GLOBAL INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Global Organized Crime Index 2023

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GLOBAL INITIATIVE

Global Organized Crime Index 2023

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Foreword:

A global x-ray of organized crime

From vision to action: a decade of analysis, disruption and resilience

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime was founded in 2013. Its vision was to mobilize a global strategic approach to tackling organized crime by strengthening political commitment to address the challenge, building the analytical evidence base on organized crime, disrupting criminal economies and developing networks of resilience in affected communities. Ten years on, the threat of organized crime is greater than ever before, and it is critical that we continue to take action by building a coordinated global response to meet the challenge.

In 2021, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (henceforth GI-TOC) launched the first-ever Global Organized Crime Index. That first edition was several years in the making, and its development was marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there have been some suggestions about how the methodology might be further improved and constructive debate around some of the results, the reaction to the Global Index has been overwhelmingly positive. Furthermore, the Index has generated considerable attention in government, among practitioners, civil society, academia and the media. Its results have been analyzed in hundreds of media articles, allowing us as an organization to connect with many interest groups and concerned actors. Indeed, the Global Index has become the GI-TOC's flagship product and an internationally used toolkit of evidence.

Thanks to generous backing from many supporters, experts and partners, we have been able to produce a second version of the Global Index, now improved and expanded. While the first edition analyzed 10 criminal markets, this second edition looks at 15, now including the fast-growing sectors of financial crime and cyber-dependent crime in its ambit. This edition also adds the private sector to the list of other criminal actors analyzed here. As a result, we have a more detailed x-ray image of the global illicit economy.

Building on the baseline of data compiled for the first edition and taking advantage of a more comprehensive body of information, this second edition is able to make a comparative analysis of changes in illicit economies and developments in resilience over the past two years. Looking ahead to the GI-TOC's second decade of activity, our intention is to update the Index every two years to allow longitudinal measurement by tracking the changing trajectories of criminality and resilience.

This index is not only an analytical exercise: it is designed to enrich the base of evidence to enable more effective policy responses. An x-ray may reveal the problem, but it does not tell you the remedy. Therefore, we encourage all those with an interest in reducing the harm caused by organized crime to use the evidence presented in this report as a tool to effect change.

This year's assessment, provided in this report, demonstrates that organized crime remains a profound challenge all over the world, posing a threat to both developed and developing countries, and an obstacle to much-needed international cooperation amid growing political, social and economic global disparities. We cannot let organized crime continue to grow between the cracks of our seemingly fractured world by taking advantage of gaps in governance, economic inequalities and political frictions. Politicians may want to paint over the cracks; populists may want to deepen them. The findings of this report give a clear signal, however, that tangible efforts are necessary to bridge the divide. It is evident more needs to be done to address the relationship between organized crime and global trends, and the impact that illicit economies exert on governance and well-being.

I would like to thank the hundreds of experts and civil society activists around the world who have contributed to this report. It is a testament to the power of civil society to carry out important research and analysis that can drive change. I also salute the courage and dedication of those who are on the front line of dealing with organized crime – those who work to strengthen resilience in their communities, carry out law enforcement operations, or track and disrupt illicit transnational flows.

It is time to take firm, strategic action against organized crime. Based on the x-ray provided by this report, we need to:

- have a more strategic approach to dealing with organized crime at the global level;
- treat financial crime as a high priority, focusing on the links between organized crime and corruption;
- pay closer attention to the nexus between organized crime and conflict;
- redouble efforts to strengthen resilience in vulnerable communities;
- defend, and expand the space for, civil society in dialogue and policymaking on organized crime; and
- more closely analyze and engage the private sector to reduce its potential facilitation of illicit activities.

Mark Shaw
Director, Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime

Introduction

Organized crime in a fractured world

Introductio

Amid global developments and challenges, including the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and the rapid advancement of technology, the world is now at a critical juncture. Following global vaccination campaigns, countries reopened as the urgency of tackling COVID-19 began to wane – cross-border trade and travel have gradually resumed to pre-pandemic levels, and social interactions are once again prioritized. Yet despite having collectively weathered the global health crisis, the world seems to have emerged more fractured than ever before.

While the pandemic exacerbated certain conditions, including growing inequality, food insecurity and a decline in livelihood opportunities, political-economic tensions and social grievances that had been sidelined to deal with the immediate health emergency have resurfaced with vigour. Conflict and instability, while often occurring in response to political moves, have had a knock-on effect on other aspects of the global ecosystem, from migration patterns to food supplies and extreme climate events. These developments have tested geopolitical alliances, highlighted the divide between democracy and autocracy, and accentuated the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities between developing and developed countries. Major political shifts and economic hardship have not only tangibly affected nearly all aspects of our daily lives, but have also fed directly into organized crime dynamics around the world, as criminal interests take advantage of instability, vulnerability and commodity shortages.

In 2021, the Global Organized Crime Index was introduced to assess levels of organized crime and the strength of countries' resilience to address the criminal threats they face. As the first tool of its kind, it offered a snapshot of these dynamics amid the circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Two years on, this second iteration of the Index has been expanded in scope and, for the first time, offers longitudinal data on criminality and resilience patterns for all 193 UN member states by comparing the results of the current Index with those of 2021. While the pandemic set the theme for the first iteration of the Index, this year's results are presented against a backdrop of conflict and political divide, characterized by open wars in Europe, Africa and Asia, large-scale corruption scandals in Latin America and elsewhere, and strained relationships between global superpowers.

Drawing on a more comprehensive dataset and informed by the specialist knowledge of over 400 experts worldwide, the results of the 2023 Index offer a complex picture of the trajectory of organized crime, underscoring the intricacies in measuring this clandestine phenomenon.

Illicit economies adapt to their environment and take on different forms. To better capture these different manifestations of organized crime, additional criminality indicators have been incorporated into this latest version of the Index. Now assessing 15 criminal markets and five criminal actor types, the widened lens of the 2023 Index offers a more comprehensive picture of how organized crime operates globally. The broader scope yields some interesting insights. For instance, while human trafficking was identified as the most prevalent criminal market in 2021, with the addition of the

new indicators, the results show financial crimes to be the most pervasive illicit economy in the world, highlighting the menacingly lucrative nature of organized crime. While the methodological and structural changes to the Index have certainly played into human trafficking taking second place among the criminal markets, qualitative data collected for this edition suggests that financial crimes have increased in scope over the past years.

Yet, in many ways, this year's Index reaffirms certain dynamics. For example, state involvement in criminality remains the most pervasive force in driving organized crime. This is particularly the case in authoritarian states. The Index also highlights once again how the space for civil society is shrinking, not least for non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders trying to shine a light on organized crime and corruption. Heavy-handed crackdowns on civil society in many countries are heightening social discontent and distrust in governments, which, in some cases, are being exploited by criminal actors as opportunities to gain legitimacy. Criminal actors are also taking advantage of the disruption presented by conflict situations. This comes against the finding that all criminal actors covered under the previous iteration of the Index increased their potency. At the same time, data shows that regions that have previously come out as more resilient are showing increased vulnerability to organized crime, and especially financial and cyber-dependent criminality.

As the world becomes more divided along social, economic and political lines, organized crime levels are simultaneously rising. These rifts are partly a function of our increasingly interconnected world, where information and disinformation are widely disseminated and easily promoted. And, unfortunately, resilience efforts have failed to keep pace with the challenges. Today, no less than 83% of the global population live in countries with high levels of criminality – up from 79% in 2021.

Despite the growing pervasiveness of organized crime on a global scale, there have been improvements in some regions. For example, overall criminality was shown to have declined in a number of regions, including Eastern and Central Asia and the Caucasus, and West and Central Africa. The 2023 Index also highlights 'international cooperation' as having increased the most among resilience measures since the first version of the tool. How countries work with one another in tackling organized crime and whom they choose to cooperate with, however, seem to fall along existing geopolitical, social and economic fault lines. In that respect, addressing the rifts that set them apart would certainly go a long way in improving anti-organized crime responses.

As a first step in prioritizing a framework for future collaboration, this report sets out the results of the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index. The data for this Index covers 2022, a year in which major geopolitical and economic divisions were sewn into the world's social fabric against the backdrop of critical health, security and environmental crises. The analysis in this report conclusively shows that, although there have been some steps taken towards improving resilience, the future holds significant challenges related to the wide-ranging impact of organized crime. Organized crime remains a major risk to human security, development and justice, and serves as a significant obstacle in addressing the challenges we collectively face.

Although there will inevitably continue to be knowledge gaps on organized crime, the Index lays the groundwork on which to build further analysis, supplementing current research endeavours, so as to better equip policymakers and other stakeholders with the tools they need to implement tailored and effective responses to organized crime. While the Index is an informative tool, its true value lies beyond the data and in how it can contribute to a global discourse on the evolving nature of organized crime and ways of strengthening resilience.



01

The global illicit economy in 2022:

A year of division

The world is a vastly different place from when the global health crisis caused by COVID-19 first began. As society slowly returned to a state of what has been defined as 'permacrisis',[1] regaining a holding pattern of instability and insecurity, the latent political tensions, environmental crises and economic stresses that had taken a backseat to the priority of addressing the health emergency resurfaced. These revealed a more fractured world than before and created the perfect conditions for illicit economies to flourish. Long-held (Western) assumptions about the inviolability of sovereign territory, democracy and economic stability were shaken. Organized crime adapted to and was shaped by these divisions.

The year 2022 also marked a pivotal point in our demographic history, when the global population reached 8 billion.[2] Accompanying this milestone, glaring socio-economic inequalities, conflict and instability driving illicit flows came to the fore. In February, Russia invaded Ukraine – the largest land war in Europe since 1945 – spurring a humanitarian crisis, including the largest refugee migration in Europe since World War II, and the most extensive sanctions regime in almost a century.[3] The conflict renewed schisms associated with the Cold War and disrupted global supply chains, exacerbating vulnerabilities and driving illicit trade of various products as people sought to meet their basic needs. The war in Ukraine also continues to draw an influx of arms, some of illicit provenance.

Elsewhere, war and instability in countries such as South Sudan, Yemen and Syria rumbled on unresolved, contributing to a deteriorating humanitarian situation and trafficking of a broad spectrum of commodities, from weapons to consumer goods to people. Irregular migration flows fuelled by these conflicts gave rise to global debates on the unequal treatment of migrants and refugees, further sowing divisions between Europe and its neighbours.

Violence and tensions continued along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border and in the Azerbaijan–Armenian conflict, undermining stability and increasing the porosity of borders,

which served to facilitate cross-border flows.[4] In Africa, a peace deal was signed marking the end of the two-year-long Ethiopia–Tigray conflict that saw the displacement of millions of people.[5] While in Haiti, an escalation in gang violence triggered thousands to flee the country.[6] Globally, 2022 saw over 100 million refugees and internally displaced people – 13 million more than the previous year[7] – a significant portion of whom turned to smugglers to help escape conflict and instability, and who were put at risk of exploitation.

The conflict in Europe also sent shockwaves around the world as energy and food costs soared, and diplomatic alliances were tested. Against the commodity shock, global inflation in 2022 climbed to its highest rates since the 1980s and stubbornly persisted, partly linked to Russian hydrocarbon exports being 'weaponized' and to rising food prices.[8] Oil prices rose globally from US$76 a barrel in January to over US$110 in March, with OPEC+ countries deciding to limit crude oil production, contributing to a growing geopolitical East–West divide and fuelling the illicit trade in non-renewable resources.[9] Criminal actors along oil and gas supply chains took advantage of consumers' exposed dependence caused by reduced commodity supplies and price discrepancies between different countries by smuggling oil, exacerbating fuel shortages and heightening economic disparities.

Natural-resource shortages also had a damaging impact on our climate, as countries turned their backs on their environmental pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and instead prioritized their immediate energy needs. April saw deforestation rates in Brazil's Amazon rainforest surging to unprecedented levels, with allegations of the government promoting it.[10] During the first seven months of the conflict in Ukraine, the fighting was estimated to have released around 100 million tonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, with the explosion of Nord Stream 1 and 2 in September leading to the biggest ever point source release of methane.[11] With greater importance placed on meeting energy demands, less attention was given to curbing environmental crimes, with criminals involved in destructive activities such as waste trafficking and the illicit trade in ozone-depleting substances carrying on unabated, jeopardizing human health and disrupting the ecological balance. The dizzying acceleration of global warming was seen violently in all corners of the world, with the arrival of extreme weather events, including the devastating floods in Pakistan in June. This was exacerbated by rampant illegal logging,[12] leaving millions displaced, compounding Pakistan's economic and political struggles.[13] Heatwaves in Asia, Europe, Australia, the US and South America, as well as flooding and increased droughts in Africa, and rural-to-urban climate migration, have placed a strain on key health and agricultural sectors and threatened livelihoods.

Yet the ability to tackle these challenges varied across nations. In November, the 27th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (CoP27), held in Egypt, highlighted the unbalanced effects of the global climate crisis on the most vulnerable in developing countries,[14] an imbalance that reinforces discord between low- and middle-income countries and economic powerhouses.

Amid these troubling dynamics and in response to inflation, central bank rates were increased,[15] making it even more difficult for many households to meet their basic needs, fomenting social unrest, impoverishing millions around the world and contributing to rising rates of hunger and malnutrition. In 2022, the severity of acute food insecurity increased and it is estimated that over a quarter of a billion people were food insecure.[16] The difficulty acquiring basic necessities fuelled organized crime, as people turned to the black market to procure essential supplies at lower prices, or to secure alternative livelihoods.

In the realm of governance, countries all over the world saw shifts in state politics and policies. From questions about the integrity of elected officials to growing government repression, in many cases, states' ability to tackle economic crises and social fragmentation in their countries dwindled, highlighting the link between malpractice among those who hold public office and the organized

criminality that this Index identifies. Corruption continues to pose a systemic threat worldwide and an obstacle to states' capacity for resilience to organized crime, while serving as a vital aid to organized criminal groups.[17]

Social discontent with governments was evident throughout 2022 and demonstrations were frequently met with harsh crackdowns on civil society and activists. For example, the death of Mahsa Amini in Iran in September, because of her choice of dress, sparked widespread social unrest in the country and unearthed an underlying dissatisfaction with the ultra-conservative authorities. These protests were responded to with extensive internet blackouts and nationwide restrictions on social media usage, while protestors themselves faced tear gassing and even public execution.[18] In China, following an unpopular three-year COVID lockdown that was eventually lifted after widespread outcries, reports came out of regular arrests of peaceful protesters.[19] Growing government repression undermined countries' social cohesion and ability to effectively respond to organized crime, particularly as non-state actors were increasingly prevented from keeping governments in check and from supporting resilience measures.

Taking advantage of these crises, and often by harnessing technological tools, criminals seized opportunities for furthering their illicit gains. In an increasingly digitized world, cyberattacks reportedly rose by 38% globally in 2022 against the previous year, as hackers and ransomware gangs exploited the normalization of remote working.[20] In May, across Europe, authorities uncovered a drug trafficking ring by tapping into communications on Sky ECC, a messaging app described as 'WhatsApp for criminals'.[21] In the United States, FTX, one of the largest digital currency-exchange platforms for cryptocurrencies, collapsed in November after its CEO was arrested and charged with security fraud and money laundering, causing over US$11 billion in damages to consumers and rendering the future of cryptocurrencies uncertain.[22]

As 2022 saw organized crime take advantage of disparities and rifts between countries, the global illicit economy posed a collective threat. Amid these dynamics, it has become essential to understand how organized crime operates and its impact on society, so as to better help global policymakers and practitioners formulate successful responses. This Index report provides detailed insight into how criminality reacts and adapts to its environment and, importantly, sheds light on where response frameworks have been successful and where they have fallen short. In this way, the Index contributes to the growing evidence base that can inform analysis of and future action against organized crime.

BE THEIR VOICE
SAY HER NAME
MAHSA

FIGURE 1.1

Notable events in 2022 that shaped global dynamics and organized crime




AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
France completes military operations withdrawal from Mali, Wagner group arrives
OPEC+ announces cutting oil production by 2 million barrels per day
World Cup in Qatar begins
Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Saudi Arabia
Rishi Sunak becomes the UK's third prime minister in 2022
Peru's former President Pedro Castillo arrested following impeachment
Fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia erupts
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) sign peace deal
FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried charged with defrauding investors
Mahsa Amini dies sparking protests in Iran
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Italy elects far right prime minister, Giorgia Meloni
World population reaches 8 billion
Gas leak from Russian-owned Nord Stream 2 pipeline drains into the Baltic Sea
Independent panel appointed by South African parliament determines there is evidence suggesting President Cyril Ramaphosa involved in corruption
Pakistan declares national emergency amid flooding that kills nearly 2 000 people
CoP27 begins in Egypt
Afghanistan's Taliban-run higher education ministry suspends access for female students
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva elected the next president of Brazil

Key findings

The Global Organized Crime Index allows users to analyze, compare and contrast a range of indicators by country, region and continent. In compiling these indicators, several key findings, divided into three broad categories – meta or cross-cutting findings, thematic and geographic findings – emerged. With the extensive dataset that the tool provides, a number of notable themes arise, with those outlined below being only a small selection. These findings serve to underscore the ubiquitousness of organized crime and shed light on the numbers affected by criminality, the scale and reach of criminal markets and levels of resilience.

FIGURE 1.2
Key finding by group



Meta findings

finding 1

The gap between criminality and resilience is widening



Nearly 83% of the global population now live in countries with high criminality – up from 79% in 2021. While global resilience has largely remained at 2020 levels, criminality has continued to grow at a staggering rate in response to intensifying political, social, economic and security challenges, signifying the difficulties involved in addressing the phenomenon.

The number of people living in conditions of low resilience to organized crime globally has declined significantly: now 62% of the world's population live in countries with low resilience, compared to 79.4% in 2021. The reason for this major shift, however, is not a momentous resurgence of resilience globally but rather a slightly improved score for a single country – China. In 2021, China was assessed as falling within the low resilience band, only 0.04 points below the 5.50 out of 10 threshold. In this second version of the Index, China's resilience score has marginally increased by 0.21 points, enough however to move it into the high resilience band. The modest improvement came in light of China's adoption of the country's first Anti-Organized Crime Law and an advance in countering money laundering, among others. With a population of 1.4 billion, China's slightly improved resilience score thus calls for nuanced interpretation of the results. While more people today live in countries characterized as having high resilience, when comparing global resilience to the rise in the pervasiveness of criminality, the data shows that responses have failed to meet the organized crime threat.

FIGURE 1.3

Vulnerability classifications



finding 2

Democracies continue to have **higher levels of resilience**

The results of the 2023 Index show that countries categorized as full democracies continue to exhibit higher levels of resilience to organized crime than authoritarian regimes. Good governance practices that are open, transparent, embedded in the rule of law and encourage active engagement from citizens lay the groundwork on which to build both state and non-state responses to criminal threats.

Indeed, democracies were shown to better withstand organized crime on average, with the correlation between regime type and resilience slightly increasing over the past two years. This relationship serves to highlight the need for coordination among the pillars of democratic societies to better understand the criminal threats faced and develop even more effective responses.

FIGURE 1.4

Resilience by regime type



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2022; Global Organized Crime Index 2023

finding 3

Conflict exacerbates vulnerability to organized crime

Conditions of conflict and fragility have long been flagged as factors contributing to criminality. The data of this second iteration of the Index shows that conflict zones face increased vulnerability to organized crime. The analysis reveals that the more affected by conflict a country is, the higher the likelihood of it experiencing reduced levels of resilience to organized crime. When war efforts top a state's agenda, for example, resources are redirected, leaving institutions weakened. The breakdown of governance structures, weakened law enforcement and limited access to basic services provide fertile ground for criminal groups to operate.

The 2023 Index data underscores these notions: many of the most crime-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Ethiopia, and most recently Ukraine, have been mired in conflict and instability over the past decades. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was certainly among the main sources of fracture in 2022 and, as a result, levels of criminality in Ukraine have significantly increased. Worse still, the effect of a prolonged war could be devastating on many levels, with repercussions ranging from greater access to weapon stockpiles to increased poverty, unemployment and subsequent vulnerability to exploitation.

FIGURE 1.5

Conflict vs criminality



Source: Global Peace Index 2022; Global Organized Crime Index 2023

Thematic findings

finding 4

Financial crime is the **most pervasive criminal market**

The category of financial crimes was not included as a criminal market in the 2021 Index. The reporting of levels of financial crimes through the Index expert review process resulted in financial crimes being identified as the most pervasive of all crime types measured in 2023. As this is the first time the Index has attempted to measure financial crimes, there is no baseline to compare the 2023 results against. However, the available data and expert opinion, including input on the results of the 2021 Index, suggests that financial crimes have indeed expanded significantly over a short period of time.

Ranging from fraud to embezzlement, financial crimes take on many forms, allowing organized criminals to infiltrate the formal economic and financial systems of a country. The very breadth of criminality typologies included under the financial crimes definition affirms the ubiquity of this market.

While often considered 'victimless', financial crimes are in many cases linked to violent crime and have the ability to significantly undermine a country's social and economic structures. Today, with the rapid innovation of digital technologies, financial crimes can be carried out at the click of a button from the other side of the world, highlighting the market's transnational impact.

Financial crimes displaced human trafficking as the most pervasive illicit economy in 2022, but that is not to say that human trafficking has declined – the Index results show that human trafficking has in fact increased since 2020, the first year under study. The continued growth of human trafficking serves as a sobering reminder of this market's impact on society, where humans are the transactional commodity.

FIGURE 1.6

Criminal markets, global averages, 2021 vs 2023



*Indicators included in 2023

2021 2023 Global criminal markets average (2023)

finding 5

The influence criminal actors exert has strengthened since the pandemic

Regardless of structure and their subsequent classification under the Index, the reach and breadth of influence of perpetrators of organized crime grew in 2022. It is notable that this increase has been consistently observed across all criminal actor types and for all regions, with the only exception being Oceania. Notwithstanding their relatively limited presence compared to other criminal actor types, even mafia-style groups have increased in prevalence over the past couple of years – growth that is indicative of a wider trend. This shift comes as global trade and travel have picked up following the restrictions imposed by the pandemic, but also as a result of more opportunities granted to criminals by the cyber domain, as well as greater chances for exploiting fracture.

FIGURE 1.7

Criminal actors, global averages, 2021 vs 2023



finding 6

State actors remain the **most dominant agents** in facilitating illicit economies and inhibiting resilience

State-embedded actors remained the most pervasive criminal actor type in 2022. While the degree to which criminality permeates the state apparatus varies across countries and, at all levels, state engagement and/or facilitation of organized crime has grown, with the Index finding human trafficking, arms trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes to have been the most affected. Corruption creates opportunities for illicit activities to thrive, as criminal groups are enabled to operate with reduced risks, while criminal infiltration of state institutions undermines countries' ability to build resilience and effectively shape policies to counter organized crime. Indeed, one of the strongest correlations found among the Index results is between state-embedded actors and overall resilience (–0.79). What this negative correlation suggests is that, as state-embedded actors grow in prominence in a particular area, levels of resilience decline.

FIGURE 1.8

Resilience vs state-embedded actors



finding 7

The **influence** of **foreign actors is growing**

While state-embedded actors continue to exert influence on organized crime flows globally, the increased power of foreign criminal groups suggests greater interconnectedness between transnational criminal networks. In a post-COVID world, the involvement of private military and security groups in conflict and crisis situations has created opportunities for foreign criminal actors to engage in illicit activities. More broadly, the growing pervasiveness of foreign criminal groups in 2022 is likely to be a reflection of the lifting of pandemic-related restrictions, particularly the reopening of country borders.

FIGURE 1.9

Influence of foreign actors by region, 2021 vs 2023



finding 8

Smuggling and **trafficking of people** are **on the rise**

While financial crimes trumped human trafficking as the most pervasive illicit economy, human trafficking has still increased since 2020. Globally, in 2022, there were over 100 million refugees and internally displaced persons – an enormous portion of whom had turned to smugglers to help them escape challenging circumstances. Profit-seeking criminals, from opportunistic individuals to large-scale professional networks, continue to smuggle people outside legal migration channels and across borders often in perilous conditions and at great human cost, leaving many irregular migrants vulnerable to exploitation. Violent conflicts, inequality and extreme weather conditions could drive further growth in this market.

FIGURE 1.10

The rise of human trafficking and human smuggling, global comparison, 2021 vs 2023



finding 9

The space for **non-state actors** as **vectors** for **resilience building** is **shrinking**

Non-state actors saw the largest decline in terms of their score since the 2021 Index of all 12 resilience building blocks. Within a global context in which state-embedded actors dominate the criminal landscape, the weakening role of non-state actors has significant implications for countries' vulnerability to organized crime, closing off alternative avenues for combating it. Civil society and the media can serve as watchdogs to hold state institutions to account, and many are closely engaged in communities heavily affected by organized crime. Yet tighter restrictions and censorship reduce the ability of non-state actors to serve as alternative sources of resilience to those provided by government. The substantive participation of all stakeholders – intergovernmental, state and non-state – in the conversation around the evolving threats of organized crime is critical in stepping up efforts to suppress and prevent organized crime, and reduce its impact on societies.

FIGURE 1.11

Resilience summary by indicator, 2021 vs 2023



finding 10

Those affected most by organized crime **are not prioritized**

As in 2021, the 'victim and witness support' indicator was the lowest-scoring resilience building block overall in the 2023 Index. This finding serves as a reminder of the fact that global anti-organized crime efforts often deploy a securitization approach, focusing on suppressing the activities of criminal actors. There is an apparent imbalance in this strategy, as it neglects those most affected by organized crime. The ramifications of this could be long-lasting and far-reaching, contributing to continued state fragility and greater vulnerability. It is therefore essential that these deficiencies in the safeguards protecting victims and witnesses be addressed.

FIGURE 1.12

Relative share of resilience indicator by resilience group



finding 11

Despite conflict and political fracture, **international cooperation has improved**

In contrast to the declining space for 'non-state actors' and the lack of support for those most affected by organized crime, the 2023 Index results show that international cooperation has improved globally. This may suggest that countries continue to move in the direction of institutional responses to combat illicit activities, leaving untapped a unique resource of local knowledge, capacity and skills that could complement state response frameworks. Paradoxically, however, fracture endures where collaboration should ideally prevail. International cooperation does not appear to be systematic globally. Rather, the division between democratic and autocratic states is apparent in countries' choice of whom to collaborate with. In that sense, true anti-organized crime cooperation on a global scale is challenging. Faced with an issue that transcends borders and politics, states need to intensify dialogue and work on mechanisms to implement and control commitments to fighting organized crime.

FIGURE 1.13

Regime type distribution by international cooperation score range

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2022; Global Organized Crime Index 2023

Geographic findings

finding 12

More countries have **high criminality rates** and **strong resilience frameworks**

The high criminality–high resilience category remains the one that features the fewest countries. The 2023 assessment shows that only 12 countries, up from nine in 2021, appear in this quadrant: China, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Arguably, this iteration's inclusion of new indicators, especially financial crimes, cyber-dependent crimes and private sector actors, is responsible for increased criminality levels in Costa Rica, Senegal and the United Kingdom.

FIGURE 1.14

Vulnerability classification, 2021 vs 2023 changes



finding 13

Europe shows the **greatest continental increase in criminality**, while resilience has grown only marginally

Continents that have previously shown high levels of resilience are assessed as vulnerable to organized crime, with Europe being a good example of that. Although the inclusion of new indicators has certainly affected criminality scores, the original 10 markets have increased in their own right, worsening the criminality environment on the continent. But while criminality is truly pervasive, affecting the entire continent albeit to a different extent, there is a clear division in levels of resilience. There is an apparent East-West divide, with countries in Eastern Europe still struggling to shake off their authoritarian legacies, which have defined organized crime dynamics and resilience frameworks, or the lack thereof, for the past three decades.

FIGURE 1.15

Score changes by indicator – Europe, 2021 vs 2023



*Indicators included in 2023

finding 14

Africa saw the **smallest continental increase in criminality**, but with increased scores across the 10 original criminal markets

The African continent saw the smallest increase in levels of criminality, despite all criminal actor types strengthening their presence on the continent in a post-COVID environment. That is largely due to the addition of new indicators bringing the average criminality scores down. While the COVID-19 pandemic has undeniably increased internet connectivity in Africa significantly,[23] the continent has been relatively slow to digitize.

Lack of development in the cyber domain has in turn prevented forms of cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled criminality from flourishing. If the original 10 markets and four criminal actor types were considered on their own, then the change in Africa's overall criminality rate would be much more significant, with an increase of 0.23 points, the second largest increase globally.

FIGURE 1.16

Criminality average changes between 2021 and 2023 by continent



finding 15

Asia has the highest average presence of criminal actors

The Asian continent saw a considerable spike in the prominence of criminal actors, especially criminal networks and foreign actors. The inclusion of the private sector as a criminal actor in this second edition of the Index is a recognition of the fact that the private sector is a key intermediary between the licit and the illicit and a vital facilitator of many criminal markets, from counterfeiting to transportation of goods, cyber-enabled crime and money laundering. And while the large increase in criminal actors in Asia was due to a rise in the scores for all four original typologies, it was the weight of the newly introduced private sector actors indicator that pushed the average score so high. Notably, private sector actors rank the highest in Asia when compared to other continents, and by a large margin.

FIGURE 1.17

Foreign actors score changes – Asia, 2021 vs 2023



02

About the Index

Based on the 2019 ENACT Organised Crime Index: Africa, the Global Organized Crime Index emerged as a key flagship tool of the GI-TOC. Providing a thorough, holistic view of organized crime dynamics, the Index evaluates all 193 UN member states in terms of the scope and scale of criminality, on the one hand, and their resilience, or ability to withstand and counteract organized crime activities, on the other. The aim of the Index is to provoke a constructive dialogue on the subject of organized crime and its impacts. By providing metrics-based data, the Index facilitates the work of different stakeholders in implementing strategies to counter illicit economies, and equips them with the means to measure the efficacy of their responses.

Index composition

Criminality under the Index

The first component of the Index – criminality – consists of two subcomponents: criminal markets and criminal actors. The former is defined as the political, social and economic systems surrounding all stages of the illicit trade in and/or exploitation of commodities or people. In this iteration of the Index, five additional markets have been added to the original 10, shown in bold in Figure 2.1. The full definitions of the criminal markets are available in Appendix 3 at the end of this report; they are also available to download from the dedicated Index platform ocindex.net.

BOX 2.1

Defining **organized crime**

For the purpose of the Global Organized Crime Index, 'organized crime' is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.



The second subcomponent of the criminality – criminal actors – assesses the structure and influence of five types of criminal actors: mafia-style groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors, foreign actors and private sector actors. It continues to be the case that not every one of the multitude of criminal groups around the globe would fit within a clear-cut category. It is with this in mind, that the five actor types that the Index delineates are broad in their characteristics, so as to cover as many criminal actor dynamics as possible.

FIGURE 2.1

Criminality indicators



CRIMINAL ACTORS

- ▲ **CA1.** Mafia-style groups
- ▲ **CA2.** Criminal networks
- ▲ **CA3.** State-embedded actors
- ▲ **CA4.** Foreign actors
- ▲ **CA5.** **Private sector actors**

CRIMINAL MARKETS

- **CM1.** Human trafficking
- **CM2.** Human smuggling
- **CM3.** **Extortion and protection racketeering**
- **CM4.** Arms trafficking
- **CM5.** **Trade in counterfeit goods**
- **CM6.** **Illicit trade in excisable goods**
- **CM7.** Flora crimes
- **CM8.** Fauna crimes
- **CM9.** Non-renewable resource crimes
- **CM10.** Heroin trade
- **CM11.** Cocaine trade
- **CM12.** Cannabis trade
- **CM13.** Synthetic drug trade
- **CM14.** **Cyber-dependent crimes**
- **CM15.** **Financial crimes**

Resilience under the Index

To produce a comprehensive and accurate depiction of the organized crime environment in different contexts to the fullest extent possible, the Index also assesses the quality and efficacy of national resilience measures. While the score for criminality allows stakeholders to identify threats and their potency, the resilience score speaks to the type and effectiveness of measures that states have in place to achieve solutions to the organized crime threats they face. Given the nature of organized crime and its varied dynamics across the world, resilience looks different in different contexts – interventions that work in one region, for example, may have little impact on levels of criminality in another. To account for the different problems posed by organized crime across a wide range of contexts, resilience measures, as defined under the Index, are far-reaching and multi-sectoral. Taken as a whole, the 12 resilience indicators form society's building blocks for providing holistic and sustainable responses to organized crime.

BOX 2.2

Defining **resilience**

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and disrupt organized criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries' measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

FIGURE 2.2

Resilience indicators

- **R1.** Political leadership and governance
- **R2.** Government transparency and accountability
- **R3.** International cooperation
- **R4.** National policies and laws
- **R5.** Judicial system and detention
- **R6.** Law enforcement
- **R7.** Territorial integrity
- **R8.** Anti-money laundering
- **R9.** Economic regulatory capacity
- **R10.** Victim and witness support
- **R11.** Prevention
- **R12.** Non-state actors



Methodology

This is an abridged version of the methodology applied in the research to compile the Index. To read the methodology in full, see the Index website ocindex.net, alongside the guiding questions that were used to assign and justify criminality and resilience scores.

Modelling an index is no easy feat, especially one that is intended to assess a phenomenon as clandestine as organized crime. The Global Organized Crime Index model thus proposes an alternative, commodity-driven assessment framework to measure illicit markets through a combination of scope and scale, value and impact. In this way, the Index aims to reconcile the information gaps other frameworks pose.

In summary, the Global Organized Crime Index is thus based on three key elements:

- The scope, scale and impact of 15 criminal markets
- The structure and influence of five criminal actor types
- The existence and capacity of countries to be resilient to organized crime, measured across 12 resilience building blocks

All countries in the Index are assigned a criminality score, which comprises two subcomponents: criminal markets and criminal actors. The assessment of the criminal markets subcomponent entails determining the monetary and non-monetary impact of a market (considering different factors such as the geographic concentration of the market, the number of people affected by or involved in the market, the presence of violence, the scarcity of the commodity illicitly traded). The criminal-actor evaluation encompasses the measurement of criminal groups' organizational capacity and level of sophistication, as well as their overall influence on the state and society more broadly. Countries are also assigned a resilience score in an effort to assess the level at which states have established the appropriate legal, political and strategic frameworks to address organized crime. The assessment of the 12 resilience indicators is centred on the issues of whether resilience measures or frameworks exist and whether these are effective in counteracting criminality in compliance with international human rights standards.

Both components are measured on a scale of 1 to 10. Whereas the criminality scale goes from lowest levels of criminality to highest levels of organized crime activity, the resilience scale shows the inverse. In other words, a score of 1 would indicate low levels of resilience, while a score of 10 indicates strong presence and effectiveness of frameworks that not only address current organized crime risks, but that are formulated to adapt to emerging threats.

Disclaimer: Small discrepancies of 0.01 in calculations of differences between 2021 and 2023 scores might occur due to binary round-off errors.

Index scoring process and limitations

To maintain consistency, every Index iteration undergoes the same multi-stage iterative development process. Preliminary country profiles outlining the context behind each criminality and resilience indicator for all 193 UN member states were constructed through open-source research. Following their completion, country profiles underwent two rounds of independent country and thematic scoring and evaluation by different experts. An additional round of geographic expert group verifications was then carried out to ensure regional score calibration and to serve as a check for country profile narratives, before country profiles were again assessed in a final round by GI-TOC observatories for global calibration purposes.

FIGURE 2.3
Index scoring process



Following up on previously identified limitations, necessary steps were taken to build a more accurate representation of organized crime globally, adding cross-cutting illicit activities such as financial crimes and cyber-dependent crimes under the Index framework. Given the addition of new indicators, however, general comparisons with the 2021 results should be approached with caution. Nevertheless, individual indicator and general resilience comparisons between the 2021 and 2023 Index iterations are valid.

Notably, corruption remains excluded from the Index as a standalone criminal market, but rather is captured as an aggravating factor when determining the scores for each of the 15 criminal markets. Furthermore, corruption is also reflected in the criminal actors and resilience components of the Index as a cross-cutting theme.

Finally, as an expert-led assessment, the Index may be subject to implicit and confirmation biases in both its development and the interpretation of its results. In response, the Index methodology was designed to limit these risks to the fullest extent possible through multiple independent and anonymized reviews, and standardized development guidelines.

How to read the representations of this report

Pyramid width and height

The **criminal markets** score is represented by the pyramid base size and the **criminal actors** score is represented by the pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.





Panel height

The **resilience score** is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

Global average score

The pyramid shape represents the criminality score, the simple average of the criminal markets and criminal actors scores. The global **criminality** score is **5.03,** composed of the global **criminal markets** score of **4.88** and the global criminal actors score of **5.19.** The global **resilience** score is **4.81**.



Коваль
Олексій

03

Global overview and results

Global context

As already outlined, one of the main findings of the Index is that levels of criminality are increasing worldwide, while resilience measures are falling short of meeting the threat. That critical gap, between growing levels of global criminality and the sustainable policy and civil society measures needed to address it, is widening. This deficit can be better understood when analyzed against the backdrop of a more fragmented and unstable global order.

The world that emerged from the pandemic is a paradox. On the one hand, the global community is more interconnected and reliant on the online tools that drive digitization. On the other, it is even more divided, plagued by greater inequality, instability and geopolitical tension. In a context of technological advances, deepening globalization, political crises and conflict, criminal actors find opportunistic openings for illicit trade by taking advantage of these dynamics.

Organized crime has found ways to adapt to and exploit specific vulnerabilities. Opportunities seized by organized crime arise in some cases from abundant availability of resources that can be illegally exchanged, and in others from scarcity, or by exploiting their targets' online presence and data. For this reason, it is worth remembering that contextual differences matter, as emphasized in the findings of the previous report. While the Index shows how transnational organized crime changes and develops at a macro level, it also allows users to focus on particular regions or countries and specific markets to understand how criminal economies have been shaped and resilience measures designed according to individual contexts. In brief, every country has its own peculiar characteristics – what makes one vulnerable to organized crime may be irrelevant to another, and vulnerability may be attributed to factors beyond a state's control.

FIGURE 3.1

Criminality scores by continent



#1 ASIA | #2 AFRICA | #3 AMERICAS | #4 EUROPE | #5 OCEANIA

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
ASIA	5.47 +0.18	5.41 +0.20	5.53 +0.15	4.34 -0.12
AFRICA	5.25 +0.08	5.05 +0.11	5.45 +0.05	3.85 +0.05
AMERICAS	5.20 +0.13	4.89 +0.19	5.51 +0.08	4.80 -0.03
EUROPE	4.74 +0.26	4.60 +0.40	4.88 +0.12	6.27 +0.04
OCEANIA	3.23 +0.16	3.28 +0.30	3.19 +0.02	5.55 +0.09
GLOBAL AVERAGE	5.03 +0.16	4.88 +0.22	5.19 +0.09	4.81 -0.00

It is important to emphasize therefore that countries may have similar scores for very different reasons. This principle also applies to the newly added indicators. In the case of financial crimes, for example, while major financial hubs are evidently vulnerable to this crime type (due to the concentration of wealthy citizens and corporations and widespread adoption of financial technology), they are by no means the only targets. Countries with weaker financial regulation may also experience pervasive financial crime markets and therefore score similarly.

The following sections provide a snapshot of the Index results in terms of global trends of criminality and resilience over time. The findings are presented by thematic area – namely, criminal markets, criminal actors and resilience. These are followed by a geographic analysis of the results by continent.

FIGURE 3.2

Criminality map





FIGURE 3.3

Criminality

Highest-scoring countries



#1
MYANMAR
8.15 ↗ +0.56



#2
COLOMBIA
7.75 ↗ +0.09



#3
MEXICO
7.57 ↗ +0.01



#4
PARAGUAY
7.52 ↗ +0.82



#5
CONGO, DEM. REP.
7.35 ↘ -0.40



#6
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

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

#8
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

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

#9
LEBANON
7.10 ↗ +0.34

Lowest-scoring countries



#193
TUVALU
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

#192
SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE
1.70 ↘ -0.08



#191
NAURU
2.05 ↗ +0.29



#190
LIECHTENSTEIN
2.27 ↗ +0.40



#188
VANUATU
2.43 ↗ +0.23



#188
SAMOA
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

#187
KIRIBATI
2.45 ↗ +0.10



#186
MARSHALL ISLANDS
2.52 ↗ +0.21



#185
MONACO
2.58 ↗ +0.16



#184
DOMINICA
2.63 0.00

Global criminal markets

The global average for the criminality component stood at 5.03 out of 10, or 0.16 points higher than in 2021 (refer to Appendix 4 for the complete scores). Analysis of the results shows that the global criminality score would have still increased if only the original 10 criminal markets were considered, and that the growth would have been even greater, with a global criminality average of 5.10. This suggests that the five new criminal markets are less pervasive on average, globally, than the original 10.

However, one of the new markets, financial crimes, was found to be the most pervasive globally (at 5.98). In fact, financial crime ranks among the three most pervasive criminal markets in every continent except in the Americas, where it is one of the five most prominent. After financial crimes and human trafficking (5.82), the illicit trade in cannabis (5.34) and arms trafficking (5.21) were identified as the third and fourth most prevalent markets globally.

All the criminal markets in the 2021 Index grew in pervasiveness globally in the current data period, with the global score for human smuggling increasing the most (+0.39), followed by illicit trade in synthetic drugs (+0.33) and cocaine (+0.30). By contrast, the heroin market saw the least movement in 2023, increasing by just 0.10 points.

FIGURE 3.4

Criminal markets, global averages



New criminal markets

Emerging crimes, especially those facilitated by the internet, are a universal threat and are reportedly growing. In the post-pandemic context, financial inequalities are more apparent, the intersection between public and private actors involved in corruption is closer, and politics and conflict drive countries' vulnerability to organized crime. The new criminality indicators have been included to provide a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the global organized crime landscape and to 'level the playing field'. In other words, countries that may have not experienced pervasive levels of criminality when scored using the original criminal markets or actors may now see their criminality scores rise with the inclusion of these additions, and vice versa. No country is untouched by organized crime, although the way it manifests from country to country may be vastly different.

When exploring the Index's new criminality indicators, it is impossible not to notice how many are significantly influenced by evolving global trends. Financial crimes, as defined by the Index, encompass various offences from traditional illicit practices, such as tax evasion and misuse of funds, to more sophisticated forms of embezzlement and fraud. These crimes are enabled by the internet, carry comparably little risk for the perpetrator and have exploited people's remote working patterns that became normative during the pandemic lockdowns and have largely persisted since. While society's growing online presence has created opportunities for development, cyber-criminals have become adept at harnessing technology and preying on vulnerabilities, at great expense to states, corporations and individuals. The impact of financial crime is exacerbated by high levels of impunity and often a lack of concern about how damaging this form of crime is, compounded by the fact that it is commonly perceived as a non-violent and victimless offence.

FIGURE 3.5

Countries under high influence of financial crimes (scores equal to or greater than 5.50)



BOX 3.1

The scope of **financial crimes**

'Financial crime' is a broad term describing non-violent crime that results in financial loss to the state, an entity or individuals. This category comprises various kinds of criminal activities. The definition above was thus needed to capture the broad scope of offences. It is, nonetheless, important to have limits to avoid double counting certain criminal activities under different criminal markets. There is a risk of double counting when assessing traditional financial crimes that are enabled by technology. For the purposes of the Index, we therefore distinguish between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes to ensure that the same offences are not counted twice, ensuring greater accuracy and consistency in the results. For example, under our definition, phishing scams would be classified as cyber-enabled financial crimes, thereby being assessed under the financial crimes market.

Another feature of the financial crimes market is the fact that money laundering is not assessed as part of it. This stems from money laundering's characterization as a secondary crime, linked to illicit proceeds of a predicate offence. As the predicate crimes are already assessed under the various criminal markets, the secondary offence – money laundering – is not included under the financial crimes market but only under the primary market. One exception is when money laundering occurs as a result of fraud or another offence that is classified as financial crime under this Index.

Similar features are also seen in many forms of cyber-dependent crime. Such crimes are reportedly on the rise globally due to increased digitalization. Despite often being described as 'borderless', the impact of cyber-dependent crimes is largely felt at the national level, as critical infrastructures, institutional websites and industries are often the targets. While cyber-enabled crimes are activities that may make use of internet technology but also occur in physical markets, cyber-dependent crimes require information and communication technologies (ICT) and are committed solely online.

In perpetrating both financial and cyber-dependent crimes, private sector actors are often central, though frequently overlooked by analyses of organized crime dynamics. This category refers to profit-seeking individuals and entities, such as multinational companies, lawyers or bankers, that are part of the legal non-state economy and, unlawfully taking advantage of their role and position, engage in illicit practices, either collaborating with organized crime groups or facilitating their activities. Criminals may in fact exploit legitimate channels of commerce, and, in turn, the private sector may engage in organized crime in a number of ways, including through corrupt practices, by serving as informants (i.e. providing information to criminals), and by supporting criminal groups in laundering their illegal proceeds and providing legal support using unethical means.

Financial crime is particularly globalized, most likely because of the many forms of criminal activity that this market encompasses. Indeed, it was found to have a significant to severe influence in 132 countries, or almost 70% of the UN member states.[24] These numbers clearly demonstrate that financial crimes are present to a great extent globally, regardless of countries' resilience, economic status, development or political stability. Nevertheless, it is worth recognizing that although the majority of countries suffer the effects of financial crime, how it manifests in each country depends on the local context.

The cyber-dependent crimes market is also prevalent in countries all along the political and economic spectrum. This, undoubtedly, is due to the nature of the cyber-domain, which

is nowadays accessible to the vast majority of the world's population. Despite its growing prominence, the cyber-dependent crimes market ranked as the 12th most pervasive market out of 15, with a score of 4.55, below the global average criminal markets score of 4.88. This relatively low average score is perhaps a result of what is being measured here, namely cyber-dependent, as opposed to cyber-enabled, activities. Although cyber-dependent crime is not ranked among the highest scoring criminal markets, country narratives highlight the incredible speed at which this particular group of offences has grown in a very short time span, and it is likely that this trend will continue in the coming years.

Although they are not often as newsworthy as other forms of organized crime, the trade in counterfeit goods and the illicit trade in excisable goods have been included in this edition of the Index, as they are major criminal economies, often prevalent in contexts where such commodities are among the limited livelihood options available. The impact of these two markets is significant, as they result in financial losses to the economy and fiscus, and can pose risks to the safety and security of people (in the case of counterfeit medicines, for example). Moreover, they may be indicators of other illegal practices, as they often overlap with other illegal economies. It is therefore crucial to observe how these markets develop, including how such activities are increasingly carried out online.

Finally, extortion and protection racketeering – long-standing and prevalent forms of organized crime – were also included together as a new criminal market indicator. Various criminal actor types engage in these practices, but they are primarily associated with mafia-style groups. Importantly, while extortion and protection racketeering are historically linked to territorial market control, other forms of virtual extortion facilitated by the internet, such as cyber-sextortion, are on the rise globally.

In terms of markets in which humans are the commodity, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of reported human trafficking victims fell for the first time in 20 years,[25] although this probably does not fully reflect an actual decline in exploitative practices. The lifting of travel restrictions following the easing of lockdowns made human mobility less of a challenge and illicit flows of people re-emerged. Since 2021, human trafficking has grown by 0.24 points with a global score of 5.82, ranking second among the criminal markets. Human smuggling saw the sharpest increase of all markets, rising by 0.39 points. Human smuggling remains less pervasive than human trafficking and ranked fifth, with an overall global score of 5.16. In 2022, the ongoing crisis in Syria was responsible for one of the largest displacement emergencies globally.[26] Another influential event that had a distinct effect on global human smuggling flows was the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Following the August 2021 events, Afghani nationals in large numbers sought ways to leave the country, moving primarily to Iran and Pakistan but also to Europe, increasing the scores for countries along the major smuggling routes.

The third people-based criminal market, extortion and protection racketeering, ranked lowest, with an global score of 4.02. The lower prevalence of this market can probably be explained in terms of how it is defined under the Index, where acts of extortion and protection racketeering perpetrated by state officials are excluded from the scoring.

Of the four drug markets, the cannabis trade (5.34) ranked third highest in prevalence globally, behind financial crimes and human trafficking. Despite measures taken in many countries to decriminalize the use of cannabis, the market has increased by 0.24 points since 2021. Cannabis continues to be illegal in many countries around the world, and even in states where use has been decriminalized, a black market for production and distribution often persists alongside the legal market. The low cost and relative ease of production are major drivers behind the prevalence of the cannabis market.

BOX 3.2

Legalization of **cannabis use**

The rising trend around the world to decriminalize cannabis use has heightened the inconsistencies and discrepancies that already existed under international law, which makes it difficult to assess illicit cannabis markets. For instance, in the US, as of June 2023,[27] 38 states had legalized the medical use of cannabis, while 23 had legalized recreational use through state legislation, despite the prohibition set forth under the relevant federal laws. This discrepancy has created not only an overlap between federal and state legislation, but also difficulties in distinguishing legal and illegal cannabis markets, and determining concrete conclusions on this already challenging market in the jurisdiction. Importantly, however, although many countries have legalized or decriminalized cannabis consumption, illicit production and trade remain major organized crime problems. The Index tracks how, and to what extent, the legal market for cannabis has interacted with the illicit one, and scores the impact of the latter.

The markets for synthetic drugs (4.95) and cocaine (4.82) increased slightly more than the cannabis trade (by +0.33 and +0.30, respectively), but still fell behind it in terms of overall scores. Heroin was identified as the least pervasive of the drug markets (4.08), having gone up by only 0.10 points since 2021 – the smallest increase among the 10 original markets by a significant margin. The minimal rise may be explained by the war in Ukraine, which has disrupted major heroin flows from Afghanistan to the Caucasus and through the Black Sea,[28] and research shows little indication of a rise in heroin supplies on other major routes, including the Turkish–Bulgarian corridor, arguably the major transit point for heroin in Europe, which hosts one of the largest consumer markets.[29]

Conflict zones are magnets for firearms, with spillover of weapons being a well-documented phenomenon.[30] In regions experiencing instability,

such as Africa and Western Asia (among others), where weapon depots have supplied insurgents and organized crime for decades, the global trade for illicit arms (5.21) increased by 0.29 since 2021, with the market for arms now identified as the fourth most pervasive globally.

One of the main sources of fracture in 2022 was triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If previous conflicts are any indication, one of the major emerging threats, come the end of Russian hostilities, would be uncontrolled stockpiles of arms in Ukraine, including the Russian–occupied regions. However, no sizable outflow of arms from conflict zones westward was recorded during the reporting period.[31] If not properly dealt with, Ukraine risks becoming a weapons depot feeding insurgents and organized crime groups for decades to come.

The illicit trade in counterfeit goods ranked sixth of the criminal markets, with a score of 4.98 out of 10 – just below the global criminal markets average. Although around 75% of global counterfeit products are reported to stem from China,[32] the societal impact of this market is extensive and global. For example, counterfeit vaccines and other medications endanger the health of consumers, while fake goods divert revenue from the formal economy. Contrary to a common misperception, and the fact that this market is accepted as the norm in some communities, the trade in counterfeit goods is not a victimless crime. While engaging in counterfeit trade may offer livelihoods to impoverished communities, often transnational flows of counterfeit items are monopolized by larger organized crime groups[33] who may also engage in other forms of crime. Moreover, the counterfeit goods market often overlaps with other illicit economies, such as child labour and exploitation in the production of these products.

The illicit trade in excisable consumer goods ranked lower than the trade in counterfeit goods, at 11th place, with a score of 4.59. Criminal groups exploit regulatory weaknesses to avoid paying excise taxes, generating profits by smuggling and selling goods subject to tariffs and duties at a lower cost than their equivalents in the legal economy. Despite posing a threat to businesses and the legitimate economy, the impact of the illicit trade in excisable goods is assessed as not overly pervasive globally, with an average score of 4.59.

Excluding the standalone cyber-dependent crimes market, the lowest scoring criminal market grouping globally was environmental crimes. All three environmental crime markets ranked below the global markets average. Of these, fauna crimes (4.83) were found to be the most pervasive, followed by non-renewable resource crimes (4.75) and flora crimes (4.06). Despite their comparably low prevalence, all three markets increased in pervasiveness by 0.20, 0.24 and 0.18, respectively. Given the vast array of wildlife and animal parts that are traded illicitly along supply chains around the world, it may not be surprising that fauna crimes ranked highest of the environmental markets. By contrast, the demand for exotic flora is much less pronounced globally. This market includes illegal logging, which is unevenly distributed around the world. The prevalence of non-renewable resource crimes is a function of the monopoly of state actors over non-renewables and to an extent over the infrastructure necessary for extraction and processing. The fact that management of primary resources is often in the hands of the state opens up opportunities for malpractice and is likely to be behind the increase.

Global criminal actors

FIGURE 3.6

Criminal actors, global averages



The average global score for criminal actors was 5.19 out of 10. Mirroring the 2021 findings, the criminal actors subcomponent was again the primary factor in driving up the overall global criminality score (5.03, as an average of criminal markets and criminal actors).

Breaking the results down by actor type, state-embedded actors continued to dominate the criminal landscape as the primary conduit for organized crime worldwide, with an average score of 5.95. Their influence is shown to have increased against the 2021 findings by a considerable margin of 0.20 points.

The continued reach and influence that all criminal actor types exert, however, is also important to recognize. Criminal networks (5.66), for instance, remained the second most influential actor, and recorded the second largest increase (+0.21) since the 2021 Index was published. Foreign actors ranked third (5.54) and recorded the largest increase (+0.26). Finally, mafia-style groups (4.02) also increased their average score globally, albeit to a lesser extent than other actor types (+0.13). Mafia-style groups were again found to be the least pervasive globally, even outranked in a global comparison by the new actor type, private sector actors (4.76).

Despite their relative levels of influence, the increases that have been consistently observed in all criminal actor indicators show that, regardless of the structure of criminal groups or the origin of their members, the perpetrators of organized crime have all expanded their reach and levels of penetration in 2022. On the one hand, thanks to the criminal opportunities offered by the cyber-space, they have found new domains where they can exert their influence, and on the other, they have allegedly exploited the challenges of the post-COVID global order to consolidate their activities.

Taken as a whole, the results underscore how criminal actors that are part of or act from within the state apparatus continue to be a major impediment to the development and implementation of effective anti-organized crime strategies. To quantify the extent of the risk, the results demonstrate that state-embedded actors have significant or severe influence in 122 of the 193 countries assessed here, or more than 60% of

the sample. Conversely, the data identifies state-embedded actors as having little or no influence in only 36 countries, or around 19% of the sample.

Although it is by no means the case that all office holders of the state are engaged in or facilitate criminality, statistically, the widespread presence of state-embedded actors in general is concerning. The countries most affected by the impact of state-embedded actors continue to be primarily authoritarian regimes. Of those countries where state-embedded actors were found to have a severe influence (i.e. those that scored 7.50 or above for this actor type), 40 (54%) were classified as authoritarian regimes under the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2022 Democracy Index.[34] Among those countries where the state-embedded actors indicator was 9.0 or above, 85% fall under the Democracy Index's authoritarian regime classification. This finding supports the idea that in countries characterized by absence of rule of law and democracy, where accountability and government transparency mechanisms are opaque and civil society participation is restricted, state-controlled organized crime appears to proliferate virtually unfettered, compromising their ability to protect citizens and encourage development.

As the second most pervasive actor both globally and within all continents, criminal networks form a critical link between other criminal actors and illicit markets. This is an unambiguous relationship, shown by the high positive correlation (+0.84) between the criminal networks indicator and the overall criminal actors subcomponent. Put simply, high criminal network scores are a good predictor of the existence of other influential criminal actor types in the same geography. Given the role of criminal networks in national and transnational crime dynamics, it is arguable that much could be gained from law-enforcement efforts to disrupt criminal flows if the operations of these groups were more effectively targeted.

Additionally, foreign actors (a grouping comprising criminal networks, mafia-style groups, private sector actors and state-embedded actors who are simply operating outside of their home country) are inextricably linked to domestic criminal networks, as exemplified by the moderately positive correlation (+0.53) observed between the two types of criminal actor. A key point is that, while in many cases criminal markets feature foreign actors from all over the world, it is largely groups from the borderlands of neighbouring countries that drive up the foreign actors' scores. This usually happens as a consequence of the spillover risk that neighbouring countries may experience due to their contiguity and the difficulty of protecting borders when criminality is high and actors are particularly pervasive. A case in point is Bosnia and Herzegovina, an attractive location for foreign criminal actors from many of the neighbouring countries in the Balkans, including Serbian and Croatian criminal groups.

BOX 3.3

Defining **foreign actors**

The foreign actors grouping is included in the Index to help provide a more accurate picture of the organized crime dynamics in specific environments. By definition, 'foreign actor' refers to any type of criminal actor that operates outside of their home country. Taking perhaps the most famous example of a diasporic criminal organization, the Italian mafia would be categorized as a mafia-style group when assessing these actors in their home territory, Italy. However, these same organizations would be assessed under the foreign actors criminal actor type in the case of other countries in which they operate. Methodologically, there is no overlap between foreign actors and other actor categories when the assessment of a single country is concerned.

As mentioned, mafia-style groups continue to be the least pervasive actor type by a large margin. The only continent where these actors exert a strong influence over criminal markets is the Americas, where these groups – primarily in the form of 'narco-cartels' – rank third, and where the gap between their scores and those of other actor types is significantly smaller than for other continents. Mafia-style groups are characterized by territorial control and defined leadership structures, but they also maintain strong transnational connections and links to corrupted state elites, enabling them to amplify the range of their operations and adapt to an increasingly globalized criminal economy.

The score for the newly added indicator of private sector actors (4.76) reflects the degree to which private entities collaborate or cooperate with other criminal actors, giving their criminal counterparts access to legal economies (see Box 3.4).

BOX 3.4

Private sector actors

The private sector is often thought of as a victim of organized crime, with criminal activities affecting legitimate businesses, either through the insecurity created by certain crimes or by direct acts of crime, such as extortion. That said, the private sector has also become a key facilitator of and participant in organized crime, bridging the licit and illicit economies. Private sector involvement in organized crime ranges from facilitating laundering of unlawfully obtained revenue to participating in criminal activities through collusion. Private sector actors engage in several criminal markets, including financial crimes, especially tax evasion and embezzlement, as well as smuggling activities. Certain industries, such as construction, real estate, hospitality and transportation, are particularly susceptible to the influence of organized crime. It is therefore essential to take into consideration the involvement of these actors in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the global criminal landscape.

FIGURE 3.7

Criminal actors: distribution by score range



Global resilience

FIGURE 3.8
Resilience map



Global score for
Resilience
4.81 ↘ -0.00

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 10 NO DATA



FIGURE 3.9

Resilience

Highest-scoring countries



#1
FINLAND
8.63 ↗ +0.21



#2
LIECHTENSTEIN
8.46 ↗ +0.04



#3
ICELAND
8.21 ↗ +0.17



#4
DENMARK
8.13 ↘ -0.08



#5
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
8.08 ↗ +0.54



#6
ANDORRA
7.96 ↗ +0.21



#7
NORWAY
7.92 0.00



#8
ESTONIA
7.88 ↗ +0.04



#8
NEW ZEALAND
7.88 ↘ -0.50



#10
SINGAPORE
7.83 ↗ +0.13

Lowest-scoring countries



#193
AFGHANISTAN
1.50 ↘ -1.17



#192
LIBYA
1.54 0.00



#191
MYANMAR
1.63 ↘ -1.79



#190
YEMEN
1.75 ↘ -0.25



#187
SOMALIA
1.79 ↗ +0.13

#187
KOREA, DPR
1.79 ↘ -0.17



#187
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
1.79 ↘ -0.13



#185
VENEZUELA
1.88 ↘ -0.04



#185
SOUTH SUDAN
1.88 ↗ +0.04



#184
SYRIA
1.92 ↗ +0.04

The 12 indicators that make up the resilience component remained the same as in the 2021 Index. Overall, very minor changes in resilience were observed globally under the 2023 Index (which stood unchanged at a global average of 4.81) and the order of highest- to lowest-scoring indicators was also more or less unchanged. That is not to say, however, that there were no changes in national and regional dynamics. It is important to look past the macro-level averages and assess the regional and national complexities that predicate the ability of a state to deal with and withstand the threat of organized crime.

FIGURE 3.10

Average global resilience scores by indicator



Indeed, the global resilience context has altered significantly, as seen in the fact that the proportion of people living in conditions of low resilience to organized crime has decreased significantly to 61.9%, down from 79.4% two years ago. Although this difference of almost 17.5 percentage points may appear counterintuitive given that the global resilience score has remained largely unchanged, it is worth observing here that a minor change in one country's resilience score can affect the overall balance, if that country happens to be heavily populated.

The reason for the change can be explained by China, which as a result of a slight improvement in its resilience score (marginally increasing from 5.46 in 2021 to 5.67 in 2023), has moved over the 5.50 midpoint, from the high criminality–low resilience category into the high criminality–high resilience one. The modest shift is mainly due to China's adoption, in December 2021, of its first Anti-Organized Crime Law and its increased efforts in combating money laundering, among others. Given the country's immense population of 1.4 billion, this has had a sizeable impact on reducing the percentage of the world population reported to be living in conditions of low resilience.

Although resilience building blocks are measured independently of each other as standalone indicators, there are common characteristics among them. This allows for the grouping of indicators under categories, which makes analysis of trends possible. From the resilience scores, it can be interpreted that indicators in the leadership and governance group (see Figure 3.10) continue to form the basis of states' preferred tools to tackle criminality – at the expense of social and economic-based ones. The global average of the indicators making up this group was 5.10 out of 10, a slight increase compared to 2021. States' expressed intentions of tackling organized crime are evident in the high scores for 'international cooperation' (5.87) and 'national policies and laws' (5.48). Undoubtedly, states' ratification of and participation in international conventions, as well as their engagement with partners on common issues and the presence of sound national legislative frameworks, are all central in curbing transnational organized crime. Nevertheless, deficiencies in transparency and accountability as well as in governance can impede these efforts. Average scores for indicators such as 'political leadership and governance' (4.70) and especially 'government transparency and accountability' (4.36) are comparably low. In fact, scores for both resilience building blocks declined globally over the last two years, with the latter identified as the second lowest indicator on average, above only 'victim and witness support' (4.24).

Institutional efforts to address criminality continue to be favoured by states at the expense of more holistic approaches, involving cooperation with non-state actors. This is evident in the scores for 'judicial system and detention' (4.54), 'law enforcement' (4.87) and 'territorial integrity' (5.06). With a focus on criminal justice and security, these indicators collectively averaged the second highest resilience category (4.82). Despite its undeniable significance in suppressing aspects of organized crime, overreliance on securitization responses, combined with the issues plaguing many state institutions, including underfunding, capacity and corruption, risks having the opposite effect by hampering anti-organized crime measures or, worse, becoming a driver of criminality.

In terms of civil society and social protection measures, the 2023 results show a marked imbalance between securitization and victim-centric, non-state-actor-facilitated approaches. The civil society and social protection indicators had the lowest average of all the resilience groupings (4.50). Although the 'non-state actors' indicator (4.72) fared comparably well against the overall resilience average, it is the one indicator that declined the most (–0.16). Meanwhile, 'victim and witness support' scored 4.24, suggesting, broadly, failings in prioritizing the very systems designed to protect those most at risk of the harms of organized crime. Proactive measures

aimed at mitigating the impact of organized crime and curbing the phenomenon in general, measured by the 'prevention' indicator (4.55), are also underdeveloped. Taken together, these deficits and the discrepancy between priority given to state-run initiatives and under-reliance on civil-society-driven approaches could have a lasting negative impact on society. These factors could serve to intensify social fracturing and generate conditions that criminal elements could exploit.

If there is one takeaway that stands out from this iteration of the Index, it would be the omnipresence of the financial crimes market. Against this, the two economic-focused resilience indicators, 'anti-money laundering' (4.71) and 'economic regulatory capacity' (4.67), score just below the global resilience average (4.81). A well-regulated economic sector serves to support legal economic development and impede organized crime's access to legitimate markets. Although the economic and financial grouping (4.69) does not reflect all types of financial criminality included under the Index definition, it is critical nonetheless that efforts to improve economic-focused resilience are stepped up globally.

04



Continental overviews and results

Asia



Asia overall score for

Criminality

5.47 ↗ +0.18

CRIMINALITY SCORES

1 10 NO DATA



Asia overall score for

Resilience

4.34 ↘ -0.12

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 10 NO DATA

FIGURE 4.1
Index scores, Asia



#1 WESTERN ASIA | #2 SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA | #3 SOUTHERN ASIA | #4 EASTERN ASIA | #5 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
WESTERN ASIA	6.02 +0.24	6.00 +0.17	6.05 +0.31	4.23 -0.21
SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	5.82 +0.36	5.88 +0.45	5.75 +0.28	4.45 -0.13
SOUTHERN ASIA	5.46 +0.16	5.41 +0.16	5.50 +0.16	3.94 -0.09
EASTERN ASIA	4.80 -0.04	4.71 +0.09	4.90 -0.18	5.63 +0.13
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS	4.48 -0.03	4.18 +0.03	4.78 -0.10	3.99 -0.13
ASIA AVERAGE	5.47 +0.18	5.41 +0.20	5.53 +0.15	4.34 -0.12

Of all the continents, Asia exhibits the highest levels of criminality (at 5.47 out of 10). The continent has a large number of highly pervasive criminal markets (5.41), although their influence varies greatly depending on the subregions. Indeed, Asia is reported to have either the highest or second highest average score globally for seven of the 15 criminal markets. Human trafficking (7.0) continues to be the most pervasive illicit market in Asia, predominantly taking the form of online sexual exploitation, bride trafficking, domestic slavery and forced labour. The continent is also a global hub for financial crimes, scoring the highest in the world for this market (6.61). From embezzlement of state funds and tax evasion fraud, which reportedly occur in most of the countries of the Persian Gulf,[35] to online scams targeting victims in many countries of South-eastern Asia, financial crimes are a significant source of profit for a wide range of malicious actors operating in Asia.

The synthetic drug trade (6.48) is also widespread on the continent, with many of these drugs sourced and produced here. Many Asian countries are global epicentres for Captagon and methamphetamine production, among others. The continent also experiences a high prevalence of human smuggling (6.07) and trade in counterfeit goods (5.59). By contrast, the cocaine trade (3.23), extortion and protection racketing (4.53) and flora crimes (4.45) were identified as the three least pervasive criminal markets in Asia, although the continent still scores comparatively higher than others for these.

Despite these high-scoring, multiple illicit economies, the criminality average for the continent is driven by the extensive presence of criminal actors (5.53). In Asia, all criminal actor types – except mafia-style groups – scored above the global average. State-embedded actors, who exert immense control in many countries, were identified as the most influential typology on the continent (6.63), in line with global trends. These are followed by criminal networks (5.97), foreign actors (5.45) and private sector actors (5.25).

Although ranked fourth most pervasive at the continental level, private sector actors in Asia have the highest score globally.

Resilience to organized crime in Asia is generally poor, with an average score of 4.34, making it the second least resilient continent (after Africa). Many responses and protection mechanisms were found to be lacking or largely ineffective in combating the pervasiveness of criminal markets and actors, especially in cases where state-embedded actors profit from illicit activities. The space for civil society and the presence of social protection frameworks were considered to be particularly weak, and Asia ranked the lowest globally for the 'non-state actors' indicator. On the other hand, although still below the global averages, the continent performed slightly better in terms of 'international cooperation' (5.29), 'national policies and laws' (4.88), and 'territorial integrity' (4.67). Like other continents, this indicates that although commitments might be expressed on paper, effective implementation of a comprehensive strategy against organized crime is lacking.

FIGURE 4.2

Criminal market scores, Asia



Given Asia's vast expanse and myriad criminal activities, whose impact is felt across the continent, it is useful to break down the analysis into regions to provide a more local picture of criminality patterns and their impact. Three out of the five regions in Asia (Western, South-eastern and Southern) rank among the top 10 in the world for criminality. The diversity of criminal activities that take place there makes it necessary to compare the regions in further detail to better identify and understand trends and patterns.

For example, while levels of human trafficking in all the regions in Asia were high, with none scoring below 5.50, this market is particularly rife in Western Asia, with a regional average of 7.71 out of 10. Indeed, 11 of the 14 countries in Western Asia scored 7.50 or higher for this market. Long-lasting conflict and insecurity in countries like Syria and Yemen, and the consequent poverty, unemployment and social disintegration make many in the region particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Moreover, the controversial but still widespread practice of the traditional Kafala sponsorship system often leads to conditions of exploitation. Many Southern Asians seek work in the Gulf, so it is perhaps unsurprising that Southern Asia followed Western Asia as the second highest region on the continent for human trafficking, with a score of 7.56. Given the overlap between human trafficking and smuggling, Western Asia and Southern Asia were also identified as the highest scoring regions on the continent for human smuggling (6.96 and 6.94, respectively). By contrast, extortion and protection racketeering was assessed as comparably less pervasive across the continent. Southern Asia scored highest for this market (5.56), followed by South-eastern Asia (5.14).

Illicit trade in various commodities is also concentrated in particular subregions of Asia. In Western Asia, for example, the mass movement of arms, often recycled from past conflicts, has turned the region into a hotbed for arms trafficking. The region's score was 7.43 – by far the highest of the five regions, and second globally. By contrast, criminal markets involving illicit trade in common consumer commodities – in the form of counterfeit goods and excise goods – are most pervasive in South-eastern Asia, where they scored 6.32 and 5.91, respectively. Counterfeit goods are a significant challenge in this region, particularly due to its proximity to China, the world's major source for counterfeit products (China scores a hefty 9.50 for this criminal market). In South-eastern Asian countries, including Malaysia and Thailand, a range of counterfeit products are manufactured, from luxury goods to pharmaceuticals, food products and automotive parts. Many countries in the region also experience high levels of illicit trade in excise goods, including alcohol and tobacco.

Although the synthetic drug trade dominates the continent, Asia is also riddled with other sizeable illicit drug economies in the form of large source, transit and consumption markets. Western Asia, for example, is the highest scoring region for the cannabis trade (6.21), although this is overshadowed by its large synthetic drugs market, for which the region has the highest score in the world (7.39). Syria, with a score of 10.0 for this market,[36] has become the main global producer of Captagon, and its economic reliance on the production and trafficking of this drug has led to the country's characterization as a 'narco-state'.[37] Similarly, Iran has increasingly become a key corridor for synthetic drugs (9.50), largely shipments of crystal meth from Afghanistan.[38] Following closely behind, South-eastern Asia ranked second for synthetic drugs on the continent (7.23). Here, Myanmar features the highest possible score (10.0). Since the February 2021 military coup in the country, drug production has sky-rocketed amid political instability, solidifying Myanmar's position as one of the world's premier source countries for methamphetamine, followed by the heroin trade (9.50). Fifth in the world for the synthetic drug trade is Eastern Asia (6.30), whose regional average is driven by the high score assigned to China for this market indicator (8.0). Synthetic drugs are widely used by the Chinese and the country is also a source hub for multiple foreign markets.

South and Central Asia and the Caucasus, meanwhile, lie on major transit routes, particularly for drugs. Almost all the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus are transit points in the transnational heroin market, given their proximity to the major global producer, Afghanistan. For this reason, it is not surprising that the region had the highest score globally for this market (6.31), with Tajikistan leading the list of most impacted countries (8.50). The Southern Asia heroin market (6.19) is also heavily influenced by Afghanistan, where heroin made from Afghan opium continues to make up 95% of the market for this drug in Europe.[39] The Taliban's takeover in August 2021 exacerbated the situation and increased the country's role as source hub, and despite the Taliban's announcement of a ban on poppy cultivation in April 2022, the country's central role in the global heroin trade persists. Compared to the scale of the other drug markets in the region, the cocaine trade in Asia remains relatively small, with no region on the continent scoring above 4.50 for this market.

BOX 4.1

The ban on poppy cultivation **by the Taliban**

Afghanistan has long been the world's largest opium producer, with an estimated 80% of global supply produced in the country. Following the (re)takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban forces in August 2021, a decree was published in April 2022 prohibiting the cultivation, trade and export of poppy seeds in the country, an intervention that caused opium prices to soar worldwide. However, the ban was enforced inconsistently by the Taliban authorities in 2022, and the illicit opium trade continues to be one of the greatest sources of income for the country.[40] Even though the Taliban had previously imposed a similar ban to eradicate the illicit opium trade, which translated to a significant supply decrease before 2001, similar tangible results were not observed in 2022.

Environmental crimes also make up a large component of Asia's criminal landscape. South-eastern Asia's fauna and flora crimes markets are the highest scoring in the world, with scores of 7.23 and 6.18, respectively. As well as a booming transit zone, the region is a major source for trafficked wildlife. Vietnam (9.0), Laos (8.50), Myanmar (8.50) and Cambodia (8.50) were all highlighted as key hubs for the trafficking of endangered fauna species, including pangolin and tiger.

Animal parts and products are still sold in physical markets in Asia, but illicit activity has increasingly moved to online platforms.[41] Although it is not counted as part of the South-eastern Asia region, China exerts a huge regional influence in terms of the flora and fauna crimes markets (respectively at 8.50 and 9.0) as a major consumer destination for a number of illegally trafficked protected species. China is believed to have one of the largest markets for illegally traded timber in the world, including highly valuable rosewoods, which are sourced in massive quantities from South-eastern Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is also recognized as a key destination for illegal wildlife from around the world, especially Africa. The most trafficked wildlife parts and products destined for consumption include those used as ingredients in Chinese traditional medicine (e.g. pangolins, bear, tiger, sea horses, donkey glue and serow horns), for decorative purposes (e.g. ivory, rhino horn, big cat skins, claws and canines) and as food (tiger, pangolin and bear meat, abalone and shark fins). In terms of rankings for non-renewable resource crimes, Western Asia led the continent, with a score of 6.75, which can be largely attributed to widespread smuggling of its vast oil reserves. In South-eastern Asia, on the other hand, this market is less developed (5.50) and usually takes the form of illegal sand mining, and illicit extraction and trafficking of minerals, especially gold.

Financial crime is also particularly prevalent on the continent, but most acutely in Western Asia (7.82). This extremely high regional score is driven largely by financial criminal activity in four countries – the United Arab Emirates (9.50), Lebanon (9.0), Iran (9.0) and Iraq (9.0). Financial crimes are considered to be systemic here, and this has an impact on regional instability and governments' financial losses, as well as a broader global ripple effect. Contextual differences, however, are again evident, as shown, for instance, by the two opposite cases of the UAE, where financial crimes manifest in a country that is considered to be a key international financial hub, and Lebanon, a country on the verge of becoming a failed state, and whose financial system has been defined by the World Bank as a 'giant Ponzi scheme'.[42] South-eastern Asia is also heavily affected by financial crimes (7.18), with a large online component, ranging from investment and job scams to e-commerce or romance scams. Experts cite a strong link between the transnational human trafficking market and financial fraud in this region, whereby organized crime groups reportedly lure tens of thousands of people from the region and beyond to work, mostly against their will, in so-called cyber-scam operations.[43]

Often closely associated with financial crimes, cyber-dependent crimes are a growing threat on the continent. While Eastern Asia scored comparatively lower than other subregions in overall criminality (4.80), North Korea and China drove up the averages for most of the criminal markets in the region, including cyber-dependent crimes, with China scoring 8.50 and North Korea 9.0. North Korean hacking groups, some of them reportedly state-controlled, are highly active in this field and have been accused of carrying out large-scale cyberattacks, usually against other countries in the region.

FIGURE 4.3

Criminal actor scores, Asia



Criminal actors are the primary drivers of the overall criminality score for Asia, with a continental average of 5.53. The linkages between criminal markets and their pervasiveness, and the embeddedness of criminal actors in Asia are profound. Although the level of pervasiveness of each typology varies across the five regions of the continent, state-embedded actors were found to be particularly powerful. Here, Western Asia had the highest score (7.21), and was the only region in Asia that figured in the top five in the world for state-embedded actors. This was followed by Southern Asia, and Central Asia and the Caucasus (both at 6.63). Generally, higher scores were attributed to countries with authoritarian leanings and where human rights standards were compromised, and to those where direct links with a range of illicit markets were found.

Often working alongside actors within the state apparatus, criminal networks have maintained a strong foothold across Asia over the years. Western Asia had the highest criminal networks score (6.82) in the world. Following close behind, Southern Asia was identified as having the second strongest presence of criminal networks (6.44). Criminal networks in the region are involved in multiple illicit markets, including human and drug smuggling.

By comparison, foreign actors were found to be most prevalent in South-eastern Asia, where countries such as Myanmar (9.0), Cambodia (8.0) and Laos (8.0) were major contributors to pulling up the regional average (6.55). The subregion was also highlighted as a standout at the global level – scoring the highest among all subregions globally for this actor type. By contrast, mafia-style groups were less prevalent across Asia, with only one region scoring above 5.0: Southern Asia (5.25). While there were individual country outliers, including Myanmar, Turkey and the Philippines, which scored 9.50, 8.50 and 8.0, respectively, the influence of other criminal actors across the continent would seem to leave little space for mafia-style groups to exert power.

Finally, despite being ranked only the fourth most pervasive criminal actor type at the continental level, private sector actors in Asia ranked the highest globally (5.25). Examples of legal businesses involved in and enabling illegal schemes were found to be widespread on the continent. Examples of such businesses are labour recruitment agencies and financial institutions implicated in illicit practices and money-laundering cases, often in collaboration with other actors and corrupt powerful elites.

FIGURE 4.4
Resilience scores, Asia



In terms of resilience, scores were more evenly distributed among Asia's subregions, although Eastern Asia (5.63) stands out as the only part of the continent that scored above the global average of 4.81. The countries in this region performed well on several resilience indicators, with its highest score being for 'territorial integrity' (7.0), which can be seen against, for example, territorial disputes over the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea.

Other Asian regions received significantly lower resilience scores. Southern Asia, grappling with heightened instability following the Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan, received the lowest resilience score on the continent (3.94), making it among the five least resilient regions worldwide. Severe deficiencies in the areas of social protection mechanisms, the judiciary and economic regulatory capacities have pulled down its overall resilience levels, with 8 out of 12 indicators scoring below 4.0. Similarly, 'judicial system and detention' as well as 'government transparency and accountability' in Central Asia and the Caucasus were found to be particularly low, with regional averages for these indicators of 3.06 and 3.38, respectively.

In the Asian context, the resilience indicator 'non-state actors' is worth noting in particular, as the continent has subregions and countries that are ranked among the lowest in the world for this gauge of resilience. In South-eastern Asia, for

example, the space for civil society and the free press to express themselves has diminished to the extent that it has raised concerns among the international community in recent years. Myanmar (1.50), specifically, has experienced a dramatic decline in press freedom following the military coup in 2021, followed by remarkably low scores for Cambodia (2.0) and Vietnam (1.50), where civil society and the media are also tightly controlled and restricted. The restrictions bestowed on civil society organizations are also a major concern in Western Asia (resilience average: 4.23), where 'non-state actors' were assessed at an average of 3.64. In Western Asia, this goes hand in hand with deteriorating 'government transparency and accountability', with an average score of 3.39. Notably, Syria (1.0), Yemen (1.50), and Iran (2.0) stand out for their lack of oversight mechanisms to prevent state collusion in illicit activities. Corruption remains a systemic issue in the governmental apparatus in this region and a significant obstacle to building resilience, as highlighted by, for example, the alleged corruption revelations surrounding Qatar's 2022 World Cup.

Variations since the 2021 Index

While the addition of six new criminality indicators means that comparing averages between the 2021 and 2023 versions of the Index cannot be wholly accurate, the headline results do, however, show that the criminality situation in Asia has deteriorated over the two-year period. The criminality average for the continent increased from 5.30 to 5.47, with the biggest jump recorded for criminal markets (+0.20). The average for criminal actors also increased (+0.15). In 2023, Asia therefore remains the highest scoring continent in terms of criminal markets, and is now also the highest scoring for criminal actors, moving from third position in 2021.

Breaking down the results by region, South-eastern Asia, Western Asia and Southern Asia registered an increase in their average criminality scores, while Central Asia and the Caucasus and Eastern Asia decreased very slightly. The result is that, compared to the previous Index, where only Western Asia was identified as being among the highest scoring globally for criminality, in 2023 the number of regions ranking among the top 10 in the world has risen to three (Western Asia, Southern Asia and South-eastern Asia). The biggest change in criminal markets was observed in South-eastern Asia (+0.44), while the average for criminal actors increased the most in Western Asia (+0.31).

FIGURE 4.5

Criminality trends by country, 2021–2023, Asia



Criminal markets

All criminal markets in Asia included in the 2021 Index increased in pervasiveness. The most marked rises were in the synthetic drug trade, which went from 6.02 to 6.48 (+0.46); the human smuggling market, to 6.07 (+0.39); human trafficking, from 6.63 to 7.0 (+0.33); and non-renewable resource crimes to 5.67 (+0.33). By contrast, the cocaine trade saw the smallest increase, with just a 0.01 point difference since 2021 (from 3.22 to 3.23).

BOX 4.2

Turkey's growing role in the cocaine trade

In the past, the cocaine trade had been a negligible drug market in Turkey, as the heroin and synthetic drug markets dominated over the years. However, recent seizures carried out by both origin countries and Turkish authorities indicate the country's expanding role in the cocaine trade.[44] As traffickers look for new routes to avoid seizures, some transit cocaine trade has been shifting to Turkish ports, a trend noted in 2021. Currently, Turkey appears to be on its way to becoming one of the major global transit hubs for cocaine originating from South America. The country provides a fertile opportunity for the cocaine trade given the expertise of Turkish criminal groups in drug trafficking and existing networks active in the trafficking routes.[45] The growing role of Turkey in the transnational cocaine trade is reflected in its cocaine market score, which saw a significant increase from 4.0 to 5.50 since 2021. As mentioned, the substantial increase is the result of a shift in trafficking routes. Additionally, however, the heightened focus of Turkish law enforcement on the cocaine trade has potentially shed more light on trafficking activities that may have been gradually established over time, yet remained unnoticed until recently.

In terms of drug markets, the synthetic drug trade saw its largest expansion in Western Asia (+0.68). Notably, two countries in Asia – Syria and Myanmar – now score 10.0 for synthetic drugs, the only two in the world with the maximum score for the synthetic drug trade. This drug market also notably increased in other countries of Western Asia, including Turkey, whose score increased from 5.50 to 7.0, and Saudi Arabia, which scored 9.0, up from 7.50. While Turkey continues to be a transit point for a wide range of synthetic drugs, specifically methamphetamine, Ecstasy and Captagon, an increase was also found in the production of methamphetamine, as indicated by the high number of seizures of liquid methamphetamine and acetic anhydride, a precursor chemical. In Saudi Arabia, synthetic drugs like methamphetamine enter the country by land from neighbouring countries, as well as through the ports and airports in Dammam and Jeddah. Similarly, Captagon, which is imported primarily from Syria and Lebanon, has continued to grow in popularity, making the country one of the largest consumer markets for this drug worldwide.[46]

Compared to the rest of the continent, the human smuggling market experienced the largest increase in Southern Asia (+0.94), with the effects of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan spreading across the whole region. Intensified repression of the Afghan people, especially women and girls, left many vulnerable to trafficking and provided a catalyst to leave the country, making the human smuggling market more expansive, lucrative and dangerous. The deteriorating security situation along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has also increased the dangers for migrants along the routes and caused displacement of people.[47]

Of the Asian subregions, South-eastern Asia experienced the greatest hikes for the human trafficking and non-renewable resource illicit economies (up by 0.72 and 0.55 points, respectively). A watershed moment was the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which had profound implications for regional criminal dynamics in 2022. The human trafficking score for Myanmar increased by 2.0, reaching 8.50. The non-renewable resource crimes score for the country increased by 2.50, up to 9.0. This can be attributed to a surge in illegal rare-earth mining after the coup, suggesting unscrupulous operators have exploited the unrest and lack of international oversight as an opportunity for illicit resource extraction.[48] Furthermore, the jade and gemstone industries are reported to be the military and paramilitary groups' main sources of funding. This is a worrying trend, since most of the world's rubies and jade come from Myanmar, with much of the latter smuggled to China.[49]

BOX 4.3

Military coup **in Myanmar**

Myanmar continues to experience civil unrest and violence following the 2021 military coup, when the democratically elected government was overthrown by the junta over allegations of voter fraud during the 2020 elections. Since the unconstitutional seizure of power by the military, there have been violent and incessant crackdowns on dissent, resulting in more than 2 500 deaths, 16 500 arrests and other severe human rights violations.[50] Moreover, since the military coup, 1.5 million people have been displaced, taking refuge in remote parts of the country and neighbouring countries, creating further instability across the region. Widespread defiance and resistance of the military leaders also resulted in the creation of people's defence forces, which gained control over certain parts of the country.[51] The implications of the coup and its aftermath have, therefore, been severely felt by the country's society and economy. The instability and insecurity have also intensified the criminal environment in Myanmar and beyond, exacerbating the existing criminal markets in the country.

Criminal actors

Perpetrators of crimes are a fundamental component of the criminality landscape in Asia. From 2021 to 2023, the continent recorded an increase in the criminal actors indicator from 5.38 to 5.53 (+0.15). Criminal networks increased the most (+0.35), followed by foreign actors (+0.33) and state-embedded actors (+0.17). These three typologies had a moderate to significant influence across the continent, while mafia-style groups were found to be much less influential, increasing by only 0.04 points. The majority of Asia's criminal activities were controlled by foreign and domestic loose criminal networks, or facilitated by agents of the state, rather than traditional mafia-style organizations. Looking at the continent's subregions, while foreign actors increased by the greatest margin in Southern Asia (+0.56), criminal networks recorded significant upsurges in Southern Asia (+0.50) and South-eastern Asia (+0.50).

Resilience

Asia was ranked the second least resilient continent in the 2021 Index, and due to a slight decrease in its resilience score (the continental average declined from 4.46 to 4.34), it holds the same ranking in this iteration. However, while the decline in resilience was only marginal (–0.12), it was the largest reduction of all continents. Among the resilience indicators, 'non-state actors' saw the biggest decline (–0.38), followed by 'government transparency and accountability' (–0.20). The only, albeit very slight, improvement was observed in 'international cooperation' (+0.02), an increase in line with global trends.

FIGURE 4.6

Resilience trends by country, 2021–2023, Asia



Africa



Africa overall score for

Criminality

5.25 ↗ +0.08

CRIMINALITY SCORES

1 10 NO DATA



Africa overall score for

Resilience

3.85 ↗ +0.05

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 10 NO DATA

FIGURE 4.7

Index scores, Africa



#1 EAST AFRICA | #2 WEST AFRICA | #3 NORTH AFRICA | #4 CENTRAL AFRICA | #5 SOUTHERN AFRICA

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
EAST AFRICA	5.88 +0.22	5.52 +0.32	6.23 +0.11	3.46 -0.08
WEST AFRICA	5.44 -0.03	5.40 +0.01	5.49 -0.06	4.28 +0.23
NORTH AFRICA	5.08 +0.22	5.20 +0.39	4.97 +0.05	3.67 -0.13
CENTRAL AFRICA	5.06 -0.06	4.66 -0.13	5.45 +0.02	3.23 +0.03
SOUTHERN AFRICA	4.83 +0.16	4.57 +0.14	5.08 +0.17	4.22 +0.04
AFRICA AVERAGE	5.25 +0.08	5.05 +0.11	5.45 +0.05	3.85 +0.05

Africa continued to experience high levels of criminality in the two-year period since 2021, remaining the second highest scoring continent in the world at 5.25 out of 10, coming in after Asia. The score, as in 2021, appears to be mainly driven by criminal actors, which, with a score of 5.45, raised the average for criminality in Africa. Criminal markets scored a lower 5.05.

In terms of regional dynamics, East Africa was the highest scoring region on the continent for overall criminality (5.88), leading the list for both criminal markets (5.52) and criminal actors (6.23), followed by West Africa (at 5.44). East Africa ranked among the top five regions for criminality in the world, as a hotbed of illicit activities and a stronghold for criminal actors, whose influence is aggravated by prolonged conflicts that make the region more vulnerable to the threat of organized crime. As for criminal markets, the region is acutely affected by human trafficking and arms trafficking, which both scored 7.78, the highest regional averages in the world for these types of crimes. These extremely high scores reflect how these two markets are generally predominant and widespread across the region, albeit with some high concentrations in particular countries.

BOX 4.4

The Wagner Group

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has established operations in a number of African countries, including the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and Madagascar. It provides military services, including direct paramilitary assistance and training programmes, to weakened autocratic governments in need of support in cracking down on insurgencies, rebellions and other civil unrest. Notwithstanding, the characterization of the Wagner Group as a foreign criminal actor under the Index is not necessarily connected to its mercenary activities, despite allegations pertaining to violations of international sanctions, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations.

The group is also known to take advantage of the economic and political fragilities of the African countries within which it operates, exploiting the rich renewable and non-renewable resources of these countries through opaque businesses allowed by concessions and bilateral agreements, which are granted by certain African governments in exchange for Wagner's mercenary muscle. The group is linked to a network of private entities operating in several sectors, including timber and mining, through which it expands its role as a mercenary group.

These businesses, combined with widespread corruption in the parts of Africa where it operates, reportedly enable Wagner to profit from illicit economies, especially flora and non-renewable resource crimes, alongside its legal activities. Some economic entities linked to the Wagner Group are accused of illegal exploitation of mineral sources and smuggling. Although criminal actors are normally perceived as violent gangs, actor types have seen a change in recent years with the establishment of modern organized crime groups that are embedded within legal economies.[52] Although it is technically a legal enterprise operating in licit markets, the involvement of the Wagner Group in such criminal markets makes it eligible to be characterized as a foreign criminal actor operating in Africa.

FIGURE 4.8

Criminal market scores, Africa



The most pervasive criminal market on the continent continued to be human trafficking, with a score of 6.06. The prevalence of this criminal practice is correlated to various factors, including the numerous ongoing conflicts in Africa, the economic push factors that leave people vulnerable to trafficking and the involvement of state-embedded actors in facilitating these activities. In the case of human trafficking, Eritrea and South Sudan were among the highest scoring countries, at 9.0 and 8.50, respectively. Military conscription continues to be a systemic and corrosive practice in Eritrea, breeding resentment and significant outward migration, which fuels the human smuggling market. This phenomenon has also been aggravated by the civil war in neighbouring Ethiopia, with the government ordering mass mobilization in an attempt to bolster

the army and increase security.[53] On the other hand, South Sudan has a more diverse market for human trafficking, with practices ranging from forced labour to domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. However, the main issue in the country concerns children, who continue to be recruited as soldiers, with thousands of minors estimated to be in combat roles, or who are employed in construction, mining and agriculture, where they are subjected to exploitative situations.

As was found to be generally the case worldwide, financial crimes were prevalent in Africa. This market was assessed as the second most pervasive, with an average continental score of 5.95. High scores were recorded for financial crimes across the continent, including widespread incidents of financial fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of public funds by state-embedded actors. The continent saw high levels of cyber-enabled financial fraud perpetrated by highly organized criminal syndicates such as Black Axe, which is of West African origin but with a global footprint. Black Axe has been responsible for online romance scams, peddling fictitious romantic relationships to defraud victims of money and steal their personal and financial data.[54]

The North Africa region had the highest score (7.83) for financial crimes. This was also the highest scoring region for financial crimes in the world, closely followed by Western Asia (7.82) and South-eastern Asia (7.18). Here, this kind of illicit economy was assessed as having a severe influence in all countries in the subregion (with scores ranging from 8.0 to 9.50), except for Morocco (whose score, at 7.50, is on the cusp between 'significant influence' and 'severe influence') and Mauritania (6.0). Libya, however, hoisted the regional average, with a score of 9.50. This is attributable to very high levels of public sector fraud, which is rife in the country and involves billions of dollars allegedly going missing through public contracts, and the engagement of high-level officials and bank employees in corruption schemes through which armed groups and their warlords have gained access to state funding. Tax evasion by local and foreign enterprises is also a chronic problem for the Libyan economy, compounded by the fact that the state has been weakened since the revolution.

With an average score of 5.77, arms trafficking was the third most pervasive criminal market in Africa, caused largely by the redirection of arms procured by governments in zones of prolonged conflict, such as Central and East Africa. The latter was the highest scoring region in the world for arms trafficking, with a score of 7.78, an increase of 0.67 points since the last iteration of the Index. With regard to arms trafficking, all countries in East Africa scored either 7.0 or above, except for Tanzania (6.0), meaning that the market is highly pervasive everywhere in the region, albeit with certain contextual differences. Sudan (9.0), Somalia (9.0), Ethiopia (8.50) and Djibouti (7.50) had some of the highest arms trafficking scores in East Africa, driven largely by armed and ethnic conflicts.

Somalia continues to be a critical hub for the smuggling of illegal weapons, with transnational links and ties with other illegal markets, such as piracy and drug trafficking. The illicit flows of arms from Yemen to Somalia increased in the reporting period, as did the number of illegal weapons circulating in the country, ranging from pistols to machine guns. Firearms are commonly trafficked by clan militias, the extremist group al-Shabaab, governmental groups and transnational trafficking networks based in the north, particularly Puntland and eastern Somaliland.

Ethiopia (7.0) recorded a notable increase in arms trafficking, a function of the civil war in Tigray, which has reportedly led to an escalation in small arms and light weapons trafficked in the region and caused spillage of firearms from war-torn areas into other parts of the country, specifically Addis Ababa.

In Sudan, multidirectional arms trafficking remains a problem, with external and internal actors continuing to supply weapons to the country, and little transparency or accountability in how state and paramilitary weapons are managed or distributed.

Research by INTERPOL in Central Africa has also found that explosive precursor chemicals and initiators are being used by non-state armed groups to manufacture explosives used in illegal mining and blast fishing.[55] Meanwhile, several Central African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (9.0), the Central African Republic (9.0), Chad (8.50) and Cameroon (7.50), have been affected by the trafficking of explosives for use in armed conflict by non-state armed groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa in the Lake Chad basin, and rebel groups Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation and the Allied Democratic Forces.

Levels of environmental crime continued to increase on the continent, with countries in Central Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa scoring highly for flora and fauna crimes. Non-renewable resource criminal markets continued to be highly pervasive in countries such as the Central African Republic (10.0) and the DRC (9.50). As a source country for gold, the illicit trade is widespread in the DRC, where both pro-government and rebel militias profit from the market. More than 90% of the DRC's gold is smuggled to neighbouring countries in the region, including Uganda and Rwanda, where it is then often refined and exported to international markets. The continent also had significant levels of illicit wildlife trade, with East Africa scoring 5.94 for fauna crimes, followed by West Africa (5.83).

The heroin trade, and extortion and protection racketeering were identified as criminal markets that have a much lower presence on the continent, with scores of 3.97 and 3.99, respectively, although the heroin trade increased slightly, by 0.16 points. The least pervasive market on the continent was cyber-dependent crimes, with a score of 3.59. This may be a result of the continent having relatively low internet penetration rates due to high internet costs.

FIGURE 4.9

Criminal actor scores, Africa



State-embedded actors remained the most dominant agents in facilitating illicit economies and inhibiting resilience to organized crime in Africa, with a continental score of 7.12, followed by criminal networks (6.11). The third place was retained by foreign actors, which, despite scoring lower than state-embedded actors and criminal networks, were found to have increased the most in influence, with a 0.28 point jump from 2021 (to 5.91). This steep rise can be attributed to activities by the Wagner Group (see Box 4.4) and human trafficking syndicates operating on the continent.

There is evidence of individuals engaged in the private sector who operate independently or collude with state-embedded actors in perpetuating criminality across the continent, using their enabling power in facilitating money laundering and illicit financial flows. However, their influence was found to be lower than that exerted by the other criminal actor typologies, with the exception of mafia-style groups. Private sector actors scored 4.80, ranking fourth, just above mafia-style groups, which, with a score of 3.31, were found to be the lowest scoring criminal actor type on the continent, despite a 0.20 increase since 2021.

In exploring the kinds of criminal groups operating on the continent, three African regions were ranked as first, second and third highest in the world for the state-embedded actors category: Central Africa (7.68), North Africa (7.67) and East Africa (7.44). In Central Africa, corruption tends to be an extensive problem and plays an essential role in the conflict dynamics and political environments of countries in the region, to an extent that the state apparatus is completely infiltrated and little room is left for others to enter criminal markets without the endorsement or authorization of state criminals. With the exception of Rwanda (5.0) and São Tomé and Príncipe (3.0), every country in the region scored 8.0, 8.50 or 9.0, which all indicate severe influence.

BOX 4.5

Why South Africa is an outlier

Regional readings of the Index, especially for the purpose of regional comparisons, necessitate the consideration of country-specific nuances, which can skew the overall picture.

South Africa is a case in point. It is one of only three African countries in the high crime–high resilience category, along with Nigeria and Senegal (see Section 5). Unlike the latter two, however, both criminality and resilience scores have worsened in South Africa. With a high criminality score of 7.18, the country is an undeniable criminality outlier within Southern Africa, tangibly bringing up the average criminality score for the region. Yet, against a background of a decade-long increasing criminality, erosion of critical infrastructure and undermining of democratic processes through organized corruption and violence for hire, resilience to the impact of organized crime in the country is also high. South Africa boasts a number of pervasive criminal markets, heightened by the influence of criminal actors, especially state-embedded actors – responsible for years of state capture – and criminal networks that are highly interconnected.

Nevertheless, in terms of resilience (5.63), South Africa also scored the highest in the Southern Africa region, driven by the efforts of non-state actors to resist organized crime, robust national policies and laws, and strong economic regulatory capacity. These resilience building blocks, however, came under strain in 2022, which saw overall resilience fall.



Criminal networks and foreign actors also have a strong grip on the continent, with East Africa and West Africa among the three highest scoring regions in the world for both indicators. With regard to foreign actors, investigations into the activities of the Wagner Group have shown that the mercenary organization has increasingly become involved in many illicit economies. The group has also been known to engage in the smuggling of gold and other mineral resources in countries in Central Africa, such as the Central African Republic, which had a foreign actors score of 9.0. Within East Africa, the Wagner Group has gained significant political influence in Sudan (8.0), where it has developed extensive commercial interests as well as playing a mercenary role.[56]

FIGURE 4.10

Resilience scores, Africa



In terms of resilience, Africa was again the lowest scoring continent, at 3.85, although it has seen a marginal improvement since the 2021 iteration (+0.05).

The highest scoring indicators on the continent were 'international cooperation' (5.03), 'national policies and laws' (4.72) and 'territorial integrity' (4.21). While implementation may be lacking, African countries have largely enacted national laws and policies to combat organized crime. A significant 51 out of the 54 countries on the continent have ratified the UNTOC and its accompanying protocols. However, while this

may have been an indication of some political will to combat transnational organized crime at the time that African countries ratified the UNTOC (36 countries ratified the UNTOC within the first five years of its adoption, and 15 countries ratified the UNTOC between 2005 and 2014), the data suggests that over the years, these countries have not been able to fully implement the Convention in an attempt to limit criminality and become more resilient to organized crime.[57] This statement remains valid, even though 'international cooperation', whose score is in part based on the ratification and implementation of international treaties on countering organized crime, was identified as the resilience indicator that had improved the most on the continent (+0.24).

The challenge is that many countries in Africa show deficiencies in implementing the Convention for several reasons, including ineffective law enforcement, the absence of a free civil society corpus to provide support, poor institutional capacity, corruption and the growing influence of state-embedded actors.[58] The space for civil society has continued to shrink in many countries across Africa, and this has had an impact on resilience indicators, such as 'victim and witness support' (scoring 2.84, the lowest average in the world for this indicator) and 'prevention' (3.25). Research has shown that these are key areas where civil society engages the most in its efforts to combat organized crime, trying to provide alternatives to inefficient state-led measures. This is evidenced by the high number of social and preventive programmes spearheaded by civil society initiatives that seek to mitigate factors that draw individuals to crime, such as poor economic indicators and lack of opportunities. In line with this finding, 'government transparency and accountability' was also among the lowest resilience indicators on the continent, at 3.31.

North Africa, East Africa and Central Africa continued to feature as the three lowest scoring regions in the world in terms of resilience levels, at 3.67, 3.46 and 3.23, respectively. The Index assessment takes into account the existence and effectiveness of resilience measures, as well as respect for fundamental human rights in their implementation, meaning that such low regional averages suggest poor performances in all these areas.

Variations since the 2021 Index

Africa was found to experience an increase in overall criminality over the two-year period. However, that increase is slightly lower when the newer criminal indicators are included in the equation, meaning that they moderately lower the average for criminal actors and markets (+0.08, opposed to an increase of 0.23 if we exclude the newly criminal indicators).

These findings are not surprising considering that, for example, the new cyber-dependent crimes indicator is not a pervasive market on the continent due to high costs associated with internet connectivity, and outdated practices by governments that have not digitalized a lot of their instruments, thereby making them less accessible and attractive to cybercriminals. While the pandemic may have led to increased connectivity levels and reliance on cyber technologies to some extent, Africa has still been slow to digitalize.

One notable exception to this dynamic, however, is seen in the scores for financial crimes. The Index found this market to be particularly pervasive, with a continental average of 5.95 and particularly high levels of penetration in certain regions, such as North Africa, pulling up the average score in that region to 7.83. On the whole, however, the original 10 criminal markets continue to exert a strong impact on the continent, and these have intensified in most regions.

FIGURE 4.11

Criminality trends by country, 2021–2023, Africa



Criminal markets

Comparing 2021 and 2023 averages, and including the new indicators, despite having the second highest overall criminal markets score in the world, Africa was the continent that saw the smallest increase in criminal market pervasiveness (+0.11). A similar result emerged with regard to the change in criminal actors (+0.05). Of all the continents, only Oceania had a smaller increase in its criminal actors score.

Looking more closely at the criminal markets reveals some interesting findings. In particular, the cocaine trade, despite its low continental average score (it was the fourth lowest scoring criminal market in Africa in 2023), saw the largest increase (+0.42). Even though West Africa still drives the continental average, scoring the highest for this criminal market, the biggest growth in terms of impact of the cocaine trade was observed in North Africa (+0.59) and Southern Africa (+0.58) in the reporting period. Nevertheless, West Africa, perhaps unsurprisingly, also saw a notable increase, recording a +0.47 rise in 2023 from 2021.

BOX 4.6

Increased cocaine trade in Africa

Cocaine trafficking has never been particularly pervasive in Africa, generally averaging lower than is the case for other criminal markets. Nevertheless, the scores would suggest that African states have been affected by changes observed in transnational cocaine trafficking patterns in recent years. There has been a transition in destination markets, where organized crime groups are increasingly targeting consumer markets other than the US.[59] This shift has translated into increased use of African ports and countries by traffickers as indirect transit hubs for other markets. These African hubs and trans-shipment points are favoured because of lax customs controls, poor law enforcement capacity and political instability. The continent's rise in popularity as a transit route has also resulted in increased availability of cocaine and consequent rising domestic consumption.

The human smuggling market saw the second largest increase on the continent (+0.41). Two regions that were assessed as having the highest scores in the world for this market, namely East Africa (7.39) and North Africa (7.33), also recorded the highest increases on the continent (+0.50 and +0.75, respectively). The high average score for North Africa can be seen in the fact that the score for each country in the region increased. Libya had the highest jump (from 8.0 to 9.50). This can be explained by the relative stability prevailing in western Libya, enabling mobility and logistical room for smugglers, and the return of more sophisticated networks focusing on developing complex but higher-value routes. Human smuggling is associated with high levels of violence, high death rates, extortion, forced labour and sexual exploitation. In the subregion, Tunisia also recorded a notable increase in the smuggling market (from 7.0 to 8.0) as the country's borders became more porous. Its territory has received large flows from Algeria and smuggling activities within the country have increased, with the majority of people smuggled out of Tunisia being Tunisian nationals.

Looking at which criminal markets increased the most is important in guiding policymakers in the prioritization of their agendas. It is also worthwhile, however, analyzing those indicators that have recorded minor changes. Interestingly, human trafficking in Africa, despite remaining the highest scoring market on the continent, is the one that saw the smallest increase since 2021 (+0.13). This finding suggests that, although human trafficking continues to be highly prevalent all over the continent, it has also remained quite stable over time in its high levels of pervasiveness.

Criminal actors

All criminal actor types in Africa strengthened their influence in 2023. Foreign actors increased their score the most (+0.28), followed by state-embedded actors (+0.23), mafia-style groups (+0.20) and criminal networks (+0.15). Despite the moderate increase, mafia-style groups remained the lowest scoring actor type across Africa. Additionally, although foreign actors significantly expanded on the continent in the reporting period, state-embedded actors continue to rank at the top of the list, still scoring much higher than the other actor indicators, at 7.12.

Resilience

Africa has the lowest average in the world for resilience levels, and its overall improvement in that field was very marginal, increasing by just +0.05 points since 2021. On the whole, where countries stepped up their efforts was in 'international cooperation' (+0.24), 'national policies and laws' (+0.11), and 'prevention' (+0.17). If the first two increases are more in line with global trends and convey the idea that countries are more focused on engaging in institutional forms of resilience rather than favouring a broader, more holistic, approach, the improvement in prevention measures represents a positive signal. Enhancing preventative initiatives is a fundamental step towards a serious and more comprehensive commitment in the fight against organized crime, as it aims to build safeguards to protect against criminality by effectuating behavioural changes in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities to take place.

The converse, however, applies to the role of 'non-state actors' on the continent, which declined (–0.07). While the margin of decline was smaller than in other continents (the exception was Oceania, the only region that recorded an increase for this resilience indicator), it still indicates a negative trend, characterized by shrinking space for civil society. Together with 'non-state actors', the other resilience indicators that reportedly worsened in Africa over the last two-year period were 'judicial system and detention' (–0.04), 'territorial integrity' (–0.03) and 'law enforcement' (–0.03).

FIGURE 4.12

Resilience trends by country, 2021–2023, Africa



Americas



Americas overall score for

Criminality

5.20 ↗ +0.13

CRIMINALITY SCORES

1 10 NO DATA



Americas overall score for

Resilience

4.80 ↘ -0.03

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 10 NO DATA

FIGURE 4.13
Index scores, Americas



#1
CENTRAL AMERICA



#2
SOUTH AMERICA



#3
NORTH AMERICA



#4
CARIBBEAN

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
CENTRAL AMERICA	6.28 +0.12	5.92 +0.20	6.64 +0.03	3.91 -0.15
SOUTH AMERICA	5.94 +0.44	5.63 +0.44	6.26 +0.44	4.72 -0.15
NORTH AMERICA	4.78 +0.19	4.85 +0.38	4.70 +0.01	7.17 +0.25
CARIBBEAN	3.91 -0.14	3.57 -0.08	4.25 -0.21	5.06 +0.11
AMERICAS AVERAGE	5.20 +0.13	4.89 +0.19	5.51 +0.08	4.80 -0.03

In 2022, the Americas experienced a significant increase in levels of criminality, affecting all regions of the continent. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, strict lockdown measures and restrictions on mobility had disrupted illicit activities and reduced income from drug sales. But organized crime groups were quick to adapt, shifting their focus to other criminal activities, including extortion, cybercrime and the black-market trade in essential goods.[60] As the pandemic restrictions were eased and supply chains reopened, criminal actors in the Americas resumed their expansion of more traditional activities linked to the drug trade, while holding onto the new markets they had captured during the pandemic. The countries of the Americas have since become fertile ground for a broad spectrum of illicit activities, as reflected in the individual Index scores for criminal markets and criminal actors.

In terms of criminality, the Americas was the third most affected continent, after Asia and Africa, respectively, with an average score of 5.20. Regionally, Central America was identified as having the highest average criminality score (6.28), followed by South America (5.94). All of the criminal markets and actors found in the Americas are present in several countries, underscoring the reach of these markets and the continent's importance to global illicit trade. These interconnected and transnational criminal markets exploit the challenges to resilience present in each country, taking advantage of situations of weak leadership and governance.

FIGURE 4.14

Criminal market scores, Americas



When considering the average scores for all criminal markets, it is clear that the Americas have emerged as a hub for global illicit markets, with its regions consistently featuring among the top three globally for 11 of the 15 markets. Furthermore, most of the original 10 criminal markets have expanded since the last iteration of the Index. However, while average scores provide valuable insights into criminal activities carried out within specific countries, they may not fully capture the complexities of the link between more localized instances of criminality and how these countries are caught up in global illicit supply chains as origin, transit or destination points. Therefore, to establish a comprehensive understanding of the global influence of criminality in the Americas, it

is necessary to delve into these criminal markets in greater detail and outline the contextual specificities that elucidate the intricate connections between them.

The 2023 Index scores show that the Americas continue to dominate the global cocaine trade as the primary source market for the drug. While coca cultivation is mainly concentrated in the northern and western regions of South America, other regions of the Americas serve as important transit zones for the plant's most popular alkaloid. The average score for the cocaine market in the Americas was 7.44 (+0.30), making it the most pervasive worldwide.

Within the Americas, the cocaine market is most prevalent in South America, which had a regional score of 8.29 (+0.46); this is followed by Central America, with a score of 7.81 (+0.37), and the Caribbean, with a score of 6.77 (+0.15). The cocaine market is also assessed as having significant influence in 33 of the 35 countries on the continent. Of these, Colombia has the most pervasive cocaine market in the world, with a score of 9.50, closely followed by Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru (all scoring 9.0). The extent of the continent's cocaine trade has meant little room for the heroin trade (3.06) to proliferate.

Alongside the expansion of the cocaine market in the Americas, there has been significant growth in the synthetic drug trade. With an average score of 7.0 (+0.75), North America was the third most affected region globally in this regard. Within the continent, Mexico appeared to be most affected by this market, achieving a score of 9.0. In 2022, Mexico stood out as a major player in the synthetic drug trade, witnessing a rise in the popularity and production of ketamine, methamphetamine and fentanyl. While Mexico clearly came under the spotlight, other countries in the region also experienced a surge in their synthetic drug markets. The rise of the hallucinogen 'pink cocaine' in Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama showcases the growth of synthetic drug use and distribution beyond Mexico.[61]

Environmental crimes are also prevalent in the Americas, with South America ranking second globally for non-renewable resource crimes, achieving an average score of 6.58 (+0.20). Illegal gold mining is a major concern on the continent, with organized criminals heavily involved in several countries – most notably Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru – exploiting the high prices of gold globally. These criminals are also embroiled in other illicit markets in the region, including human trafficking and financial crimes.[62]

Central America ranked third globally for both flora and fauna crimes, with average scores of 5.88 (+0.13) and 6.13 (+0.25) for these markets respectively. Brazil ranked first on the continent in these two markets, with scores of 8.50 for each, and has emerged as a significant source of illicit fauna in particular. These high scores are in part explained by the prevalence of illegal logging and wildlife trafficking in Brazil, especially in the Amazon region, which has caused severe environmental degradation and provoked violence perpetrated by criminal actors engaged in such activities, often targeting indigenous people, activists and public officials, which sometimes resulted in reported murders.

With regard to arms trafficking, Paraguay and Jamaica lead in the Americas, both with scores of 9.0 for this market. Brazil and Mexico each scored 8.50. Regionally, Central America ranked third in the world for arms trafficking, with a score of 6.50 (+0.25). The illegal arms that supply Central America originate predominantly in the US. Statistics reveal that between 70% and 90% of guns recovered at crime scenes in Mexico can be traced back to the US, with drug cartels procuring weapons in Texas and Arizona and smuggling them across the border.[63] This initial flow sets off a chain reaction, turning all countries in Central America into transit and destination points in the illicit arms trade, and fuelling violence and insecurity.

The 2023 iteration of the Index saw the addition of five criminal markets, all of which showed significant prevalence in the Americas. In terms

of cyber-dependent crimes, North America ranked first in the world, with a score of 7.25. The FBI's list of most wanted cybercriminals includes over 100 people and groups involved in committing harmful cybercrimes against the US government. Ransomware attacks have targeted local governments, universities, school districts and healthcare providers, resulting in data breaches and an increased demand for innovative cybersecurity solutions. In November 2022, malware spread across 55 counties in the US, leading to substantial data theft.[64] A growing market that evolves with each technological advancement, cyber-dependent crimes have become an increasing risk with the rise of artificial intelligence (AI). Greater integration of AI is anticipated to significantly amplify the scope and complexity of cybercrimes, a challenge that stakeholders globally will have to work hard to navigate.[65]

Central America holds the top position globally for extortion and protection racketeering, scoring 6.38. The ability of criminals to instil fear and employ the threat of harm is what drives this particular market. Extortion and protection racketeering have long been used as both strategy and business model by organized crime groups.[66] In many cases, victims who are unable to meet extortion demands are forced into displacement, increasing their vulnerability to other criminal markets, specifically human trafficking and smuggling. Across the Americas, these two criminal markets have a moderate influence on society, with an average continental score of 5.53 (+0.34) for human trafficking and 4.99 (+0.51) for human smuggling.

Mexico holds the top position in the Americas for both human trafficking and human smuggling, with respective scores of 8.0 and 9.0. The country is a crucial link between North America and the Central American states of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, for trafficking victims from across the region. Colombia closely follows Mexico, ranking second in the Americas for human trafficking (8.0) and human smuggling (7.50). The Darién Gap, a remote jungle region on the Colombia–Panama border, presents significant dangers to migrants heading for the US. These migrants, who originate primarily from Venezuela and other parts of South America, face significant physical hardship on this route, in addition to violence and the authoritative influence of criminal networks, such as the notorious Gulf Clan. Local and transnational networks facilitate the smuggling of migrants, with exploitation persisting along the route.[67]

The trade in counterfeit goods is another criminal market that is rampant in the Americas. South America's average score of 6.25 puts the region second globally. Peru and Paraguay had the highest individual scores in the region (both 9.0), with the two countries assessed as major hotspots for counterfeit goods. In Peru, counterfeit activity is estimated to be worth millions of US dollars, with the proliferation of counterfeit healthcare products (including medicines) being a particular concern for authorities and society more broadly. Meanwhile, Ciudad del Este in Paraguay is a major centre for counterfeit goods, including clothing, shoes, watches, household appliances and perfumes. Criminal groups in Paraguay are notable in facilitating this illicit trade.

The illicit trade in excisable goods was the smallest of the five newly added markets in the Americas, with a relatively low continental score of 4.29. Paraguay is a significant hub for the illicit tobacco trade, both domestically and regionally. The tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina is a bustling corridor for tobacco trafficking, which finances other criminal activities. Paraguay ranked highest in the Americas for this illicit market, scoring 7.50.

The market for financial crimes (5.98) is recognized as the most prevalent worldwide. In the Americas, the market scored an average of 5.39, with Mexico (8.50) and Guyana (8.50) ranking among the top 10 countries globally. Financial crimes in Mexico, for example, involve state institutions, private sector entities and individuals, with misappropriation of public funds, tax evasion and corruption presenting as major concerns. In Guyana, financial crimes feature both public and private actors and involve procurement fraud as well as Ponzi and pyramid schemes.

FIGURE 4.15

Criminal actor scores, Americas



In terms of criminal actors, the Americas had the second highest average score globally (5.51) (Asia is ranked highest). Within this category, state-embedded actors attained the highest average (5.89), placing them in the third position globally, after Africa (7.12) and Asia (6.63). Criminal networks scored 5.77, followed by mafia-style groups (5.66) and foreign actors (5.53). Private sector actors ranked lowest among the criminal actors on the continent, with an average score of 4.70. These generally high average scores indicate that criminal actors have substantial authority in the Americas and that their reach is expanding. However, closer examination of the individual countries and regions reveals important distinctions that magnify the challenge of combating criminal actors on the continent.

It is noteworthy, for example, that 19 of the 35 countries in the Americas had scores of 6.0 or higher for the state-embedded actors indicator. Paraguay, Venezuela and Nicaragua stood out among these, each with a score of 9.0, suggesting that criminal actors have a concerning level of influence within society and state structures.

This considerable leverage increases the risk that transnational anti-organized crime strategies, involving or implemented by these countries, may be limited or completely obstructed due to public decisions manipulated by these actors.

Criminal networks in the Americas play a prominent role on the world stage, with Colombia, Mexico and Peru ranking among the top five countries globally for this indicator. Colombia ranked first in the world for criminal networks (9.50), with an equal score for mafia-style groups. Venezuela was on a par with Colombia on the mafia-style groups indicator, followed closely by Mexico (9.0), Honduras (8.50), Haiti (8.50) and El Salvador (8.50).

These criminal actors do not limit their operations to individual countries, however. Consequently, when considering foreign actors throughout the Americas, it is likely that criminal actors from Colombia, Mexico and Brazil are also significant players in the illicit landscapes of neighbouring countries.

BOX 4.7

Primeiro Comando da Capital

Since the mid-2010s, the prominent Brazilian criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has exerted significant influence across the border in Paraguay, where it has dominated drug and arms trafficking markets. This has led to a surge in violence in the country, particularly due to attacks perpetrated by the group against the state, private sector and other highly armed criminal organizations. The cartel's presence extends throughout Paraguay, with some operations taking place along the border with Brazil. The PCC's expansion into neighbouring countries and its connections to international networks underline the group's growing influence in South America.[68] However, the cartel is particularly concentrated and violent in Paraguay. In this line, the PCC is partly behind the score for foreign actors in Paraguay (9.0) being greater than the scores for the rest of the continent.



Private sector actors play a significant role in the criminal landscape of the Americas as facilitators of organized crime. Notably, with a score of 8.50, Panama stands out as the tied top-ranked country worldwide for this type of criminal actor. Although the continent has an average score for private sector actors of only 4.70, the second lowest globally, Panama's high ranking highlights Central America's significance as a region where criminal activities are being perpetrated by private sector actors.

FIGURE 4.16

Resilience scores, Americas



It is perhaps unsurprising that criminal actors embedded within the state are among the most influential in the Americas. And this can be seen in the continent's resilience scores. For example, the continent had the third lowest global score for the 'government transparency and accountability' indicator, with an average of 4.44. Looking at individual countries, only Uruguay's score was within the threshold of high effectiveness (9.0), where government transparency is promoted, as are independent anti-corruption bodies. Elsewhere on the continent, obstacles to achieving transparency and accountability, such as ineffective implementation of the relevant legislations, absence of independent anti-corruption bodies or disregard for the rule of law, heighten the risk of institutional corruption.

Corruption is especially damaging within the justice and security sectors, where criminal actors may evade detection through bribery or resort to manipulating judicial outcomes through biased decision-making. This can involve covert negotiations or even acts of violence, as exemplified by the assassination of Marcelo Pecci, a Paraguayan prosecutor who specialized in combating organized crime.[69] Such incidents not only erode citizens' trust in the security forces but also underscore the prevailing sense of impunity among criminal actors on the continent. The average score of 4.20 in the Americas for the 'judicial system and detention' indicator is deeply concerning and demands urgent attention alongside addressing transparency and accountability.

'International cooperation' achieved the highest score in the Americas among all the resilience indicators, with an average of 6.09. This average was negatively affected by poor performances from Haiti (3.0), Nicaragua (2.0) and Venezuela (1.50), which also occupied the bottom three positions in terms of overall resilience scores on the continent. Yet it is in these countries that international cooperation is most needed. For example, the international community has been vital in addressing gang violence and the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, with the UN Security Council establishing a new sanctions regime targeting criminal groups and their financiers in October 2022.[70] This highlights the global recognition of the need for collaborative efforts to address complex challenges and restore stability on the continent.

While resilience does not depend solely on international cooperation, the interconnected nature of global challenges, such as organized crime, necessitates cooperation among nations to effectively manage the problem. As a result, 'international cooperation' not only holds immense significance for all of the countries on the continent but is also a key resilience factor worldwide, with a global average score of 5.87, the highest of all the resilience indicators.

The role of international cooperation varies among the countries of the Americas, yet it is widely acknowledged that in most countries, non-state actors are better able to champion transformative change when supported by the international community. The average score in the Americas for 'non-state actors' was 5.10, the third highest globally. But this should not create a false sense of achievement. While there are many examples of the resilience of non-state actors in the Americas, it is concerning to acknowledge the numerous instances that highlight their vulnerabilities and limitations and illustrate the violence faced by civil society. An example of this was the killing of 126 human rights defenders in 2022, which has been condemned by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The alarming number of killings of human rights defenders in 2022 reflects the ongoing challenges faced by non-state actors on the continent, particularly in Brazil and Colombia.[71]

It is imperative that any strategy aimed at combating organized crime in the Americas prioritizes the protection of civil society members to ensure their safety and effectiveness in countering criminal activities. Despite the high average score for this resilience indicator, there remains a substantial amount of work to be done to guarantee the protection of non-state actors, who play a crucial role as strategic allies in the fight against organized crime.

The scores revealed in the 'anti-money laundering' indicator can be viewed as overly optimistic considering the high criminality scores in the Americas. Argentina took the lead with a score of 7.0, closely followed by Uruguay, the US, Chile, and Trinidad and Tobago, each scoring 6.50. The average of 4.54 in the Americas strikes a balance between this perceived optimism and the acknowledgment that there is significant room for improvement. However, the higher risk lies within countries where there is either a non-existent framework or where extreme ineffectiveness prevails in combating money laundering. This is evident in the cases of Paraguay, Nicaragua, Haiti, Venezuela, Suriname and Belize, all of which

scored below 3.0 for this resilience indicator. These countries need to make a substantial effort to strengthen their frameworks and increase their effectiveness in tackling this pernicious issue.

Efforts to enhance resilience frameworks require strong political leadership. However, with a low global average score for the 'political leadership and governance' indicator (4.70), it is clear that this is, in fact, a universal shortcoming. In the Americas, this indicator scored slightly below the global average at 4.69. At the regional level, North America had the highest average score for 'political leadership and governance' (6.75), followed by the Caribbean (5.23), South America (4.42) and Central America (3.69). These low regional scores, especially in Latin America, imply that constraints on leadership and governance in the Americas could be limiting the potential of some of the other resilience indicators.

Regional variations in overall resilience scores are evident within the Americas. Canada (7.21) and the US (7.13) both achieved scores higher than 6.0, producing an average score of 7.17 for North America and placing this region among the top five strongest globally. Conversely, Central America's average score of 3.91 further underscores the regional need to strengthen anti-organized crime frameworks. South America gained an average resilience score of 4.72, just below the Caribbean's average of 5.06. These regional scores cannot be viewed in isolation, however, as low resilience in one region can be exploited by criminal actors with influence in other regions. Illicit markets flourish in environments with weak foundations for combating organized crime, exploiting vulnerabilities that transcend regions. The weakness of one region can potentially jeopardize the success and resilience of others.

The reasons for the regional variations are multifaceted and serve as a motivation for engaging in deeper dialogue on the nature of organized crime in the Americas. In the Caribbean and Central America, for example, 'international cooperation' (with scores of 6.23 and 5.19,

respectively) and 'national policies and laws' (5.85 and 4.63) achieved the highest scores of all the resilience indicators, while 'judicial system and detention' (4.31 and 3.50) and 'victim and witness support' (4.23 and 3.50) had the lowest averages. This indicates that criminal justice systems in these regions are at high risk of influence from state-embedded actors, which may affect the kinds of national policies and laws that are drafted and approved.

Within South America, 'international cooperation' emerged as the top-scoring resilience indicator (6.13), closely followed by 'non-state actors' (5.38) and 'national policies and laws' (4.96). Uruguay stood out among the countries in this region for its high overall resilience score of 7.50, while Venezuela came in at the lower end, with a score of 1.88. The wide range of individual scores on the resilience spectrum between Uruguay and Venezuela are indicative of the different anti-organized crime dynamics at play in each country in the region. Future actions for South America to strengthen resilience should ideally make use of international cooperation, while leveraging the resolute determination of non-state actors, and their capability to call for the effective implementation of national policies and laws.

Variations since the 2021 Index

Comparisons with the 2021 Index show that criminality in the Americas has worsened at the same time as resilience has suffered. The average criminality score for the Americas increased to 5.20 by 0.13 points since 2021, bringing the levels of criminality in the Americas more in line with those seen in Africa (5.25). While it is important to note that the average scores cannot be directly compared because of the addition of four new criminal markets, looking at individual country scores reveals a consistent upward trend in criminality for almost every country on the continent.

FIGURE 4.17

Criminality trends by country, 2021–2023, Americas



Criminal markets

A comparison between the scores of criminal markets in the Americas from 2021 to 2023 reveals deterioration across all markets. Ecuador stands out as the country with the most significant increase in criminal market scores, with a difference of +0.80, when taking into account only the existing 10 criminal markets. Another country that experienced a significant increase is Chile (+0.75). While Chile's situation may not yet be comparable to that of Mexico and Colombia, the country is showing alarming parallels in terms of practices associated with organized crime. For example, signs of territorial control by criminal gangs have been observed, as have phenomena not previously common in the country, such as 'narco' funerals.[72]

BOX 4.8

Ecuador - a state in flux

In the span of only two years, Ecuador witnessed a significant increase in criminality levels (+0.82), and now ranks among the 10 most organized-crime-ridden countries globally.

These numbers are indicative of a complex and more violent criminal ecosystem driven by empowered mafia-style groups and local criminal networks, which, along with foreign actors, are involved in numerous criminal markets.

One market in particular is worth highlighting – the cocaine trade (+1.50). Having a large stake in it, Colombian criminal groups have pushed the coca crops and cocaine production in the porous border region between Ecuador and Colombia. Combined with Ecuador's weak counter-narcotics and security capacities in port cities, this has allowed criminal organizations to traffic drugs to European markets, in collaboration with Balkan and Mexican criminal cartels, which have deepened their influence over the criminal landscape in Ecuador.

Similarly, the criminal governance that mafia-style groups exert in cities like Guayaquil and the need for provision of service for violence by criminal networks to ensure that drug exports are functional have created a demand for arms. This has also had a direct impact on homicides rates, which have risen to historic levels. Additionally, Ecuador has experienced a steady increase in illegal gold mining since 2000, a criminal market that generates both violence and environmental harm in the rural areas of the Amazon region.

Against this backdrop, the country's resilience saw the third largest decrease globally (−0.83). This is arguably a result of weak political leadership, widespread corruption and a weak judicial system that struggles to cope with the challenges, including the unpunished killings of political figures.

Criminal actors

The influence of criminal actors in the Americas continues to develop, presenting a growing challenge to the region's security and stability. A comparative analysis made between the scores from 2021 and 2023, without taking into consideration the newly added private sector actors, revealed a trend: all indicators related to criminal actors experienced an increase of more than 0.20. Criminal networks had the greatest increase (+0.31), followed by foreign actors (+0.29). This upward trend is telling of the escalating impact of organized crime in the Americas.

Looking at the individual country scores, several countries in the Americas experienced notable increases in criminality levels, specifically Ecuador, Paraguay and Haiti. In Ecuador, for example, local gangs play a prominent role in the drug trade, often fuelling violent conflicts as they compete for control over drug routes. Adding to the complexity of the situation, Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation have established a strong presence in Ecuador. Criminal groups from Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Russia and Serbia have also infiltrated the country, with their primary involvement being in the drug trafficking markets.[73] In Haiti, around 200 gangs operate with influence over a substantial portion of the country, and nearly 100 of them are concentrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince.[74]

Resilience

In 2021, the Americas scored 4.83 for overall resilience, ranking third in the world. In the 2023 iteration of the Index, this score decreased to 4.80 (–0.03), while still ensuring third place for the continent. Even though the average change is minimal, when examining individual scores, it becomes evident that some countries experienced significant decreases in resilience levels, among them Ecuador and El Salvador. Ecuador's resilience score dropped from 5.71 to 4.88 (–0.83) and El Salvador's from 3.71 to 3.21 (–0.50).

In Ecuador, various circumstances have led to declines in nine of the 12 resilience indicators. The lack of leadership under Guillermo Lasso has resulted in a political stalemate and a loss of public support for the government, while corruption cases involving the president's inner circle have further eroded the public's trust in state institutions. The judicial system is seen as lacking independence and facilitating crime, while the dysfunctional prison system has led to increased violence and gang conflicts within the penitentiary system, which is exacerbated by the growing control exerted by prisoners over the system. Additionally, regulatory control over NGOs and limitations on press freedom are hindering the efforts of civil society members and journalists in certain parts of the country.

Like Ecuador, El Salvador's battle against organized crime is hampered by corruption. Moreover, the government's approach to combating criminality, which relies on an 'iron fist' policy, raises concerns about the state's commitment to democratic principles and respect for human rights. In fact, serious allegations of human rights violations have been raised due to the suspension of certain principal rights, as part of the anti-organized crime policy, including freedom of expression and association, as well as several due process guarantees. Civil society organizations play a crucial role in supporting victims and advocating for democratic principles and human rights in El Salvador, but they face regular harassment and intimidation. Overall, El Salvador's ability to combat organized crime is challenged by systemic issues within the state apparatus and the need for greater respect for human rights by the government. Significantly, criminal influence over legitimate markets and the discretionary and uneven application of commercial regulations are negatively affecting the country's economic growth.

BOX 4.9

Threatened civil society and media in the Americas

The freedom with which civil society and the media are able to carry out their work has been significantly curtailed in the Americas in the past two years. There has been a notable increase in violence towards journalists and activists on the continent, particularly those covering organized crime and environmental issues. The June 2022 murder of British journalist Dom Phillips and indigenous expert Bruno Pereira, who were investigating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Amazon, is illustrative of the dangers faced by activists on the front line.[75] Killings such as these point to the lack of capacity, or sometimes even unwillingness, of state authorities to protect non-state actors. Security concerns have meant a reluctance among investigative journalists and activists to address significant organized crime-related issues in the region. This hesitancy adversely affects media freedom and plurality in the media landscape, which has become apparent under the 2023 Index, especially in South America, which experienced a significant decrease in the 'non-state actors' score from 5.96 to 5.38 (–0.58), since 2021.

FIGURE 4.18

Resilience trends by country, 2021–2023, Americas



Argentina, Nicaragua and Guatemala also experienced significant decreases in their respective resilience scores. Guatemala's score declined from 4.42 to 4.08 (−0.34), Nicaragua's from 2.46 to 2.08 (−0.38) and Argentina's from 6.33 to 5.96 (−0.37). In Argentina, the government has been accused of lacking transparency in procurement processes, and there are concerns about the influence of drug-trafficking money on local politics. The judicial system is considered corrupt and inefficient, while poor prison conditions and allegations of police collusion with criminals have exacerbated the decline in resilience. In Guatemala, attacks on prosecutors and judges investigating corruption and organized crime have increased, while press freedom is increasingly compromised, with a growing number of attacks on journalists and limited government support for independent media. As in El Salvador, human rights violations, including attacks on activists, are a growing concern in Guatemala. This escalating trend of repression is also present in Nicaragua, where, in 2022, legislature passed a resolution that resulted in the shutdown of over 30 civil society organizations. These closures added to the growing list of over 130 organizations that have been declared illegal in the country, further stifling independent voices and limiting avenues for advocacy and community development.[76]

Some countries in the Americas may only have small differences between their 2021 and 2023 resilience scores, but are worth highlighting for their low and declining scores. Haiti and Venezuela, for instance, have maintained low resilience scores, with no signs of improvement in 2023. Haiti's overall score decreased from 2.67 to 2.46 (−0.21), while Venezuela's went down from 1.92 to 1.88 (−0.04). This path of decline will not only affect these individual countries but could also have consequences for the entire continent, providing fertile ground for the development and dominance of organized crime groups. The other countries in the Americas should keep a close eye on these two nations and develop strategies to reverse this downward trend.

When comparing resilience in the Americas, it is evident that there have been declines in several key areas. Out of the 12 indicators, eight have shown decreases. One of the most significant differences is for the 'non-state actors' indicator, which recorded average scores of 5.31 in 2021 and 5.10 in 2023 (−0.21). This change highlights the diminishing capacity of non-state actors to address criminality challenges on the continent.

The 'law enforcement' indicator also experienced a notable negative change in 2023, particularly in South America. In 2021, the average score for this indicator in the subregion was 4.54, but it dropped to 4.0 in 2023 (−0.54). A continuing decline in law enforcement results in a greater loss of trust, as agencies struggle to address security challenges and uphold the rule of law. This erosion of public trust leads to reduced cooperation, decreased crime reporting and a breakdown in community–police relations, all of which have proven to be essential in enhancing community resilience to organized crime.

An important increase worth highlighting, however, is the resilience score for the US. In the 2021 Index, the average score for resilience in the US was 6.58, which rose to 7.13 in 2023 (+0.55). This positive change can be attributed to regulatory changes in environmental protections and immigration policies, the establishment of the US Council on Transnational Organized Crime,[77] sanctions imposed on foreign nationals engaged in drug trafficking, and increased international cooperation efforts (including extradition treaties related to cybercrime).

While the comparison of the two sets of resilience scores in the Americas may not be encouraging, it presents an opportunity for countries to reflect on the decisions they have made, evaluate what has and has not worked in the fight against organized crime, and identify main areas for improvement. By addressing some of these challenges and implementing more effective strategies, the countries in the Americas can strive for higher levels of resilience in the long term.

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

Europe overall score for
Criminality
4.74 ↗+0.26

CRIMINALITY SCORES
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

Europe overall score for
Resilience
6.27 ↗+0.04

RESILIENCE SCORES
1 10 NO DATA

FIGURE 4.19
Index scores, Europe



#1
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE



#2
SOUTHERN EUROPE



#3
WESTERN EUROPE



#4
NORTHERN EUROPE

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	5.37 +0.18	5.20 +0.32	5.53 +0.04	5.01 +0.05
SOUTHERN EUROPE	4.73 +0.31	4.14 +0.41	5.33 +0.22	5.66 +0.07
WESTERN EUROPE	4.43 +0.34	4.48 +0.42	4.38 +0.27	7.48 -0.01
NORTHERN EUROPE	3.86 +0.26	3.97 +0.51	3.75 +0.02	7.89 +0.07
EUROPE AVERAGE	4.74 +0.26	4.60 +0.4	4.88 +0.12	6.27 +0.04

In 2022, while Europe was beginning to address the social, political and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine generated serious new concerns for the continent's stability, with potentially lasting implications for the global order. The war fast altered Europe's security landscape, exposing the continent to novel and multidimensional threats. It is difficult to accurately assess the extent to which the conflict will reshape regional dynamics, given that the war is ongoing at the time of writing and the situation on the ground is constantly evolving. However, some effects are currently being felt, especially at regional and subregional levels, and Ukraine's destabilization has already had significant implications for organized crime across the continent.[78]

The changes to organized crime dynamics catalyzed by the war in Ukraine have been partly captured in the 2023 Index. Although the Index was built during a particularly mercurial phase, it manages to take into account the most evident and tangible trends emerging from the conflict, particularly those related to the trafficking of people, arms, drugs and illicit goods, often linked to the occupied territories in the country. However, while the conflict in Ukraine has affected illicit flows on the continent, other developments tracked by the Index appear to be detached from the war. And despite an overall increase in levels of criminality, Europe is still one of the continents least affected by organized crime (with a criminality score of 4.74, higher only than Oceania). This is mainly the result of stable and robust anti-crime frameworks, with criminal organizations finding fewer opportunities to expand their operations, mitigating in part the damaging impact of illicit economies on the continent. Europe also continues to lead in resilience globally, with an overall score of 6.27, far above the global average of 4.81.

FIGURE 4.20

Criminal market scores, Europe



The Index found that, once again and in line with global trends, criminal actors in Europe (4.88) are still more prominent than criminal markets (4.60), pulling up the continent's average criminality score. However, this higher average can also be attributed to some of the newly added criminal market indicators, two of which are reported to be particularly pervasive in Europe – namely, financial crimes (6.24) and cyber-dependent crimes (5.58).

Financial crime is the most pervasive market on the continent, with Europe ranking second in the world after Asia. Alongside traditional forms of white-collar crime, many countries in Europe are increasingly faced with innovative financial crimes facilitated by digital technologies, of which phishing is a prime example. The high technological and economic development of most European countries offers opportunities for cyber-enabled financial crimes to thrive. These illicit markets were aided by the COVID-19 pandemic, when rates of digitalization accelerated as many professional and personal activities moved online.[79] Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe were identified as the highest scoring regions in this regard, both with 6.50 for financial crimes. In Western Europe, the pervasiveness of illicit financial activities appears to be mainly driven by a small group of countries with highly developed economies and advanced democracies – the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland, all with a score of 7.50 for financial crimes. By contrast, the financial crime markets in Central and Eastern Europe are concentrated in countries characterized by levels of authoritarianism and corrupt state actors, including Russia (8.50), Belarus (8.0) and Moldova (8.0). This supports the idea that financial crimes, and other illicit economies, do not necessarily arise within a particular national context, but rather are truly transnational phenomena, constantly adapting to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that accompany globalization, digitalization and growing geopolitical tensions.

As the second highest scoring market after financial crimes, cyber-dependent crimes are very prevalent throughout Europe, which ranked first in the world for this market. Most ransomware attacks are directed at 'big game' targets, including major corporations, governments and critical infrastructure. Highly sophisticated cyberattacks are being perpetrated in Europe, often by cybercriminals operating from both within and outside the continent. Cyber-warfare has also been used during the conflict in Ukraine not only for ideological reasons but also for financial gain, with perpetrators frequently backed by state actors. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Central and Eastern Europe was the highest scoring region on the continent for cyber-dependent crimes (6.0), with Russia's score (9.0) driving up the regional average, followed by Ukraine (8.50).

Another market that is highly pervasive on the continent is the cocaine trade (5.20). Cocaine is still the main source of revenue for a number of organized crime groups operating in Europe, and the continent continues to host a major consumer market for this drug, especially in countries in Western and Southern Europe, which scored 5.77 and 5.38, respectively. Western Europe was also among the top five highest scoring regions for the cocaine trade globally. These substantial scores reflect the increasing role played by main cocaine trafficking hubs in the EU, the majority of which are located in key gateway states in Western and Southern Europe, with Belgium (8.0) and the Netherlands (7.50), and Spain (7.50) and Italy (8.0) topping the list. Besides having developed large domestic consumer markets, these countries are also important transit corridors for the trafficking of cocaine, owing to the centrality of their ports, where drugs are often concealed in legal shipments.

BOX 4.10

Infiltration of European ports by organized crime groups

Europe's ports have come under stress from illicit flows in recent years, with organized crime groups leveraging their reliable infrastructure and connectivity to smuggle high volumes of illicit goods, particularly drugs. As vital gateways for the transportation of legitimate goods domestically and internationally, European ports handle millions of containers annually. And the sheer volume of incoming containers, combined with complex operational structures, makes illicit activity difficult to detect. In fact, European port authorities are only able to physically inspect between 2% and 10% of incoming containers,[80] which means that these ports are suitable playgrounds for smuggling activities. Additionally, the ports' extensive connectivity, enabling access to a host of global destinations, enhances the appeal for organized crime groups eager to expand their operations and maximize profits. Most of the major European maritime ports, including Antwerp in Belgium, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Hamburg/Bremerhaven in Germany, Le Havre in France and Piraeus in Greece have increasingly grappled with this challenge in recent years.

Organized crime groups use European ports as major entry points on the continent for a broad spectrum of illicit commodities, ranging from illegal substances such as cocaine, heroin and synthetic drug precursors to illicit tobacco products and counterfeit goods. Even though international organized crime groups mostly rely on cooperation with local criminal networks and corrupt port officials, they are also increasingly using more sophisticated modus operandi, including the misappropriation of container references. This enables criminal groups to carry out their activities without having to rely too heavily on corruption. The increased level of criminal activities occurring in maritime hubs and rivalries between organized crime groups have also resulted in a higher levels of street violence, adversely affecting local communities.

Record cocaine seizures have been reported all across Europe in the last two years, as seen in the interdiction of 10 tonnes in Le Havre in 2021 and more than ten times that amount in Antwerp in 2022.[81] In fact, it is estimated that around 200 tonnes of cocaine have been smuggled through the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp since 2021, illustrating the sheer magnitude of the problem.[82]

Increased volumes of cocaine seizures combined with growing violence and stable street prices indicate that Antwerp has emerged as the primary gateway for cocaine trafficking in Europe. Criminal actors involved in drug trafficking are increasingly choosing Antwerp, Europe's second biggest port, as their primary hub, especially since the improvement of port security in the Netherlands. It is estimated that nearly 40% of Europe's cocaine imports reach the continent through Antwerp.[83]

China's continuous investment in European ports as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, including Piraeus, Le Havre and Antwerp, has contributed to enhanced trade and operational efficiency at these ports.[84] However, the increase in the volume of container traffic has meant higher levels of illicit activity. In addition, increased trans-shipment with ports in Asia and the Middle East has made European ports more susceptible to smuggling activities.[85]

The impact of drug markets in Europe is also seen in the high scores for the cannabis trade (5.20, at the same level as cocaine) and the synthetic drug trade (5.16, just below the previous two markets). At the regional level, Northern Europe, despite being the lowest scoring region in Europe for criminal markets overall, ranked second highest on the continent for the synthetic drug trade (5.25), with five of the eight countries achieving scores of 5.0 or above. Of all the drug markets, only the heroin trade was assessed to be not particularly pervasive on the continent, with a comparatively low score of 4.35.

Europe is also significantly afflicted by other markets, including human smuggling (5.14) and human trafficking (5.13). As in the 2021 Index, Central and Eastern Europe was identified as the highest scoring region in Europe for both markets (6.06 and 5.79, respectively). Compared to other illicit economies, human smuggling and human trafficking are considered to be more far-reaching and dispersed across the continent, mainly due to lax border controls and well-connected trafficking and smuggling routes. The severity of the situation has been increased by the significant number of refugees fleeing instability outside of the continent, but also linked to the Ukraine war, who are at risk of exploitation by organized crime groups.

Other moderately prevalent illicit economies in Europe include the illicit trade in excisable goods (4.41) and the trade in counterfeit goods (4.28). Countries in Western Europe are important transit and destination markets for counterfeit goods (with a regional average score of 4.59), with articles ranging from luxury products to everyday items increasingly trafficked to the region, mainly from China. The illicit trade in excisable goods is more rampant in Central and Eastern Europe (5.03), compared to the rest of the continent, driven by high demand and low prices, especially for tobacco products. Cigarette smuggling, often facilitated by corruption of border police officers, is widespread in Moldova (7.50), Montenegro (7.50) and Romania (6.0).

The least pervasive criminal markets in Europe are extortion and protection racketeering (3.70) and the three environmental crime markets: non-renewable resource crimes (3.58), fauna crimes (3.44) and flora crimes (3.02). These last three indicators, despite having all increased slightly since 2021, scored substantially below the global averages.

FIGURE 4.21

Criminal actor scores, Europe



In terms of criminal actors, the dominant typology in Europe is foreign actors (5.58), which, unlike many other continents and in contrast to global trends, scored higher than state-embedded actors (4.67). Globally, only Africa scored higher than Europe for this actor type.

In second place, as in the 2021 Index, are criminal networks (5.27), followed by private sector actors (4.86). Europe ranked second in the world for private sector actors, after Asia, which is perhaps unsurprising given that some countries in the region are key money laundering and tax evasion hubs facilitated by criminals acting in the private sector. In particular, Southern Europe was identified as the region with the greatest presence of private sector actors (5.50). This result reflects the role that a few small but notable countries, such as Malta (6.0) and San Marino (5.50), play as attractive environments for money to be laundered through the formal financial sector.

The two least pervasive criminal actor types on the continent are state-embedded actors (4.67) and mafia-style groups (4.02), the latter, however, scoring higher in Europe than in Africa and Oceania. Mafia-style groups are assessed to be unequally distributed among the regions, with powerful groups identified in several countries in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. However, Northern Europe in fact ranks first on the continent for mafia-style groups (4.25), despite having the lowest scores for all other criminal actor types. Within this region, Denmark (5.50) and Sweden (5.0) are considerably affected by the activities of smaller biker gangs, characterized by clan-based structures and engaged in a range of illicit activities. Swedish authorities have also noted a rise in fatal gang violence driven by the drug trade and associated proliferation of illegal firearms, particularly in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö.[86]

FIGURE 4.22

Resilience scores, Europe



Europe ranked first in the world for overall resilience (6.27), with particularly high scores for 'international cooperation' (7.24), 'national policies and laws' (6.85) and 'territorial integrity' (6.48). By contrast, Europe's lower-scoring resilience indicators included 'victim and witness support' (6.03), 'anti-money laundering' (5.83) and 'government transparency and accountability' (5.82). Although these were Europe's worst-performing indicators, their scores were nevertheless higher than the averages for the other continents.

At the regional level, despite contextual differences, the picture is again positive, with all regions in Europe included among the top 10 most resilient globally. Most noteworthy here is Northern Europe, which achieved an overall resilience score of 7.89. Significantly, no country in Northern Europe scored below 6.0 for any of the Index resilience indicators. The region leads the way in 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws', while at the same time, performing particularly well in areas where other European regions struggled, including 'non-state actors' and 'victim and witness support'.

Ranking high globally, but with lower overall resilience scores than the three other European regions, was Central and Eastern Europe. With an average score of 5.01, Central and Eastern Europe ranked 10th of all the regional groupings worldwide, just below the Caribbean. Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe have

been assessed as sufficiently effective in their resilience mechanisms, but many others appear to be largely unprepared and defenceless against the multifaceted threat posed by organized crime.

Major shortcomings in governments' abilities to act transparently and provide a supportive space to civil society organizations are hampering the fight against criminality.

Variations since the 2021 Index

Given the drastic events that occurred in Europe in 2022, the continent experienced the largest increase overall in terms of criminality at the global level (+0.26). By breaking down the criminality component, a major shift was observed in the pervasiveness of criminal markets, which recorded an increase of 0.40, counterbalanced by a more modest rise in the score for criminal actors (+0.12). This considerable upsurge in the score for criminal markets is both methodological and geopolitical in origin, a consequence of the new criminal markets being included in the 2023 Index (with financial crimes and cyber-dependent crimes particularly pervasive in Europe) and the war in Ukraine. The effect of the Ukraine conflict on illicit economies becomes clearer when considering which markets increased the most and in which parts of the continent.

FIGURE 4.23

Criminality trends by country, 2021–2023, Europe



Criminal markets

The three criminal markets that saw the largest increases in Europe were human smuggling (+0.42), the synthetic drug trade (+0.40), arms trafficking (+0.38) and the cocaine trade (+0.38).

Human smuggling proliferated in Central and Eastern Europe (+0.47) as a result of conflict and fragility in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Yet human smuggling also increased, and by slightly more, in Northern Europe (+0.50), with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania driving up the score. The war in Ukraine precipitated the swiftest and largest refugee migration in Europe since the Second World War, with around 7.8 million Ukrainian refugees as of November 2022. The chaos of humanitarian operations in the first few months of the conflict made Ukrainians potentially vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers and smugglers, although evidence of widespread smuggling of Ukrainians has remained very limited. Additionally, conscription in both Russia and Ukraine created an unprecedented wave of migration to bordering countries, including Moldova, Romania, Poland and Hungary. Smugglers of other commodities, such as alcohol and tobacco, took advantage of the demand for movement, reportedly switching to conscript smuggling, while people with no criminal backgrounds began to set up sophisticated smuggling schemes.[87]

Central and Eastern Europe saw the biggest increase in the synthetic drug trade on the continent (+0.44), with the production and distribution of these drugs continuing across the region despite disruptions and displacement. The growth in this drug market was fuelled by demand from the front line of the Ukraine war, as was the case for the illicit arms trade, with arms trafficking seeing the largest increase of all criminal markets both across the continent and within the region (+0.86). Although the number of documented instances of cross-border arms trafficking appears to be quite low, authorities in Moldova, for example, have reported a significant increase in weapons seizures at the Ukrainian border since the start of the war.

Finally, with regard to the cocaine trade, even though Southern Europe was not the highest scoring region on the continent for this criminal market (ranking second after Western Europe), it was the region that recorded the largest increase from 2021 (+0.63). Italy (8.0), Spain (7.50) and Portugal (6.0) accounted for the highest number of cocaine seizures on the continent, being main entry points and key hubs for the drug's distribution. Significantly, Greece, which has not traditionally been associated with cocaine trafficking or consumption, saw a noticeable increase in its score for the cocaine trade (moving from 3.50 to 5.0), indicating that points of shipments are diversifying and consumer markets developing.

While almost all of Europe's criminal markets have increased in prevalence since the 2021 Index, the heroin trade in fact saw a marginal decline (–0.01). This is likely to be a consequence of the growth of other drug markets, specifically cocaine and synthetic drugs.

Criminal actors

In line with global trends, foreign criminal actors witnessed the largest average score increase of all criminal actors in Europe, from 5.38 to 5.58 (+0.20). As in other regions, this is probably a consequence of the easing of COVID-related restrictions, including the reopening of borders. Criminal networks saw the second largest growth (+0.11), followed by mafia-style groups (+0.10) and state-embedded actors (+0.09). At the regional level, Northern Europe experienced the greatest increases for foreign actors and criminal networks, despite still having the lowest scores on the continent for both.

Resilience

Europe not only achieved the highest resilience score globally, but it was also one of three continents, together with Oceania and Africa, that recorded a slight increase in average resilience in 2023 (+0.04). As with the other two continents, 'international cooperation' experienced the largest increase (+0.22), followed by 'national policies and laws' (+0.15) and 'prevention' (+0.14). At the other end of the spectrum, four indicators declined across the continent, with the greatest reduction perhaps unsurprisingly for 'territorial integrity' (−0.09), followed by 'non-state actors' (−0.08), 'economic regulatory capacity' (−0.03) and 'victim and witness support' (−0.01).

With a few notable exceptions, the overall changes in the scores for resilience indicators in European countries were minimal, with the average resilience score for the continent on a par with 2021 levels. There were also no major changes at the regional level, as all four regions maintained the same positions they held in 2021: Northern Europe ranking first for resilience, followed by Western Europe, Southern Europe, and then Central and Eastern Europe. One caveat here is the fact that national resilience frameworks are generally slow to respond to global events, such as the war in Ukraine. The effects of current events on structural resilience dynamics may therefore only be seen in the years to come. Nevertheless, the 2023 Index did reveal some differences in resilience levels, with modest increases in the scores for Northern Europe (+0.08), Southern Europe (+0.07), and Central and Eastern Europe (+0.04), and a slight, almost negligible, decline for Western Europe (−0.01).

FIGURE 4.24

Resilience trends by country, 2021–2023, Europe



DOUANE

Oceania



Oceania overall score for

Criminality

3.23 ↗ +0.16

CRIMINALITY SCORES

1 10 NO DATA



Oceania overall score for

Resilience

5.55 ↗ +0.09

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 10 NO DATA

FIGURE 4.25

Index scores, Oceania



#1
MELANESIA



#2
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND



#3
POLYNESIA



#4
MICRONESIA

REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
MELANESIA	4.18 +0.57	4.00 +0.56	4.35 +0.58	4.73 +0.02
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND	4.04 +0.42	4.03 +0.53	4.05 +0.30	7.63 -0.54
POLYNESIA	2.58 +0.13	2.80 +0.32	2.37 -0.05	5.74 +0.10
MICRONESIA	2.54 -0.03	2.69 +0.19	2.40 -0.26	5.27 +0.37
OCEANIA AVERAGE	3.23 +0.16	3.28 +0.3	3.19 +0.02	5.55 +0.09

At first glance, Oceania may look like the global outlier in terms of its results. With overall criminality scores well below the world's average and resilience surpassing all other regions barring Europe, this might be true in absolute terms. However, a closer examination reveals a more complex picture. And this does not simply derive from the heterogeneous nature of Pacific societies, the unique, isolated marine topography of the continent and the varying levels of economic and technological development and related vulnerabilities. The region is also an arena for geopolitical and geo-strategic competition that plays out in Oceania's political, economic and security spheres, and this has implications for governance and corruption, law enforcement and societal vulnerabilities to crime, and its broader repercussions. These dynamics unfold against the alarming regional impacts of climate change, which threaten all aspects of life, and influence illicit markets and governments' ability, and sometimes willingness, to counter crime.

With the exception of Papua New Guinea, which is characterized by high levels of criminality, the other 13 countries in Oceania recorded low criminality scores. Whereas this is an accurate assessment with regard to certain criminal markets and countries, these results are also influenced by the structure of the Index, whereby countries featuring a larger number of criminal markets – which is not the case for many Pacific island countries, and to some extent New Zealand – obtain higher overall scores. This is not to say, however, that countries in the region do not feature pervasive and pernicious criminal markets that are perpetuated by a diverse range of domestic and foreign actors.

FIGURE 4.26

Criminal market scores, Oceania



Fauna crimes (5.25), financial crimes (4.64) and human trafficking (3.96) were the three highest scoring markets in Oceania. Indeed, at 6.20, the region of Micronesia had one of the highest scores for fauna crimes worldwide. Specifically, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, particularly of tuna, is the most significant and widespread form of organized crime in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. The vast fishing grounds of the Pacific and the extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the region make the detection of usually Asian fleets and so-called 'blue boats' (wooden boats from South-eastern Asia) an enormous challenge for local authorities.

Fish is one of the most abundant natural resources in the region and a crucial revenue stream for governments and individuals. The growth of IUU fishing undermines economic and food security among Pacific populations. In addition, the fishing industry is linked to various forms of human exploitation, and indeed human trafficking of fishermen as well as of women and girls who are often forced into sex work for clients in the fishing industry.

Flora crimes in Melanesia were found to be among the highest scoring globally, with Papua New Guinea (8.50) and the Solomon Islands (8.0) leading the way. This illicit market is primarily associated with illegal logging. More than half of the timber logged illegally here is destined for Asian consumer markets.

Papua New Guinea is also home to Oceania's highest scoring criminal market: financial crimes (9.0). The 'resource curse' that is often associated with parts of Africa manifests itself in the Melanesian country in the logging and mining sectors. The presence of vast natural resources, in a context of high levels of corruption has left the country open to mismanagement of public funds and multi-million-dollar frauds, with revenue from illicit activities often laundered through domestic and Australian property investments.

With Australia and New Zealand being among the most lucrative consumer markets in the world for drugs, it is no surprise that Pacific island countries have become transit hubs for narcotics originating in South-eastern Asia and Latin America. The high price of cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin make them for the most part inaccessible to Pacific islanders. However, larger countries such as Fiji have experienced the emergence of domestic consumer markets and local production of methamphetamines in recent years. This also applies to Tonga, which is currently experiencing an epidemic of methamphetamine use. Indeed, the synthetic drug trade (7.50) was by far the highest scoring market in the Polynesian kingdom.

FIGURE 4.27

Criminal actor scores, Oceania



Taking the region as a whole, no criminal actors in Oceania scored higher than 4.50, suggesting a moderate actor influence. Notably, and this mirrors other regions of the world while confirming the results of the 2021 Index, foreign actors were the highest scoring category (4.29). This was followed by criminal networks (3.86) and state-embedded actors (3.43).

Looking beyond regional averages, significant differences exist and Melanesia hosts by far the most influential criminal actors. This applies particularly for Papua New Guinea, which scored the highest for state-embedded actors, at 8.50, and the Solomon Islands, which is also plagued by grand corruption and where state-embedded actors (7.0) enable foreign actors (6.50) – who are

engaged in illicit activities in the fishing, logging and gambling sectors – as well as local private sector actors (6.50). Alarmingly, revenues are known to be used to finance political campaigns, hence influencing the democratic process. Foreign groups (7.0) also play an influential role in Tonga's criminal landscape, especially South and North American cartels trading cocaine and methamphetamine, as well as Asian syndicates.

FIGURE 4.28

Resilience scores, Oceania



At 5.55, Oceania had the second highest continental score for resilience (Europe scored 6.27). In terms of the continent's averages, 'national policies and laws' (6.39), 'international cooperation' (6.21) and 'law enforcement' (5.96) were the strongest indicators; the areas of 'victim and witness support' (4.46), 'prevention' (4.71) and 'economic regulatory capacity' (4.89) were the most lacking.

The relatively high overall continental score for resilience is to be attributed to the high scores assigned to Australia's resilience indicators, ranging between 6.0 for 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention', and 9.0 for 'international cooperation'. New Zealand's resilience also weights the continent's overall scores. New Zealand scored 6.50 for 'anti-money laundering' and 8.50 for 'international cooperation', 'territorial integrity' and 'non-state actors' – suggesting that all resilience measures are, at a minimum, 'sufficiently' effective. In keeping with the previous Index iteration, Papua New Guinea remained the least resilient country in Oceania, with no indicator scoring higher than 5.50.

Variations since the 2021 Index

The research and analysis confirmed some existing trends but also brought to the fore some changing dynamics. Criminality scores increased in 10 of the 14 Oceania countries, while resilience deteriorated in five. Of those, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu exhibited both higher criminality and lower resilience scores. Overall, however, resilience was 0.1 higher across the continent than the 2021 results, while crime increased from 3.07 to 3.23.

FIGURE 4.29

Criminality trends by country, 2021–2023, Oceania



Criminal markets

Three markets exhibited the largest increases. The first was the cocaine trade (+0.50), followed by the cannabis trade (+0.39) and fauna crimes (+0.32). Unsurprisingly given the earlier discussion on narcotics, some of the largest score increases were in Australia and New Zealand (+1.50 for cocaine in both). Cannabis markets registered increases in Fiji, New Zealand, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Samoa (all +1.0), alongside smaller increases elsewhere, confirming cannabis as the most widely produced and consumed on the continent. Fauna crimes increased notably in the Marshall Islands (from 6.50 to 7.50) driven by the trafficking of protected species and IUU fishing. The latter has also driven higher scores (+0.50) in other parts of Micronesia, including Palau and Nauru, where fish stock is one of the key natural resources – and in some cases the principal resource and the most lucrative – as well as in Vanuatu and Australia.

A market that declined in prevalence and impact was human smuggling, which fell by 0.11 points (from 2.40 to 2.29).

Criminal actors

With a 0.29 point increase, state-embedded actors exhibited the most significant growth in influence in Oceania in 2023. Variations across countries are nevertheless relevant. Whereas in some countries the influence of these actors remains of limited significance, in others, such as Papua New Guinea, the impact of criminality is directly embedded within the political class and law enforcement. Here the involvement of these state actors in organized criminality and corruption is widespread. On the other hand, the influence of mafia-style groups appears to be declining across Oceania, albeit marginally (–0.07). The exceptions are Australia and New Zealand where mafias retain 'moderate' influence, but, for the most part, they are virtually non-existent.

Resilience

Resilience levels in Oceania increased marginally from an average of 5.45 to 5.55. Differences from one country to another are striking and reflect the continuing capacity gaps with which Pacific island countries have to contend. At one end of the spectrum is Palau, where overall resilience increased from 4.54 to 5.33 as a result of improved scores across multiple indicators. Resilience in the Marshall Islands has also seen some improvements, with the national average growing from 5.04 to 5.79.

At the other end of the spectrum are traditionally highly resilient countries that are now exhibiting diminished resilience. Australia was down from 7.96 to 7.38, and New Zealand from 8.38 to 7.88. However, these scores indicate that both retain sufficiently effective resilience measures. Among the most marked changes, 'territorial integrity' in Australia decreased from 9.0 to 7.50, and 'non-state actors' from 8.0 to 6.50. These sharp variations can be attributed to the vulnerabilities brought about by the reopening of borders after the pandemic and the fragile state of press freedom, a by-product of the ultra-concentration of media ownership in the country and attempts by the government to control the information made public by the media. In New Zealand, the most concerning score variation is the decrease from 8.0 to 6.50 for anti-money laundering, which highlights the country's growing role as a conduit for the laundering of illicit financial flows and reflects glaring government deficiencies in addressing the issue.

FIGURE 4.30

Resilience trends by country, 2021–2023, Oceania



URIDAD
CRISTÓBAL

05

Vulnerability classifications

FIGURE 5.1

Vulnerability classifications map





FIGURE 5.2

Vulnerability classifications



The design of the Index allows not only for an assessment of the extent of criminal behaviour, but also an evaluation of where vulnerabilities lie. This way, stakeholders can work on mitigating the impact of organized crime.

The purpose of this section is to examine any notable movement of countries across the four quadrants of the vulnerability matrix (see Figure 5.2) since the 2021 Index and determine the underlying causes, be they related to criminality or resilience.



Low criminality–high resilience

FIGURE 5.3

Low criminality–high resilience



The number of countries falling within the low criminality–high resilience quadrant, which constitutes the best position in terms of facing organized crime, has decreased by three since the 2021 Index, to 47. That means just under a quarter of the UN member states could arguably be classified as equipped to handle the organized crime threats they face. However, this does not mean that countries in this quadrant do not have areas in which to improve their resilience. In many cases, shifts to another quadrant are likely, as several countries find themselves on the cusp of falling into the low resilience bracket if political will and efforts to enhance resilience are lacking.

Looking at the regional breakdowns, only three African countries are placed within the low criminality–high resilience quadrant: Cabo Verde, Mauritius and Rwanda. The latter two, meanwhile, are prime examples of why complacency could have negative

impacts in terms of their resilience. Mauritius and Rwanda have resilience scores of 5.54, a hair's breadth away from relegation to the low criminality–low resilience quadrant, which is a possibility, given that Mauritius's overall resilience fell by 0.13 since 2021. Of the 14 countries in Oceania, six are positioned in this quadrant, which, on the one hand, is a function of the diminutive size of the majority of countries in the region and their remoteness, factors that suppress opportunities for sizeable criminal markets to take hold there. On the other hand, the high scores for resilience are a testament to the preventive efforts made by these countries. The Americas and Asia both have seven countries in this quadrant. More than half of the European countries – 24 – are classified as having low levels of criminality and being highly resilient to organized crime. Of these, however, almost all are in Western and Northern Europe, with the exceptions of Monaco,[88] Portugal, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.

The data shows that conditions worsened in seven countries, leading them to fall into another quadrant, while only four countries improved their anti-organized crime frameworks and boosted their resilience scores to climb into the low criminality–high resilience category. These were the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Monaco. For the most part, the changes came from efforts made in the civil society and social protection sphere, as well as the 'political leadership and governance' and 'government transparency and accountability' indicators – all of which were assessed as problematic on a global scale.

Low criminality–low resilience

FIGURE 5.4

Low criminality–low resilience



As was the case in the 2021 assessment, the low criminality–low resilience quadrant again features the most countries (71). At first glance, the organized crime threats facing countries in this quadrant are not significant. Further examination, however, shows a clustering of countries towards the high criminality border of the quadrant. In other words, a number of countries would be endangered by rising levels of criminality, which their current resilience frameworks are not equipped to face. It is therefore crucial for countries within this quadrant to be forward-thinking and build up resilience capacities. On the bright side, there is also a clustering of countries at the margin between low and high resilience. Around a third of the countries in this quadrant are at this critical threshold, and little effort to strengthen resilience measures would be needed to elevate them to the low criminality–high resilience quadrant.

The regional breakdown shows that half of the countries in Oceania (7) are located in this quadrant, six of them in that near-high resilience

cluster, within a 0.50 score range of the low criminality–high resilience quadrant. Only eight European countries are located in this quadrant, along with 11 American and 18 Asian countries. Interestingly enough, although Africa ranks second globally for criminality, half of the countries on the continent, or 27, are assessed as having low levels of criminality and low resilience. This to an extent underscores the magnitude of the criminality problem within the rest of the continent.

The data shows that seven countries have moved into the low criminality–low resilience quadrant. These are Albania, Bahrain, Botswana, Georgia, Qatar, Tajikistan and Zimbabwe. Of these, three countries saw their criminality scores drop in comparison to 2021, but that could to an extent be attributed to the newly added indicators lowering the criminality average. It is worth highlighting that four countries saw their resilience scores drop below the 5.50 threshold, which resulted in these countries moving into this quadrant. This is another reminder that the only way to counter the ever-changing organized criminality dynamics is for states to take a holistic approach to resilience and, importantly, continuously build up their frameworks.

BOX 5.1

Interpreting Albania

As a hub of organized crime both regionally and on a global scale, Albania is one of the countries the GI-TOC monitors closely. Since the last iteration of the Index, however, Albania's ranking has improved, moving from the high criminality to low criminality band, something that appeared unexpected. Even though this change does indeed signal a decrease in criminality in the country, it should be viewed with some caution. While it is true that the country has combated certain criminal activities, the shift in the ranking is rather due to the change in the Index's composition this year. A closer look at the scores for Albania shows that some of the original 10 criminal markets have changed by 0.50 points at most. That is to say, the drop into the low criminality band can be mainly attributed to the low pervasiveness in Albania of the newly added criminal markets, which bring down its overall criminality average.

Another nuance that has to be taken into consideration is the active involvement of Albanian criminal actors abroad in several transnational criminal markets, where they have gained notoriety. This phenomenon has been increasingly observed and well documented. The influence of Albanian groups has grown especially in Italy, France and the UK, in some cases to such an extent that they have become the most dominant foreign organized criminal groups in those countries.[89] There are also indications of the existence of Albanian criminal actors in Latin American countries, exercising an increased influence over key parts of the cocaine pipeline, especially in Ecuador and Peru, also resulting in increased violence in these countries. The growing presence of Albanian groups in both Latin America and Europe showcases the expanded control exerted on transnational drug trafficking by these actors. Nevertheless, their impact is assessed on a geographic principle, which takes into account only where they operate from. Thus, despite their increased prominence across Europe and Latin America, the activities of Albanian groups abroad are not taken into consideration when assessing criminality for Albania. Instead, they are considered as foreign actors in the countries where they are active.

High criminality–low resilience

FIGURE 5.5

High criminality–low resilience



Although, again, there tend to be clusterings of countries towards the edges of the quadrant, the majority of the 63 states in the high criminality–low resilience quadrant are facing substantial challenges. These are present both in the countries' considerable levels of criminality and their apparent deficiencies to withstand and counter the threats they face. Compared to the first iteration of the Index, statistics show that the number of countries that fall under this quadrant has increased by six, to 63 in 2023.

The geographical distribution of countries in the high criminality–low resilience category is slanted towards Africa, which has 21 – a significant proportion of the continent. In comparison, vulnerability to the impact of organized crime is significant, but the number of states that suffer its effects is smaller in Asia and the Americas,

with 19 and 14 countries, respectively. Eight European countries also find themselves in this quadrant. Notably, all of them come from a single region: Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, all countries in the quadrant have experienced a democratic backslide and fragility, with two of them – Ukraine and Russia – engaged in a full-scale war. In fact, a large share of states in this quadrant have experienced some form of fracture – be it in the form of conflict, rebellion, outright war or fragility. Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine and Yemen are the more stark examples of that. Fractures in the political stability of states is another driver behind rising criminality and an ensuing inability of countries to develop adequate measures to respond. There are a number of countries in this quadrant that have seen their democratic values and the rule of law imperilled, resulting in a deteriorating organized crime environment.

All of the countries that have moved into the high criminality–low resilience category saw a spike in criminality without their governments taking adequate measures to meet the new challenges. One of the best examples is Bulgaria, where rampant endemic corruption continued against the backdrop of political instability, which saw four parliamentary elections in just one and a half years. With the country being under the leadership of caretaker governments and a national assembly that could not function continuously, resolving the political deadlock topped the agenda. This underlines how, for many of the countries within this quadrant, addressing issues of political leadership and governance will be an essential foundation upon which to build broader resilience to organized crime.

High criminality–high resilience

FIGURE 5.6

High criminality–high resilience



As highlighted previously in this report, the high criminality–high resilience quadrant is perhaps the most counterintuitive category. But it is also the quadrant that has the fewest countries. Only 12 countries are featured here: China, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. It continues to be the case that most countries in the sample tend to be economically well developed. Arguably, the inclusion in this Index of indicators that disproportionately affect developed countries, especially financial and cyber-dependent crimes as well as private-sector criminal actors, has shone a spotlight on the vulnerability of such nations to these forms of crime. This was certainly the case for Costa Rica, Senegal and the United Kingdom, three of the four countries that moved into the quadrant in 2023 – and whose increased criminality scores were

the reason for that shift. It would therefore be a challenge for nations in this situation to enhance their resilience frameworks to such an extent as to contain overall criminality within lower levels.

But despite the challenges, there is no place for complacency, otherwise countries risk being overwhelmed by the already heavy load of organized crime. Such was the case of Ecuador, which was the only country that fell out of the high criminality–high resilience quadrant, and is now struggling to respond to the much aggravated organized crime environment in the country.



BOX 5.2

US and UK: The impact of financial crimes

Two of the most developed and largest economies in the world, the US and the UK, have seen their criminality averages increase, signalling a worrying trend that does not spare countries widely recognized as stable and wealthy. In the case of both these G7 countries, the upsurge in criminality levels has appeared to be driven by the inclusion of new indicators, some of them assessed to thrive in strong economies. The most glaring examples of such illicit economies are cyber-dependent crimes and financial crimes.

Many developed economies are more susceptible to financial crimes as a side effect of their 'business friendly' regulatory frameworks, their openness to foreign capital and investment, and their integration into the global financial system. All these factors, which make such countries attractive for legitimate financial activity, also leave them vulnerable to criminal exploitation. In the UK, for example, despite London being one of the biggest financial hubs in the world and a global epicentre for international payments, investments and banking, which certainly drives economic growth, the pervasiveness of financial crimes is a serious risk. Numerous reports over recent years have highlighted the scale of this crime and its impact on the country, and outlined possible responses to curb it.[90] Nevertheless, in the face of increasing awareness of the phenomenon, institutions and stakeholders have reportedly failed to deal a decisive blow to this growing threat.

Official statistics indicate that fraud constitutes the largest stand-alone crime type in England and Wales, with one in 15 adults falling victim to fraud in 2022 (18% of them being victimized more than once), while 80% of all reported fraud was cyber-enabled. Digital fraud, in particular, rose substantially in the UK, with account takeovers and payment transfer frauds experiencing a spike in recent years, also as a consequence of the increased reliance on digital tools derived from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, fraudulent financial activities are still also linked to more traditional offences, including tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of public resources. Similarly, according to the latest available statistics released by the US Federal Trade Commission, US citizens lost almost US$8.8 billion to various types of scams in 2022, following a surge of over 30% in fraud-related losses compared to the previous year. In 2021, an estimated 5% of US citizens fell victim to fraud, collectively losing US$5.8 billion – a 70% increase since 2020.[91] Most US-based fraud takes the form of imposter scams, internet service scams and business opportunity scams. Companies and financial institutions are also frequently targeted in the country, with fraud rates and losses increasing for nearly all payment types from 2021 to 2022.[92]

Financial crimes are a significant threat to the security and prosperity of developed countries, as they endanger the soundness of financial systems and impact all sectors of society, from citizens to the private sector and government. Public anxiety has grown over the failure of states to mount an adequate response and the inability of mandated institutions to address systemic deficiencies, such as weak checks on information, transparency loopholes, ineffective supervision and enforcement. Although financial criminals are often well organized and persistent, governments and industry need to work together to take proactive steps to tackle fraud. This objective was flagged in the 2023 UK Fraud Strategy, which aims to reduce fraud by 10% from 2019 levels by December 2024, through increased cooperation and intelligence sharing, and increased law enforcement efforts, including better investigation and prosecution processes and enhanced systems for victims to report such crimes to the police.[93]

FIGURE 5.7

Criminality and resilience – country classifications





Low criminality – high resilience | 47 countries | ↘ –3

- AD ANDORRA
- AR ARGENTINA
- AM ARMENIA
- AU AUSTRALIA
- AT AUSTRIA
- BS BAHAMAS
- BB BARBADOS
- BE BELGIUM
- CV CABO VERDE
- CA CANADA
- CL CHILE
- HR CROATIA
- CZ CZECH REPUBLIC
- DK DENMARK
- EE ESTONIA
- FI FINLAND
- DE GERMANY
- IS ICELAND
- IE IRELAND
- IL ISRAEL
- JP JAPAN
- JO JORDAN
- KR KOREA, REP.
- KW KUWAIT
- LV LATVIA
- LI LIECHTENSTEIN
- LT LITHUANIA
- LU LUXEMBOURG
- MH MARSHALL ISLANDS
- MU MAURITIUS
- FM MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
- MC MONACO
- NL NETHERLANDS
- NZ NEW ZEALAND
- NO NORWAY
- PL POLAND
- PT PORTUGAL
- RO ROMANIA
- RW RWANDA
- WS SAMOA
- SG SINGAPORE
- SI SLOVENIA
- LC ST. LUCIA
- SE SWEDEN
- CH SWITZERLAND
- TV TUVALU
- UY URUGUAY



Low criminality – low resilience | 71 countries | ↘ –6

- AL ALBANIA
- DZ ALGERIA
- AG ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
- AZ AZERBAIJAN
- BH BAHRAIN
- BD BANGLADESH
- BZ BELIZE
- BJ BENIN
- BT BHUTAN
- BO BOLIVIA
- BW BOTSWANA
- BN BRUNEI
- BI BURUNDI
- KM COMOROS
- CG CONGO, REP.
- CU CUBA
- CY CYPRUS
- DJ DJIBOUTI
- DM DOMINICA
- DO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
- EG EGYPT
- GQ EQUATORIAL GUINEA
- ER ERITREA
- SZ ESWATINI
- FJ FIJI
- GA GABON
- GM GAMBIA
- GE GEORGIA
- GR GREECE
- GD GRENADA
- GN GUINEA
- GW GUINEA-BISSAU
- HU HUNGARY
- KZ KAZAKHSTAN
- KI KIRIBATI
- KP KOREA, DPR
- KG KYRGYZSTAN
- LS LESOTHO
- MW MALAWI
- MV MALDIVES
- MT MALTA
- MR MAURITANIA
- MN MONGOLIA
- MA MOROCCO
- NA NAMIBIA
- NR NAURU
- MK NORTH MACEDONIA
- OM OMAN
- PW PALAU
- QA QATAR
- SM SAN MARINO
- ST SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE
- SC SEYCHELLES
- SL SIERRA LEONE
- SK SLOVAKIA
- SB SOLOMON ISLANDS
- LK SRI LANKA
- KN ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
- VC ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
- SR SURINAME
- TJ TAJIKISTAN
- TL TIMOR-LESTE
- TG TOGO
- TO TONGA
- TT TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
- TN TUNISIA
- TM TURKMENISTAN
- UZ UZBEKISTAN
- VU VANUATU
- ZM ZAMBIA
- ZW ZIMBABWE



High criminality – low resilience | 63 countries | ↗ +6

- AF AFGHANISTAN
- AO ANGOLA
- BY BELARUS
- BA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
- BR BRAZIL
- BG BULGARIA
- BF BURKINA FASO
- KH CAMBODIA
- CM CAMEROON
- CF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
- TD CHAD
- CD CONGO, DEM. REP.
- CI CÔTE D'IVOIRE
- EC ECUADOR
- SV EL SALVADOR
- ET ETHIOPIA
- GH GHANA
- GT GUATEMALA
- GY GUYANA
- HT HAITI
- HN HONDURAS
- IN INDIA
- ID INDONESIA
- IR IRAN
- IQ IRAQ
- JM JAMAICA
- KE KENYA
- LA LAOS
- LB LEBANON
- LR LIBERIA
- LY LIBYA
- MG MADAGASCAR
- ML MALI
- MX MEXICO
- MD MOLDOVA
- ME MONTENEGRO
- MZ MOZAMBIQUE
- MM MYANMAR
- NP NEPAL
- NI NICARAGUA
- NE NIGER
- PK PAKISTAN
- PA PANAMA
- PG PAPUA NEW GUINEA
- PY PARAGUAY
- PE PERU
- PH PHILIPPINES
- RU RUSSIA
- SA SAUDI ARABIA
- RS SERBIA
- SO SOMALIA
- SS SOUTH SUDAN
- SD SUDAN
- SY SYRIA
- TZ TANZANIA
- TH THAILAND
- TR TURKEY
- UG UGANDA
- UA UKRAINE
- AE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
- VE VENEZUELA
- VN VIETNAM
- YE YEMEN



High criminality – high resilience | 12 countries) | ↗ +3

- CN CHINA
- CO COLOMBIA
- CR COSTA RICA
- FR FRANCE
- IT ITALY
- MY MALAYSIA
- NG NIGERIA
- SN SENEGAL
- ZA SOUTH AFRICA
- ES SPAIN
- GB UNITED KINGDOM
- US UNITED STATES

GUICHET
CHAUFFEUR

06

Criminal markets, actors and **resilience:**

Understanding the dynamics

Even though five new criminal markets and one new criminal actor type were included in the 2023 iteration, the criminality–resilience dynamics remained consistent with the 2021 Index findings. As the data shows, criminality and resilience are negatively correlated (–0.44, compared to –0.45 in 2021). Therefore, the less resilient a state is to the threat of organized crime, the higher the likelihood of it experiencing criminality, and vice versa: higher resilience equates to lower pervasiveness of criminal markets and actors. Yet, at –0.44, the relationship is not very strong (see Figure 6.1, which shows how the countries are dispersed across the criminality–resilience matrix).

FIGURE 6.1

Criminality vs Resilience



The reason is that the relationship between resilience and criminality is not as linear as intuition might suggest, and several factors determine the dynamics between criminality and resilience. Indeed, there are a growing number of countries that deviate from the pattern that logic would support, as can be seen in Figure 6.1.

But why do we observe such anomalies? To answer that, we need to look at the two categories in the vulnerability matrix that include countries that deviate from the linear criminality–resilience relationship.

They include countries that fall into the low crime–low resilience category, as well as some of the countries that fall into the high crime–high resilience category. The low crime–low resilience category comprises the largest number of countries, with 71. Given their comparatively low levels of crime, with an average score of less than 5.50, some of these countries may have very few pervasive criminal markets, or none at all.

Oceania is a good example to illustrate these dynamics, the continent boasts the lowest overall criminality score by a significant margin (3.23 compared to the global score of 5.03). Barring Australia and New Zealand, most island states lie at a great distance from major trafficking flows, which would partly explain their comparably lower criminality scores. Owing to these lower levels of vulnerability to criminality, some Pacific island states have just not had the stimulus to establish resilience measures in the form of anti-organized crime regulatory or institutional frameworks. For such countries, the low resilience–low criminality ranking is not so much an anomaly, but rather a function of how they have been largely bypassed by organized crime flows, and are therefore not incentivized to adopt resilience measures.

Africa is another good example. The large majority of countries on the continent (48 out of 54) fall within the low resilience band, and most of them (27) do not experience high levels of criminality. While environmental and geographic factors almost certainly play into the low criminality scores for these countries, there are also economic conditions that have constrained the development of a large number of pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actors. At the same time, economic factors – such as low income and high poverty – hamper states' abilities to develop and enforce effective anti-organized crime measures.

These factors help explain how the relationship between criminality and resilience is even less pronounced in these regions than it is globally. The correlations for both Oceania and Africa are not statistically significant.

Besides the considerations outlined above, another circumstance that should be factored in when analyzing the relationship between criminality and resilience is the thematic composition of the Index, i.e. the criminal markets covered by the Index. It is arguable that the ambiguous relationship between criminality and resilience could be explained by the nature of specific criminal markets. Indeed, as was the case in the first iteration of the Index, the entire drugs-based category bears little correlation to overall resilience. The correlation between resilience on the one hand and synthetic drugs trafficking, heroin trafficking and the illicit cannabis trade is negative, but not statistically significant. Interestingly, however, repeating the outcome of the 2021 analysis, cocaine continues to exhibit a positive, albeit weak, relationship to overall resilience (0.19). This admittedly non-significant relationship between the two suggests that, as with the other three drug markets, the pervasiveness of the cocaine trade is fairly independent of how resilient a country is in general. The positive direction of the correlation underscores, as in the previous iteration of the Index, that wealthy and generally more highly resilient countries are slightly more likely to be impacted by this illicit trade, as they are predominantly classified as consumer markets.

A similar relationship is modelled by one of the criminal markets newly incorporated into this edition of the Index: cyber-dependent crimes, a market that is also positively correlated with overall resilience (0.31). The results for cyber-dependent crimes also suggest that countries with high levels of resilience to organized crime are just as likely to have a well-developed cyber-dependent crimes market as countries with low levels of resilience. One explanation would be that wealthy, developed states, which tend to be more resilient, are a target for cyber-dependent offences. That would

also explain the comparably higher correlation between 'economic regulatory capacity' and cyber-dependent crime (0.38) – countries that have well-established business environments, free to operate from traditional organized crime, have allowed citizens to accumulate wealth, which makes them an attractive target. It may therefore be that wealthy nations experience higher victimization rates of cyber-dependent offences. However, those contexts, where essential resilience structures, namely regulatory frameworks and their implementation mechanisms, lag behind, are also likely to be increasingly impacted by such threats, as they cannot keep up with the speed with which this form of criminality is developing.

The criminal markets subcomponent, however, only partially explains the dynamics behind the criminality–resilience relationship. As already outlined, the criminality component also features a second subcomponent: criminal actors. This aims to measure the influence of different criminal group typologies as well as their impact. Numbers show that the overall criminal actors scores are a better predictor of the state of resilience in a given country than criminal markets. The relationship is a moderately negative one (−0.49), which is to say that, as criminal actor scores rise, resilience tends to decline. The same relationship is observed between criminal markets and resilience, though it is somewhat weaker at −0.35.

Analysis has demonstrated a weak correlation between resilience and individual criminal actor types globally, with the exception of state-embedded actors, which, in line with the 2021 analysis, continues to exhibit a strong negative relationship (−0.79). It is therefore tenable to suggest that at the centre of the strong interrelationship between criminal actors and resilience lies the state-embedded actors typology. Furthermore, while the affiliation between resilience and individual actor types might differ depending on regional context, state-embedded actors are tied to resilience levels to a considerable degree on all five continents, especially Europe, where the correlation between the two indicators is very strong at −0.90. Mirroring the 2021 results, the current conclusions serve to reiterate how crucial of a deterrent the presence of criminals acting from within the state apparatus is to the development of adequate and functional strategies and institutions to curb organized crime.

Crime convergence

As observed earlier in the report, financial crimes topped the list of the most pervasive markets. Despite their global prevalence, however, the presence of a financial crimes market is not the strongest predictor of overall criminality, with a correlation coefficient of 0.71. In fact, extortion and protection racketeering, and arms trafficking are most strongly correlated to criminality at 0.79, followed by human trafficking (0.78), human smuggling (0.75) and non-renewable resource crimes (0.73).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, as was the case in 2021, the cocaine trade remains weakly correlated to overall criminality (0.31). Similarly, although cyber-dependent crimes have reportedly increased over the past couple of years, this criminal market has the second lowest criminality correlation coefficient (0.45).

The transnational reach of these flows has largely been facilitated by globalization. A number of studies have argued that globalization and advancements in information technology have tremendously benefited organized crime groups, allowing criminals to expand their operations, and at the same time diversify their criminal activities.[94] Thus, there is an increasing convergence between criminal markets, or in other words an overlap between criminal markets as well as the criminal groups that are involved in them.

BOX 6.1

Encrypted messaging platforms

Organized crime groups have been integrating newly developed technologies into their illicit activities to expand and diversify their activities. The use of modern technologies has rendered their activities more sophisticated and complex, which has helped them to evade law enforcement authorities.

One of the main tools used by criminal groups is encrypted communication platforms, with EncroChat and Sky ECC being the most popular. These have been widely used in the illicit drug trade and corruption schemes, as they provide a secure line of communication between users, guaranteeing a high level of anonymity and non-traceability. Comprehensive operations were carried out by international and national law enforcement authorities to crack down on encryptions, which has resulted in the dismantling of large-scale organized crime operations, high numbers of arrests and seizures of illicit revenues globally.[95] Even though these operations, with Sky ECC-related arrests continuing in 2022, have proven to be successful in combating and preventing organized crime to an extent, organized crime groups are inherently capable of adapting and finding new methods and technological advancements to support their illicit activities.

The Index has identified a number of examples of crime convergence, most notably between human trafficking and human smuggling, where the correlation coefficient is estimated at 0.79, the highest correlation between any two criminal markets. From region to region, this relationship varies in strength from 0.87 and 0.84 in the Americas and Asia, respectively, to 0.79 in Europe and 0.62 in Oceania. The likely reason behind the strong link between the two is the fact that the lines between human trafficking and human smuggling are blurred in many geographies. What may start out as smuggling of individuals seeking to move elsewhere may develop into human trafficking, with people being exploited en route to their destination or after arriving there, being forced to repay incurred debt or left with no means to fend for themselves and falling victim to various forms of exploitation.

Besides its close relationship with human smuggling, globally, human trafficking correlates moderately with half of all the other criminal markets, including the new markets added for this second Index iteration, barring cyber-dependent crimes. Despite the possible overlap between human trafficking and other markets, it is important to acknowledge that correlation does not equal causation. In other words, there is not necessarily a direct link between markets that would explain the apparent relationship.

The second highest correlation coefficient remains the one between flora and fauna crimes (0.72), only a slight change compared to the 2021 Index (0.71). And, as argued previously, the explanation is likely to be that there is a geographic overlap in source countries for both. In other words, source countries that have a higher biodiversity of fauna are also likely to have extensive forest cover or a high diversity of coveted flora species. In spite of the strong correlation, flora and fauna markets are only weakly correlated to other criminal markets, with the exceptions being the non-renewable resource crimes market and, surprisingly, trade in counterfeit goods. It seems logical that the moderate correlation between flora and non-renewable resources markets (0.52), as well as between fauna and non-renewable resources (0.45), is a degree of convergence between environmental crime markets.

Cyber-dependent crimes are weakly correlated with almost all other criminal markets, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.22 (cyber-dependent vs fauna crimes) to 0.47 (cyber-dependent vs financial crimes). The relationship with the synthetic drug trade is the main outlier (see Figure 6.2).

FIGURE 6.2

Cyber-dependent crimes vs synthetic drug trade



There has been a growing global trend over the past years towards online purchasing of synthetic drugs (classified as the cyber-enabled synthetic drug trade under the Index definitions). Such user behaviour might point to a well-developed cyber environment, which would, in turn, presumably imply a heightened risk of cyber-dependent criminality. A recent illicit practice that exemplifies this emerging trend is the widespread use of cryptocurrency as the preferred method of payment for some of the transnational organized crime groups involved in the synthetic drug trade, particularly fentanyl and its chemical precursor. Continental results lend further credence to the hypothesis. The correlation between synthetic drugs and cyber-dependent crimes is strong and statistically significant across all regions, especially Europe (0.77) and the Americas (0.74). The only exception is Africa, where the relationship is moderate (0.42) – perhaps a consequence of the absence of a well-developed cyber infrastructure and a cyber-dependent crimes market as a result. But while cybercrime is not among the highest scoring markets, the narratives that underpin country scores indicate the breakneck speed at which the market has grown over the past couple of years. Given the speed at which cybercrime has been growing, it will be interesting to see how the relationship evolves in the next Index iteration.

Importantly, these are macro correlations, the analysis of which, despite looking at some regional dynamics, largely ignores local context. To better understand the convergence between different criminal markets and the subsequent dynamics in order to conceptualize and implement adequate counter-organized crime measures and initiatives, it is critical to assess local regional conditions – an ambitious undertaking that would hopefully be aided by the successive Index iterations.

Who is doing what?

Although criminal networks are not the highest ranked actor types overall, their reach and impact are felt all over the world. This particular criminal actor type is central to the functioning of transnational organized crime flows, regardless of the commodity that is trafficked. This assertion is supported by the fact that criminal networks demonstrate the highest correlation with the overall criminal markets score of all five actor types (0.78). Put in simpler terms, criminal networks continue to be the common denominator across many illicit economies.

The state-embedded actor category is the second best predictor of the presence of a developed criminal market environment in a given country, with a pairwise correlation of 0.64. This is hardly a surprise, given the pervasiveness of state-embedded actors and their various roles at different institutional levels as both perpetrators and facilitators of criminality.

State-embedded actors are strongly associated with the arms trafficking and human trafficking markets (both at 0.66). In line with the analysis in the previous iteration of the Index, the results of the 2023 Index show that 12 of the 15 countries ranking highest on the arms trafficking market experience some form of fragility – such as civil or open wars, unrest or coups – or are known suppliers of arms to conflict areas in breach of embargoes. In these instances, illicit arms flows either happen with the knowledge of the state or are an unwritten state policy. Ukraine has become a key example, where arms are being illegally imported by the Russian state into conflict-torn Ukraine. Iran is another notable case, where arms trafficking is a key element of the country's regional geopolitical strategy, supplying weapons to other states in Western Asia and North Africa, as well as to Russia and Afghanistan. It is thus evident how state-embedded actors are able to attain a dominant position in a market such as arms trafficking. The arms trade is also among those markets where the state is the sole authority able to exert an oversight over the legal economy. This would arguably allow for opportunities for corruption or direct involvement in the illicit arms trade.

Other groups are also known to exhibit strong relationships with specific criminal markets. Mafia-style groups are one such instance. Although they are the lowest scoring actor type globally and not even moderately associated with most markets, mafia-style groups do form a strong pairwise correlation with the arms trafficking (0.53), and with extortion and protection racketeering (0.75), which is the highest correlation coefficient observed among all actor–market relationships. These results might arguably speak to the violent nature of gangs, syndicates and mafia-style groups in general, and reaffirm their role as primary perpetrator of extortion and protection rackets.

There is also an apparent link between private sector actors and financial crimes, estimated at 0.64. This provides crucial empirical evidence of the tangible role of private entities – companies and individuals – as facilitators and perpetrators of financial crime, assessed as the most pervasive criminal market globally. This should flag the importance of better regulatory frameworks to curb or inhibit the involvement of the private sector in organized crime.

Resilience

Following the adverse effects of the pandemic on the global state of affairs, the world emerged divided. Climate emergencies, political and economic turmoil, an open war in Europe: the ramifications of these only contribute to a more fractured world. The way forward seems to place international cooperation as the main prong of the solution to global issues, including the increased scope and scale of organized crime. What does the data tell us though?

'International cooperation' scored the highest among all the resilience indicators (5.87) and has improved the most since the first iteration of the Index, climbing by 0.19 points. Why is it then that the overall criminality score also went up? The 'international cooperation' indicator refers to not only the structures and processes of interaction and policymaking, but also the concrete implementation of measures. It is very likely that political talk and 'on paper' measures push the score upwards, whereas implementation is weaker. Furthermore, results indicate that higher levels of international cooperation are not a good predictor of criminality levels, with the pairwise correlation between the two indicators estimated at −0.28, which is the lowest correlation of criminality with any of the resilience building blocks.

It is therefore evident that international cooperation would do little to curb organized crime if no follow-up mechanisms to evaluate implementation are designed. The push towards better state accountability should, however, come from different vectors, non-state actors being one. The past couple of years, particularly in the wake of the pandemic, have seen even more restrictions on free speech and a shrinking environment where non-state actors can freely work, as evidenced by the Index results. In this challenging context, it is essential that the role of civil society actors in countering organized crime is recognized for its value, and active steps are taken towards bridging the gap between state and non-state actors in their anti-organized crime efforts. The strong relationship between 'non-state actors' and 'political leadership and governance' (0.78) as well as between 'non-state actors' and 'government transparency and accountability' (0.83) only lend further credence to this observation.



07

Changing organized crime dynamics and comparing datasets

This section analyzes how the Index results compare with various economic and socio-political indicators. These sets of indicators, whose scores vary between continents and regions, often reflect how organized crime emerges and develops.

Factors such as a country's level of technological advancement, state resources and social inequality can shape how an environment might become conducive for criminal actors to exploit. Certain global phenomena, such as climate change, also play a hand in how the organized crime landscape develops, at least in certain vulnerable regions.

The analysis conducted for this Index has not only reaffirmed existing organized crime dynamics but also shed light on emerging trends that warrant close attention. In addition, the 2023 results allow us to introduce a new dimension to our analysis – developments and patterns that become visible over time. Having an insight into these evolving dynamics allows for a better interpretation of what may lie ahead. One crucial finding is the widening gap between criminality and resilience. What vulnerabilities – economic, political and social – contribute to this growing divide? Are authoritarian regimes, for example, more likely to have witnessed an increase in criminality? And what other factors are connected to a country's fluctuating levels of criminality and resilience?

The purpose of this exercise is not to establish definitive causal relationships, but rather to shed light on the complex interplay of economic, political and social factors that shape a country's susceptibility to organized crime or contribute to its resilience. While factors such as political instability, corruption and unemployment may be directly linked to levels of criminality in certain regions, their impact is more ambiguous in others. Likewise, progress in technological and trade development may contribute to a decline in certain illicit economies while simultaneously fuelling others. Recognizing these relationships and complexities provides a starting point for policymakers, law enforcement and civil society to develop tailored responses to organized crime, emphasizing the need to adapt approaches to the ever-changing economic and political landscapes.

FOR THE ANALYSIS IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING DATASETS WERE ASSESSED:

- Global Peace Index 2022
- Human Development Index 2021
- Democracy Index 2022
- Corruption Perceptions Index 2022
- Fragile States Index 2022
- Global Climate Risk Index 2021
- Intentional homicide rates (UNODC, 2019, latest data available)
- Income inequality (taken from the Gini Index, World Bank, latest data available)
- GDP current (World Bank, latest data available)
- GDP per capita (World Bank, latest data available)
- IUU Fishing Index 2021
- Rule of Law 2023

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

Economic, socio-economic and **geographical** vulnerabilities

Criminality

FIGURE 7.1

Correlation coefficients between criminality and selected indicators, by continent





Source: UN Population Division, UNFAO, United Nations Development Programme, World Bank and OECD

In terms of economic vulnerabilities, the results of the 2023 Index largely reaffirm the conclusions drawn in the previous iteration, namely that a country's economic activity, as measured by its total GDP, is not tied to criminality levels. In other words, wealthier countries are generally no more or less susceptible to organized crime than poorer countries. When looking at GDP per capita, however, the picture is less well defined. On the one hand, high economic performance can create opportunities for prosperity and development, and reduce certain vulnerabilities to organized crime, such as individuals' motivations for participating in illicit markets. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that wealthy countries can expect less criminality. Indeed, in some cases, positive developments, such as economic growth, can have a dual effect. While they may contribute to combating certain illicit economies, paradoxically, they can also expose society to a new set of organized crime risks.

The five new criminal markets included in this Index – cyber-dependent crimes, financial crimes, illicit trade in excisable goods, trade in counterfeit goods, and extortion and protection racketeering – have provided a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between levels of criminality and economic performance. In the previous iteration of the Index, the data showed a negative correlation (–0.35) between a country's GDP per capita and the pervasiveness of criminality. With the inclusion of the new indicators, this correlation's strength has dropped to –0.28.[96] This can be partly explained by the fact that increased economic output may be coupled with certain characteristics, such as the development of financial hubs and advanced ICT systems, which can be inherently conducive to certain criminal markets. In other words, economic advancement may alleviate certain organized crime risks but simultaneously pave the way for others. This vulnerability is particularly pronounced in areas with minimal regulatory oversight or susceptibility to corruption.

The relationship between economic indicators and criminal activity can be further understood when one looks at individual criminal markets. The Index results show that financial crimes are pervasive in 17[97] of the world's 20 largest economies (scoring 6.0 or higher, which indicates a 'significant to severe influence'). This also illustrates that wealthy countries are not immune to organized crime. Furthermore, cyber-dependent crime is also

found to correlate positively to GDP per capita across nearly all continents, with the exception of Europe. This does not mean, however, that other countries are exempt from these criminal markets. As the world is increasingly moving into online spaces, more so since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous countries have, irrespective of their economic performance, experienced a surge in criminal activities taking place online, such as financial fraud and hacking activity.[98]

At the same time, GDP and GDP per capita tell us little about how income and wealth are distributed among society, which is important to consider. Limited opportunities for sustainable livelihoods – typically measured in the form of high rates of poverty and unemployment, and high income inequality – have long been linked to the flourishing of illicit economies.[99] In many economically marginalized areas, individuals may find themselves compelled to engage in illicit markets to survive, making illicit economies simultaneously central to the livelihoods of many worldwide. The Index analysis reaffirms such notions, finding a correlation of 0.26 between income inequality[100] and criminality, and a correlation of 0.29 between income inequality and criminal actors. While such correlations are weak, a closer look shows a discrepancy in various parts of the world. In Oceania, for example, income inequality correlates moderately with criminality (0.40), whereas in Africa there was found to be no correlation between the two.[101]

Similar results are found when criminality is assessed against the Human Development Index, which measures a country's performance across various socio-economic indicators, including life expectancy, education and gross national income. A correlation, albeit a weak one, between human development and criminality (−0.25) is observed, meaning that human development at the individual level plays a role, although only to a weak degree, in a country's criminality levels. The direction of causality between the two variables remains uncertain, however, with both factors potentially influencing each other.

In addition to economic indicators, the analysis examined the impact of geographic factors on criminality. These findings reaffirm those of the previous Index, highlighting a weak positive relationship between criminality and population size (0.21) and surface level size (0.21). In other words, countries that have large territories or populations are only slightly more likely to have higher levels of criminality. Certain regions do, however, reveal an increased vulnerability to organized crime as a result of their geographical and natural characteristics. On the African continent, for example, criminality is moderately correlated with both population size and country size (0.53). Countries with very large surface areas and long borders that are difficult to monitor encounter significant control challenges stemming from weaker governance, heightened insecurity and difficult natural terrains, which make effective surveillance challenging. Moreover, heightened vulnerability can arise from proximity to neighbouring countries that are heavily affected by organized crime and when countries lie along major illicit trade routes. In contrast, smaller states, with limited access to natural resources for exploitation, tend to exhibit lower susceptibility to organized crime.[102]

Resilience

FIGURE 7.2

Correlation coefficients between resilience and selected indicators, by continent

Source: UN Population Division, United Nations Development Programme, World Bank and OECD

As we have seen, the relationship between economic indicators and criminality is complex, as economic development may alleviate certain vulnerabilities while giving rise to others. In terms of resilience, however, the link is less ambiguous. Mirroring the findings of the previous Index, the 2023 findings reveal a positive correlation between resilience and GDP per capita, namely 0.57. This indicates that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to exhibit greater levels of resilience to organized crime. While this relationship can be considered moderate, all twelve resilience indicators show statistical significance.

The reasoning is straightforward: countries that have more financial revenue at their disposal are generally in a better position to allocate resources to tackling the root drivers of organized crime, and protecting its citizens from it, for example by strengthening civil society or implementing drug harm reduction facilities. Of the resilience indicators, none exemplifies this as strongly as 'victim and witness support', which is significantly correlated with GDP per capita at 0.63. This observation shows that, in wealthy countries, individuals especially vulnerable to criminal activities, such as victims and witnesses, are more likely to have adequate support.

The finding that higher economic output per capita is linked to higher resilience does not always hold, however. Numerous countries provide evidence to the contrary. Russia, for example, which ranks among the top 15 economies, has a low resilience score of 3.79. Turkey (3.38) is another example. The country may be an economic powerhouse of Western Asia, yet it ranks among the lowest for resilience in the region.[103] Moreover, even when countries have the capacity and willingness to invest resources in combating organized crime, this does not always equate to improvements in their reservoirs of resilience. The Philippines provides a striking example of this. Despite its multi-billion-dollar investments over the years to wage its war on drugs, the Philippines continues to receive a low score (4.21) for resilience, which improved by just 0.08 since the last Index.

Other socio-economic indicators besides GDP are needed to provide a more comprehensive picture of a country's ability to become resilient, or maintain resilience, to organized crime. Human development is one such indicator that is highly correlated to resilience, with 0.72. A higher level of human development indicates that a country has invested in the social and economic well-being of its people, which strengthens its capacity to address the root causes of organized crime. While the direction of causality between the two variables remains uncertain, there is nevertheless a clear link, with both resilience and human development having the capacity to mutually shape and influence one another.

In terms of inequality and resilience, the results find no statistically significant correlation. This shows that when countries experience considerable income disparities – which, as discussed before, may drive criminal participation in some cases – it does not play a role in determining a country's ability to achieve, maintain or increase its resilience to organized crime.

Political and socio-political vulnerabilities

FIGURE 7.3

Correlation coefficients between criminality and resilience scores and selected indicators, by continent



Note: Victims of intentional homicide – rate per 100 000 population – data approximately 50% from 2020, 20% from 2019, 5% from 2018 and data for the remaining 25% is unavailable.

FIGURE 7.3 (CONTINUED)

Source: Transparency International, Freedom House, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Economist Intelligence Unit, The Fund for Peace and UNESCO

The previous section examined the nuanced relationships between criminality and resilience, and economic and socio-economic indicators. Here, the 2023 results are measured against a country's political and social environment, including regime types, political and civil freedoms, corruption, conflict and fragility, violence and climate change. Under assessment are questions such as, does state fragility indicate weak institutional mechanisms to combat organized crime? Are certain criminal markets more associated with violence than others? And can connections be determined between climate change and criminality?

The findings reaffirm those of the previous iteration, in that there continues to be a strong correlation between resilience to organized crime and the level of democratic freedoms a country allows its citizens (0.81). In other words, democracies for the most part exhibit higher levels of resilience than authoritarian states. The

transparency and accountability inherent in democratic systems provide a robust framework for institutional mechanisms designed to combat organized crime. For example, constitutionally democratic states, with an independent judiciary, free media and strong civil society institutions, usually allow for effective regulatory processes, which reduce opportunities for corruption and enable law enforcement agencies to operate with independence and integrity.

This year's data also found a correlation, albeit a weak one, between democracy and criminality (−0.36), suggesting that countries with greater democratic values are generally less susceptible to high levels of criminality. However, numerous countries provide evidence to the contrary. There are many examples of Western countries with high levels of democracy that also received high scores for criminality, namely Italy (6.22), Spain (5.90), France (5.82) and the United States (5.67). All four countries saw their criminality levels increase against the previous Index results.[104]

In a similar vein, there is a significant correlation of −0.46 between criminality and the Freedom in the World Index. This indicates that countries that uphold and prioritize the protection of political rights and civil liberties tend to exhibit lower levels of criminality. A few criminal markets in particular stand out here. Strong correlations were found between freedom and human trafficking (−0.65) and human smuggling (−0.50). This is hardly surprising: countries where political rights and civil liberties are compromised by prosecution, conflict or instability experience mass displacement as people seek security and freedom elsewhere.

An issue closely related to levels of democracy and freedom is corruption. From low-level corruption in law enforcement agencies, to impunity within the judicial system resulting from bribery, to direct involvement in illicit economies among office-holders at the highest political level, corruption plays an important role in a country's susceptibility to organized crime, while also enabling criminal infiltration into the state apparatus.[105] Unsurprisingly, the Index 2023 results found a very strong negative correlation between corruption perception and resilience (−0.90). Although the exact causal direction is not straightforward, the link between corruption and weak resilience is clear. Similarly, the findings reveal a moderate correlation between corruption and criminality (0.51). What is perhaps less expected is the variation in the relationship between corruption and various criminal markets. In other words, certain illicit markets are more linked to corruption than others, these being primarily human smuggling, arms trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes. That these markets are closely linked to corruption may be explained by the role of state officials in monitoring cross-border movements and in managing regulatory schemes in key sectors.

Conflict has also long been recognized for its intersection with organized crime. Geographies characterized by conflict, violence and social unrest create an environment conducive to organized criminal activities. In such contexts, the breakdown of governance structures, weakened law enforcement and limited access to basic services provide fertile ground for criminal networks. The disruption of legal economies and displacement of populations during conflict create economic disparities and social dislocation, which can fuel criminal activities. Similarly, the

absence of strong institutions and erosion of social cohesion can exacerbate the situation, as communities become more vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation by organized crime groups.

The findings underscore these notions. When looking at the countries that scored highest in terms of criminality, many have been mired in conflict and instability for decades, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka. State fragility is conducive to organized crime, especially in terms of state-embedded criminal actors, when it allows for criminal groups to infiltrate the state. The data reveals that state fragility is closely linked to state-embedded actors (0.74), whose presence enables criminal markets to thrive amid corruption and limited governmental oversight. The criminal markets most closely tied to state fragility were found to be human trafficking (0.53) and non-renewable resource crimes (0.53).

Organized crime is commonly associated with violence and murder. Environments with illicit economies such as firearms and drug trafficking are notoriously prone to violence in the absence of effective law enforcement and judicial systems. Although there remains a challenge with the comprehensiveness of global homicide data across the world, the available statistics do support a moderate correlation between homicide rates and certain criminal markets, particularly cocaine trafficking (0.42) and arms trafficking (0.37), and to a lesser extent extortion and protection racketeering (0.30). Homicide and criminal markets show a tendency to mutually influence each other. Environments in which safety and development are jeopardized are conducive to illicit economies and, in the absence of effective law enforcement agencies and judiciary, this contributes to a high rate of homicide. In the case of drug markets, compromised safety has a detrimental impact on communities, creating an environment where individuals are not only more vulnerable to drug use, but where drug traffickers can also operate with impunity.

This notion is apparent when measuring homicide rates against changes in criminality over time. In Africa, for example, homicide is moderately correlated to changes in criminality (0.43), whereas in the Americas and Europe this correlation is −0.39 and 0.31 respectively. Hence, in most parts of the world at least, countries that have seen their criminality increase are also likely to have high homicide rates.

Homicide is tied not only to criminality, and changes in criminality over time, but also to a country's resilience. This is the case in nearly all parts of the world. In Asia, for example, homicide rates are strongly tied to changes in resilience over time (−0.70). In other words, countries with higher homicide rates are more likely to have experienced a decrease in their resilience scores compared to 2021. Extreme violence generates insecurity and social instability, erodes the rule of law and hinders efforts to promote social development, ultimately undermining resilience. However, this does not imply a direct causal relationship. Notably, for Europe, Africa and Asia, no connection between changes in resilience and homicide rates was found.

The impact of climate change on organized crime and other aspects of society is becoming increasingly evident. This is reflected in the data when measuring the 2023 Index scores against the Global Climate Risk Index, in which a moderate correlation of

0.41 against criminality is observed. On a global level, countries are – albeit unevenly – impacted by climate change as it drives mass displacement, as extreme weather events, rising sea levels and environmental degradation force people to flee their homes in search of safer areas or a better livelihood. This also engenders criminal activities. In the aftermath of devastating climate-related events, criminal actors have exploited the vulnerable conditions, engaging in human trafficking and smuggling, and illicit resource extraction, perpetuating the cycle of environmental devastation and organized crime.

While the intensification of climate change-related disasters, including hurricanes, floods and droughts, are worldwide phenomena, the data also tells us that the link between climate change and criminality impacts certain parts of the world more than others. The relationship is strongest in Oceania, where the correlation is 0.55, followed by Asia (0.52), Africa (0.36) and America (0.31), while in Europe, it is only a weak correlation of 0.19. While the correlation between climate change risks and criminality varies according to region, it is important to acknowledge that this relationship has the potential to transform as climate change trends continue to develop over time.

08

Conclusions

Conclusions

The results of the 2023 Index offer interesting insights into the evolution of illicit economies, the actors involved and the efficacy of resilience measures designed to counter the threat of organized crime.

Major global events unfolding over the last two years, combined with the lingering effects of a major pandemic, have given rise to a fractured, divided, conflictual world. In recent times, economic and social inequality, and political instability and conflict have become more accentuated than ever before, and this has had a momentous impact on global organized criminality.

It quickly became clear that COVID-19 did not deal a decisive blow to the global illicit economy. And as the pandemic dwindled, criminals reoccupied old territories while keeping a firm grip on new sources of revenue. Nations around the world were forced to reckon with the reality that organized crime had shown no signs of slowing down, but quite the opposite, had increased over the past two years. States appear to be unable to keep pace with the growing threat posed by organized crime, which has contributed to a widening gap between criminality and resilience. The percentage of the global population living in countries characterized by high levels of criminality has increased since 2021, while levels of resilience overall have remained the same.

Financial crimes, as reported through the Index methodology, have come out on top as the most widespread and predominant form of criminal activity in the world – ahead of the human-based markets and growth in the cocaine and synthetic drug trades. Our results find that financial crime is omnipresent, targeting victims across the social and economic spectrum, from large corporations to individuals. It is a form of organized crime that seriously undermines countries' social and economic cohesion. Moreover, corruption, especially in the public sector, is still a facilitator of organized crime as criminal actors continue to permeate all spheres of the state apparatus. In line with the 2021 findings, state-embedded actors continue to be dominant vectors of organized crime. As these criminal interests attached to the state strengthen their grip, opportunities for their countries to engineer realistic, impactful and implementable resilience frameworks to withstand the organized crime threat are dramatically reduced.

While criminality undermines good governance and corruption inhibits effective responses, the promotion of oversight mechanisms, protection frameworks for victims of organized crime and collaboration with civil society organizations are key to building effective, sustainable resilience measures. However, as the Index has revealed, responses to organized crime have been heavily skewed towards institutional mechanisms in the last two years, while falling short in addressing the social and structural vulnerabilities that allow criminality to take root. Despite the presence of sound international frameworks, signalled by the notable increase in the 'international cooperation' indicator, engagement with civil society is worryingly lacking, as seen in the decline of the 'non-state actors' indicator. This illustrates a tendency of some regimes to crack down aggressively on dissent, opposition and media freedoms. Restrictions and censorship mute the voice of non-state actors, emasculating their potency as agents of oversight and free speech, and as advocates of democracy. The outcome is undermined resilience and increased vulnerability. The

need for effective collaboration both between state institutions and with non-state counterparts is essential for good governance, and in order to adapt international obligations to local contexts while implementing meaningful resilience frameworks able to withstand the impact of organized crime.

Given these challenges, it is crucial for national authorities and international entities to turn their sights to building capacity by promoting a truly holistic approach to tackling organized crime. While certain global stressors are beyond the control of governments, and a fractured world cannot be easily remedied, they can at least shape how risk is accounted for and see that tangible threats are appropriately mitigated. All the necessary resilience mechanisms and preventative measures need to be in place in order to provide the best possible response to organized crime. Good governance, characterized by transparency, participation and accountability, sets the foundation on which to build resilience. But the participation of all stakeholders, both state and non-state, in the discussion around the evolving threats of organized crime is fundamental if we are to ultimately adjust the course and advance global efforts to fight organized crime and tackle the phenomenon to the fullest extent possible.

APPENDIX 1

An **interactive** tool

The Global Organized Crime Index website

To visualize the results of the Global Organized Crime Index, sort and compare the scores, investigate correlations and allow users to explore the data, a dedicated website – ocindex.net – was created for the launch of the first iteration of the tool. The 2023 version of the website offers users an updated platform featuring new functionalities and an improved user experience.

By exploring the Index and its functionalities, users are able to compare data geographically, substantively and – for the first time with this year's edition – temporally, enabling them to identify trends over space and time.

As with the previous platform, the homepage features a criminality heatmap, which allows users to visualize the scores for the 15 criminal markets, five criminal actor types and 12 resilience indicators, in addition to the aggregate component and sub-

component scores. By hovering over a country on the heatmap, an overview of its scores, both aggregated and disaggregated, comes up. In addition, the website allows for comparison of heatmaps for Index indicators across all components of the tool. Thematic and geographic sections are also available on the website, focusing on each criminality and resilience indicator, and each continental subregion, to allow for side-by-side comparisons of regions and thematic areas.

Under the criminality and resilience components, countries are ranked by their scores, allowing users the option for comparative analysis. Rankings are not meant to judge or merely identify the best- and worst-performing countries, but to start a conversation among policymakers and regional bodies, encouraging them to explore how and why organized crime affects their countries, and learn from one another in order to develop effective resilience strategies for specific contexts.

In addition to the scores and rankings, the Index website has maintained and updated its 'country summaries' section, allowing users to explore the narratives that underpin countries' scores. The summaries provide the background context for each country's criminality and resilience indicators, and illustrate key trends.

In the data explorer section, users can make their own comparisons by viewing the Index's scores in relation to one another as well as to external indicators and other indices. The Index offers an overarching and holistic framework of a country's overall relationship to organized crime. At the same time, its subcomponents and indicators allow users to disaggregate such information and determine correlations with various impact areas in any given country or region.



New features:
Improved user experience

As mentioned, users are now able to make longitudinal comparisons using historical data from the previous iteration of the Index. Besides that analytical capability, other features have been introduced to improve the overall user experience:

- Short definitions of criminal markets, actor types and resilience indicators have been included, which pop up when users hover over an indicator (i.e. heatmaps, country pages, rankings, etc.). For the full definitions, users can refer to 'Expanded definitions and guiding questions' in the 'Downloads' section.

- The 'About' section has been expanded to include all the analysis and dissemination activities, such as blogs, podcasts, papers on measuring different organized crime markets and events, that have been envisioned and realized to showcase the Index results.
- A survey for users to complete evaluating their experience and level of engagement with the Index has been created (see the 'Feedback' section). This has been introduced to learn how the Index is used and what can be improved to help us provide the best possible experience.

APPENDIX 2

Interpreting **results**

As a data-driven tool, the Index aims to standardize the complex concepts of criminality and resilience across 193 countries. While standardization promotes comparative analysis and easy interpretation, it does not come without challenges. The collection of data may vary across countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. These issues are even more pronounced given the inherently clandestine nature of organized crime. While the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges by expert cross-checks and triangulating sources, another challenge arises when there is abundant information on a particular country or component. Research and information promote greater understanding of the organized crime situation in a given country and its resilience, informing better policymaking and responses. Nevertheless, for comparative tools such as the Index, an information bias – where more information is published on some areas rather than others – may risk skewing results and interpretation of findings. In other words, an organized crime problem may appear to be more acute in countries where more information, research and reporting have occurred. One of the main goals of the Index is to highlight areas where information is lacking in an effort to promote further research. It is important for stakeholders to accept indices for what they are and the information they provide as supplementary to other means of gathering information. Similarly, instances arise where published information and evidence are lacking but experts with in-depth knowledge of a specific context acknowledge that problems exist. In such cases, the Index as an expert-led assessment heavily relies on expert knowledge in evaluating country contexts.

Diversity in the **Index components**

Countries that differ in their criminality and resilience may nevertheless be assigned the same scores, while those that host a particularly acute organized crime problem may appear to score lower than other countries. These results can be explained by the structure of the Index. Because overall criminality and resilience scores are assigned based on a simple average of their respective composite indicators, countries that have a diverse range of criminal markets and criminal actors will score higher than those that have fewer, albeit more pervasive, criminal characteristics. The same can be said to describe resilience indicators. Overall resilience scores will be dependent on a country's ability to tackle the organized crime situation based on a holistic and multifaceted approach, rather than a criminal justice- or economically-driven approach.

Limitations

Recognizing the difficulties in creating a tool that studies a subject matter that is highly varied and inherently clandestine, the Index comes with limitations and potential biases. Nevertheless, it can be described as a worthwhile exercise, although with certain limitations, that we hope will become a catalyst for further debate.

On a methodological note, there are considerations that must be taken into account when interpreting the scores. First and foremost, the Index relies heavily on individual expert knowledge and experience, which introduces the possibility for an implicit bias, where experts' personal convictions might affect their judgement. The ramifications in

this case are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, experts might have been too critical, given their knowledge of a specific country's deficiencies, and on the other, they might have been tempted to be too lenient. Although the latter was presumed more probable prior to the evaluation rounds, it was observed that experts tended to be more critical and often held countries, especially developed ones, to a higher standard. Throughout the development of the tool, we have attempted to control that bias by providing preliminary country profiles, as a basis on which experts were able to make their assessments, and by specifying scoring thresholds to guide the scoring process, as outlined in the methodology section. In addition, all countries underwent a number of anonymous verification rounds, comparing the scores across indicators and regions in an attempt to account for implicit bias.

Experts in the initial scoring round provided scores that were presented to experts in the following geographic and thematic scoring rounds. This opened the possibility for a confirmation bias, where experts would confirm the scores assigned in previous rounds. To address this, an additional score verification round was carried out, where groups of representatives from numerous areas of expertise came together in moderated regional discussions to debate and scrutinize the scores and justifications for each country.

In addition, as one aspect of the Index tool is to help policymakers improve their approach to organized crime, it is fundamental to understand where harms for different markets are coming from. It is undeniable that many of the harms associated with specific markets stem from existing policies. One example of that is the cannabis trade. Policies related to the policing and use of cannabis differ from country to country, and even within countries. Thus, evaluating the impact associated with that market has been ambiguous. While an increasing number of states are moving to decriminalize or legalize cannabis, there is some room for illegality, such as trafficking cannabis to countries with stricter policies, for instance. Thus, to be as consistent as possible, the importance of capturing that aspect of illegality when evaluating the market was emphasized to expert scorers. Nevertheless, consistency in that case has been difficult to achieve.

Another critical issue during the scoring process was the debate on the harm and impact of markets, namely whether harms are comparable across markets. Here lies another limitation of the tool – the weighting of different components of the Index. Currently, as has been already specified, indicators are weighted evenly. Nevertheless, four of the 15 markets are drug-related, which puts implicit weight on the impact of drugs, which, depending on the context, may pose issues. Environmental crime markets in Europe, for example, are almost non-existent. Yet they are weighted equally with more pervasive markets, such as human trafficking and the synthetic drug trade. That has, on a number of occasions, raised the obvious question among experts on European organized crime whether this approach was justified. However, environmental crime has had a significant impact in Africa and Oceania, for instance, where it has endangered entire ecosystems and even threatened the existence of coastal communities. Arguably, the impact of environmental crime markets has been more severe there than human smuggling, for example, which is perceived as problematic in a European context.

Thus, the current weighting of indicators might lead to some curious results. What often occurs is that two countries, which perhaps would not be expected to have the same criminality ranking, turn out to be very similar to one another. This is where we advise caution and recommend readers to look at the disaggregated scores, as we have stressed at the beginning of the report, because countries might have similar or the same overall ranking but for different reasons.

Broader scope: **Additional Index indicators**

To address recognized limitations in the scope of the criminal markets covered by the Index, the current edition has been expanded. An additional five criminal markets (financial crimes, cyber-dependent crimes, illicit trade in excisable goods, trade in counterfeit goods, and extortion and protection racketeering), and a criminal actor type (private sector actors) have been added. Incorporating these new indicators provides for a more thorough global assessment of the organized crime landscape.

We recognize the difficulties in measuring organized crime in general, but an accurate assessment of cross-cutting markets, such as financial crimes and cyber-dependent crimes, comes with its own set of challenges. As a result, expert technical groups were set up to assess whether these markets would fit into the existing Index methodology. Expectedly, given the sheer volume of criminal activities that fall under these two crime types, financial crimes and cybercrime were the most difficult to define and measure. Therefore, the definitions of these two criminal markets include a set of specific criminal activities. Narrowing down the types of offences that would fall under the respective markets allows us still to adequately measure a specific market while avoiding double-counting (i.e. counting the same criminal activity under two different markets). Needless to say, double-counting would artificially increase the average criminality score of a country, skewing the overall results of the Index.

To illustrate, take the example of cybercrime. Our approach has been to distinguish between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime. What are often described as cyber-enabled offences (i.e. activities carried out online to enable traditional 'offline' forms of crime) have already been captured under the first iteration of the Index. So using the internet to target and recruit victims of human trafficking would be captured under the human trafficking market, for instance. In that sense, it is necessary for cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes to be separated to avoid such significant overlaps between markets. To avoid issues stemming from such overlaps, a decision was made for the Index to measure cyber-dependent crime as a standalone market.

As a cross-cutting phenomenon, defining and measuring financial crime also came with some challenges. Again, to avoid overlap when assessing financial crimes and to allow comparability with the previous iteration of the Index, any activities that can be attributed to another criminal market under the Index fall under that respective market indicator. Procurement fraud for logging contracts is one such example, which is considered under the flora crimes market, as opposed to financial crimes. Notably, the laundering of illicit proceeds and bribery are not included in the financial crimes category either. Excluding money laundering from this category is justified by the fact that it does not exist in itself but rather occurs as a secondary crime linked to illicit proceeds of a predicate offence. As the predicate crimes are already assessed under the various markets (e.g. drug trafficking), the secondary offence – in this instance laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking – would not fall under the financial crimes market. It is instead classified under the primary market: drug trafficking. The one exception is when money laundering occurs as a result of fraud or another offence that is classified as a financial crime.

APPENDIX 3

Definitions

Defining **organized crime**

Any index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring organized crime, the parameters that this Index relies on are informed by definitions of organized crime, and related activities and concepts.

Organized crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Although there is an awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by different actors, that fluctuate and adapt to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organized crime, came into force, compelling member states to consider a definition for organized crime. Unable to reach a consensus, however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition, but rather offers clarity on two constants within the broad context of organized crime.

The terms 'organized criminal group' and 'serious offence', outlined in the convention, offer the basic conditions for an activity to be deemed to be organized crime and the flexibility to address the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organized criminal group may refer to a broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely connected networks. Likewise, the convention's focus on the term 'serious offence' ensures a distinction is maintained between low-level criminality and organized criminal activity. Moreover, the convention specifically speaks to activities that are profit-driven, allowing for policies and responses to distinguish organized crime from solely politically motivated actions, such as terrorism. Today the consensus among the convention's member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional debates surrounding the term 'organized crime' and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in which the label 'organized crime' can be understood and conceptualized.

Nevertheless, for an index to offer true insight and value, some form of definition is essential. While relying (though not exclusively) on international instruments to define various criminal markets, the Index considers both transnational organized crimes and organized criminal activities occurring within state boundaries.

BOX

Organized crime

For the purpose of the Global Organized Crime Index, 'organized crime' is defined as illegal activities conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

By defining organized crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and perpetrators to be considered and measured. One key point to note in this definition is the issue of legality. Activities that are not designated as illegal or that have been legalized in a country fall outside of the scope of the assessment of that particular country, even if considered illegal in another. At the same time, activities that are not illegal but that violate international human rights standards are included under the Index.

Criminal market definitions

People

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Drawing from a range of sources, the Index covers human trafficking within a modern slavery context and includes the trafficking of human organs. In line with common interpretations of human trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men, women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows (such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the Index, human trafficking includes activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and transfer, to harbouring and receipt of persons. To distinguish this market from that of human smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim's consent. In line with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC, exploitation includes, at a minimum, the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

HUMAN SMUGGLING

Under the Index, human smuggling is defined as the criminalization of the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organized criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit activity, including producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents when committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants. Although they are distinct crimes that are defined in different ways, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING

Crimes of protection and extortion linked to an organized crime group or groups that exert control over a given territory or market – either legal or illegal – include:

- Activities of organized extortion, where the extortioner asks for money or other utility/benefit in exchange for a purposefully fake, fabricated or real need for protection (with or without an extortion request).

- Cartel racketeering, where an organized crime group acts as intermediary or mediator by handling external competition and solving disputes as gatekeeper by controlling access and exit to and from key markets.

The definition does not include such acts when committed by state officials (in which case, it is included under various markets, including corruption).

Trade

ARMS TRAFFICKING

The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well as intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. 'Firearms' refers to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UNTOC. 'Small arms' and 'light weapons' refer to a range of specific weapons, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often, the trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organized crime activities.

TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS

Refers to the production, transport, storage, distribution and sale of counterfeit goods. Counterfeit goods are either deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or source, or are fraudulent imitations of registered brands and involve the theft of a trademark.

ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS

This market involves the illicit transport, distribution and sale of excise consumer goods, with the exception of oil (which is included under non-renewable resource crimes). An illicit market exists where the product is either transported or sold illegally (i.e. despite prohibition) or where the product is distributed outside regulated processes, the regulated trade market or the legal regulatory framework (e.g. for the purposes of tax evasion). This market does not include trade in counterfeit versions of such products (which falls under trade in counterfeit goods).

Environment

FLORA CRIMES

Crimes related to flora involve the illicit trade as well as possession of species covered by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), as well as other species protected under national law.

FAUNA CRIMES

Like flora crimes, crimes involving fauna species entail the poaching and illicit trade in animals and animal products, as well as the possession of species or animal products covered by CITES or protected by national law. The Index also considers protected marine species, and IUU fishing falls under this category.

NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES

The Index includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. It also covers any illicit activities related to trade in such products, including price misinvoicing. The Index covers commodities including, but not limited to, oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

Drugs

HEROIN TRADE

The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

COCAINE TRADE

Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market.

CANNABIS TRADE

The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Recognizing the growing legalization of cannabis production, sale and consumption, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalized and/or where criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE

As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants, methamphetamines and fentanyl are included in this criminal market, as is any other narcotic included in the 1972 Protocol, Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Notably, 'substandard and falsified medical products', as outlined by the World Health Organization, have been excluded.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Defined as organized crimes that are dependent on the use of a computer, computer network or other forms of information communications technology (ICT). These include the spread of viruses or other malware, hacking, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud. These activities are considered to be conducted for the purpose of obtaining a monetary or material benefit (as opposed to a political or ideological objective).

Financial crimes

Refers to organized crime that results in a financial loss to the state, entity and/or private individuals through one or more of the following activities:

- Financial fraud: this refers to cases where money and/or financial assets are obtained through deception, including, but not limited to, procurement fraud, identity fraud, mass marketing fraud, banking fraud, Ponzi schemes, etc.
- Tax evasion (including activities such as price misinvoicing) and abusive tax avoidance: this refers to the use of illegal means to avoid paying taxes. It occurs when the taxpayer either evades assessment or evades payment. When committing price misinvoicing, the profit-maximizing actor will either over- or under-invoice and the misdeclaration depends on the relative tax and tariff rates. Tax avoidance is to be distinguished from tax evasion, which is when someone acts against the law or abuses the letter of the law. By contrast, abusive tax avoidance complies with the letter of the law, but subverts its purpose.
- Embezzlement: this involves the fraudulent appropriation of property or funds entrusted to an individual for their management and safekeeping, with the intention of using these assets for personal benefit. It differs from regular fraud because the actor who takes the money or property has trusted and legitimate access to the valuables before taking them for their own use.
- Misuse of funds: this refers to the misapplication of funds from state, international or regional bodies for purposes other than those for which they were originally granted.

To be considered financial fraud, the aforementioned activities must be committed by an organized crime group for the purpose of financial gain or professional advantage. Such activities, when attributable to another criminal market under the Index, fall under that respective market indicator. For example, procurement fraud for logging contracts would fall under flora crimes.

The laundering of illicit proceeds and bribery are not included in this category, as explained in Appendix 2.

Criminal actor definitions

MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS

Refers to clearly defined organized criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining features of a mafia-style group: a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

CRIMINAL NETWORKS

Refers to a loose network of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or do not have a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any of the other defining features of mafia-style groups. In essence, criminal networks and entrepreneurs are defined by their failure to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS

Refers to criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus.

FOREIGN ACTORS

Refers to state or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. In addition to foreign nationals, this may also in some instances include individuals forming part of a diaspora group that has established roots in a particular country.

PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS

Refers to profit-seeking individuals or entities that own, manage or control a segment of the legal economy free from state ownership or control, that collaborate or cooperate with criminal actors wilfully, through coercion or neglect. Activities include, but are not limited to, the laundering of illicit proceeds, acting as informants, and legal representation through unethical means.

Resilience indicator definitions

Leadership and governance

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Refers to the role a state's government plays in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness in doing so. Strong political leadership and governance indicate higher state resilience to organized crime.

Governments orientate citizens towards a state's stance on organized crime, championing its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundations for implementing action. The platform on which anti-organized crime rhetoric is delivered reflects to some degree the level of prioritization of organized crime on the national agenda.

Governance serves as a function of the relationship between the state and its governed populations. Leaders who are seen as legitimate in their intent and actions unify society. People's confidence in those who govern them can be directly linked to conflict in a society. The presence of organized crime can tangibly reduce the capacity for governance and the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. When there is no or little confidence in the government, society can become unstable, creating (further) opportunities for organized crime to fill the governance void between the state and its populations.

BOX

Resilience

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and disrupt organized criminal activity as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries' measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Refers to the degree to which a state has put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities – in other words, whether or not the state creates opportunities for the reduction of state corruption and to obscure the illegitimate control over power or resources, including resources linked to organized crime.

As representatives of their citizens, governments are entrusted with powers to oversee and maintain the rule and order of societies. When this contract is abused, it both undermines citizens' trust in state institutions (which may lead to vulnerabilities to organized crime) and can imply state collusion in organized crime. Efforts to increase transparency, such as adequately resourcing anti-corruption measures, work to reduce opportunities for organized criminals to exert their influence. Thus, the more transparent governments are, the more resilient a state is to organized crime.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Refers to the structures and processes of interaction, policymaking and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level in order to respond to organized crime. Strong international cooperation indicates high levels of state resilience to organized crime.

As organized crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, with actors and supply chains able to span national and continental boundaries, it is essential that states work together on a global scale to combat the threat.

The ratification (and timeliness of ratification) of relevant international organized crime treaties implies state willingness to effectuate responses to organized crime, in line with international standards. These treaties are:

- The UNTOC and its three protocols
- The UN Convention against Corruption
- The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
- The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
- The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
- The Arms Trade Treaty
- CITES

At the international level, for states parties, these instruments constitute sufficient legal grounds to carry out response measures to organized crime. Such responses include cooperation in criminal matters, particularly mutual legal assistance, extradition, the transfer of sentenced prisoners and transborder asset confiscation. The presence of such structures and policies, and evidence of their effective use, implies a higher degree of state resilience to organized crime.

NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS

International cooperation is an essential component of combating organized crime because it provides the basis for national responses. Thus, national policies and laws refer to state legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. National organized crime strategies and legislation are adapted to the needs of the state, its legal tradition and social, economic cultural and geographic conditions. As such, the presence of these reflects higher state resilience to organized crime.

Criminal justice and security

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION

Refers to the power of a state's judiciary to effectively try to enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases. The ability of a country's judicial system to do so depends on whether it is adequately resourced and operates independently and effectively at all points along the juridical chain. Although passing judgment on cases is its primary function, the ability to enforce is also an essential component of a judiciary's activities. Factors such as evidence that key organized crime leaders are successfully prosecuted and, in particular, the degree of organized crime influence from within the prison system, should be key considerations in assessing a state's judicial capacity. Where the prison system has been captured by organized crime, this should significantly impact the score. Thus, while having more resources and independence to pass judgment on organized crime cases implies higher state resilience, high impunity implies lower state resilience.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Refers to the state's ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures regarding organized crime. As the front line of a state's criminal justice system, law enforcement and intelligence are often in direct contact with organized criminal activities. In order to bring criminal perpetrators to justice, the capacity of a state's law enforcement to combat organized crime rests on factors such as whether it is adequately resourced and whether the state has invested in law enforcement mechanisms that are specifically focused on organized crime. It follows therefore that greater law enforcement capacity makes a state more resilient to organized crime.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Refers to the degree to which states are able to control their territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities, including the capacity to carry out effective border control.

A country's physical location and geography may increase the risk of exploitation by organized criminal groups. For example, long borders are less likely to be regulated effectively, and criminals are therefore more likely to take advantage by smuggling illicit commodities and people unnoticed. Moreover, the level of a state's economic engagement internationally, marked by factors such as its port and airport infrastructure, can increase the ease with which goods and people are able to move (both legitimately and illegally) between countries.

As such, the greater the resources and infrastructure put in place by a state to manage its territorial integrity against organized crime, the higher the state's resilience.

Economic and financial

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

Refers to a state's ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

Profits that criminals make from organized crime are often concealed by being funnelled through legitimate businesses. Through the development of anti-money-laundering mechanisms, states become more resilient to the threat of money laundering, which potentially underlies all forms of organized crime.

The Financial Action Task Force is a policymaking body that has developed a series of recommendations that are recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis for a coordinated response to these threats to the financial system. States are assessed through mutual country evaluations to determine their level of compliance with these standards. The higher compliance, the more resilient states are to organized crime.

ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY

Refers to the ability to control and manage the economy, and to regulate financial and economic transactions (both nationally and internationally) so that trade is able to flourish within the confines of the rule of law. In other words, these determine whether an actor has put into place and can effectively oversee the mechanisms that ensure economic transactions and businesses operate in a predictable, fair way, free from distortion, including criminal activities such as extortion and illicit taxation.

When actors are able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, it allows for options and opportunities for legitimate, regulated business to expand. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for informal, illegal business to arise, or for criminal groups to unduly influence economic forces, through alternative regulation, extortion or criminal practice.

States under protracted sanctions by the international community have been shown to develop illicit means by which to circumvent or mitigate the impact of those sanctions.

The larger the number of sound economic regulations that are in place and the lower the number of (and duration of) sanctions placed on a state, the higher a country's resilience to organized crime.

Civil society and social protection

VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT

Refers to the existence of assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime (for example, human trafficking, drug trafficking, extortion or fraud).

Support mechanisms, treatment programmes for victims, as well as resources allocated to these initiatives create an environment in which citizens are able to recover more quickly from the effects of organized criminal activities.

Moreover, initiatives such as witness protection programmes are essential, and often the only way to successfully prosecute organized criminals. The more effective the support programmes that are put in place, the more resilient states are to organized crime.

PREVENTION

Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed at inhibiting organized crime. While prevention considers mainly state initiatives, these frameworks often use a holistic approach to preventive measures through community outreach, recognizing that citizens who are engaged in the prevention of organized crime help make the state more resilient.

Through prevention, states can build safeguards to protect against organized crime by effecting behavioural change in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities. Thus, the more robust a state's prevention scheme is, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

NON-STATE ACTORS

From a resilience perspective, non-state actors play a role in responding to organized crime by supplementing government initiatives and by ensuring 'checks and balances' are applied to governments to guarantee resilience to organized crime. The non-state actors indicator is also a measure of the degree to which civil society organizations are able and allowed to play a role in responding to organized crime across the spectrum, from victim support to crime prevention.

Civil society organizations are engaged in local communities, where ownership of initiatives against organized crime is formed, leading to more sustainable response measures. Similarly, the media is critical in the role it plays in holding governments to account while providing a voice for communities by mobilizing civil society against the threat of organized crime. Thus, the more civil society capacity a state has, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

RESCUE ZO

APPENDIX 4

Ranking tables

Criminality scores

	COUNTRY	SCORE	
1.	MYANMAR	8.15	+0.56
2.	COLOMBIA	7.75	+0.09
3.	MEXICO	7.57	+0.01
4.	PARAGUAY	7.52	+0.82
5.	CONGO, DEM. REP	7.35	-0.40
6.	NIGERIA	7.28	+0.13
7.	SOUTH AFRICA	7.18	+0.56
8.	IRAQ	7.13	+0.08
9.	AFGHANISTAN	7.10	+0.02
9.	LEBANON	7.10	+0.34
11.	ECUADOR	7.07	+0.82
11.	SYRIA	7.07	+0.23
13.	HONDURAS	7.05	+0.08
14.	IRAN	7.03	-0.07
14.	TURKEY	7.03	+0.14
16.	KENYA	7.02	+0.07
17.	PANAMA	6.98	+0.31
18.	LIBYA	6.93	+0.38
19.	RUSSIA	6.87	+0.63
20.	CAMBODIA	6.85	+1.03
20.	INDONESIA	6.85	+0.48
22.	BRAZIL	6.77	+0.27
23.	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	6.75	-0.29
24.	VENEZUELA	6.72	+0.08
25.	PHILIPPINES	6.63	-0.21
26.	GUATEMALA	6.60	+0.13
27.	NEPAL	6.57	+0.41
27.	YEMEN	6.57	+0.45
29.	UGANDA	6.55	+0.41
29.	VIETNAM	6.55	+0.27
31.	UKRAINE	6.48	+0.31
32.	PERU	6.40	+0.05
33.	CHINA	6.37	+0.36
33.	SUDAN	6.37	-0.09

	COUNTRY	SCORE	
33.	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	6.37	+0.62
36.	SOUTH SUDAN	6.32	-0.02
37.	CAMEROON	6.27	-0.04
38.	MALAYSIA	6.23	+0.29
38.	SAUDI ARABIA	6.23	+0.22
40.	ITALY	6.22	+0.41
40.	SERBIA	6.22	+0.01
42.	MOZAMBIQUE	6.20	-0.33
42.	TANZANIA	6.20	+0.05
44.	THAILAND	6.18	+0.42
45.	SOMALIA	6.13	+0.34
46.	LAOS	6.12	+0.61
47.	PAKISTAN	6.03	-0.25
48.	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.02	-0.13
49.	GUYANA	5.97	+0.87
50.	HAITI	5.93	+0.21
50.	MALI	5.93	+0.04
52.	BURKINA FASO	5.92	+0.43
52.	EL SALVADOR	5.92	-0.02
54.	MONTENEGRO	5.90	-0.10
54.	SPAIN	5.90	+0.13
56.	BELARUS	5.87	+0.80
57.	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	5.85	-0.04
58.	FRANCE	5.82	+0.16
59.	GHANA	5.80	-0.21
59.	JAMAICA	5.80	-0.11
61.	INDIA	5.75	+0.23
61.	UNITED KINGDOM	5.75	+0.86
63.	NICARAGUA	5.72	-0.34
63.	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.72	+0.28
65.	NIGER	5.70	-0.31
66.	ETHIOPIA	5.68	+0.89
67.	UNITED STATES	5.67	+0.17
68.	BULGARIA	5.65	+0.23

COUNTRY	SCORE		COUNTRY	SCORE	
69. MOLDOVA	5.60	+1.15	106. SWITZERLAND	4.87	+0.53
70. ANGOLA	5.58	+0.29	109. GABON	4.85	-0.05
70. MADAGASCAR	5.58	-0.01	109. ISRAEL	4.85	+0.44
72. COSTA RICA	5.53	+0.54	111. KOREA, DPR	4.82	+0.04
73. SENEGAL	5.52	+0.71	112. AZERBAIJAN	4.80	-0.28
74. CHAD	5.50	-0.36	112. MOROCCO	4.80	+0.01
74. LIBERIA	5.50	+0.45	114. CONGO, REP	4.78	-0.25
76. ZIMBABWE	5.47	-0.19	115. SURINAME	4.77	-0.13
77. QATAR	5.45	+0.24	116. ZAMBIA	4.73	-0.19
77. TAJIKISTAN	5.45	-0.16	117. SLOVAKIA	4.72	+0.03
79. GREECE	5.35	+0.43	118. SWEDEN	4.70	+0.14
80. GERMANY	5.33	+0.43	119. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.68	+0.05
81. BENIN	5.32	+0.07	120. DJIBOUTI	4.65	+0.66
81. KYRGYZSTAN	5.32	0.00	121. HUNGARY	4.62	+0.12
83. TOGO	5.23	-0.09	122. GUINEA	4.58	-0.62
84. KUWAIT	5.20	+0.06	122. ROMANIA	4.58	-0.01
84. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.20	+0.26	124. GAMBIA	4.53	-0.30
86. CHILE	5.18	+0.58	125. MALAWI	4.48	+0.66
87. ALBANIA	5.17	-0.46	125. POLAND	4.48	+0.47
88. CROATIA	5.15	+0.09	127. KAZAKHSTAN	4.47	+0.21
89. BANGLADESH	5.12	+0.15	128. TUNISIA	4.45	+0.66
90. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.10	-0.35	129. BELGIUM	4.43	+0.09
91. IRELAND	5.08	+0.18	129. CYPRUS	4.43	+0.24
92. EGYPT	5.05	-0.11	129. KOREA, REP.	4.43	-0.48
93. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.03	-0.28	132. OMAN	4.40	+0.26
94. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.02	-0.13	132. SOLOMON ISLANDS	4.40	+0.25
95. ARGENTINA	5.00	+0.63	132. TURKMENISTAN	4.40	-0.21
95. MALTA	5.00	+0.35	135. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.38	+0.27
- KOSOVO	4.97	-0.22	135. ESWATINI	4.38	+0.76
97. NETHERLANDS	4.97	+0.28	135. MAURITANIA	4.38	0.00
98. BAHRAIN	4.95	+0.13	138. MAURITIUS	4.37	-0.14
98. BOLIVIA	4.95	+0.65	138. SLOVENIA	4.37	+0.08
98. SIERRA LEONE	4.95	-0.45	140. BOTSWANA	4.35	+0.64
98. UZBEKISTAN	4.95	-0.01	141. NAMIBIA	4.30	-0.03
102. JORDAN	4.93	+0.22	142. CABO VERDE	4.28	+0.24
103. SRI LANKA	4.92	+0.28	142. JAPAN	4.28	-0.25
104. ALGERIA	4.88	+0.37	144. MALDIVES	4.27	+0.21
104. PORTUGAL	4.88	+0.33	145. ESTONIA	4.25	+0.65
106. BELIZE	4.87	+0.23	146. FIJI	4.15	+0.25
106. BURUNDI	4.87	+0.36	147. AUSTRIA	4.13	+0.09

COUNTRY	SCORE
148. MONGOLIA	4.12 +0.11
149. NEW ZEALAND	4.08 +0.83
149. TIMOR-LESTE	4.08 +0.12
151. DENMARK	4.02 +0.16
152. AUSTRALIA	4.00 0.00
153. ERITREA	3.97 -0.37
154. COMOROS	3.92 +0.06
154. LESOTHO	3.92 +0.02
156. BHUTAN	3.90 +0.21
156. LATVIA	3.90 +0.39
156. LITHUANIA	3.90 +0.59
156. SEYCHELLES	3.90 +0.23
160. CANADA	3.88 +0.22
161. BAHAMAS	3.75 -0.04
161. NORWAY	3.75 -0.06
163. TONGA	3.70 -0.07
164. GEORGIA	3.60 +0.64
164. RWANDA	3.60 -0.07
166. ST. LUCIA	3.53 -0.56
167. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	3.52 -0.58
168. SAN MARINO	3.48 +0.47
169. SINGAPORE	3.47 +0.35
170. CUBA	3.37 -0.07

COUNTRY	SCORE
170. ICELAND	3.37 -0.02
172. ANDORRA	3.22 +0.26
172. URUGUAY	3.22 +0.53
174. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	3.08 -0.22
175. BARBADOS	3.07 -0.14
176. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	3.00 -0.30
177. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	2.98 -0.36
177. FINLAND	2.98 +0.27
179. GRENADA	2.93 -0.12
180. BRUNEI	2.85 +0.09
180. LUXEMBOURG	2.85 +0.49
182. ARMENIA	2.82 -0.44
183. PALAU	2.70 -0.24
184. DOMINICA	2.63 0.00
185. MONACO	2.58 +0.16
186. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.52 +0.21
187. KIRIBATI	2.45 +0.10
188. SAMOA	2.43 +0.39
188. VANUATU	2.43 +0.23
190. LIECHTENSTEIN	2.27 +0.40
191. NAURU	2.05 +0.29
192. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70 -0.08
193. TUVALU	1.62 +0.08

Criminal market scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS
1. MEXICO	8.13 +0.13	8.0 +0.5	9.0 +0.5	9.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	8.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
2. MYANMAR	7.70 +0.65	8.5 +2.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	9.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
3. IRAN	7.37 +0.42	8.0 +0.5	8.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	9.0 +1.0	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
3. NIGERIA	7.37 +0.32	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
5. COLOMBIA	7.30 +0.10	8.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
6. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	7.03 +0.28	8.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	7.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
7. AFGHANISTAN	7.00 +0.10	9.0 +0.5	9.5 +1.5	6.0 n/a	9.0 +0.5	8.5 n/a	9.0 n/a
8. BRAZIL	6.93 +0.43	6.0 +1.0	5.5 +1.5	7.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
8. KENYA	6.93 +0.28	8.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
10. SOUTH AFRICA	6.87 +0.87	4.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	8.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
11. RUSSIA	6.83 +0.73	7.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	8.5 +4.0	4.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
12. THAILAND	6.77 +0.37	7.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	6.5 +1.0	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
12. TURKEY	6.77 +0.37	8.0 +1.0	9.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	8.5 -0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
14. ECUADOR	6.73 +0.73	6.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	8.0 n/a	8.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
14. PARAGUAY	6.73 +0.83	7.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	9.0 +0.5	9.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
16. CAMBODIA	6.70 +0.55	8.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	5.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
16. INDIA	6.70 +0.40	8.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	6.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
18. MALAYSIA	6.67 +0.42	7.5 +1.0	7.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	5.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
18. PANAMA	6.67 +0.32	7.5 -0.5	6.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	7.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
20. INDONESIA	6.60 +0.60	7.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
21. LIBYA	6.57 +0.47	8.5 -1.0	9.5 +1.5	9.0 n/a	9.0 -0.5	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
21. PHILIPPINES	6.57 +0.27	7.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	7.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
21. SAUDI ARABIA	6.57 -0.33	8.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
24. CHINA	6.53 +0.63	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	9.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
25. VIETNAM	6.50 +0.45	7.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.5 +0.5	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
26. MALI	6.47 +0.32	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
27. SYRIA	6.43 +0.38	8.5 0.0	9.0 +0.5	8.0 n/a	9.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
28. TANZANIA	6.40 -0.15	6.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	6.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
28. UGANDA	6.40 +0.75	7.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
30. LAOS	6.33 +0.68	7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 +1.0	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
31. LEBANON	6.30 +0.40	7.5 -1.0	8.0 +1.5	5.5 n/a	8.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
32. IRAQ	6.27 -0.08	7.5 -0.5	8.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	9.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
32. PAKISTAN	6.27 -0.03	8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	8.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
32. UKRAINE	6.27 +0.67	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.5	5.0 n/a	9.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
35. CAMEROON	6.23 -0.02	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	7.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
36. CONGO, DEM. REP	6.20 -0.30	7.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	9.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
36. PERU	6.20 0.00	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.5 +1.0	9.0 n/a	2.0 n/a

FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	FINANCIAL CRIMES
7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	8.5 n/a
8.5 +1.5	8.5 +0.5	9.0 +2.5	9.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	10.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	8.5 n/a
4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	9.5 +1.0	9.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	9.5 +1.0	8.0 n/a	9.0 n/a
6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
7.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	9.5 0.0	7.0 -1.0	6.0 +1.0	7.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
5.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.5 +1.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	8.0 n/a	9.5 n/a
5.5 -0.5	3.5 -0.5	6.5 -1.5	9.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	9.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
8.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	9.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	8.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
5.0 +1.5	8.0 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	7.0 +1.5	5.0 +1.5	8.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.5 +2.5	6.0 -1.0	3.5 -1.0	5.0 0.0	8.5 +1.0	9.0 n/a	8.5 n/a
6.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	8.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	8.5 -1.0	8.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.5	6.5 +1.5	7.0 +1.5	5.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
7.0 +1.0	7.0 +1.0	7.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	8.5 +1.5	5.5 +1.5	5.5 0.0	6.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
6.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	8.5 +1.5	9.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
6.0 +0.5	7.0 -1.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
8.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	9.5 +1.0	2.5 0.0	5.5 +1.5	7.0 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	9.5 n/a
7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
5.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	9.0 +1.5	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
8.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
7.0 +0.5	9.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
5.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	8.5 +1.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	10.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
7.0 -0.5	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
7.0 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	4.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	3.5 +2.0	7.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	8.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	9.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	7.0 +1.0	2.0 n/a	9.0 n/a
4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
7.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	1.5 -2.0	6.5 +1.5	8.0 +4.5	8.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
7.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
9.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	9.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
7.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	9.0 0.0	5.5 +2.0	9.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS
38. GUATEMALA	6.10 +0.15	7.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a	7.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
39. ETHIOPIA	6.07 +1.12	8.0 +2.0	7.5 +1.0	6.0 n/a	8.5 +1.5	8.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
40. NEPAL	6.03 +0.33	8.0 +1.0	7.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	6.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
40. VENEZUELA	6.03 +0.38	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
42. GHANA	6.00 -0.15	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	6.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
42. HONDURAS	6.00 +0.30	7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	8.5 n/a	6.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
44. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.93 -0.12	7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	7.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
44. FRANCE	5.93 +0.23	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 n/a	6.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
46. MOZAMBIQUE	5.90 -0.15	4.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	6.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
47. BURKINA FASO	5.83 +0.48	7.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
47. UNITED STATES	5.83 +0.33	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	3.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
49. HAITI	5.77 +0.32	7.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 +1.5	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
50. ITALY	5.73 +0.48	7.0 0.0	7.5 +1.0	7.5 n/a	6.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
50. KOREA, DPR	5.73 +0.43	8.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	9.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
50. SERBIA	5.73 +0.18	6.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.5 -1.0	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
53. KUWAIT	5.70 -0.45	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	6.0 -0.5	6.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
53. NIGER	5.70 -0.20	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
53. QATAR	5.70 -0.10	8.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
53. SPAIN	5.70 +0.40	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
57. YEMEN	5.63 +0.63	9.0 +0.5	9.0 +1.5	8.0 n/a	9.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
58. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.60 -0.10	7.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
59. SENEGAL	5.53 +0.53	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	5.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
60. UNITED KINGDOM	5.50 +1.10	7.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a	4.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
61. GERMANY	5.47 +0.67	6.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
62. BENIN	5.43 +0.18	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	6.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
62. EL SALVADOR	5.43 +0.43	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	7.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
64. BAHRAIN	5.40 -0.25	8.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	5.0 -0.5	5.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
64. BULGARIA	5.40 +0.30	5.0 -1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.5 +1.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
64. LIBERIA	5.40 +0.30	6.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
67. COSTA RICA	5.37 +0.52	5.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
68. BELARUS	5.33 +0.93	7.0 0.0	7.5 +2.0	4.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
68. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.33 +0.33	7.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	6.5 +1.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
70. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	5.30 +0.15	5.5 0.0	6.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a	6.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
71. MADAGASCAR	5.27 -0.03	6.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 +1.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
71. ROMANIA	5.27 +0.22	6.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 +1.5	5.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
71. SOMALIA	5.27 +0.82	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	9.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
74. NETHERLANDS	5.23 +0.23	5.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	6.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
74. NICARAGUA	5.23 -0.27	7.0 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
74. SUDAN	5.23 -0.32	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	9.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
77. MOLDOVA	5.20 +1.30	7.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	7.5 +2.5	5.0 n/a	7.5 n/a

FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	FINANCIAL CRIMES
4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
4.5 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 +1.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
3.5 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	9.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 +1.5	3.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
7.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	8.5 +1.0	7.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 -1.5	4.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 +2.5	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
5.5 +1.5	6.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	5.5 -0.5	5.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
2.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	8.5 +1.0	8.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
6.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
3.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
3.0 +2.0	3.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	1.5 -0.5	5.0 -1.0	8.0 +1.0	9.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
5.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
4.0 -1.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
3.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.5	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	1.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	10.0 +1.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	3.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
3.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
2.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
6.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
3.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
6.0 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
6.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	7.5 n/a
5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
3.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
8.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.0 +1.5	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	5.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	9.0 n/a
4.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
8.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
6.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
7.0 +1.0	5.5 +1.0	3.0 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
4.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 +1.0	5.5 0.0	8.5 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
3.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	8.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS
77. MONTENEGRO	5.20 +0.20	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	6.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
79. ALGERIA	5.17 +0.52	4.0 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	4.5 -0.5	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
79. ANGOLA	5.17 -0.03	6.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	2.0 n/a	6.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
79. BELGIUM	5.17 +0.12	5.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	6.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
79. IRELAND	5.17 +0.62	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
83. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.13 -0.17	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
83. GUYANA	5.13 +0.43	5.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	6.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
83. SOUTH SUDAN	5.13 -0.17	8.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
86. CHAD	5.10 -0.25	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	8.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
86. EGYPT	5.10 +0.15	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 n/a	7.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
86. MOROCCO	5.10 +0.15	5.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	2.0 -1.0	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
89. CHILE	5.07 +0.62	6.0 +2.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.5 +1.0	6.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
90. BANGLADESH	5.03 +0.08	8.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
90. ZIMBABWE	5.03 -0.17	5.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.5 n/a	4.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
92. BOLIVIA	5.00 +0.40	5.0 0.0	4.0 +2.0	3.0 n/a	5.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
92. ISRAEL	5.00 +0.80	6.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	6.5 +1.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
92. TUNISIA	5.00 +0.80	4.0 0.0	8.0 +1.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 -2.0	6.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
95. POLAND	4.97 +0.57	5.5 0.0	6.0 +1.5	2.5 n/a	4.5 +1.0	4.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
96. CROATIA	4.90 +0.15	5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
96. JAMAICA	4.90 +0.70	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	9.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
96. OMAN	4.90 0.00	7.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
99. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.87 +0.12	5.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	5.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
99. JORDAN	4.87 +0.32	6.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	6.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
99. NORTH MACEDONIA	4.87 -0.13	5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
102. ALBANIA	4.83 -0.42	5.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	3.5 n/a	4.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
- KOSOVO	4.83 -0.17	5.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 -0.5	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
102. SRI LANKA	4.83 +0.18	6.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	7.5 n/a	6.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
104. TAJIKISTAN	4.80 -0.30	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	4.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
104. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4.80 +0.55	6.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	7.0 +1.0	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
106. GUINEA	4.77 -0.38	7.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	1.0 n/a	5.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
106. MALAWI	4.77 +0.62	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	2.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
106. TOGO	4.77 -0.13	5.5 -0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	7.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
109. HUNGARY	4.73 -0.02	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	4.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
109. SLOVAKIA	4.73 +0.48	5.0 -0.5	4.5 +1.0	3.0 n/a	5.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
111. GREECE	4.70 +0.60	5.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a	3.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
112. GAMBIA	4.67 -0.48	6.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	2.5 0.0	6.5 n/a	2.5 n/a
112. PORTUGAL	4.67 +0.57	5.5 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
114. BURUNDI	4.63 +0.23	8.5 0.0	6.5 +1.0	4.5 n/a	8.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
114. KYRGYZSTAN	4.63 +0.23	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	3.5 n/a	3.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
114. SWITZERLAND	4.63 +0.33	5.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	5.5 -1.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a

FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	FINANCIAL CRIMES
3.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
7.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	8.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
3.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
5.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	9.0 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	8.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.5 +1.0	2.0 n/a	8.5 n/a
7.0 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	8.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	8.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
2.0 -1.0	4.5 0.0	1.5 -1.5	4.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
4.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
5.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
4.5 -1.0	7.0 -0.5	8.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
7.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	8.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	9.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
3.5 0.0	5.0 +1.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 +1.5	4.0 +1.0	7.0 +2.0	6.0 +2.0	4.0 n/a	8.0 n/a
2.5 +0.5	5.0 +2.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
4.5 -0.5	3.5 +1.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	8.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
4.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0	4.0 -0.5	6.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
3.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
5.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
4.0 -1.0	5.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
4.0 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
4.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 +1.5	5.5 +0.5	3.5 +1.0	3.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
7.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
4.0 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	5.5 +1.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
2.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	6.5 +1.0	7.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	4.5 -1.0	4.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.5 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS
117. GABON	4.60 -0.20	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	4.5 0.0	7.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
117. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.60 -0.30	5.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
117. SIERRA LEONE	4.60 -0.45	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
117. SWEDEN	4.60 +0.35	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
117. UZBEKISTAN	4.60 +0.05	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
122. SURINAME	4.53 -0.02	4.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
123. ARGENTINA	4.50 +0.75	5.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	3.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
123. LATVIA	4.50 +0.85	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	3.5 n/a	3.5 0.0	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
125. CONGO, REP	4.47 -0.33	6.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
125. ZAMBIA	4.47 -0.13	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
127. BELIZE	4.43 +0.03	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	3.5 n/a	5.0 +0.5	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
128. BOTSWANA	4.40 +0.60	4.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
128. TURKMENISTAN	4.40 +0.05	8.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	2.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
130. DENMARK	4.33 +0.48	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a	5.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
130. KAZAKHSTAN	4.33 +0.18	6.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	3.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
132. AUSTRALIA	4.30 +0.55	3.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a	3.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
132. DJIBOUTI	4.30 +0.70	6.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	7.5 +1.5	5.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
132. FIJI	4.30 +0.50	5.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	3.5 n/a	2.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
132. MALTA	4.30 +0.25	5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	3.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
136. MAURITANIA	4.27 +0.27	7.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	3.5 -0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
137. ESTONIA	4.20 +0.75	4.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	2.0 -1.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
138. AUSTRIA	4.17 +0.22	4.5 0.0	6.0 +1.0	4.5 n/a	5.5 -1.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
139. MAURITIUS	4.13 -0.27	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	2.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
140. AZERBAIJAN	4.10 -0.05	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
140. NAMIBIA	4.10 +0.20	3.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
140. NORWAY	4.10 +0.10	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
143. SLOVENIA	4.03 +0.08	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
144. RWANDA	4.00 -0.10	5.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	6.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
145. CABO VERDE	3.97 +0.27	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
145. CYPRUS	3.97 +0.47	5.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	2.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
147. ERITREA	3.93 -0.12	9.0 0.0	9.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	7.5 +1.0	3.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
147. SINGAPORE	3.93 +0.68	5.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
149. BHUTAN	3.90 +0.15	6.0 +1.0	5.0 +2.0	2.0 n/a	2.5 +0.5	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
150. CANADA	3.87 +0.42	4.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 +1.0	4.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
150. ESWATINI	3.87 +0.62	4.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5	4.5 n/a	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
150. JAPAN	3.87 -0.18	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	2.5 -0.5	2.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
153. MONGOLIA	3.83 -0.07	5.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 -0.5	3.5 n/a	2.0 n/a
154. LITHUANIA	3.80 +0.80	4.0 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
155. NEW ZEALAND	3.77 +0.52	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
156. COMOROS	3.73 -0.12	5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	1.5 n/a	3.5 0.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a

FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	FINANCIAL CRIMES
8.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
8.5 0.0	6.5 +1.0	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	5.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0	5.5 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
4.5 -0.5	4.0 +0.5	8.5 -0.5	1.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	2.0 -0.5	3.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
2.0 -1.0	4.0 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.5 +1.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	2.0 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
7.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
5.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
2.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	5.5 n/a
2.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	2.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.5 +1.5	3.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.5 n/a	8.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	1.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
2.0 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
3.5 +1.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
3.0 -0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 -1.0	6.5 +0.5	1.5 -1.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
6.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
2.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
3.0 +1.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 n/a	6.0 n/a
2.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	8.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 -1.5	4.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
2.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	2.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.5 +1.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
6.5 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	3.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
5.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	5.5 -0.5	6.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
1.5 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.5 +1.5	5.0 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a	7.0 n/a
3.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	2.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 -1.5	1.5 n/a	5.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	EXTORTION AND PROTECTION RACKETEERING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS
157. SOLOMON ISLANDS	3.70 +0.15	4.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
158. TIMOR-LESTE	3.67 +0.12	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	5.0 n/a
159. CUBA	3.63 -0.37	5.5 -0.5	5.5 -0.5	2.0 n/a	1.5 0.0	5.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
160. BAHAMAS	3.60 -0.35	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	1.5 n/a	5.5 +1.0	2.0 n/a	1.5 n/a
160. GEORGIA	3.60 +0.55	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 n/a	3.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
162. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.57 -0.28	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
162. KOREA, REP.	3.57 -0.38	5.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.0 n/a	2.5 -1.0	3.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
164. MALDIVES	3.53 +0.03	7.0 +1.0	6.5 +1.0	2.5 n/a	2.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
165. SEYCHELLES	3.50 -0.10	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	3.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
165. TONGA	3.50 +0.20	3.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	5.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
167. LESOTHO	3.43 -0.12	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	4.0 +1.0	1.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
168. URUGUAY	3.33 +0.58	3.0 0.0	4.0 +2.0	4.0 n/a	3.0 +0.5	3.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
169. BRUNEI	3.30 +0.15	5.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
170. FINLAND	3.27 +0.47	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	3.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
171. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	3.00 +0.15	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 n/a	1.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
172. SAMOA	2.97 +0.52	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
173. ARMENIA	2.93 -0.47	3.0 -0.5	1.5 -0.5	1.5 n/a	2.0 -0.5	3.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
173. ICELAND	2.93 +0.28	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	2.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	1.0 n/a
175. LUXEMBOURG	2.90 +0.55	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.0 0.0	3.5 n/a	2.5 n/a
175. PALAU	2.90 -0.10	3.5 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	1.5 n/a	1.5 0.0	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
177. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	2.83 -0.37	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	4.5 -0.5	2.0 n/a	2.0 n/a
178. ANDORRA	2.73 +0.18	2.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	2.5 -0.5	2.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
178. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.73 +0.23	5.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	2.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
180. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	2.67 -0.38	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.5 +0.5	1.5 n/a	1.0 n/a
180. DOMINICA	2.67 -0.08	3.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.5 n/a
180. GRENADA	2.67 -0.18	2.0 0.0	2.5 +1.5	1.0 n/a	3.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.0 n/a
180. ST. LUCIA	2.67 -0.38	4.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	5.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	1.5 n/a
180. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2.67 -0.18	2.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
180. VANUATU	2.67 +0.27	3.5 +1.0	1.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
186. KIRIBATI	2.60 +0.15	5.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.5 n/a	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
187. BARBADOS	2.43 -0.12	4.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.0 +1.0	1.5 n/a	1.0 n/a
188. SAN MARINO	2.37 +0.47	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.5 -0.5	3.0 n/a	1.0 n/a
189. LIECHTENSTEIN	2.33 +0.33	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.0 -0.5	1.0 n/a	1.0 n/a
190. NAURU	2.20 +0.55	1.5 0.0	1.5 -1.0	1.0 n/a	1.0 0.0	4.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
191. TUVALU	1.93 +0.23	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
192. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70 -0.10	1.5 0.0	1.0 -0.5	1.0 n/a	1.5 -0.5	1.5 n/a	1.5 n/a
193. MONACO	1.67 +0.07	2.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.5 0.0	1.0 n/a	1.0 n/a

FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	FINANCIAL CRIMES
8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	3.5 +1.0	1.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	7.0 n/a
3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	5.5 n/a
3.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0	3.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
1.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
4.0 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
8.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.5 n/a	6.0 n/a
3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
4.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	2.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.0 -1.0	1.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 +1.0	2.0 n/a	4.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
1.5 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
1.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
1.5 0.0	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.5 +1.0	5.5 +1.0	4.0 +1.5	2.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	2.5 -1.0	4.5 +0.5	1.5 -0.5	3.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 n/a	5.0 n/a
1.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a	6.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	2.5 n/a	2.5 n/a
1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 n/a	4.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	7.5 +1.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	3.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	2.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
2.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	2.5 n/a
3.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	1.0 -0.5	2.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.5 n/a	3.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 +1.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 n/a	4.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	1.5 n/a	2.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a	7.5 n/a
1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	4.0 n/a	6.5 n/a
1.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.5 +0.5	1.5 +0.5	1.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a	3.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 n/a	2.5 n/a
2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a	3.0 n/a
1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 n/a	2.5 n/a

Criminal actor scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS	PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
1. MYANMAR	8.60 +0.47	9.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	9.0 +0.5	9.0 +1.5	7.5 n/a
2. CONGO, DEM. REP	8.50 -0.50	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.5 n/a
3. PARAGUAY	8.30 +0.80	8.0 +2.0	8.0 +0.5	9.0 +1.0	9.0 +0.5	7.5 n/a
4. COLOMBIA	8.20 +0.07	9.5 0.0	9.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
5. HONDURAS	8.10 -0.15	8.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	8.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 n/a
6. IRAQ	8.00 +0.25	6.5 0.0	8.5 +1.0	8.5 +0.5	9.0 0.0	7.5 n/a
7. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.90 -0.48	8.0 -1.0	8.0 0.0	9.0 +0.5	9.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a
7. LEBANON	7.90 +0.27	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	9.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a
9. SYRIA	7.70 +0.07	4.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	10.0 0.0	8.0 +1.0	7.0 n/a
10. SOUTH AFRICA	7.50 +0.25	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	6.5 n/a
10. SOUTH SUDAN	7.50 +0.12	5.0 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 n/a
10. SUDAN	7.50 +0.12	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 n/a
10. YEMEN	7.50 +0.25	7.0 -1.0	8.0 +1.0	8.0 +2.0	8.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a
14. ECUADOR	7.40 +0.90	8.0 +1.5	7.5 +2.0	7.0 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a
14. VENEZUELA	7.40 -0.23	9.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a
16. LIBYA	7.30 +0.30	9.0 +1.0	7.5 0.0	9.5 +1.0	5.5 +1.5	5.0 n/a
16. PANAMA	7.30 +0.30	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.5 n/a
16. TURKEY	7.30 -0.08	8.5 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	9.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a
19. AFGHANISTAN	7.20 -0.05	5.0 -2.5	8.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0	6.0 +2.0	8.0 n/a
19. NIGERIA	7.20 -0.05	5.5 0.0	8.5 -0.5	7.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
21. GUATEMALA	7.10 +0.10	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 +1.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a
21. INDONESIA	7.10 +0.35	6.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	8.0 n/a
21. KENYA	7.10 -0.15	7.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
21. NEPAL	7.10 +0.47	5.5 +1.0	7.5 +1.0	7.5 -1.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 n/a
25. CAMBODIA	7.00 +1.50	4.5 +2.0	7.0 +3.0	8.5 0.0	8.0 +1.0	7.0 n/a
25. MEXICO	7.00 -0.13	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
25. SOMALIA	7.00 -0.13	9.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.5 n/a
28. RUSSIA	6.90 +0.52	6.0 +1.5	7.0 -0.5	8.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.0 n/a
29. GUYANA	6.80 +1.30	6.0 +3.0	5.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.0 +1.0	8.0 n/a
30. IRAN	6.70 -0.55	5.0 -2.0	7.5 0.0	9.5 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a
30. ITALY	6.70 +0.32	9.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
30. JAMAICA	6.70 -0.93	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	2.5 n/a
30. PHILIPPINES	6.70 -0.68	8.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	3.5 n/a
30. SERBIA	6.70 -0.18	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
30. UGANDA	6.70 +0.07	5.5 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 n/a
30. UKRAINE	6.70 -0.05	5.5 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.5 n/a
37. BRAZIL	6.60 +0.10	8.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	8.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS	PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
37. MONTENEGRO	6.60 -0.40	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a
37. PERU	6.60 +0.10	7.0 +1.0	8.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a
37. VIETNAM	6.60 +0.10	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a
41. MOZAMBIQUE	6.50 -0.50	5.0 +1.5	8.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	3.0 n/a
42. BELARUS	6.40 +0.65	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.5 +1.5	7.5 n/a
42. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	6.40 -0.23	4.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
42. EL SALVADOR	6.40 -0.48	8.5 -1.0	7.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 n/a
45. CAMEROON	6.30 -0.08	4.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.0 +1.0	4.5 n/a
46. CHINA	6.20 +0.07	6.5 -0.5	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.0 n/a
46. NICARAGUA	6.20 -0.43	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a
48. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.10 -0.15	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a
48. HAITI	6.10 +0.10	8.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	4.5 +1.5	3.0 n/a
48. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	6.10 +0.22	1.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	6.5 n/a
48. SPAIN	6.10 -0.15	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.0 n/a
48. TAJIKISTAN	6.10 -0.03	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	9.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 n/a
53. ANGOLA	6.00 +0.62	3.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 n/a
53. BURKINA FASO	6.00 +0.37	4.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
53. GREECE	6.00 +0.25	3.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 n/a
53. KYRGYZSTAN	6.00 -0.25	6.5 +1.0	6.0 -0.5	8.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 n/a
53. MOLDOVA	6.00 +1.00	5.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	8.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 n/a
53. TANZANIA	6.00 +0.25	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.5 n/a
53. UNITED KINGDOM	6.00 +0.62	4.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	7.5 n/a
60. BULGARIA	5.90 +0.15	5.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a
60. CHAD	5.90 -0.48	5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
60. LAOS	5.90 +0.52	1.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.0 n/a
60. MADAGASCAR	5.90 +0.02	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	5.5 n/a
60. SAUDI ARABIA	5.90 +0.77	3.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	8.0 n/a
60. ZIMBABWE	5.90 -0.23	3.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a
66. MALAYSIA	5.80 +0.17	4.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a
66. PAKISTAN	5.80 -0.45	6.0 0.0	7.0 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 n/a
68. COSTA RICA	5.70 +0.57	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	2.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 n/a
68. FRANCE	5.70 +0.07	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	5.5 n/a
68. MALTA	5.70 +0.45	3.0 +1.5	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
68. NIGER	5.70 -0.43	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a
68. TOGO	5.70 -0.05	1.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	6.0 n/a
68. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	5.70 +0.95	1.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	7.5 n/a
74. GHANA	5.60 -0.28	3.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS	PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
74. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.60 -0.40	1.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
74. LIBERIA	5.60 +0.60	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
74. THAILAND	5.60 +0.47	1.5 0.0	6.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	7.0 n/a
74. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.60 -0.03	6.0 0.0	6.5 +1.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
79. ALBANIA	5.50 -0.50	6.5 -0.5	7.0 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	3.0 +0.5	4.5 n/a
79. ARGENTINA	5.50 +0.50	5.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a
79. AZERBAIJAN	5.50 -0.50	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	3.0 n/a
79. SENEGAL	5.50 +0.87	3.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 n/a
79. UNITED STATES	5.50 0.00	5.5 +0.5	6.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
84. CROATIA	5.40 +0.02	4.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a
84. MALI	5.40 -0.23	4.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
86. BELIZE	5.30 +0.42	6.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a
86. CHILE	5.30 +0.55	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	5.0 n/a
86. ETHIOPIA	5.30 +0.67	2.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 n/a
86. KOREA, REP.	5.30 -0.58	5.5 -1.0	5.0 -1.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a
86. SIERRA LEONE	5.30 -0.45	2.5 -1.0	6.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a
86. UZBEKISTAN	5.30 -0.08	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
92. BANGLADESH	5.20 +0.20	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 +2.0	3.0 n/a
92. BENIN	5.20 -0.05	2.0 +1.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
92. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	5.20 +0.82	1.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	8.5 n/a
92. GERMANY	5.20 +0.20	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a
92. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.20 -0.43	3.0 -1.0	6.0 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.5 -0.5	5.0 n/a
92. QATAR	5.20 +0.57	1.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a
98. BURUNDI	5.10 +0.47	2.0 +1.0	4.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
98. CONGO, REP	5.10 -0.15	3.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a
98. GABON	5.10 +0.10	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 n/a
- KOSOVO	5.10 -0.28	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 n/a
98. PORTUGAL	5.10 +0.10	5.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 n/a
98. SOLOMON ISLANDS	5.10 +0.35	1.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 n/a
98. SWITZERLAND	5.10 +0.72	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	7.5 n/a
104. DJIBOUTI	5.00 +0.62	1.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
104. EGYPT	5.00 -0.38	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
104. IRELAND	5.00 -0.25	6.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0	2.0 n/a
104. JORDAN	5.00 +0.12	1.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	6.0 n/a
104. MALDIVES	5.00 +0.37	6.5 +1.5	6.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 n/a
104. SRI LANKA	5.00 +0.37	5.5 +1.5	6.0 +1.0	7.0 0.0	3.5 +1.0	3.0 n/a
104. SURINAME	5.00 -0.25	3.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
104. ZAMBIA	5.00 -0.25	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	3.0 n/a
112. BOLIVIA	4.90 +0.90	4.0 +0.5	4.5 +2.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 n/a
112. CYPRUS	4.90 +0.02	3.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS	PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
112. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4.90 -0.10	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
112. ESWATINI	4.90 +0.90	2.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 n/a
116. INDIA	4.80 +0.05	3.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	5.0 n/a
116. SWEDEN	4.80 -0.08	5.0 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.0 n/a
118. ISRAEL	4.70 +0.07	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 n/a
118. JAPAN	4.70 -0.30	6.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a
118. KUWAIT	4.70 +0.57	1.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	6.5 n/a
118. NETHERLANDS	4.70 +0.32	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.5	4.0 n/a
118. SLOVAKIA	4.70 -0.43	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
118. SLOVENIA	4.70 +0.07	3.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
124. ALGERIA	4.60 +0.22	1.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.0 n/a
124. CABO VERDE	4.60 +0.22	3.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	4.5 n/a
124. KAZAKHSTAN	4.60 +0.22	4.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
124. MAURITIUS	4.60 -0.03	2.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
124. SAN MARINO	4.60 +0.47	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a
129. BAHRAIN	4.50 +0.50	1.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 n/a
129. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.50 0.00	3.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 n/a
129. HUNGARY	4.50 +0.25	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a
129. MAURITANIA	4.50 -0.25	1.5 -1.0	5.0 +0.5	6.5 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	3.5 n/a
129. MOROCCO	4.50 -0.13	1.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
129. NAMIBIA	4.50 -0.25	2.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
129. TIMOR-LESTE	4.50 +0.12	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a
136. GAMBIA	4.40 -0.10	1.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
136. GUINEA	4.40 -0.85	1.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	7.5 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	1.0 n/a
136. LESOTHO	4.40 +0.15	3.0 +2.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.5 n/a
136. MONGOLIA	4.40 +0.27	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 n/a
136. NEW ZEALAND	4.40 +1.15	4.0 -0.5	5.5 +2.0	2.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	6.0 n/a
136. ST. LUCIA	4.40 -0.73	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	2.0 n/a
136. TURKMENISTAN	4.40 -0.48	2.5 -0.5	5.0 +1.5	8.5 0.0	3.5 -1.0	2.5 n/a
143. BOTSWANA	4.30 +0.67	1.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 n/a
143. ESTONIA	4.30 +0.55	3.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 n/a
143. SEYCHELLES	4.30 +0.55	2.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	4.0 n/a
146. MALAWI	4.20 +0.70	2.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 n/a
146. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	4.20 -0.80	1.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	2.0 n/a
148. AUSTRIA	4.10 -0.03	1.0 -1.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 n/a
148. COMOROS	4.10 +0.22	1.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 +1.0	3.0 n/a
150. ERITREA	4.00 -0.63	1.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	9.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.5 n/a
150. FIJI	4.00 0.00	1.0 0.0	5.0 -1.5	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 n/a
150. LITHUANIA	4.00 +0.37	4.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0	3.5 n/a
150. POLAND	4.00 +0.37	2.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 n/a

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS	PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
154. BAHAMAS	3.90 +0.27	4.0 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
154. BHUTAN	3.90 +0.27	4.0 0.0	4.5 +1.0	4.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
154. CANADA	3.90 +0.02	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 n/a
154. KOREA, DPR	3.90 -0.35	1.0 0.0	3.0 +1.0	10.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a
154. OMAN	3.90 +0.52	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.5 n/a
154. ROMANIA	3.90 -0.23	3.0 -1.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
154. TONGA	3.90 -0.35	1.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	1.5 n/a
154. TUNISIA	3.90 +0.52	1.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	2.5 -0.5	4.5 n/a
162. ICELAND	3.80 -0.33	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
163. ANDORRA	3.70 +0.32	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	6.0 -1.0	6.0 n/a
163. AUSTRALIA	3.70 -0.55	4.5 -0.5	5.0 -1.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a
163. BARBADOS	3.70 -0.18	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 n/a
163. BELGIUM	3.70 +0.07	3.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
163. DENMARK	3.70 -0.18	5.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	1.5 n/a
168. GEORGIA	3.60 +0.72	3.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	5.5 n/a
169. MONACO	3.50 +0.25	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 n/a
169. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	3.50 -0.25	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	3.0 n/a
171. NORWAY	3.40 -0.23	4.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	1.5 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	2.0 n/a
172. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	3.30 -0.33	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	1.5 n/a
172. LATVIA	3.30 -0.08	4.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	2.5 n/a
174. GRENADA	3.20 -0.05	2.0 -2.0	3.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 n/a
174. RWANDA	3.20 -0.05	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
176. CUBA	3.10 +0.22	3.0 -1.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.0 +1.0	4.5 n/a
176. URUGUAY	3.10 +0.47	2.5 +1.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 n/a
178. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	3.00 -0.75	1.0 0.0	4.5 -1.0	2.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	1.5 n/a
178. SINGAPORE	3.00 0.00	3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 n/a
180. LUXEMBOURG	2.80 +0.42	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
181. ARMENIA	2.70 -0.43	2.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.0 n/a
181. FINLAND	2.70 +0.07	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 n/a
183. DOMINICA	2.60 +0.10	1.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 n/a
184. PALAU	2.50 -0.38	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	1.5 n/a
185. BRUNEI	2.40 +0.02	1.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	3.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 n/a
186. KIRIBATI	2.30 +0.05	1.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5	2.0 n/a
186. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.30 +0.17	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	3.0 -0.5	2.0 n/a
188. LIECHTENSTEIN	2.20 +0.45	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 n/a
188. VANUATU	2.20 +0.20	1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	1.5 n/a
190. NAURU	1.90 +0.02	1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a
190. SAMOA	1.90 +0.27	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	1.0 n/a
192. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.70 -0.05	1.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 n/a
193. TUVALU	1.30 -0.08	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 -0.5	1.5 n/a

Resilience scores

	COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
1.	FINLAND	8.63 +0.21	9.0 0.0	9.0 +0.5	9.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5
2.	LIECHTENSTEIN	8.46 +0.04	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	9.0 0.0
3.	ICELAND	8.21 +0.17	8.0 +1.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	8.5 0.0
4.	DENMARK	8.13 -0.09	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0
5.	KOREA, REP.	8.08 +0.54	9.0 +1.0	8.0 +1.0	8.5 +0.5	9.0 +1.0
6.	ANDORRA	7.96 +0.21	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.5 +0.5	8.5 +0.5
7.	NORWAY	7.92 0.00	8.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.5 0.0
8.	ESTONIA	7.88 +0.04	8.0 0.0	7.5 -0.5	8.5 0.0	8.0 0.0
8.	NEW ZEALAND	7.88 -0.51	8.0 -0.5	8.0 -0.5	8.5 0.0	8.0 -0.5
10.	SINGAPORE	7.83 +0.12	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.5 0.0
11.	LATVIA	7.58 +0.16	7.0 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5
12.	UNITED KINGDOM	7.54 -0.34	7.5 -0.5	6.5 -1.0	7.5 -0.5	8.0 -0.5
13.	AUSTRIA	7.50 +0.08	7.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0
13.	GERMANY	7.50 -0.17	6.5 -0.5	7.0 -0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
13.	LUXEMBOURG	7.50 0.00	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.0 +1.0
13.	URUGUAY	7.50 -0.25	7.5 -0.5	9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
17.	NETHERLANDS	7.46 +0.04	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0
17.	SWEDEN	7.46 0.00	6.5 -0.5	8.5 -0.5	8.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5
19.	AUSTRALIA	7.38 -0.59	7.5 -0.5	8.0 -0.5	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
19.	JAPAN	7.38 -0.09	6.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	7.5 0.0
21.	IRELAND	7.33 -0.05	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
22.	LITHUANIA	7.29 +0.08	7.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	8.5 +1.0	7.0 0.0
23.	CANADA	7.21 -0.04	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
24.	UNITED STATES	7.13 +0.55	6.0 +1.5	6.0 +0.5	9.0 +2.0	6.5 0.0
25.	BELGIUM	7.04 +0.04	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5
25.	SWITZERLAND	7.04 -0.09	8.5 -0.5	6.0 -0.5	8.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5
27.	FRANCE	6.96 +0.13	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	7.5 0.0
28.	SPAIN	6.75 +0.12	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0
29.	CABO VERDE	6.58 +0.25	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.5 0.0	7.0 0.0
30.	PORTUGAL	6.50 +0.04	7.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0
31.	ITALY	6.46 +0.17	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	9.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0
32.	CZECH REPUBLIC	6.42 +0.17	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5
33.	CHILE	6.17 -0.25	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
34.	BARBADOS	6.13 +0.42	6.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0
35.	ISRAEL	6.08 +0.08	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 -0.5
35.	TUVALU	6.08 +0.04	5.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0
37.	SLOVENIA	6.04 -0.04	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	9.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.5 +0.5
9.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	9.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	9.5 0.0	9.5 0.0	8.5 0.0
8.5 0.0	9.0 +0.5	8.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0
7.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	8.0 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	8.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	9.0 0.0
9.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.0 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
8.0 0.0	8.5 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.0 0.0	8.5 0.0	8.5 +0.5	8.0 -0.5
8.0 0.0	8.0 -0.5	8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	7.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5
8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	7.5 -0.5	7.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5
7.5 -0.5	7.5 -1.0	8.5 0.0	6.5 -1.5	8.0 -0.5	8.0 -0.5	7.5 -0.5	8.5 0.0
9.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	4.0 +1.0
8.0 +0.5	8.0 +0.5	8.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0
8.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 -0.5
8.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0
8.0 +0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 -0.5	6.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 -0.5
7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	7.0 -1.0	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
6.0 -1.0	7.0 -1.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5	8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.5 0.0
7.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	8.0 +0.5	7.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	8.5 0.0
8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 -1.5	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 -1.5	6.0 -1.5	6.5 -1.5
8.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	7.5 -0.5	8.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	8.0 0.0
7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 -0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 0.0
8.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5
7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
6.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	8.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0	8.5 +1.0
6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.5 -0.5
7.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	8.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 -1.0	6.0 0.0	8.0 0.0
6.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	8.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0
7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0
7.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0
6.0 +0.5	7.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5
5.5 +0.5	7.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5
6.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
5.5 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 -1.0	6.0 -1.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 -1.0
5.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 +1.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
5.0 0.0	6.5 +1.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.5 -1.5
8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0
6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.0 -1.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
38. ROMANIA	6.00 +0.42	6.0 +0.5	6.5 +1.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0
39. ARGENTINA	5.96 -0.37	6.5 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 -1.0
40. CROATIA	5.92 +0.34	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	7.0 +0.5	7.0 +1.0
40. MALAYSIA	5.92 +0.09	4.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5
42. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	5.88 +0.55	7.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	7.0 +1.5	6.0 +0.5
42. POLAND	5.88 -0.26	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0
44. SAMOA	5.83 +0.16	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0
45. MARSHALL ISLANDS	5.79 +0.75	7.0 +1.5	6.5 +2.0	6.0 +1.0	6.5 +0.5
45. NIGERIA	5.79 +0.29	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5
45. SENEGAL	5.79 +0.21	5.5 0.0	5.0 +1.0	7.0 +1.0	6.5 0.0
48. ARMENIA	5.71 0.00	7.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.5 +0.5
49. CHINA	5.67 +0.21	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5
50. COLOMBIA	5.63 -0.21	6.0 -1.0	5.5 0.0	9.0 0.0	6.5 -0.5
50. COSTA RICA	5.63 +0.13	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0
50. MONACO	5.63 +0.25	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5
50. SOUTH AFRICA	5.63 -0.17	5.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	7.0 +0.5
54. JORDAN	5.58 -0.34	5.5 -1.5	4.5 -0.5	8.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5
54. ST. LUCIA	5.58 -0.05	7.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0
56. KUWAIT	5.54 +0.00	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0
56. MAURITIUS	5.54 -0.13	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 0.0
56. RWANDA	5.54 +0.04	5.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
59. BAHAMAS	5.50 +0.29	6.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5
60. BOTSWANA	5.46 -0.17	5.0 -1.0	4.0 -1.0	8.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0
60. GHANA	5.46 +0.08	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
62. BAHRAIN	5.42 -0.12	6.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0	5.5 0.0
62. FIJI	5.42 +0.17	5.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5
62. INDIA	5.42 +0.17	4.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	8.5 +1.0	5.0 +0.5
62. JAMAICA	5.42 -0.04	4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0
62. QATAR	5.42 -0.16	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0
67. CUBA	5.38 0.00	6.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.0 0.0
67. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	5.38 -0.09	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0
69. BULGARIA	5.33 +0.04	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0
69. KENYA	5.33 +0.12	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	7.0 +1.0
69. PALAU	5.33 +0.79	7.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	7.5 +1.5	5.5 0.0
69. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.33 +0.12	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 0.0
73. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.29 +0.08	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
73. SLOVAKIA	5.29 -0.09	5.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0
73. TONGA	5.29 +0.08	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5
76. GEORGIA	5.25 -0.46	4.0 -1.0	5.0 -1.5	6.0 -1.0	6.5 0.0

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
6.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0
5.5 -0.5	5.5 -1.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	7.5 -0.5
5.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5
5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	4.5 -1.0
6.5 +1.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0
5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	6.5 -0.5	6.5 -1.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0
6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.0 0.0
7.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.5	6.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5
5.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	7.0 +0.5
5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
4.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	3.0 -2.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5
5.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	7.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
5.5 0.0	5.0 -1.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0
6.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 0.0
8.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	4.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0
6.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	7.0 0.0
4.5 0.0	6.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0
6.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0
5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	7.0 0.0	4.0 -1.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5
5.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0
3.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0
6.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	4.5 -1.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 -1.0
5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
4.5 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0
4.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 +2.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 -0.5
4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	8.0 +1.5	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5
3.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0
5.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	7.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	3.5 -1.0
3.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	8.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
6.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0
5.0 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	6.0 -0.5	5.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5
5.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0
5.0 +2.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.5	5.5 +1.0
3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0
4.5 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0
5.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
3.5 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5
3.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	6.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
77. MONGOLIA	5.21 +0.13	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0
77. OMAN	5.21 -0.04	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	6.5 0.0
77. SAN MARINO	5.21 +0.08	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0
77. SEYCHELLES	5.21 +0.63	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0
81. DOMINICA	5.17 +0.09	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
81. GAMBIA	5.17 +0.17	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0
81. GREECE	5.17 -0.08	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0
84. ALBANIA	5.13 +0.09	5.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0
84. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.13 +0.71	5.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5
84. GRENADA	5.13 +0.46	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5
84. MALTA	5.13 -0.04	4.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5	7.5 0.0	6.0 0.0
84. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	5.13 -0.21	5.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0
84. VANUATU	5.13 -0.21	5.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.5 -0.5	6.5 0.0
- KOSOVO	5.08 +0.67	5.0 +1.0	5.5 +1.5	5.5 +1.5	5.0 0.0
90. SOLOMON ISLANDS	5.08 -0.13	4.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0
91. NAURU	5.00 +0.33	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	7.5 +1.0
91. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	5.00 0.00	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0
93. SERBIA	4.96 +0.04	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
94. BRAZIL	4.92 -0.12	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	4.5 0.0
94. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	4.92 0.00	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	7.0 0.0
96. ECUADOR	4.88 -0.84	4.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 -1.5
96. HUNGARY	4.88 -0.21	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5
98. BOLIVIA	4.83 -0.05	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
99. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4.79 +0.12	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
99. THAILAND	4.79 +0.12	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0
99. VIETNAM	4.79 +0.12	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	6.0 +0.5
102. ETHIOPIA	4.75 -0.63	4.0 -1.0	4.5 -0.5	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
102. MONTENEGRO	4.75 +0.29	4.5 +1.0	4.5 +0.5	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0
104. BHUTAN	4.71 +0.13	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0
105. PANAMA	4.67 -0.16	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
106. MOROCCO	4.63 0.00	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 +0.5
107. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	4.58 +0.25	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
107. BRUNEI	4.58 +0.00	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0
107. MALAWI	4.58 +0.29	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	5.5 0.0
110. KAZAKHSTAN	4.54 -0.17	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0
110. NAMIBIA	4.54 -0.42	4.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	7.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5
110. UKRAINE	4.54 +0.54	5.0 +1.5	3.5 -0.5	7.5 +2.0	4.5 +0.5
110. ZAMBIA	4.54 +0.21	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0
114. ANGOLA	4.50 +0.08	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
114. TOGO	4.50 +0.50	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +1.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.0

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 -1.0
5.0 -0.5	7.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5
6.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 0.0
6.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 +1.5	4.5 +1.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.5
4.5 -0.5	6.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
4.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5	6.5 0.0
4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0
6.0 +1.0	5.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5
5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +1.5	4.5 +1.0	5.5 +2.5	5.0 +0.5
4.5 -0.5	6.5 +0.5	6.0 0.0	5.0 +1.0	6.0 +1.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5
4.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.5 0.0	7.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	6.5 0.0	3.0 0.0
7.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.0 -1.0	3.0 -1.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.0 0.0
5.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.5 +1.5	6.0 0.0
5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	7.0 +0.5	5.0 -0.5
6.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	7.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	3.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.5 +1.5
7.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.5 0.0
3.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5
6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
4.0 -1.5	4.0 -2.0	3.5 -1.0	5.5 -1.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.5 -1.5
5.0 0.0	5.0 -1.0	6.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
3.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5
4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0
4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	1.5 -0.5
5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 -2.0	7.0 0.0	5.0 -1.0	3.0 -1.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0
4.5 0.0	4.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5
5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0
3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	3.5 -1.0	5.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5
4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +1.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0
4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.0 -0.5	3.0 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0
5.0 +1.0	3.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0
5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0
4.0 -0.5	3.5 -1.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
4.5 0.0	5.0 +1.5	1.5 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5
5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0
4.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	4.5 0.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
114. TUNISIA	4.50 -0.33	4.5 0.0	4.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 -0.5
117. CYPRUS	4.46 +0.04	4.5 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	7.0 +0.5	6.0 0.0
118. BANGLADESH	4.42 +0.29	4.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0
119. ALGERIA	4.38 -0.26	4.5 0.0	3.0 -1.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
119. DJIBOUTI	4.38 -0.13	4.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0
119. PERU	4.38 -0.21	2.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0
122. KIRIBATI	4.33 +0.00	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	6.0 0.0
123. INDONESIA	4.25 -0.08	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0
124. MEXICO	4.21 -0.25	3.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0	6.5 -0.5	5.5 -0.5
124. PHILIPPINES	4.21 +0.08	3.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	5.5 +0.5	5.0 0.0
126. TANZANIA	4.13 +0.09	5.5 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0
127. GUATEMALA	4.08 -0.34	3.0 -0.5	3.5 -0.5	5.5 0.0	4.5 -1.0
127. HONDURAS	4.08 +0.16	3.0 +0.5	3.5 0.0	6.5 +1.0	4.0 0.0
127. MALDIVES	4.08 +0.20	5.5 +0.5	6.0 +1.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 +0.5
130. GUYANA	4.04 -0.25	4.0 -1.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5
130. SIERRA LEONE	4.04 +0.58	4.5 +1.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	3.5 +1.0
132. NEPAL	4.00 +0.29	3.5 +1.0	2.5 +0.5	5.5 +1.0	4.5 +1.0
132. SAUDI ARABIA	4.00 -0.29	3.5 +0.5	2.5 -1.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
134. AZERBAIJAN	3.96 -0.12	3.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0
134. PAKISTAN	3.96 -0.04	3.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
136. LESOTHO	3.92 +0.25	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	7.0 +1.0	5.0 -0.5
136. MOLDOVA	3.92 +0.21	4.0 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0
138. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3.88 -0.04	4.0 +1.0	3.5 -0.5	6.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0
138. UGANDA	3.88 -0.09	4.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
138. UZBEKISTAN	3.88 +0.09	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
141. EGYPT	3.83 -0.21	3.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0
141. KYRGYZSTAN	3.83 -0.34	3.0 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	4.0 -1.0
141. TIMOR-LESTE	3.83 +0.16	3.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	4.0 -0.5
144. RUSSIA	3.79 -0.25	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 -1.5	6.0 +0.5
145. CAMBODIA	3.63 -0.30	4.0 -0.5	3.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
146. BENIN	3.50 -0.04	3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0
147. BURKINA FASO	3.46 -0.17	2.5 -1.0	3.5 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	5.5 +0.5
147. LAOS	3.46 +0.04	3.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0
147. LEBANON	3.46 -0.54	2.5 -2.0	3.0 -0.5	5.5 -1.0	4.0 0.0
147. NIGER	3.46 +0.25	4.0 +0.5	2.5 0.0	5.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5
151. PARAGUAY	3.42 +0.04	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.0 +2.0	3.5 +0.5
151. SRI LANKA	3.42 -0.62	2.5 -1.5	3.0 -0.5	5.5 0.0	5.5 0.0
153. TURKEY	3.38 -0.17	4.0 +1.0	2.0 -1.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0
154. MADAGASCAR	3.33 -0.05	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5
155. BELIZE	3.29 +0.16	6.0 +1.0	2.5 0.0	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
3.5 -1.0	4.5 0.0	6.0 +0.5	5.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 -1.5
4.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 +0.5	3.5 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	5.5 +1.0	5.0 +1.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
3.0 -1.0	6.0 0.0	6.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.5 -1.0
4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5
6.5 +0.5	3.5 -1.5	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 0.0
3.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.5 -0.5
4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0
4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.5 +1.5
5.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 +1.0
3.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0
3.5 +0.5	5.0 +0.5	4.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.0 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
4.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	5.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0
3.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.5 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	4.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0
3.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	4.5 -0.5	2.0 -1.0
2.5 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.5 0.0
3.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	4.0 -1.0	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +1.0	3.5 +1.5	3.5 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	3.5 +1.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -1.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
2.0 -1.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.5 +0.5	4.0 -0.5
4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	5.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.0 +0.5	4.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.0 -0.5
3.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	6.0 0.0	5.0 -1.0	4.0 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
3.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 -0.5
3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	4.5 +1.0	5.0 +0.5
4.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.0 -0.5	3.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.5 -1.0
4.0 0.0	3.5 -1.0	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	4.0 +1.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5
4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 -1.0	4.0 +1.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5
3.5 -0.5	3.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	1.5 -0.5	4.0 -1.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 0.0
2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 +1.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0
2.5 -0.5	2.0 -1.0	4.5 -0.5	2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
3.0 -0.5	3.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	2.0 -3.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	2.5 -1.0
2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 -1.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	3.0 -0.5
2.5 -0.5	4.0 +0.5	5.5 +0.5	4.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5
4.0 0.0	4.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
155. ESWATINI	3.29 +0.04	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 0.0	3.0 -1.0
155. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29 +0.00	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	5.5 0.0
155. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	3.29 -0.13	2.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5
159. BELARUS	3.25 -0.54	3.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
159. CONGO, REP	3.25 0.00	3.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	5.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
159. GABON	3.25 +0.08	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
159. LIBERIA	3.25 +0.08	3.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	4.0 +1.0
163. EL SALVADOR	3.21 -0.50	2.0 -0.5	2.0 -1.0	4.5 -1.0	4.0 -1.0
163. IRAQ	3.21 -0.58	3.5 -1.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5
165. CAMEROON	3.17 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0
166. GUINEA	3.13 +0.30	2.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.5 -0.5	4.0 +0.5
166. IRAN	3.13 -0.38	2.5 -0.5	2.0 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.0 0.0
166. MAURITANIA	3.13 +0.04	4.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0
166. ZIMBABWE	3.13 -0.04	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.5 +0.5
170. SURINAME	3.04 +0.79	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.5 +1.5	3.5 +1.5
171. SUDAN	2.71 -0.25	2.0 -1.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	4.5 0.0
172. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.58 +0.16	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0
172. TAJIKISTAN	2.58 -0.09	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
174. HAITI	2.46 -0.21	2.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
175. CHAD	2.42 -0.04	3.0 -0.5	2.0 -0.5	5.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5
176. COMOROS	2.38 0.00	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
176. CONGO, DEM. REP	2.38 +0.09	1.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
176. MALI	2.38 0.00	2.5 +0.5	2.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
179. ERITREA	2.33 +0.00	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
180. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.21 +0.04	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.5 0.0
180. TURKMENISTAN	2.21 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
182. BURUNDI	2.17 +0.09	3.0 +0.5	1.0 0.0	2.5 +1.0	3.0 +0.5
183. NICARAGUA	2.08 -0.38	1.5 -0.5	1.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	3.0 -0.5
184. SYRIA	1.92 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0
185. SOUTH SUDAN	1.88 +0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
185. VENEZUELA	1.88 -0.04	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
187. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.79 -0.13	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5
187. KOREA, DPR	1.79 -0.17	3.0 -0.5	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
187. SOMALIA	1.79 +0.12	1.5 +0.5	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	2.5 +0.5
190. YEMEN	1.75 -0.25	1.5 -0.5	1.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
191. MYANMAR	1.63 -1.80	1.5 -1.5	1.5 -1.5	2.0 -3.0	2.0 -2.5
192. LIBYA	1.54 +0.00	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
193. AFGHANISTAN	1.50 -1.17	1.5 -1.5	1.0 -1.5	1.0 -2.0	1.5 -1.5

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
3.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 +0.5	5.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	2.5 0.0
2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 -1.5	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5
2.0 -1.0	3.0 -2.0	4.0 -0.5	4.5 0.0	4.0 -1.0	3.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	2.0 -1.0
2.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5
3.0 0.0	4.5 0.0	4.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5
3.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	3.5 +0.5	3.0 -1.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	4.0 0.0
2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	5.5 +0.5	3.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	2.5 -1.5
3.5 -0.5	3.5 0.0	2.5 -1.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	3.0 -1.0	3.0 -1.5
2.5 0.0	4.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	5.0 0.0
3.5 +0.5	3.5 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	2.0 +0.5	3.5 +0.5
3.0 -0.5	3.0 -0.5	5.0 -0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	3.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5
2.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5	4.5 +0.5	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5
2.5 -0.5	3.0 0.0	4.5 -0.5	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 -1.0
3.0 +1.0	3.0 +1.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 +1.0	2.0 +0.5	3.0 +1.0	5.0 +2.5	3.5 -0.5
3.0 -0.5	2.5 -1.0	2.5 0.0	3.5 -0.5	2.0 -0.5	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
3.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	3.5 +0.5	3.0 +0.5	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 +0.5	3.0 0.0
2.0 -1.0	3.0 0.0	3.0 +0.5	3.0 -0.5	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.0 0.0
2.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	4.0 -0.5
2.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5
2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
2.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.5 +0.5	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	5.0 0.0
2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0
2.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	7.0 0.0	3.0 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0
2.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 +0.5	1.5 -0.5
1.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	4.5 +2.5	3.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 -1.5
2.0 -0.5	1.5 0.0	3.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	2.5 0.0
2.0 -0.5	2.5 -0.5	2.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	3.0 -0.5	1.0 -1.0
1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 +0.5
2.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0
1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 -0.5	2.0 +0.5	2.0 +1.0	1.5 +0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 -2.0
2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.5 -0.5	1.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5
1.0 -0.5	1.5 0.0	6.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 -0.5	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 -0.5
2.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	2.0 -0.5	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0	3.0 +0.5
1.5 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.5 -0.5	2.0 0.0	2.0 -0.5	1.0 0.0	1.0 -1.0	2.0 0.0
1.5 -2.0	1.5 -2.5	2.0 -1.0	2.0 -1.0	1.5 -1.5	1.0 -1.0	1.5 -1.5	1.5 -2.5
1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.5 0.0	1.0 0.0	2.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	1.5 0.0
1.5 -0.5	1.5 -1.5	3.5 +0.5	1.0 -2.0	1.5 -2.0	1.5 -0.5	1.5 -0.5	1.0 -1.0

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105 Correlation between corruption perception and criminality: 0.49; corruption perception and state-embedded criminal actors: 0.80.

Acknowledgements

The Global Organized Crime Index was developed by a core team at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Laura Adal, Kosyo Ivanov, Chiara Gentili, Ebru Erkan, Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw. Index development was also supported by Ana Castro, Kristina Amerhauser, Rumbi Matamba and Virginia Comolli, as regional coordinators, as well as by Nina Kaysser, Michael McLaggan and Sarah Fares. Credit to the GI-TOC Publications team, Claudio Landi and Café.art.br for the editing, design, visualizations and website.

In the process of developing this tool, the team drew on the support and expertise of more than 480 individuals and we would like to express our sincere gratitude to colleagues, experts, reviewers and research assistants for their tireless efforts to build a comprehensive and informative knowledge-sharing and analytical tool.

Over a two-year period, experiences and informed opinions were exchanged, and lessons learned in order to develop the second iteration of this Global Organized Crime Index. The Index itself was conceptualized years before the publication of the first iteration of the tool, and its realization would not have been possible without the foundational work under ENACT (Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime) – supported by INTERPOL and the Institute for Security Studies, and funded by the European Union and in part by the Government of Norway. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the United States Department of State for funding the 2021 and 2023 editions of the Global Organized Crime Index.

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Layout and design: Café.art.br

This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

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The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with over 600 Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organized crime.

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Funding provided by the United States Government

Contributions also received from the Government of Norway

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The Organized Crime Index design and development was supported by the ENACT Programme.

ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.