermore, the market dynamics and actors involved in each context are integral to the socio-political conditions where peacekeeping, negotiations and peacebuilding occur. We know that transnational markets cut across regions of conflict and instability, the benefactors and facilitators are both internal and external actors, and the longer conflict persists we see the size and number of markets expand, as well as the number of groups involved – many smaller and more predatory.²⁴ These markets and the actors are baked into the current socio-economic conditions of the conflict zones.

As national peace advances – or, conversely, a stalemate sets in – certain similarities can be found between the regions where instability and conflict persist, and where illicit economies find a lasting foothold. Due to their remote locations or lack of political power, such zones are often left out of conflict resolution. Consequently, the dynamics of high-value illegal markets are not resolved, and the armed actors who control them remain, with the result that instability persists even after a public détente with a government.

Formally accounting for illicit markets during mediation has become more common – one example being the Colombian peace accord. But the reality in Colombia has been difficult, as remnants of armed groups continue to splinter and vie for control of illicit markets, with levels of violence against communities rising, including assassinations of local leaders and activists.

In Haiti, the main security threat is local gangs. Traditionally empowered by political and business elites, as gangs have increased in number, they have expanded into several local markets, from extortion (of businesses and along transit routes) to kidnapping. Others remain involved in transnational markets such as drug trafficking, which does not preclude involvement in these local markets. Any solution has to account for long-term demobilization and disarmament – including stopping the flow of illegal

arms into the country – and reducing the actors’ political influence, which long pre-dates the current situation. A long-term solution to break the power of gangs hinges on security, politics, the justice system and socio-economic development, reflecting how comprehensive the thinking has to be around weakening the power of organized crime.

A comprehensive and lasting peace must therefore address areas of continued exploitation and the impacts of criminal governance and power. Otherwise criminal influence driven by illicit economies will continue to dominate vulnerable institutions and sow instability among local communities. There is a need for a more holistic approach by the Council, one that embeds analysis and responses to these markets in the continuum from peacekeeping to peacebuilding as part of the political solution.

Conclusion: Challenges to a comprehensive approach

It may be widely recognized that illicit markets are a serious risk to international security and a driver of conflicts, yet how to address them in an effective way within the peace and security landscape remains an ongoing discussion. Although there may be some shared interest in the broad issues relating to transnational organized crime among the permanent members of the Council, they tend to have differing views on how a Council response should be integrated into the wider UN response. In general, the P-5 support addressing illicit economies only when they impact country situations on the Council’s agenda, but hesitate to expand the Council agenda on illicit markets, recognizing that these are issues for national governments and cooperation among them.

Complicating matters further are the current levels of discord within the Council, which have been present in the past but dramatically increased following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This can be seen in how the adoption of unanimous resolutions by the Council has been in steady decline: in 2022, only 36 out of 54 resolutions (67%) were adopted unanimously, compared to 84% in 2021.²⁵ Existing disagreements over process and procedure – over specific sanctions regimes, for instance – have now solidified into strong political resistance as a result of post-Ukraine geopolitical tensions. This means the likelihood of arriving at consensus, especially on a bold idea, is very limited.

And then there are the realities on the ground in countries where the Council has mandated missions, yet where Security Council members are at odds. The West’s sanctioning of Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and meanwhile Russia’s growing influence in Council-mandated countries means that geopolitical divisions will have an impact on the ability to maintain an effective UN presence in these countries. The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, which the United States has designated a transnational criminal organization,²⁶ has a presence in multiple Council-mandated countries, including Libya, CAR and Mali. In these countries, Wagner establishes separate security arrangements with regimes or opposition figures often in exchange for local resource extraction, while Russia continues to direct the actions of UN missions that operate in the same arena. In Mali, for instance, the transitional government has restricted the movement of MINUSMA, inhibiting their ability to carry out their mandate. Questions exist over how the UN can provide security support to the Malian forces, as the latter work hand in hand with Wagner. In the most recent meeting at the Council, China and Russia very clearly supported the role of Wagner, without naming it, whereas the US, UK and France all voiced concern over the presence of the Russian group.

While relations on the Council are strained, this does not diminish the need for updated responses to the organized crime and security agenda. One practical new thematic area for the Council to consider could place the organized crime debate within the discussion on conflict resolution and illicit markets, including its impacts on mediation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, elections and peacebuilding.

The UN Security Council will therefore be a critical body for the future implementation of the New Agenda for Peace, and fresh thinking on how to counter organized crime within its agenda would help support a more comprehensive approach. More broadly, in the New Agenda for Peace, stronger prevention and peacebuilding needs to include responses that strategically consider the impacts of organized crime in disrupting peace, and including these in a holistic approach to building and sustaining peace.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS COMMITTEES: LISTING CRITERIA RELATED TO ILLICIT ECONOMIES

The table below sets out listing criteria from UNSC sanctions committees that impose sanctions for actions related to organized crime and illicit economies.

Afghanistan (1988 Sanctions Committee)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to (the Taliban) ■ Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of (the Taliban)
Al Shabaab Sanctions Committee (Somalia)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Violating arms embargo ■ Engaging in the export or direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia ■ Recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in Somalia in violation of applicable international law by political or military leaders ■ Violating applicable international law in Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict, including [...] abduction ■ Engaging in any non-local commerce via Al-Shabaab controlled ports which constitutes financial support for a designated entity ■ Misappropriating financial resources which undermines the Transitional Federal Institutions' and their post-transition successors' ability to fulfil their obligations in delivering services within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement
Central African Republic Sanctions Committee
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Violating arms embargo ■ Recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the CAR, in violation of applicable international law ■ Providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, wildlife as well as wildlife products in or from the CAR ■ Involved in planning, directing, or committing acts in the CAR that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including [...] abduction [...]

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1718 Sanctions Committee)

- Persons or entities engaging in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction. Family members of such persons may also be designated for the travel ban

Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee

- Violating arms embargo
- Supporting individuals or entities, including armed groups or criminal networks, involved in destabilizing activities in the DRC through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife as well as wildlife products
- Recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the DRC in violation of applicable international law
- Planning, directing, or committing acts in the DRC that constitute human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law, as applicable, including [...] abduction [...]

Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee

- Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals identified in paragraph 6(a) notes that such means of support or financing include, but are not limited to, the proceeds from organized crime, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in and transiting through Guinea-Bissau

Haiti (2653 Sanctions Committee)

- Engaging in, directly or indirectly, or supporting criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks that promote violence, including forcible recruitment of children by such groups and networks, kidnappings, trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, and homicides and sexual and gender-based violence
- Supporting illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel, or illicit financial flows related thereto
- Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing an individual or entity designated in connection with the activity described in subparagraphs 16(a) and (b) of resolution 2653 (2022), including through the direct or indirect use of the proceeds from organized crime, including proceeds from illicit production and trafficking in drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Haiti, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants from Haiti, or the smuggling and trafficking of arms to or from Haiti
- Acting in violation of the arms embargo established in paragraph 11 of resolution 2653 (2022), or as having directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to armed groups or criminal networks in Haiti, or as having been the recipient of, arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to violent activities of armed groups or criminal networks in Haiti
- Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses, including abduction, enforced disappearances, or kidnappings for ransom in Haiti
- Planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and sexual slavery, in Haiti

Iraq (1518 Sanctions Committee)

- None

ISIL & Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee

- Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to (ISIL)

Lebanon (1636 Sanctions Committee)

- None

Libya Sanctions Committee

- Violating arms embargo
- In the context of attempted illicit exports or illicit exports of crude oil from Libya, the Committee may designate vessels for some or all of the measures in paragraph 10 of resolution 2146 (2014)
- Providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya
- Threatening or coercing Libyan State financial institutions and the Libyan National Oil Company, or engaging in any action that may lead to or result in the misappropriation of Libyan state funds

Mali Sanctions Committee

- Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property
- The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali
- Planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through...abduction, enforced disappearance [...]

South Sudan Sanctions Committee

- Violating arms embargo
- The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan
- Engagement by armed groups or criminal networks in activities that destabilize South Sudan through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources
- The targeting of civilians, including women and children, through [...] abduction, enforced disappearance [...]

Sudan Sanctions Committee (Resolution 1591)

- Violating arms embargo

Yemen (2140 Sanctions Committee)

- Violating arms embargo
- Engaging in [...] the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law

NOTE: Many sanctions committees include listing criteria for committing acts of sexual violence, which are considered serious violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. Haiti's committee is the first to list sexual slavery, which is understood to be a form of human trafficking in conflict.

SOURCE: United Nations Security Council, Sanctions, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information>

Notes

- 1 New Agenda for Peace, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, <https://dppa.un.org/en/new-agenda-for-peace>.
- 2 See Global Organized Crime Index 2021, GI-TOC, <https://ocindex.net/>.
- 3 See Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.
- 4 UN General Assembly highlights role for Kimberley Process in 2030 Agenda, 15 March 2018, <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/un-general-assembly-highlights-role-for-kimberley-process-in-2030-agenda/>.
- 5 See 2000–2022: Charting organized crime on the UN Security Council agenda, GI-TOC, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/scresolutions/>.
- 6 See Organized crime and instability dynamics: Mapping illicit hubs in West Africa, GI-TOC, September 2022, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africa-illicit-hub-mapping/>.
- 7 2000–2022: Charting organized crime on the UN Security Council agenda, GI-TOC, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/scresolutions/>.
- 8 Security Council Report, Thematic issues: Small arms, 31 January 2020, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-02/small-arms.php>.
- 9 United Nations Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.8909, 22 November 2021, p 4.
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