



Africa Organised Crime Index 2021 **Evolution of crime in a Covid world**

A comparative analysis of
organised crime in Africa, 2019–2021

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Preface

As COVID-19 dominates the world's stage, nearly every aspect of society has been affected by the deadly pandemic. While the impact of the contagion on countries' economies, social cohesion, health and security has been widely reported on, less is known about its influence on criminal dynamics. The pandemic has not only become a central component of the everyday lives of Africans, but has also revealed the important role the continent plays in the global economy – both licit and illicit. COVID-19 measures have posed a double burden on African countries by heavily challenging people's economic livelihood and restricting the freedom of movement of Africans, while also challenging governments in how they balance the need to address the health crisis with the provision of services and security amid declining economies. In this context, organised crime in Africa has evolved and taken advantage of the confusion and frustration wrought by the pandemic; it has filled in the gaps left by state institutions, by both adapting its illicit activities in order to circumvent COVID restrictions and providing new sources of livelihoods and parallel services.

Institutional responses to stop the spread of the virus have had a profound impact on movement, trade and business, including in black markets and shadow economies. In Africa, COVID-19 was slower to take effect than in other parts of the world, and even though the continent has had experience in handling other major viral epidemics, the health, economic and security systems of many countries on the continent have found themselves ill-equipped to face the particular challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.¹ As legitimate businesses suffered extensive losses across the continent, people increasingly turned to the informal and illicit economies for alternative sources of livelihood. Meanwhile, those already vulnerable to exploitation become even more at risk due to the paucity of economic opportunities available to them and the isolating restrictions put in place in the interest of public health.²

While the closure of borders may have restricted illicit flows within and across countries in the short term, over the course of the pandemic, it has become clear that organised crime has found ways to adapt and bypass controls throughout Africa, with illicit activities continuing, often more covertly than ever before. As states diverted their attention and resources to curbing viral spread, new opportunities emerged for criminal groups to exploit gaps in service delivery and communities' economic vulnerability, enabling them to expand their activities unchecked. For example, with limits on in-person interactions, illicit activities have increasingly shifted online,³ while cases of counterfeit, substandard and illegally diverted pharmaceuticals have been on the rise, marketed as 'cures' for COVID-19.⁴

As African countries recover from the initial effects of the pandemic and learn to live with the virus for the foreseeable future, an examination of the impact of COVID-19 on organised crime and resilience can reveal a number of insights into the evolution of criminality and guide countries' efforts to respond in the short, medium and long term.

Of course, COVID-19 is only one contributing factor to these changing dynamics, and meanwhile a number of African countries have continued to experience conflict, fragility and corruption. From inter-ethnic violence and the rise of jihadists in the Sahel, to the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau, conflicts in Ethiopia's Tigray region and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and an insurgency in Mozambique, the instability faced by several African countries in 2020 has been another key factor enabling the expansion of organised crime activities. The continent has also experienced an overall economic downturn for the first time in nearly three decades,⁵ leading to untold effects, including government crackdowns, and social and economic marginalisation of vulnerable groups. These all sew conditions that are ripe for organised crime to exploit, embedding, in the process, further insecurity and instability.

Although the full effects of the pandemic in Africa remain to be seen, the 2021 Index,⁶ the second iteration of the ENACT Organised Crime Index,⁷ aims to capture to the extent possible the dynamics of organised crime and responses on the continent amid the current health crisis in the hope that policymakers and other stakeholders will be better equipped from it to maintain and improve countries' resilience to organised crime – even amid future global crises. This 2021 version of the Organised Crime Index, Africa builds on the results of the 2019 iteration; by developing the analysis, this 2021 Index tool offers an evolving picture of the scope and scale of organised crime in Africa, as well as the efficacy of countries' resilience efforts, amid a unique set of global circumstances in 2020.

The Index is a flexible tool that allows users to analyse, compare and contrast a number of criminality and resilience elements through a geographic, temporal and thematic lens. Drawing on an extensive updated literature review and the expertise of over 160 experts with country, regional and thematic expertise, the Index is published once again as an integral part of the EU-funded ENACT⁸ programme in its efforts to undertake in-depth research on organised crime

trends and promote comprehensive policies that build resilience to organised crime. It is hoped that the Index can contribute to a more informed dialogue on the impact of criminality and response measures.

In parallel to the development of this year's Africa Index, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime produced a Global Organized Crime Index covering 193 countries. The creation of these two indices provides a unique perspective: Africa is distinct, in that it is the only continent in the world where data on criminality and resilience has been collected over two periods, allowing for policymakers to identify longitudinal trends over the past two years since the publication of the inaugural Organised Crime Index, Africa of 2019. At the same time, the continent's inclusion in the Global Organized Crime Index offers policymakers and other stakeholders a greater understanding of Africa's position within the global criminal economy.

Therefore, unlike the first iteration of the ENACT Organised Crime Index, the results for Africa captured in the 2021 version reflect the continent's scores when calibrated globally. Although this variation means that users should approach comparisons between African scores for 2019 and 2021 with caution, particularly at an individual country level, policymakers can still assess changes in regional and country relationships, and identify key continental trends over the past two years. It is expected that this comparative challenge will be eliminated in future iterations of the Index.

Despite these challenges, the ENACT Organised Crime Index aims to build a foundation of longitudinal knowledge from which further research can be gathered, complementing and supplementing other analyses so as to better inform policymakers in their efforts to respond to organised crime. While scores and rankings are an inherent component of any index, the Index tool's ultimate goal, therefore, is to move beyond mere numbers, and to encourage and maintain a global dialogue around the nature of organised crime and resilience.

SECTION 1

ABOUT THE INDEX






About the Index

1.1 The Index composition

Criminality under the Index

While encompassing a range of activities, criminal markets, as a subcomponent of the Index's criminality measure, can be thought of as the political, social and economic systems surrounding all stages of the illicit trade and/or exploitation of commodities or people. Appendix 2 at the end of this report contains definitions of these criminal markets, as used for the purpose of the Index; they are also downloadable from the website (africa.ocindex.net). Both the forms of organised crime, as well as their pervasiveness, are considered by classifying manifestations of crime within these illicit markets.

FIGURE 1.1
Criminality indicators



Criminal Actors

- ▲ **CA1.** Mafia-style groups
- ▲ **CA2.** Criminal networks
- ▲ **CA3.** State-embedded actors
- ▲ **CA4.** Foreign actors

Criminal Markets

- ◆ **CM1.** Human trafficking
- ◆ **CM2.** Human smuggling
- ◆ **CM3.** Arms trafficking
- ◆ **CM4.** Flora crimes
- ◆ **CM5.** Fauna crimes
- ◆ **CM6.** Non-renewable resource crimes
- ◆ **CM7.** Heroin trade
- ◆ **CM8.** Cocaine trade
- ◆ **CM9.** Cannabis trade
- ◆ **CM10.** Synthetic drug trade

Together with these criminal markets, the ENACT Organised Crime Index also assesses the structure and influence of four types of criminal actors: mafia-style groups; criminal networks; state-embedded actors; and foreign criminal actors. Although it is impossible to fit each of the myriad of different types of criminal actors around the world neatly under a specific definition, these four criminal actor types assessed by the Index have certain broad, defining characteristics.

Mafia-style groups are clearly defined, organised criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining, although not exclusive, features of a mafia-style group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Criminal networks, on the other hand, are loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or with a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any of the other defining features of mafia-style groups. State-embedded actors are those criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus, including officials from state institutions, such as law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. Finally, foreign actors encompass criminal actors of all types, both state and non-state, operating outside their home country.

DEFINITION OF ORGANISED CRIME

For the purpose of the Africa Organised Crime Index, 'organised crime' is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

Resilience under the Index

A focus on criminality alone limits the perspective of the organised crime landscape, therefore necessitating a balanced approach by also looking at the quality and efficacy of countries' resilience – their defence mechanisms. Countries may have similar scores for criminality, but it is how they approach this problem that arguably matters most. Like criminality, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to resilience, and no assumptions can be made about what makes a country resilient. Just as nations in conflict may not have the capacity to respond to a growing crime problem, stable and large economies attract organised crime, undermining their resilience efforts. Because criminality includes a wide range of illicit activities and actors, resilience measures to address these problems should be far-reaching and multi-sectoral.

DEFINITION OF RESILIENCE

The Index defines ‘resilience’ as the ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries’ measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.


One important consideration when it comes to resilience is the way in which responses to organised criminal activities are implemented. A pillar around which the Index is based is that resilience measures must be in line with international human rights standards and principles.

Although the precise relationship between criminality and resilience cannot yet be seen, it is hoped that, over time, the ENACT Organised Crime Index will offer a means by which to systematically analyse and better understand these resilience dynamics, and help policymakers find means to foster them.

FIGURE 1.2

Resilience indicators



- **R1.** Political leadership and governance
- **R2.** Government transparency and accountability
- **R3.** International cooperation
- **R4.** National policies and laws
- **R5.** Judicial system and detention
- **R6.** Law enforcement
- **R7.** Territorial integrity
- **R8.** Anti-money laundering
- **R9.** Economic regulatory capacity
- **R10.** Victim and witness support
- **R11.** Prevention
- **R12.** Non-state actors



1.2 How to read the pyramid representations used in this report

Pyramid width and height

The **criminal markets** score is represented by the pyramid base size and the **criminal actors** score is represented by the pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.




Panel height

The **resilience score** is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

Africa average score

The pyramid shape represents the criminality score, the average between criminal actors and criminal markets.

The overall **criminality** score for Africa is 5.17. This score is composed by a 4.94 score for **criminal markets**, and 5.40 score for **criminal actors**. The **resilience** score is 3.80.



SECTION 2

KEY FINDINGS





2

Key findings

By evaluating a range of indicators by country and region, several key findings emerge from the 2021 Index that shed light on the scale and reach of criminal markets and actors, juxtaposed against the efficacy of resilience measures in African countries.


FINDING 1

The majority of people in Africa live in countries with high criminality and in countries with low resilience.

Analyses of the social, economic and political impacts of organised crime may elude most people, but the effects of organised crime are nonetheless tangible and felt by many. As shown by the results of the Index, the majority of Africa's population – almost two-thirds (60.9%) – live in countries with high levels of organised crime. At the same time, more than three-quarters are found to live in countries with low resilience to organised crime. While places that suffer acute criminality are not necessarily the same as those determined to be less resilient to the phenomenon, there is a certain overlap. In numerical terms, 18 out of the 54 countries on the continent, representing more than 40% of the population, feature simultaneously high criminality and low resilience to organised crime. This finding is indicative of the profound vulnerability to crime that is present across large swathes of the continent.

FIGURE 2.1

Vulnerability classifications



FINDING 2

The gap between criminality and resilience grew wider amid the COVID-19 pandemic.



CRIMINALITY
5.17
⬆ +0.20

RESILIENCE
3.80
⬇ -0.06

Across the continent, both criminality and resilience worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite restrictions on movement and COVID-related shutdowns, organised crime was able to maintain illicit flows and adapt better than many entities operating in the licit economy. While the global pandemic caused some criminal activities to halt, it also brought about other opportunities,⁹ which were quickly exploited by criminal actors. The negative impact of the global health crisis is visible across almost all illicit economies – from an increased exploitation of people and escalation in environmental crime, to drug trafficking, which weathered yet another crisis. Despite the lockdowns, the global demand for drugs did not fall across the board. While use of so-called party drugs declined in North America and Europe, use of other substances either increased or remained the same.¹⁰ This had a knock-on effect on production and transit hubs, including many African countries, where production of illicit narcotics and transit routes have by and large either remained intact or simply displaced.¹¹ Similarly, from a resilience perspective, reduced border security – a consequence of the pandemic-related restrictions –

made already weak borders even more permeable, further facilitating drug trafficking and other forms of cross-border illicit trade. In this context, it is not surprising, therefore, that overall criminality increased in Africa in 2021 (Index score 5.17) compared to 2019 (4.97). Data shows that criminality worsened in 42 of the 54 countries in Africa, while only 12 saw improvements, and even those were marginal.

Similarly, although specific resilience indicators, such as the ones reflecting social protections, did experience minor improvements continentally, overall resilience in Africa saw a slight decline from 3.86 to 3.80, which demonstrates the difficulties countries face in implementing adequate anti-organised-crime responses. In contrast to criminality, resilience experiences across the 54 African states were spread more evenly, with 28 countries marking a decline in their resilience capacity, 25 seeing an improvement and one recording no change since 2019. While some positive developments were made across the continent over the past two years, the overwhelming finding is that the gap between criminality and resilience grew wider amid the pandemic.

FINDING 3*Criminal markets and criminal actors expanded their influence across the continent.*

Diving deeper into the criminality data, the Index results show that both subcomponents of criminality, criminal markets and criminal actors, increased across the continent in 2021 since two years prior. Central Africa is the region that registered the highest criminality increase. This can be attributed in large part to the pandemic, where besides the economic strain, which made certain groups more vulnerable to exploitation, the health crisis affected flora and fauna crime markets in the region, resulting in an increase in poaching and illegal logging¹² due to a decline in field and forest management operations. Similarly, the persistent fragility caused by simmering conflicts in Central Africa and the engagement of non-state armed groups increased demand for arms, and the overall arms trafficking score was higher as a consequence. A continental analysis shows that among the 10 criminal markets that make up the criminality component, all but one (the heroin trade) became more pervasive, evidenced by an average growth of 0.26 since the first iteration of the Index.

In the case of criminal actors, criminal networks and state-embedded actors saw pronounced changes, gaining on average 0.23 and 0.29 points, respectively. On the other hand, the scores for foreign actors and mafia-style groups fluctuated considerably from country to country, but the overall scores for these two criminal actor types increased negligibly, by 0.06 and 0.01, respectively. But while domestic criminal groups appear to have become further entrenched in the socio-economic life of many communities,¹³ it is the increasing dominance of state-embedded actors in particular that warrants further examination.

FINDING 4


State-embedded actors grew more powerful amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

With an overall score of 6.89 in 2021, state-embedded actors continue to dominate the criminal landscape in Africa. From low-level officials in criminal justice and other state institutions to the highest echelons of government, state-embedded actors are not only the foremost criminal actor on the continent, but also saw the largest increase in potency (+0.29) among the four criminal actor types since 2019. A possible hypothesis could be that the increased influence of state-embedded actors may bear a link to the COVID-19 pandemic. As informal and illicit flows increased to make up for declining revenues from a formal economy reeling from the pandemic restrictions,

state-embedded actors monetised their control over state resources and institutions. The pandemic may also have provided opportunities for state-embedded actors to crack down on critical voices under the pretext of promoting health and safety.¹⁴ It is very likely that this move only served to mask misconduct and possible engagement in criminal activity. Of course, the rise of state-embedded actors has troubling regional and continental ramifications that may see institutions constrained in their ability to implement adequate anti-organised-crime initiatives that are grounded in transparency and the rule of law.

FIGURE 2.2

State-embedded actors, regional changes 2019–2021




FINDING 5

Human trafficking remained the most pervasive market in Africa, while the cocaine trade saw the biggest increase.

FIGURE 2.3

Criminal markets, continental averages 2019–2021



In line with global trends, results of the 2021 Index show that not only has human trafficking remained the most prolific criminal market in Africa (5.93), but it was also the criminal market that registered the second highest increase (+0.56) (the cocaine market experienced the greatest increase). The fact that 30 out of the 54 African countries are assessed as suffering either significant or severe influence from human trafficking should be cause for concern and an impetus for immediate action among policymakers. According to UNICEF, 160 million children worldwide were engaged in labour in 2020, an increase of 8.4 million from four years previously.¹⁵

The African context is cited as one of the major drivers behind this increase.¹⁶ As with other criminal markets, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing vulnerabilities, exposing ever more people to various forms of exploitation.

While human trafficking remains the highest-scoring market in Africa, the cocaine trade was assessed as the second least pervasive one. However, it is the market that registered the biggest increase (+0.70) since 2019. The surge in the cocaine market can be largely accounted for by flows in West Africa, which has recently found itself in the spotlight after a

number of record-breaking cocaine seizures were recorded.¹⁷ Although consumption of the drug is fairly limited in the region, and throughout Africa more broadly, West Africa has re-emerged as a key transit hub for cocaine.

The coastal ecosystem of drug trafficking in the region, with countries like Senegal, the Gambia, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau as its hubs both strategically and geographically, takes advantage of a well-developed transport


infrastructure, which enables the illegal passage of shipments of cocaine from Latin American countries of origin to European destination markets.¹⁸ Central to the cocaine market is widespread corruption, especially in port authorities, the main logistical nodes in the regional cocaine trafficking business. Reduced oversight over trade and trafficking in the ports of Banjul and Dakar, a consequence of both being within free trade zones, is another challenge that allows criminal actors to go about their illegal business undisturbed.¹⁹

FINDING 6

Africa has the second-highest levels of criminality globally.

FIGURE 2.4

Criminality by continent



With an overall score of 5.17, results of the Global Organized Crime Index 2021 put Africa among the highest-scoring continents on the criminality component, second only to Asia (5.30). The high overall continental score is a reflection of the pervasiveness of criminal markets in Africa, as well as the severe influence of criminal actors across the continent. Two African countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (7.75) and Nigeria (7.15) – rank among the five countries globally most affected by organised crime, at first and fifth, respectively.

But to what can these levels of organised criminal activity throughout Africa be attributed? On the one hand, the continent's great abundance of natural resources and well-established trade relations,

combined with relatively weak mechanisms to counter organised crime have created opportunities for criminal groups to exploit. On the other, although the continent was not, for the most part, afflicted with the extraordinarily high death counts experienced by other regions, the COVID-19 pandemic did not spare Africa and, as a result, the continent witnessed its first recession in over a quarter of a century.²⁰ This has undoubtedly worsened the situation for the most vulnerable populations, exposing them to higher levels of criminality, forcing many to seek an income in illicit economies, and often becoming targets of organised crime themselves. Evidence suggests that conflict is another important piece of the puzzle, both in an African and global context, that could explain higher levels of criminality.

FINDING 7

Conflict provides a breeding ground in which criminality thrives, and Africa is no exception.

The 2021 assessment shows that countries scoring highest on the criminality component of the Index all experience conflict or some other form of violence, be that insurrection, terrorist activity or civil unrest. Struggling formal economies, displaced persons with increased vulnerability to different forms of exploitation, an influx of illicit weapons: these are all ramifications of state fragility that directly impact criminality levels. But the crime–conflict nexus is not unidirectional. As conflict creates and sustains criminal markets, illicit economies contribute to


and sustain conflict. The Index results also serve to highlight the increasing convergence of illicit economies. For instance, of the 12 countries scoring at least 8.0 on arms trafficking – a market that thrives in and sustains conflict, all but two scored at least 7.0 for human trafficking. From child soldiering to sexual exploitation, human trafficking takes many forms in conflict settings, and the strong correlation between arms and human trafficking only highlights the strong link between criminality and conflict.

Furthermore, conflict unavoidably diverts important resources, thereby undermining institutions responsible for anti-organised-crime measures. As a consequence, the resilience of a state arguably also declines as a result of conflict as priorities shift towards tackling the immediate threat of violence. Ethiopia is a case in point, where the Tigray conflict in 2020 arguably shifted authorities' attention away from the organised crime threat. In cases where the state is in conflict with armed groups,

territorial integrity and social cohesion are likely to be diminished, thereby weakening state response to organised crime. If not addressed adequately, this self-reinforcing cycle of conflict and criminality could very well lead to high criminality and low resilience dynamics becoming ingrained into the very fabric of the state. Evident from the 2021 Index results, conflict-ridden countries, such as Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Central African Republic, to name but a few, consistently score the lowest on resilience.

FIGURE 2.5

Conflict and instability




FINDING 8

Social protection resilience measures improved, but security-driven responses in Africa remain the norm.

FIGURE 2.6

Resilience, continental averages



While national policies and laws, international cooperation and territorial integrity scored highest among the resilience building blocks across the continent in both 2019 and 2021, in line with global trends, their implementation is nevertheless challenging. The discrepancy between rhetoric and measures on paper on the one hand, and the often flawed security- and criminal justice-driven approaches on the other suggests that the continent needs to continue building up more holistic resilience frameworks, involving non-state actors. Non-governmental organisations are fundamental in advancing anti-organised-crime efforts, keeping authorities in check and promoting tenable organised crime responses through their engagement with communities at a local level.

In a number of instances, non-state actors were assessed to be the most active or sole responders to organised crime. In certain countries, such as Cameroon, DRC and Zimbabwe, non-state actors remain the last bastion of freedom for many, safeguarding against the complete capture of the state by criminal structures. In parts of the continent, media and civil society operate in hostile environments, and this was accentuated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Against this backdrop, the social protections grouping of resilience indicators saw the largest score increase of all 12 resilience building blocks since 2019. This has certainly been the case for Central Africa – one of two regions that recorded an improvement in resilience (+0.26) in 2021. The advancement of the social protection resilience indicators is mostly due to recorded progress in victim and witness support as well as prevention. For Central Africa specifically, while these changes could to some extent be attributed to calibration for global scores,²¹ tangible improvements in victim and witness support, as well as in security collaboration with European and US counterparts, were noted. It is therefore critical for African countries to continue dedicating attention to those directly affected by criminality. Addressing deficits in this area could reduce negative impacts on social cohesion and state fragility – both conditions under which organised crime thrives.

Conclusion

As these findings show, organised crime on the African continent remains a widespread threat, one that is compounded by the current global pandemic. The adaptability of illicit actors to external shocks like COVID-19, combined with expanding criminal markets and the growing influence of criminal actors mean that organised crime has the potential to deeply permeate societies, undermining the political, social, economic and criminal justice spheres – even beyond the current health crisis. While a more balanced approach to responding to organised crime appears to be emerging across the continent, countries still face the challenge of building up holistic resilience measures to help them withstand future crises while continuing to grapple with the current pandemic. In the face of these challenges, the ENACT Organised Crime Index aims to build a foundation of knowledge from which further research can be gathered, complementing and supplementing other analyses so as to better inform policymakers and other stakeholders in their responses to organised crime.



SECTION 3

CONTINENTAL OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS



SUBJECT

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3 Continental overview and analysis

Although the term ‘organised crime’ has in the past tended not to be strongly associated with Africa, the growing role the continent has played in international trade, technology and knowledge-sharing has not only solidified its position in the global licit economy, but also increased opportunities over the last two decades for organised crime to expand its reach through an increasingly interconnected world. This interconnectedness has become even more pronounced against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. With Africa already experiencing an estimated annual loss of US\$88.6 billion in illicit financial flows linked to criminal activities,²² the continent’s economies face an uphill battle as the global pandemic further erodes formal economies, leading many to turn to illicit economies to survive, while emboldened criminal actors look to exploit opportunities for illicit activities.

As the second largest continent in the world, Africa hosts a range of illicit activities and a diverse set of actors engaged in organised crime. From human smuggling to environmental crime and the drug trades, Africa is simultaneously a source, transit and destination market for a range of criminal flows at the national, regional and international levels. The combined impact is far-reaching on all areas of African society – and beyond.

Although the Organised Crime Index uses a country assessment model in its approach to measuring criminal markets, criminal actors and resilience, its results are also valuable when considered at the broader macro-levels. By exploring the tool’s findings as a whole, users are able to gain interesting insights into criminality and resilience trends across the continent, particularly when considering the transnational nature of organised crime. Criminal economies found in particular countries and regions are inevitably shaped by whether they serve as source, transit or destination markets, or a combination thereof. And the role countries play in illicit supply chains affects how resilience measures are designed in coordination with regional neighbours. One important consideration when looking at continental or regional analyses is that (as with all averages) single countries with very high criminality and very low resilience scores pull down regional and continental averages; stronger countries, with lower criminality and higher resilience scores, elevate them in the rankings. The flexibility of the Index means that users can approach regional and continental analyses through either a thematic or geographic lens.


The following sections provide a continental overview of the 2021 index findings, followed by more nuanced regional analysis, highlighting current criminality and

resilience dynamics as well as key changes since 2019. In considering criminality and resilience dynamics in Africa longitudinally, an unfortunate constant over the past two years has been that the continent's criminality average has remained higher than its resilience. Perhaps more troubling is that, as mentioned, the gap between continental criminality and resilience grew even wider in 2021. In other words, Africa's criminality became more pervasive over the past two years, while the continent became less resilient overall.

3.1 Criminality

FIGURE 3.1

Continental criminality



Looking at Africa as a whole, the continent features a criminality average of 5.17. While this middle-of-the-ground score reflects the broad spectrum of criminality levels found in the continent's 54 countries, a comparative regional analysis reveals where the greatest harms are being felt. For example, East Africa was assessed by experts as having the highest overall criminality with a regional average of 5.66, followed by West Africa (5.47), Central Africa (5.11), North Africa (4.86) and Southern Africa (4.67).

However, a geographic breakdown shows that the top 10 countries with the highest criminality scores are in fact scattered throughout the continent. For example, the DRC, in Central Africa, has the highest criminality in Africa with a score of 7.75, followed by Nigeria (7.15). Other countries in the top 10 include Kenya (6.95), South Africa (6.63), Libya (6.55) and Mozambique (6.53), indicating that hotspots for criminality are geographically dispersed across Africa's five regions. By contrast, when looking at the lower end of the criminality spectrum, six out of the 10 lowest scoring countries are located in Southern Africa: eSwatini (3.63), Seychelles (3.68), Botswana (3.71), Malawi (3.83), Comoros (3.86) and Lesotho (3.90); hence there is a higher concentration of these low criminality dynamics in certain parts of the continent.

The mid-point continental criminality average therefore has little to offer by way of thematic insight into the sources of criminality; it is important to delve deeper into the Index subcomponents, where its value lies as an analytical tool. Breaking down criminality into its subcomponents, the continent's criminal markets average was 4.94, below the overall criminality average. When one compares this with Africa's criminal actors average of 5.40, it is evident that the influence criminal groups exert is the driving force of criminality in the continent. Going further and examining the

East Africa was assessed by experts as having the highest overall criminality, with a regional average of 5.66.

Index results from a regional perspective, the region with the highest criminality score, East Africa, scores an average that is influenced by the fact that it hosts both a wide range of extremely pervasive

criminal markets, including human trafficking, environmental crimes and the drug trades in countries like Kenya and Tanzania, and an array of highly potent criminal actor types in countries like Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia.

While a diversity of criminal markets and criminal actors contribute to higher criminality scores, particular subcomponents of criminality may be more acute in regions that otherwise have overall lower criminality. For example, West Africa is the only region on the continent where two of the top three highest-scoring criminal markets are drug markets (the cocaine and cannabis trades, at 6.00 and 5.87, respectively). Conversely, even though the region scores the highest in Africa for the cannabis trade (6.92), North Africa has the lowest flora crimes score by far across the continent, with a negligible average of 1.92 (due to its lack of forest area and flora biodiversity). These variations highlight the clustering of different criminal economies across a vastly diverse continent.

Criminal markets

Of the 10 criminal markets, human trafficking was determined to be the most pervasive in Africa, with a continental average of 5.93, followed by arms trafficking (5.56), non-renewable resource crimes (5.44) and fauna crimes (5.39).

The prevalence of human trafficking is perhaps unsurprising. Given that humans are the focus of exploitation, barriers to enter the market are low while the impact is high. Moreover, the term 'human trafficking', as applied here, encompasses a range of illicit activities from forced labour and the forced recruitment of child soldiers to sex and organ trafficking, which means that human trafficking can occur in all environments and contexts, regardless of the socio-economic or political conditions of a country. Indeed, 30 of the 54 countries on the continent were assessed as having a human trafficking market whose influence is either significant or severe, demonstrating the wide reach of this illicit market.

In reality, there is often an exploitative overlap in the people-focused markets of human trafficking and human smuggling, due to the irregular migration of

thousands of Africans in search of a better life, which accelerates the growth of these exploitative and lucrative markets. However, the disparity between human trafficking and smuggling in terms of their pervasiveness (human smuggling ranks much lower, as the sixth criminal market in Africa, with an average of 4.85) may be explained by the limited circumstances in which human smuggling can occur. Whereas human trafficking occurs both within a country and transnationally, smuggling necessitates the use of smugglers to bring individuals across a border in contravention of a country's immigration laws. In Africa, regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which provides freedom of movement across national boundaries, mean that human smuggling activities are limited. Nevertheless, there are areas in the continent where human smuggling is particularly prevalent. For example, Eritrea stands out as particularly affected by human smuggling, with the highest score on the continent (9.5), and experts identify it as one of the largest refugee-producing countries in Africa.

As the second most pervasive criminal market across the continent, arms trafficking has had a profound impact in the facilitation of other illicit economies and violence in increasingly weaponized zones across Africa. Across the continent, 23 countries were assessed to have an arms trafficking market with a significant to severe influence, underscoring the pervasiveness of this illicit economy. Libya has the highest arms trafficking score (9.5). Since 2011, the country has become a major source in the illicit arms trade, unleashing a wave of weapons to its neighbours, contributing to conflicts across the continent and beyond. Whether firearms are illegally produced, recycled from past conflicts or diverted from government stockpiles, their prevalence rests on their recurring use. Other countries experiencing conflict, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (9.0), Somalia, Sudan and the Central African Republic (8.5), were also among the highest scoring countries in Africa for arms trafficking.

Africa's abundance in natural resources and high levels of biodiversity make the continent particularly vulnerable to environmental exploitation. Among the three environmental crimes the Index considers, illicit trade in non-renewable resources and fauna

crimes were identified as the first and second most prominent criminal markets in Africa, with continental averages above Africa's criminal markets average at 5.44 and 5.39, respectively. Ten countries in Africa feature a non-renewable resource market with severe influence, including Libya due to its large-scale oil smuggling market; South Sudan and the DRC, in large part due to illicit gold smuggling, which has fuelled violence and contributed to the expansion of other criminal markets, such as human trafficking; Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic for the diamond trade; as well as mineral-rich countries like Angola. Similarly, the illicit trade in fauna crimes was found to be particularly acute in biodiverse countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa, where animals and animal products, such as ivory, rhino horns and lion bones (among others), are illegally traded, threatening species' populations and countries' ecosystems. By contrast, flora crimes were noted as the least pervasive among the environmental markets and the only one below the continent's criminal average, at 4.73.

Although it ranked fifth among the 10 criminal markets, the cannabis trade is the highest scoring of the four drug markets in Africa, and the only market with a continental score above the overall criminal markets


average, at 5.26. Morocco leads the continent in this market with a score of 9.0, followed by Sudan and Nigeria (both 8.0). The ubiquity of the cannabis trade can be explained by its widespread cultivation and cheap prices, appealing to large consumption markets. By contrast, synthetic drugs (4.34), cocaine (4.10) and heroin (3.81) are the three lowest scoring criminal markets in Africa. While many countries have low scores for all four drug markets, others that feature low cannabis market scores were identified as being hotspots for other narcotics. For example, in Mozambique, the cannabis market ranked third after heroin (7.5) and synthetic drugs (7.0), while the illicit trade in synthetic drugs was identified as the most prominent drug market in the Central African Republic. The top seven countries on the continent for the cocaine trade are all located in West Africa.

The top seven countries on the continent for the cocaine trade are all located in West Africa.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 3.2

Criminal actor score, continental distribution



Turning to criminal actors, the other subcomponent of criminality, the continental average (5.40) shows that it is criminal actors that drive up Africa's criminality. Indeed, the vast majority of countries (72%) were assigned higher criminal actor scores than criminal market scores. State-embedded actors were identified as the most dominant criminal actor type by far, with a continental average of 6.89, followed by criminal networks (5.96), foreign actors (5.63) and mafia-style groups (3.11), the only criminal actor typology well below the continental average. State-embedded actors are the most pervasive type of criminal actors in all five regions in Africa, with Central Africa (7.55) topping the list, followed by North Africa (7.17), West Africa (6.90) and Southern Africa (6.90).

With 21 countries on the continent identified as having state-embedded actors that exert a severe influence on society, the prominence of this actor type has troubling implications for states' abilities to provide services to their people and implement response frameworks to organised crime that are rooted in transparency. Moreover, countries with higher state-embedded actor scores tend to be authoritarian in nature, with 11 of the top 12 highest-scoring countries for state-embedded actors in the Index classified as 'authoritarian regimes' by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020.²³

Criminal networks are similarly prevalent in all regions in Africa, but none more so than in East Africa (6.83) and West Africa (6.43). Notably, all of the top six countries with the highest criminal network scores also scored 7.5 or above for state-embedded actors. These results suggest a symbiotic relationship between state and non-state criminal actors working in tandem on illicit enterprises.

Foreign criminal actors were also identified as fairly prevalent, with half of the 54 countries in Africa featuring foreign criminal actors with either a significant or severe influence. Among the highest scoring regions, West Africa tops the list (6.30), followed by East Africa (6.00) and Southern Africa (5.54). Similar to the link between state-embedded actors and criminal networks, countries with higher foreign actor scores (7.0 or above), also tend to have higher criminal networks and state embedded actors, including countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Togo (which score 7.0 or more for all three actor typologies), suggesting that both domestic and foreign criminal groups work together, particularly as illicit supply chains extend to have a transnational reach. Notably, however, while particular markets in certain regions feature foreign actors from different parts of the world (such as actors with links to the Latin American cocaine trade), often many of the

countries with high foreign actors scores are those in which there is a spillover of criminal actors from neighbouring countries, rather than as a result of the involvement of transcontinental criminal actors.

At the other end of the spectrum, mafia-style groups are comparably rare, albeit with a few exceptions, such as Somalia, Kenya and South Africa (among others). While these countries featured relatively high scores, the criminal groups that are described

as 'mafia-style' differ from context to context. For example, highly organised gangs that wield significant influence in Kenya and South Africa may fall into this category, whereas in countries like Somalia, Libya, the DRC and CAR, armed groups and militias, who may not fall under the traditional definition of organised crime group, are heavily engaged in organised illicit activities, from arms trafficking and human smuggling to extortion and racketeering, and thus can be described as exhibiting mafia-style characteristics.

3.2 Resilience

FIGURE 3.3
Continental resilience



Africa has significantly lower scores for resilience than for criminality, with an average of 3.80. This points to the urgent need for more effective response measures to address organised crime across the continent. Among Africa's five regions, Southern Africa was identified as having the highest resilience, with a regional average of 4.18, followed by West Africa (4.06), North Africa (3.79), East Africa (3.54) and Central Africa (3.21). Indeed, Southern Africa performed better than its regional counterparts on most of the resilience indicators used to compile the overall resilience scores, with the exception of 'law enforcement' and 'territorial integrity', for which North Africa's average topped the list, reflecting the emphasis placed on securitisation of borders in that region.

While each resilience indicator is evaluated independently, natural groupings arise that allow for trends analysis. For example, indicators that relate to leadership and governance include indicators such as 'political leadership', 'government transparency and accountability', 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws'. This group of indicators, when averaged together, scored higher (4.11) than other resilience indicator groups that relate to areas such as criminal justice and security (3.91), economic and financial systems (3.79), and civil society and social protection (3.28). While regional averages of individual resilience indicators varied, results show an overall emphasis in Africa on political and governance measures to combat organised crime.

When breaking down the 12 resilience indicators, only four scored above the continental average. These are 'international cooperation' (4.79), followed by 'national policies and laws' (4.61), 'territorial integrity' (4.24) and 'non-state actors' (3.95). By contrast, the lowest scoring resilience indicators in Africa were those related to social protections, such as 'victim and witness support' (2.81) and 'prevention' (3.08).

Among the best-performing resilience indicators, the leadership and governance indicator group, 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws', feature among the highest-scoring indicators in all five regions, reflecting an emphasis on developing legislative and cooperative frameworks related to organised crime. Despite this, the continent's overall low resilience average suggests that there are either gaps and/or significant obstacles in the implementation of these structures. This would

indicate that although policymakers may have expressed a desire to combat organised crime, it is the degree of effective implementation of response measures that ultimately raises or lowers resilience scores. To illustrate this, 'government transparency and accountability' was the third lowest resilience indicator across Africa (3.30), signifying a major obstacle to the implementation of effective resilience measures owing to shortcomings in transparency and accountability of state governance functions. However, there was considerable variation in country scores for this indicator. For example, a number of countries in East Africa, notably Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia, were given particularly low scores, while Mauritius, Cabo Verde, Rwanda, South Africa and Ghana were assigned comparably higher scores than their neighbours.

Institutional-based resilience indicators, such as 'judicial system and detention' (3.67), 'law enforcement' (3.81) and 'territorial integrity' (3.91), collectively averaged the second highest for resilience, reflecting African countries' emphasis on criminal justice and security measures to combat organised crime. Although systems and structures such as border security, law enforcement agencies that specifically focus on organised crime issues and a well-resourced judiciary and prison system are essential to combating illicit activities, many countries were cited as having major shortfalls when it comes to the functioning of these institutions and systems. For example, 30 of the countries scored below a 4.0 for 'judicial system and detention'; and in a number of countries there are criminal groups operating, and in some cases controlling, detention centres. Other common obstacles and constraints, such as corruption, backlogs and lack of adequate training and resources, were indicated in several countries – issues that are aggravated by COVID-19 restrictions. These shortcomings not only pose challenges to curbing criminality, but in many cases contribute to it.

Economic-focused resilience indicators, including 'anti-money laundering' and 'economic regulatory capacity' scored lower, averaging 3.89 and 3.69, respectively. Despite these low continental averages, the top 10 highest-scoring countries for economic and financial resilience frameworks were geographically dispersed across Africa, including Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and the Gambia. The nature of organised crime as a profit-driven

endeavour means that even when criminal markets are not present in a particular country, its ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat the proceeds of crime ultimately influences how prepared it is against the potential risk of criminality. When sound economic regulations are in place, opportunities are made for legitimate businesses to develop and operate in fair way, free from interference. It is a question of balance – where such policies are too bureaucratically burdensome, it may disincentivise licit business and individuals may then turn to informal or illegitimate profit-making activities.

Civil society and social protection indicators were among the lowest-performing resilience indicators in all five regions. Except for a few countries that scored between 5.0 and 5.5 for their resilience efforts focused on victims and prevention (such as Mauritius and Rwanda), these results suggest that response measures on the continent overall tend to focus on perpetrators of crime and illicit activities, rather than considering those most affected by organised crime.

An exception to this is the ‘non-state actors’ indicator, which although still low (3.95) outperformed most of the other resilience indicators. Despite a tendency for countries to emphasise institutional responses to organised crime, non-state actors, an indicator grouping that includes civil society, the private sector and the media, play a critical role in building resilience to criminality. This can take the form of either supplementing government responses, or in the absence of institutional responses, serving as the sole source of resilience in often highly challenging contexts. The DRC serves as an example of this: no resilience indicator scored above 4.0, with the exception of ‘non-state actors’, who experts described as playing a key role in the provision of services and in battling corruption. Although ‘non-state actors’ was the highest-scoring social resilience building block on average, the Index results show significant differences in the regional averages. West Africa featured the highest score (4.87) (driven predominantly by countries such as Cabo Verde, Senegal and Ghana, which all scored 7.0); by contrast, the average for East Africa was 3.11.

3.3 Changes since 2019 Index

An important point to consider when analysing how scores have changed since the 2019 Index is that the fluctuations should be approached with caution. Scores for Africa in the current 2021 Index have been calibrated for global comparisons, significantly expanding the tool’s comparative scope from the 2019 iteration, which remained limited to a continental analysis of 54 countries. Moreover, while country and regional scores underwent several rounds of expert verification to ensure accuracy, with each round of review, differences in scoring interpretation (despite undergoing a standardised guided review process) may have implications for score changes. This is particularly true when considering that overall changes in country and regional scores were often very minor, making it difficult to assess differences in criminality and resilience dynamics. The results from the 2021 Index show that criminality worsened in the vast majority of African countries (42 of the 54 countries). Conversely, only 12 countries across the continent saw improvements, albeit marginal ones.

Criminality

Since 2019, Africa's overall criminality average increased marginally from 4.97 to 5.17. All five regions of the continent saw an increase, with Central Africa showing the largest (0.26), followed by Southern Africa (0.24) and West Africa (0.19).

When looking at the criminality subcomponents, although the continent's criminal actors' average score remained higher than the criminal markets average, a greater increase in the score for criminal markets over the two year period was identified. Criminal markets increased by 0.26, while the criminal actors average saw an increase of 0.15. Notably, although all five regions experienced an increase in their criminal market averages, the same was not found for criminal actors. North Africa was identified as the only region that experienced an improvement in its criminal actors average (albeit marginal), decreasing by 0.13 since 2019.

Since 2019, all five regions in Africa have seen an increase in their criminality scores.

No country on the continent maintained the same criminality score over the period, which would indicate the evolving nature of criminal activities over time. Ghana

was assessed as having the largest increase in its criminality score (1.13), in large part due to the prevalence of the human trafficking market (among others), as well as an identified increase in the potency of all four criminal actor typologies. Other countries, notably Kenya (0.81), Mozambique (0.66) and Equatorial Guinea (0.59), also saw relatively significant changes in criminality averages. Perhaps unexpectedly, a few countries experienced an improvement in criminality including Somalia (which scored a -0.61 decrease), Nigeria (-0.55) and Mali (-0.31). Although on the surface these results may seem counterintuitive, they are in fact only marginal improvements in countries that have already high criminality scores, underscoring the need to look past the Index score changes and to focus on contextual shifts.


When one examines the results thematically over the period, human trafficking remained the dominant criminal market continentally. Meanwhile, the cocaine market saw the most marked increase in pervasiveness, with a rise of 0.70. This may be attributable to the continuing trend of cocaine trafficking via West Africa, as well as to expanding consumption markets in countries such as Kenya, Namibia and Lesotho. Other increases were found in the human trafficking market, and human smuggling, synthetic drugs and arms trafficking markets. Heroin was the only market that declined in prevalence, albeit marginally, with continental scores improving by 0.12.

Despite pandemic-related restrictions being put in place across Africa, in a number of countries organised criminal activities moved online, including human trafficking and drug sales, as way to circumvent the restrictions.²⁴

The continent's actor rankings remained the same since the Index's first iteration. State-embedded actors maintained their dominance as the most prominent criminal actor type in Africa, and saw the greatest increase, with a rise of 0.29 in scores since 2019. This troubling trend may be linked to the pandemic, as declining formal economies gave way to more informal and illicit flows, including those occurring within the state apparatus. Another likely explanation is that government crackdowns on populations in the interest of promoting public health and safety during the pandemic may have served in some cases as a cloak to perpetuate criminality. Criminal networks saw the next highest increase (0.23), followed by foreign criminal actors (0.06) and mafia-style groups, with a minimal marginal rise of 0.01. Although such minor rises in scores cannot offer a clear picture of the changes in continental dynamics, what is clear is that the pervasiveness of criminal actors in Africa is not waning, even amid the global pandemic.

FIGURE 3.4

Criminology trends by country, 2019–2021



Resilience

Turning to resilience, the overall continental picture deteriorated slightly from a score of 3.86 to 3.80. This decline might indicate that the continent has generally failed to make improvements in terms of enacting and implementing adequate response measures to the criminal threat. Such marginal changes might also mean that the pandemic reduced the efficacy of these responses, as national authorities and institutions turned their attention, and shifted resources, to the health crisis. Over the period, resilience scores changed more than was the case for criminality: 28 countries had declining resilience scores; 25 saw improvements; and one country (Eritrea) had no change.

Looking at the regions, Central Africa scored the largest increase in criminality, but simultaneously experienced the greatest improvement in its resilience score, with an increase of 0.26, followed by East Africa (0.04). By contrast, North Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa all saw a decline in resilience, with decreases of -0.40, -0.20 and -0.08, respectively.


Of the 12 resilience building blocks, the continent saw an improvement in only three, with 'prevention' being the most improved (0.40), despite this indicator consistently ranking bottom across all regions, followed by 'victim and witness support' (0.37) and 'international cooperation' (0.30). Of the remaining nine indicators, 'non-state actors' and 'law enforcement' saw the largest declines (both by -0.34).

In many cases, the ability of civil society to convene was hampered by public health restrictions, and there were curbs on the freedom of expression of media critical of state. This was the case in countries with typically vibrant non-state communities, such as Morocco, Liberia and Zimbabwe. Indeed, 24 countries saw a decline in the resilience of non-state actors. Similarly, law enforcement agencies across Africa struggled to carry out their duties in line with human rights standards as reports arose of police brutality, along with arbitrary arrests, relating to COVID-19 restrictions. These shortcomings were compounded with the risk of police, as first responders, getting sick themselves, further compromising law enforcement bodies' ability to carry out their duties.

Although these results may offer some broad insight into criminality and resilience dynamics, continental comparisons may be too vague for nuanced analysis, as the continent encompasses many countries, with distinct historical, cultural, geographical and economic contexts. Moreover, the continental changes in criminality and resilience dynamics over the last two years have been relatively minimal and perhaps affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in ways not yet known. When comparing large groupings of states, there is a risk that results may be misinterpreted, as subregions with the highest criminality or lowest resilience scores tend to skew the results for the other countries in the same region that otherwise fare well. Therefore, it is necessary to delve deeper into the regional groups for a more accurate comparative analysis.

FIGURE 3.5

Resilience trends by country, 2019–2021



SECTION 4

REGIONAL ANALYSIS






4 Regional analysis

4.1 East Africa

East Africa is the region that scored the highest levels of criminality (5.66). This is driven by a myriad of extensive criminal markets as well as by a strong presence of criminal actors in fragile areas that are beset by prolonged conflicts. Data shows that six of the nine countries that make up this region have high levels of criminality, clustered in the score space between 5.79 and 6.95. Notably, criminal actors appear most influential in the region, as the average score for East Africa (6.13) is the highest on the continent.



Criminal markets

People in East Africa are vulnerable to a multitude of corrosive practices, including unlimited state-sponsored conscription in Eritrea, child marriage and child soldiering in South Sudan, modern slavery, and forced labour and sex trafficking of men, women and children across the region. The 2021 Index results point to human trafficking (7.39) being the most pervasive criminal market in East Africa. This extremely high average score is driven largely by four countries – Eritrea (9.00), South Sudan (8.50), Sudan (8.00) and Somalia (8.00), which rank among the five most affected countries for human trafficking in Africa. Human smuggling, although scoring lower on average in East Africa (6.89) than human trafficking, is still pervasive. Although all countries in the region are afflicted by high levels of human smuggling (with the exception of Uganda, at 5.00), the very high average


score is largely a result of the situation in Eritrea.

Human smuggling is exacerbated in the country by the repressive border control procedures imposed by the government, which compel those who seek to migrate to rely on illegal channels. Along with human smugglers, these include diplomats serving abroad who are able to procure visas, as well as senior military officers, who smuggle Eritreans across the militarized border in return for a fee. Thus, the country's human smuggling market has a significant impact on large numbers of Eritreans. A clear outlier, Eritrea, with a score of 9.50, is the highest-scoring country not only in the region, but in Africa.

The 2021 Index results point to human trafficking (7.39) being the most pervasive criminal market in East Africa.

FIGURE 4.1

Criminal markets, East Africa



Long-term political instability in the region, conflicts and overall fragility have led to a proliferation of illegal arms in East Africa. The arms trafficking market is extensive, largely affecting all countries in East Africa and involving a myriad of criminal actors, including state-embedded actors, militias, terrorist groups and criminal networks. Illicit trafficking of arms is such an acute issue that the regional average of the criminal market for illegal arms is 7.11, making it the highest-scoring arms trafficking market in Africa by almost a point (0.97).

Environmental crimes are also widespread across East Africa but arguably not as pervasive. Standing on the cusp of high criminality at 5.56, fauna crime is the fourth highest-scoring market in the region. The region's high biodiversity makes it vulnerable to fauna crimes, while well-established transport links position East Africa as a major transit hub for different live species and wildlife parts, such as illegal ivory, rhino horn, pangolin scales, etc., which are trafficked mostly to Asia. Rich in natural resources, most countries in the region are also largely affected by non-renewable resource crimes (5.28). Results show that six countries have high levels of criminality related to the illicit extraction and trafficking of non-renewable resources, standing at between 5.50 and 8.00. Illegal gold mining appears to be a common practice and often a sole source of livelihood for entire communities, especially in South Sudan, where


around 90% of the estimated 93 tonnes of annual gold production is sourced by artisanal miners.²⁵ Criminal networks and parastatal organisations in the region are heavily involved in trafficking natural resources and laundering the criminal proceeds. There are, however, a handful of countries in the region in which the illicit market for non-renewable resources has a minimal influence on society.

The cannabis trade (5.17) constitutes the most pervasive drug market in the region, driven mostly by Sudan's score of 8.00, which reflects the country's reputation as one of the largest cannabis producers in Africa, second only to Morocco. Albeit on a lesser scale, cannabis production takes place across the region, especially in Tanzania and Kenya. With the exception of these two countries' cannabis markets, all other drug markets, including synthetic drugs (3.06) as well as high-value drug markets, such as cocaine (3.06) and heroin (3.83), are extremely limited across the East Africa region. Tanzania plays a central role in the regional heroin trade, being a large transit hub. Cocaine and synthetic drugs are much smaller markets in the country, although it does play some role as a transit point. In turn, Kenya has a small but growing domestic market for synthetic drugs and is a well-established transit point in the heroin trade. It is also a growing destination market and transit hub for cocaine.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.2

Criminal actors, East Africa




As in all other regions on the continent, state-embedded actors (7.22) are the most dominant criminal actor type in East Africa, with seven out of the nine countries significantly or severely influenced by this actor type. Additionally, Eritrea and South Sudan are clear outliers, with state-embedded actors permeating virtually all state structures. The former scores 9.50, the latter 9.00, which positions them first and second in Africa for this actor type. Criminal networks also hold a strong grip on the region, engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, from human, drug and arms trafficking to illegal mining and kidnap for ransom. The average criminal networks score for East Africa 6.83. Although less pervasive, foreign actors are also influential. With the exception of Eritrea (2.50) and Somalia (4.50), all other countries have high levels of foreign actor engagement,

averaging a score of 6.00. Notably, besides criminal actors from across Africa, the region has a significant presence of European criminal groups, particularly the Italian mafia as well as citizens of France and Spain involved in wildlife crime. Overall, domestic mafia-style groups are the least impactful criminal actor in the region. However, looking at disaggregated scores, it is evident that while mafia-style groups are virtually non-existent or have limited influence in certain countries, they are rather dominant in others, Somalia (9.50) being a good example. Al-Shabaab has infiltrated economic and government structures in the country to such an extent that it has managed to establish a parallel, illicit taxation system, extorting taxes on produce, sales, exports, etc., through intimidation and violence. The mafia-style criminal actor type averages a score of 4.44 in East Africa.

Resilience

FIGURE 4.3

Resilience, East Africa



Resilience to organised crime is generally low across Africa, but this deficit holds especially true in East Africa, which has a regional average score of 3.54, the second lowest on the continent. Individual countries in the region have some of the worst resilience scores in Africa, largely due to ongoing conflicts and consequent heightened fragility.

The highest-scoring resilience indicator for East Africa is territorial integrity (4.50), with Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia – all three outliers scoring in the range of 1.50 to 2.50 – bringing the average for the region down. These low scores are the result of continued conflicts and the inability of authorities to enforce control over borders and states' territories. Although borders are porous across the region, certain measures have been taken towards improving territorial integrity. With the exception of Tanzania (4.50), the rest of the countries in East Africa boast somewhat high levels of territorial integrity. Notwithstanding, law enforcement capabilities (3.39) are poor, as lack of trust in law enforcement agencies, limited integrity, corruption and weak enforcement capacities have been recurring problems across the region. Similarly, the judicial system and detention indicator (3.67) has been deemed inadequate, due to lack of independence, weak institutional capacity, poor access to justice and harsh prison conditions, which in some cases do not meet fundamental human rights principles.

Akin to continental trends, national policies and laws (4.44) is among the highest-scoring resilience indicators. By and large, countries in the region have sound legal frameworks guiding anti-organised-crime efforts, although implementation of these laws is often inadequate or absent, especially during the pandemic, when organised crime dropped down on the agenda. International cooperation (4.39) is also among the indicators that score higher for several countries; however, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea score low not only on this specific building block but virtually across the board, which brings averages down. At the other end of the spectrum, political leadership and governance, and government transparency and accountability – the two indicators that speak to political will for and the effectiveness of anti-organised-crime measures, as well as to the practical implementation of resolutions on combating organised crime – score among the lowest on average, at 3.56 and 2.39, respectively. These scores signal fragility or lack of institutional frameworks, which

contribute to corruption and thwart appropriate responses to organised crime in the region.

Anti-money-laundering (AML) responses vary greatly throughout the region, with East Africa averaging 4.17. Three countries have made good progress towards improving their AML frameworks, deemed sufficiently effective. Sudan and Djibouti are both assessed as having moderately effective frameworks, while the remaining four countries have been evaluated as either lacking AML frameworks or having extremely ineffective ones. The informal economy across the region is pervasive and authorities have had little success in ensuring legitimate business can operate free from criminal interference. To that effect, the overall average score stands quite low at 3.78.

The indicators in the civil society and social protection grouping are among the lowest-scoring in East Africa: prevention (2.94), victim and witness support (2.17) and non-state actors (3.11). The region arguably has the poorest victim support mechanisms and allows the most limited space for NGOs and media to operate in, scoring lowest on average for both indicators in Africa.

Changes since 2019 Index CRIMINALITY

The criminality situation in East Africa has deteriorated slightly over the two-year period, but this is to be expected given the impact COVID-19 had on organised crime. The region's overall criminality score increased from 5.51 to 5.66 since the last Index results. This marginal increase is mostly due to the growing prevalence of illicit markets, whereas the increase in the average criminal actor score was minimal. All but two countries in the region registered an increase in their average criminality score. The most distinct changes were observed in notable economic hubs, such as Kenya and Tanzania, whose criminality scores went up by 0.81 and 0.53, respectively. Such countries are economic heavyweights of the continent, with advanced trade infrastructure and business communities, an unfortunate by-product of which is their attractiveness to economic activity in both the licit and illicit sectors. At the other end of the spectrum, Somalia is the only state in the region to


record a significant decline in criminality (-0.61). This is a result of criminal markets being less pervasive in the country, declining by 0.35, and criminal actors losing influence (-0.88).

In 2020, children reportedly suffered enhanced vulnerability to soldiering and forced marriage in South Sudan, largely brought about because of the pandemic. In addition, a new human trafficking route, which saw Kenyan people trafficked to India for exploitation, came under the spotlight. The situation in Uganda deteriorated the most as the country's growing youth population faces poor employment prospects, exacerbated by the pandemic, and as a result are becoming more vulnerable to exploitative practices.²⁶ It therefore comes as no surprise that human trafficking (which saw an increase of 0.78) and human smuggling (+0.67) were the two criminal markets to register the largest score increases in East Africa.

Although it is the lowest-scoring criminal market on average in East Africa, the cocaine market's score increased by 0.44. Kenya was the main driver of this change, with its cocaine market gaining two points. This reflects the country's status as a primary entry point for the drug in East Africa and its growing domestic market. Arms trafficking and fauna crimes were also more pervasive in 2021 compared to 2019, increasing by 0.33 and 0.39. The latter increase is largely the result of the illegal fauna trade gaining momentum primarily in Tanzania and Ethiopia, which collectively went up by 3 points compared to the previous iteration of the Index. This is broadly attributable to two overarching factors, but first and foremost the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected the entire region. The pandemic has put additional strain on wildlife, arguably reducing available funding for conservation, impeding the ability of conservation agencies to operate and triggering an upsurge in poaching, caused by economic hardship and food insecurity.²⁷ The continued civil unrest in Ethiopia is the other factor that echoed through East Africa. Although Ethiopia made some progress in curbing the illegal animal trade, the Tigray conflict shifted focus away from that and stalled efforts to counter the practice. All other markets increased only negligibly by between 0.06 and 0.11, with the exception of the heroin and cannabis markets. The former declined slightly (-0.06), while the shrinking of the cannabis trade was more marked (-0.44).

FIGURE 4.4

Criminality trends by country, East Africa 2019–2021



With Uganda experiencing a Marburg virus outbreak²⁸ and regional authorities intensifying preparedness for a potential Ebola outbreak²⁹ not long before COVID-19 hit, East African governments had had some experience managing health crises. Therefore, they responded swiftly to the emerging COVID-19 threat, closing borders and imposing lockdown restrictions almost as soon the first cases of the novel virus were reported. It is therefore arguable that while other criminal actor types, most notably criminal networks gained influence (up by 0.28), the restrictions and limited movement imposed were the primary reason for the decline of foreign actors (-0.33) in the region.


RESILIENCE

East Africa was the second least resilient African region in 2019. In the 2021 iteration of the Index, the region was assessed as performing better, although the improvement was only negligible – 0.04. However, three countries in the region saw their overall resilience scores decline: Tanzania (-0.08), Djibouti (-0.17) and Ethiopia (-0.63). Evidently, the deterioration in resilience levels that Ethiopia experienced in 2021 is the major impediment to greater overall regional resilience improvement, and as the situation in Ethiopia continues to evolve it skews the regional average. This prompts a closer look at the country. The deteriorating resilience in Ethiopia is a direct consequence of the Tigray conflict, which stymied government's ability to respond to organised crime and resulted in a decrease in a number of indicators, including political leadership (-1.50 since 2019), international cooperation (-1.00), territorial integrity (-1.00) and law enforcement (-2.00). Despite boasting a solid anti-organised-crime legislative framework, funding, as well as proper implementation remained limited, likely due to attentions diverted to the conflict. Indeed, only two resilience indicators, victim and witness support as well as prevention, improved since 2019, albeit marginally (+0.50 for both).


Finally, over the past year the media environment has been curtailed across East Africa, primarily due to the pandemic. Journalists faced increased abuse in the region, and censorship in Tanzania specifically. Additionally, the work of NGOs was also inhibited following the lockdowns, with personnel being pulled from work in the field and programmes being delayed due to the virus outbreak. The Index results point to non-state actors being the only resilience indicator that has fallen consistently in countries across East Africa.

FIGURE 4.5

Resilience trends by country, East Africa 2019–2021



4.2 West Africa



West Africa, the region encompassing the largest number of countries, has the highest level of criminality after East Africa, with an average score of 5.66. Contrary to some of the other regions in Africa – and not taking to account the outliers at either end of the criminality spectrum, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Nigeria – the range of criminality scores across West Africa is relatively narrow. Thirteen of the 15 countries in the region score between 4.81 and 6.15, a range of just 1.34. The Index results clearly show that organised crime is a serious issue across much of West Africa, including the various coastal states and the landlocked countries of the Sahel region.

Criminal markets


The highest-scoring criminal market in West Africa is human trafficking, at 6.17. This high regional score is not driven by a few extremely high-scoring outliers, but rather by relatively high scores across a large number of countries in the region. Human trafficking is found to have a significant influence in no fewer than 11 countries in West Africa. Human trafficking in the region takes many different forms, from forced labour and modern slavery to trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and organ trafficking.

The distinct form of organised criminal activity of human smuggling, on the other hand, has far less of an influence in the region (4.85), due in large part to freedom of cross-border movement, enjoyed by citizens of the ECOWAS bloc. Nevertheless, there are several countries that play major roles in the transcontinental human smuggling industry from Africa to Europe, involving both highly organised

networks and opportunistic criminal entrepreneurs operating in the region. Furthermore, despite the far lower degree of friction at the borders in the ECOWAS area, various other factors, including treacherous terrain, corruption at the borders and law enforcement measures, mean that migrants hoping to reach Europe often have little choice but to seek the services of smuggling networks.

FIGURE 4.6

Criminal markets, West Africa



The second-highest scoring market is the cocaine trade (6.00), attesting to the very large role played by West Africa in the transnational cocaine trafficking ecosystem as a transit point linking source countries in Latin America to not only traditional consumption markets in Europe, but also increasingly to destinations in the rest of Africa itself.³⁰ Guinea-Bissau, which for the past two decades has been involved in the cocaine trade both as a result of its strategic location and its political and military connections to the trade,³¹

is joined by other littoral states, including Guinea, Senegal and Ghana, as well as the archipelago of Cabo Verde, as countries where the cocaine trade is assessed to have either a significant or a severe influence on society and state institutions. Cocaine is not the only drug market to exert notable influence in West Africa. Cannabis, which dominates drug consumption throughout the region, also scores highly, at 5.87. Nigeria is a significant producer of cannabis, which is distributed across West Africa and further afield by

sophisticated networks of organised criminal groups. The Sahelian countries play an important role as transit points for the regional cannabis market, as part of the larger Sahel trafficking network linking the region to European markets. West Africa has also seen a proliferation of synthetic drugs (5.07), namely Tramadol and amphetamines, and local consumption of a wide range of synthetic drugs is on the rise. The one drug market that has failed to gain traction in West Africa, however, is the heroin trade (3.81), although there are a few countries in the region that are increasingly used as entry points to the African continent for heroin originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Environmental crimes are also identified as widespread across West Africa, not least non-renewable resource crimes, the fourth-highest-scoring criminal market in the region at 5.87, followed closely by fauna crimes (5.67). Illegal gold mining by criminal groups, including terrorist organisations in some countries, is extremely rife throughout the region, which not only breeds further instability and corruption, but is extremely detrimental to the environment and to the health of local populations. The region is also home to illicit diamond mining and oil bunkering, although these illicit economies are less pervasive than the illicit gold trade, and tend to be concentrated in a limited number of West African


countries. West Africa is also host to endangered animal species that are poached and illegally sold primarily in Asian markets, but also on the African continent, including pangolins, elephant ivory, chimpanzees and other primates, and numerous bird species. Moreover, illegal fishing is an increasingly pertinent issue in several coastal West African states, as are flora crimes (5.50). Illegal logging of rosewood and other types of timber is widespread in coastal West Africa, with government involvement recorded in logging in several countries, not least Guinea-Bissau.³² Furthermore, a combination of armed groups, state-embedded actors and foreign companies are decimating the forests in and around the Casamance region.³³

Finally, a pervasive regional arms trafficking market (5.50) is driven predominantly by Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, which all score 8 for arms trafficking. There has been a proliferation in increasingly sophisticated small arms and light weapons in the region, often extracted illegally from government stockpiles, that are used by armed groups involved in inter-ethnic and inter-community conflict across the region. Moreover, ideological extremist groups, in the aforementioned Sahel countries, but importantly also in Nigeria, are increasingly active in the arms trafficking market.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.7

Criminal actors, West Africa



The Index data shows that there is an abundance of different forms of criminal actors operating in West Africa, with three of the four actor types scoring between 6 and 7.

As the common denominator facilitating the activity of most types of criminal actors, state-embedded actors are assessed to be the most pervasive criminal actor types in West Africa, scoring 6.90. As with criminal networks, state-embedded actors are almost universal in the region, with 13 of the 15 West African states scoring 6 or above. From high-level corruption and embezzlement to the direct involvement of state officials in illicit economies, such as illegal logging, gold mining and drug trafficking, state-embedded actors are clearly the primary vectors through which organised crime operates in the region.

Criminal networks are also a major feature of the regional organised crime landscape (6.43). In fact, they are almost ubiquitous throughout West Africa. Countless loose criminal networks are involved in innumerable illicit economies, from environmental markets, such as illegal logging and trafficking of endangered species, to cross-border smuggling of goods, people and drugs.

There is extensive collaboration between criminal networks across the region, with foreign criminal actors (6.30) playing an important role in organised crime activities in most West African countries, facilitated in large part by porous borders in the region. However, just as important are the criminal actors operating in West African states that hail from both commodity origin countries, such as the Latin American cartels at the helm of the transnational drug trade, and from destination markets, such as Asian companies responsible for much of the illegal fishing carried out in the Gulf of Guinea and surrounding waters.

State-embedded actors are assessed to be the most pervasive criminal actor types in West Africa.

Mafia-style groups (2.57) are fairly sparse across the region, with Nigeria's organised crime groups, which are involved in oil bunkering, kidnapping and banditry, being

among the few exceptions to this in the region, together with violent extremist organisations that act as quasi-mafia-style groups in a few other countries in West Africa.

Resilience

Although there are a number of countries in the region with very low levels of resilience to organised crime, on the whole West Africa fares better than most other African regions with regard to resilience, registering an average score of 4.06. The bottom 20 countries in Africa for resilience feature only five countries in West Africa, and four of the 10 most resilient countries on the continent are from the region. Notwithstanding, it is still imperative to recognise that resilience to organised crime across the continent as a whole, including West Africa, is very weak. Support services available to victims of organised crime, as well as protection offered to witnesses – a fundamental weapon in the armoury against impunity – are very limited, as reflected in the average score of 2.83 for the victim and witness support indicator. Similarly, strategies aimed at preventing organised crime in its various forms are few and far between across the region, with prevention scoring just 3.17, although some countries have developed awareness campaigns on several issues, including violence, arms trafficking and human trafficking.


However, a major issue identified across most of West Africa with regard to both of the aforementioned resilience indicators is the lack of funding provided by central governments, which pushes the burden onto civil society actors instead. Therefore, the non-state actors indicator is the second-highest-scoring resilience indicator in West Africa at 4.87, reflecting the significant efforts put in by non-governmental organisations to provide support to victims of human trafficking or to help set youth on a path away from gangs and towards a more prosperous future. Unfortunately, however, many governments in West Africa, as in the rest of the continent, are increasingly hostile to civil society, and in particular the media, cracking down on the free press through arbitrary detentions and prosecutions.

The leadership and governance-focused indicators present a mixed picture. On the one hand, international cooperation does fairly well and is the highest-scoring indicator in West Africa (5.13), thanks to robust collaboration between countries within the region as well as with global partners in Europe and the Americas, and through multilateral intergovernmental organisations. Similarly, national policies and laws (4.40) is among the higher-scoring resilience indicators, illustrating that the foundations of an effective response to organised crime are in place in several countries. However, the greatest challenge across much of the region is the effective implementation and coordination of the legal frameworks to target organised criminal activity. Performing much worse, however, are the resilience indicators under which a lot more emphasis is placed

on political will to tackle organised crime, as well as openness, transparency and degree of corruption within government. Political leadership and governance registers a regional average of 3.97, with government transparency and accountability slightly lower at 3.90. Chronic insecurity across much of the region has simultaneously allowed criminal actors to gain a foothold in societies across West Africa and led governments to often prioritise conflict and terrorism over organised crime. It is intuitive that there is lack of political will in a region in which state-embedded actors are known to profit from illicit economies, cronyism and graft. Corruption is rife in West Africa, and most countries in the region have been slow to implement – or even introduce – anti-corruption measures and initiatives.

FIGURE 4.8

Resilience, West Africa





Territorial integrity (4.33) and law enforcement (4.20) feature in the top five resilience indicators for West Africa, but, as with many of the indicators, there are significant differences across the region for both the aforementioned building blocks of resilience. In a number of states, law enforcement agencies, and thus by extension governments, have full control over their territory, border patrols are regularly carried out, often with international assistance, and efforts to improve security at key infrastructure hubs are ongoing. In other countries in West Africa, however, borders are extremely porous – not least thanks to pervasive corruption among border officials – and in some cases significant tracts of sovereign territory have fallen beyond the control of the state authorities. Under-resourcing, -staffing and -funding of law enforcement agencies pose significant challenges to an effective response to organised criminality, and as with border forces, low wages within police forces across the region leave some police officers susceptible to corrupt practices. Of the three criminal justice-related resilience indicators, however, it is the judicial system and detention (3.93) that scores lowest in West Africa. The major issues facing the justice system in most countries are much the same as those experienced in the area of law enforcement, namely corruption, lack of resources and inadequate training. The politicisation of the judicial process in several countries is such that civil society activists are often prosecuted under dubious charges, while powerful alleged criminal actors are able to evade justice, allowing impunity to proliferate.

Lastly, there are sizeable informal sectors in many West African countries, exacerbated by lack of access to formal banking and credit channels, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite relatively robust regulatory frameworks in some of the wealthier coastal West African states, economic regulatory capacity has a fairly low regional average of 4.07. Anti-money-laundering frameworks in the region are also assessed as extremely weak (3.87). Although many countries do have financial intelligence units, these are for the most part underfunded, and staff often lack the training required to effectively identify and track money laundering offences. Nevertheless, several countries are committed to improving their anti-money-laundering capacity and have begun implementing measures, limited though they may be.

Changes since 2019 Index

CRIMINALITY

In line with continental trends, the overall criminality score for West Africa deteriorated marginally (+ 0.19). This was driven by increases in the criminal markets score and criminal actor score in almost equal measures. 10 of the 15 countries in the region experienced worsening levels of criminality between 2019 and 2021, which shows that although some countries were able to buck the trend of heightened

organised criminal activity, the overwhelming pattern is one of things getting worse.

The criminal market showing the greatest degree of growth in pervasiveness across West Africa is the cocaine trade, increasing by 0.8 since the last edition of the Index. The ports of several coastal states in the region are increasingly being used as entry or transit points for cocaine arriving from across the Atlantic Ocean, which has the knock-on effect of ever larger volumes of cocaine transiting through the states of the Sahel. Furthermore, the pandemic appears to have helped the cocaine trade: in Niger, for example, traffickers, who are afraid of being targeted by armed groups in southern Libya, have taken advantage of the reduced number of vehicles travelling across the Ténéré Desert to increase their flows.

Other drug markets also registered marginal score increases, including the synthetic drug trade (+0.27) and the cannabis trade (+0.17), as did the human smuggling (+0.20) and arms trafficking (+0.27) markets. Finally, the heroin trade is the only drug market in West Africa to have registered a decrease (-0.33). While no conclusive reason can be determined yet, one possible explanation is the apparent shift toward the use of cheaper synthetic alternatives in a number of countries across the region.

Human trafficking has worsened in West Africa (+0.63), due in part to a rise in the number of migrants travelling to Gulf countries, where they are then subjected to exploitation and forced labour. The economic toll of the global health crisis on household income in many countries is another possible explanation for individuals' heightened vulnerability to exploitation.³⁴

While fauna crimes increased slightly, by 0.13, the other environmental crime markets – flora crimes and non-renewable resource crimes – both declined, by 0.23 and 0.20, respectively.

Turning to the second criminal subcomponent of the Index, all four criminal actor types increased in pervasiveness in West Africa over the past two years, none more so than foreign actors, registering a 0.47 score increase, reflecting among other things the influence foreign criminal actors have in the burgeoning illegal fishing and mining sectors,

FIGURE 4.9

Criminality trends by country, West Africa 2019–2021





FIGURE 4.10

Resilience trends by country, West Africa 2019–2021



as well as their involvement in the region's cocaine transit trade. The score for state-embedded actors, already the most influential criminal actor type throughout the region, also increased, as did mafia-style groups, although changes in scores for both indicators are fairly minor. Lastly, the strength of criminal networks in West Africa remained more or less constant, and at high levels.


RESILIENCE

Accompanying an increase in the criminality level in West Africa is a deterioration in levels of resilience to organised crime. Improvements were assessed to have occurred in only two resilience indicators – prevention (+0.07) and victim and witness support (0.10). However, these increases were very minor and from extremely low initial levels.

The largest decrease in score was that of the non-state actors indicator, declining by 0.53 since 2019. There have been further crackdowns on civil society, in particular the media, across many countries in West Africa, with the introduction of new restrictive legislation, including laws focusing on the digital media landscape. Furthermore, law enforcement crackdowns on protests and general increased insecurity across much of the region have hampered the ability of civil society organisations and networks to operate effectively. National policies and laws (-0.43) and political leadership and governance (-0.37) also deteriorated, due to a combination of factors, including increased insecurity, lack of political will to prioritise organised crime, implementation weaknesses in the legal frameworks across the region and pervasive corruption. Indeed, government transparency and accountability also deteriorated, albeit only marginally, by 0.10.

Very few countries in the region saw improvements in their anti-money-laundering capacity, and a similar pattern is visible with regard to law enforcement across West Africa, where disproportionate use of force by police in certain countries and an increased threat of organised criminal activity has not been met with the required resources. International cooperation (-0.20), economic regulatory capacity (-0.17), territorial integrity (-0.10) and judicial system and detention (-0.07) all registered score decreases.

4.3 Central Africa



Like the rest of the world, Central Africa was severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Restrictions on movement in many countries in the region were paired with widespread violence across the region. National elections in Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR) were accompanied by violence against political opponents. Cameroon was marked by the Anglophone Crisis and killings of hundreds of civilians by Boko Haram in Far North, while the protracted armed conflict in the DRC continued. Crackdowns on political dissidents and ethnic minorities under the banner of COVID-19 measures led to widespread human rights abuses in countries in the region. In this context of conflict and instability, Central Africa saw an expansion of organised crime during 2020.

In this current iteration of the Index, Central Africa scored 5.11, just below the African average for criminality (5.17). The criminality score in the region is determined to be mostly driven by the situation in the DRC (7.75) and CAR (7.04) – both countries ridden by armed conflict and organised crime. The DRC ranked the highest in the continent in terms of its criminality levels.³⁵ Notably, however, the comparably lower criminality score for the Central Africa region as a whole is due to the fairly low scores of the drug markets across almost all countries in the region, which to an extent balance out the higher scores for other criminal markets.


Criminal markets

Marred by decades of ceaseless conflicts, several countries in Central Africa remain susceptible to the illicit smuggling of arms. Indeed, arms trafficking is particularly prevalent between the DRC and CAR, which both rank among the 10 largest arms trafficking markets in the world under the Global Organized Crime Index. Given this context of ongoing conflict, the illicit arms trade is the most pervasive criminal market in Central Africa, averaging 6.14. The region

also boasts a wealth of natural resources. Regional instability, along with rife corruption that permeates the highest echelons of power in most countries in the region, creates opportunities for the criminal exploitation of resources. The DRC and CAR are again a case in point, as illicit gold and diamond mining, as well as their smuggling, are widespread, involving pro-government and rebel militias.³⁶ Thus, both countries are among the most affected by illegal exploitation and trafficking of minerals in the world. This is reflected in the region's overall high score for non-renewable resources trade, at 6.05.

FIGURE 4.11

Criminal markets, Central Africa



Other environmental crimes are also widespread. Countries in the Central Africa region host most of the Congo Rainforest, which provides easy access to round wood and higher-value timber to satisfy the thriving regional wood market,³⁷ as well as external demand, primarily from Asia. The low purchasing power of local communities, corruption and lack of adequate control over forest resources also set the scene for extensive illicit extraction of wood in the region. Worse still, the

COVID-19 pandemic has had a very negative impact on the flora trade, limiting forest oversight and pushing communities towards illicit logging in their bid to counter the economic hardships brought about by the pandemic. Thus, almost two-thirds of the countries in the region suffer significant or severe influence of the flora crimes market (5.73). The illicit flora trade was particularly pervasive in the DRC (8.5), Gabon (8.5) and Equatorial Guinea (8.5), with all three ranking among

the most affected countries worldwide. Like other high-value and easily available commodities, wildlife in Central Africa has not been left unharmed. Vulnerability of animal species was heightened not least because of conflict, allowing armed militias to fund their operations. Elephants and pangolins appear to have been the prime targets of poachers, but other species often come in their crosshairs as well. Additionally, poverty drives the illegal bushmeat trade, which is of great concern in Central Africa, as is, reportedly, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing as well. In numeric terms, the fauna crimes market in Central Africa – which boasts the second highest fauna crimes score in Africa, albeit by a negligible margin – averages 5.64. The high score is again a result of the high incidence of fauna crimes in the DRC and CAR, both holding the top spots in the region, with scores of 8.0.

Human trafficking (5.95) is predominantly an internal issue in the region but it nonetheless affects large segments of societies. Although less pervasive than in most other regions on the continent, human trafficking is the third highest-scoring criminal market in Central Africa. The Index results show that the region hosts the largest number of countries with human trafficking levels assessed to have significant or severe influence (scoring a 5.5 or above). This criminal market is driven primarily by conflict-induced vulnerability, with displaced persons most at risk of becoming victims of trafficking. Related to that, a common practice in much of Central Africa is the recruitment of child soldiers. Sexual and labour exploitation are also


prevalent. A significant number of children and adults are forced to work in the booming illegal extraction of non-renewable resources in many countries in the region. Even though ongoing conflicts drive many people out of Central Africa, porous borders allow those who seek to flee to do so on their own, obviating their need for smugglers at the initial stage of their journey. Thus, most countries tend to score in the moderate to significant range (4.00 to 5.50) for human smuggling, with a few outliers, the most notable being Chad (7.00). Overall, human smuggling scores comparably low in the region, averaging 4.36.

What stands out are the across-the-board low scores for the drug markets, especially heroin (2.68) and cocaine (3.27). Given the low purchasing power of people in the region, Central Africa is for the most part a transit hub for both drugs, which serves to justify their relatively low community impact. Similar to other drugs, the synthetics market is not extensive in the region, scoring 3.68 on average. While this holds true for the majority of countries, Tramadol is pervasive in Cameroon (7.00), Chad (7.00), CAR (7.00) and Gabon (5.00), where the domestic markets for this drug continue to grow. Scoring significantly higher, at 4.45 on average, the cannabis trade in Central Africa eclipses the other three drug markets. While this market has little impact in most countries, there are three – Cameroon (7.00), DRC (7.00) and Chad (6.00) – that are particularly affected and characterised by both extensive domestic production and consumption of cannabis.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.12

Criminal actors, Central Africa



Nine of the 11 Central African countries were assessed as being under severe influence of state-embedded actors.

Corruption tends to be an extensive problem across the region and plays an essential role in conflict dynamics and the political economy of Central African countries.

Results of the Index clearly demonstrate the extent to which

state-embedded actors have infiltrated the state apparatus of countries in Central Africa. Nine of the 11 countries were assessed as being under severe influence of state-embedded actors, which directly or indirectly affects virtually all communities in the region. Compared to these, Rwanda (5.00) and São Tomé and Príncipe (2.00) appear as islands of stability, bringing down the regional average for state-embedded actors to 7.55 – still the highest in all of Africa.

The impact of mafia-style groups (3.50) is at the other end of the spectrum, with almost half of the countries found to have no such domestic organisations operating on their territory. A plausible hypothesis is that state-embedded actors dominate the criminal landscape to such an extent that little room is left for others to enter the market. There are, of course, few exceptions characterised by ongoing conflicts – the DRC, CAR and Chad – which have allowed rebel groups to develop. Their control often extends to rural areas, where they engage in a myriad of crimes, including extortion, illicit taxation, environmental crime, human trafficking, etc., and there are structures that dominate urban settings as well.

In Africa, criminal networks consistently rank towards the higher end of the spectrum. Central Africa is no exception, and criminal networks (5.41) are the second most dominant actor type in the region. But given the dominant nature of state-embedded actors, how come these groups exert such comparably high levels of influence in the region? One possible reason is that networks are often involved in criminality that does not interfere with the interests of state-embedded actors. Criminal networks could also be regarded essentially as intermediaries, proving to be vital in running day-to-day criminal operations and paying state-

embedded actors for their continued protection. In some cases, criminal networks might even be used to attain transnational connections, allowing illicit commodities controlled by state-embedded actors to reach foreign destination markets.


Finally, foreign actors are less influential in the region, scoring 5.27 on average. With the exception of the DRC and CAR where conflict prevents state-embedded actors from suppressing other groups from gaining too much influence, foreign actors across the rest of the region were assessed as mostly moderate in their impact.

Resilience

Central Africa fares particularly poorly on the resilience component, with exceptionally low scores across the board. On average, the region scores 3.21, which makes it not only the least resilient in Africa, but also globally. In line with continental (and global) trends, 'international cooperation' (4.32) and 'national policies and laws' (4.32) appear to be the most developed resilience building blocks in the region. Countries in the region are on track of ratifying relevant agreements pertaining to organised crime, but all appear to struggle with their proper implementation. Although most countries in the region are making strides towards improving their legislative framework, similar to 'international cooperation', implementation efforts are lagging behind. Given the levels of fragility in the region and the conflicts that have been a constant throughout Central Africa for decades, it comes as no surprise that effective responses to organised crime are often non-existent. Numerous assessments point to authorities being involved in organised crime, either directly or indirectly. Expectedly, 'political leadership and governance' (3.05) is poor, bar São Tomé and Príncipe, Rwanda and Angola, which have moderate to high resilience overall. The rampant corruption that plagues Central Africa hinders governance, while transparency is virtually non-existent, especially in sectors of direct interest to state-embedded actors, e.g. the mining industry. Overall, government transparency and accountability is therefore assessed as non-existent or fragile and fragmented at best across almost all countries with the exception of the three countries mentioned above, averaging 2.45.

FIGURE 4.13

Resilience, Central Africa



Although Central Africa is not a major money-laundering hub, the informal nature of the economy raises concerns. Additionally, despite the existence of anti-money-laundering frameworks, significant gaps remain in regional responses to money laundering. Thus, the Index results find that the majority of the countries have weak AML frameworks, evident in the low overall score for the region, averaging just 2.95. The other indicator comprising the economic and financial environment category – economic regulatory capacity (2.64) – does not come out particularly well either. Indeed, the economy of the entire region has suffered the damaging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, pushing more people into criminality. But even prior to the pandemic, the region's over-reliance on natural resources³⁸ coupled with rife corruption were enough of a precondition for the extensive informal economy and weak regulatory capacity to proliferate.

Despite the lockdowns and border closures that were brought about in response to the spread of the coronavirus, borders remain porous, evident in the illicit goods flowing through state lines in the region. In addition, national authorities are unable to exert full control over their territory and infrastructure against incursions by organised crime actors. Stemming from that, regional territorial integrity is poor, averaging a score of 3.64 – the lowest recorded both on the African continent and globally. Poor access to justice, especially in rural areas, rampant corruption, and lack of independence, resources and capacity in the judicial sector and law enforcement are constraints that persist across almost all countries in the region. Thus, the other two indicators making up the criminal justice and security grouping – judicial system and detention (3.00) and law enforcement (3.50) also fare quite badly. Notably, Central Africa again ranks bottom continentally and

globally for the former indicator and the second worst worldwide for the latter.

As evidenced by the scores, victim and witness support (2.73) measures across most of the region would appear to be low on the agenda and are as a result fragmented and weak at best. Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe as well as Rwanda again stand out, with legal frameworks and available support mechanisms that are better suited to aid victims and witnesses of organised crime, but even they are assessed as moderately effective. Prevention efforts are absent throughout most countries in Central Africa and limited both in number and scope, even in states that top the region on that indicator. This is reflected in the low average score of just 2.68, which puts the region last globally. Lastly, the development of a vibrant civil society sector that works in the field of countering organised crime is largely hampered by conflict. Civil society organisations' impact is very weak across the region, and their focus is mostly on issues related to conflict and human rights. In addition, civil society organisations operate in hostile environments where governments often violate rights and freedoms, including of the media, which has led many journalists to self-censor.

Changes since 2019 Index

CRIMINALITY

Following continental trends, the overall levels of criminality in Central Africa have slightly increased since the previous iteration of the Index. Resilience of countries in the region to organised crime, on the other hand, has improved and although the region still falls behind and is the least resilient in Africa, it has closed the significant gap that was observed in 2019.

Attempts by national governments to flatten the curve of COVID-19 infections have centred on limiting mobility by means of lockdowns and travel restrictions. This has had the unintended consequence of bringing about enormous economic strain³⁹ over large segments of society, and which has compelled people to seek better economic opportunities, often becoming vulnerable to exploitation in the process. The impact of the pandemic and conflict over the human trafficking market has been very distinct, evident in the average

market increase of 0.55 in Central Africa in 2021 compared to the 2019 period. By comparison, the human smuggling market only worsened marginally overall (+0.09). In fact, the majority of the countries in the region either saw their human smuggling market shrink or remain unchanged. The Republic of the Congo (+0.50), Angola (+1.50) and Chad (+2.00) are the three exceptions where the market increased. As the pandemic hit, smuggling of migrants generally became riskier and more expensive in North African transit states,⁴⁰ which for the most part affected markets in source countries as well. The restrictions on movement, however, had a slight impact on the market in Chad, for instance, where the gold sector fuelled demand for labour and resulted in an upsurge in smuggling of migrants.⁴¹ Due to a number of factors, including budgetary constraints experienced by the government of Chad coupled with the remoteness of the goldfields, authorities have been unable to exert effective control over the goldfields and curb the illicit extraction of gold in the country.⁴² These deficiencies have allowed illicit exploitation of gold deposits to grow, which resulted in the non-renewable crimes market worsening (+3.00) in the country. Regionally, while land flows of illicit gold remained active, gold-smuggling routes by air were temporarily closed off.⁴³ Field gold prices in Central Africa plummeted but prices on international markets went up, which allowed criminal groups to seize the moment, stockpiling artisanal gold and peddling it for a large profit on the global market.⁴⁴ Thus, the illicit market for non-renewable resources was among the most heightened Central African criminal market, growing by 0.41 on average.

The flora crimes market in Central Africa worsened as well, although the average score increased only by a very small margin (0.05). Lockdowns were again pivotal, as forest management operations decreased, which allegedly resulted in an increase in illegal logging in the Congo Basin.⁴⁵ COVID-induced financial difficulties faced by communities also served as a catalyst for animal poaching. Looking for alternative ways to alleviate the impact of the pandemic, people started selling mostly poached pangolin scales to traffickers⁴⁶ or hunting bushmeat for food,⁴⁷ which again resulted in a small increase in the average score for the criminal market (+0.05).

Continued volatility in the region caused by conflicts in the DRC, CAR and Burundi, along with the proliferation of non-state armed actors, has led to growth in the illicit trade in firearms. It is therefore unsurprising to note a moderate increase in arms trafficking in Central Africa (+0.23). The fluctuations observed in the heroin and cocaine trade are, however, curious. Heroin, on the one hand, is the criminal market that shrank the most in Central Africa in 2021 (-0.41), while the opposite was observed in the cocaine trade, where the largest regional surge in the average score was observed (+0.73). Meanwhile, the cannabis and synthetic drug markets in most Central African countries remained relatively steady. The former rose by 0.09 on average, and the latter recorded the same average score change, but in the opposite direction.


In terms of criminal actors, somewhat counterintuitively and in spite of the COVID-19 counter-measures, the largest average score increase was observed for foreign actors (+0.59). The anomaly is mostly due to the 3.50-point increase of the foreign actors score for Equatorial Guinea – a long-term shift that can be tracked back to before the pandemic as foreign shipping fleets got increasingly involved in IUU fishing in Equatoguinean territorial waters. Criminal networks (+0.32) and state-embedded actors (+0.45) also grew in prominence in the region. Notably, anti-COVID-19 measures were used across the continent to justify repressive actions on part of the government against the free press, which by extension allowed state-embedded actors to consolidate their involvement in or hold over criminal economies in the region. With a few notable exceptions, mafia-style groups in the region are rather weak and the 0.05 increase in the average score for that criminal actor is inconsequential.

RESILIENCE

Despite the low resilience scores across the board, comparing the 2021 data against the 2019 scores suggests an improvement in Central Africa. In contrast to the average continental score for Africa, which worsened slightly, a gain of 0.26 was observed in Central Africa. All countries, except for Rwanda (-0.25) and Cameroon (-0.21), saw their resilience scores increase to varying degrees. São Tomé and Príncipe, for instance, managed to

FIGURE 4.14


Criminality trends by country, Central Africa 2019–2021



not only record a decline in its overall criminality score (-0.10) but also a boost in its overall resilience score (+1.13), which is another indicator of stability in that country. Changes across the resilience building blocks were for the most part minor, ranging from 0.05 to 0.18. The largest shifts were recorded in victim and witness support (+0.86), prevention (+0.73), non-state actors (+0.45), international cooperation (+0.50) and law enforcement (+0.23). While the changes for the first three indicators making up the civil society and social protection grouping appear significant, the 2021 scores correspond to weak or fragmented legislative frameworks and rarely to moderately effective ones. Nevertheless, there have been some positive changes, such as pieces of legislation passed in Angola that strengthen victim support and set provisions for witness protection. In turn, the boost seen in the average international cooperation score for Central Africa is mostly due to better cooperation of Chad with France, the EU and US on anti-terrorism and organised crime in the wider region, as well as DRC ending its self-isolation and re-establishing good relations with the UN, EU and Western donors since President Felix Tshisekedi took office in 2019. Both indicators that were observed to have worsened in 2021 declined only by a small margin: economic regulatory capacity (-0.14), where all countries in the region kept their 2019 scores, barring Cameroon and the Republic of Congo, and territorial integrity (-0.09).


FIGURE 4.15

Resilience trends by country, Central Africa 2019–2021





4.4 North Africa



The most pervasive criminal market in North Africa is the cannabis trade (6.92), driven first and foremost by Morocco's score of 9.

with all other regions on the continent, the criminal actors score (4.92) is higher than the criminal markets score (4.81), albeit only marginally.

After Southern Africa, the six countries comprising North Africa have the lowest average criminality score (4.86) of any of the five African regions. Libya is the only country in the region with high levels of criminality, with an overall score of 6.55. As

Criminal markets


The most pervasive criminal market in North Africa is the cannabis trade (6.92), driven first and foremost by Morocco's score of 9, reflecting the country's status as one of the largest producers of cannabis resin not just in Africa, but in the world.⁴⁸ Cannabis cultivation also takes place in other countries throughout the Maghreb, such as Algeria and Egypt, albeit to a far lesser extent. Nevertheless, the high regional score is largely a result of the high levels of cannabis consumption, together with the major role played by North African countries as transit countries for cannabis originating from Morocco bound for European markets.

The exploitative illicit economies of human smuggling and human trafficking are also extremely pervasive across the region, scoring 6.58 and 6.08, respectively. Strategically located between common source countries across the rest of the continent and favourable destinations in Europe, countries in North Africa are significant transit states for human smuggling. As well as serving as a transit point for human smuggling, a number of countries in the region are seeing increasing numbers of their own

citizens seeking the services of smuggling networks to cross the Mediterranean. Although the human smuggling industry has been on the decline since 2017, Libya remains the highest-scoring country. It is also home to the most pervasive human trafficking market in Africa, with forced prostitution and labour exploitation rife throughout the country. Modern slavery is also widespread throughout Mauritania, which has an embedded culture of slavery dating back centuries.

FIGURE 4.16

Criminal markets, North Africa



Arms trafficking is not a particularly prevalent market in a number of North African countries, such as Morocco and Mauritania. However, the strength of the illicit arms trade in Egypt and Libya in particular is such that the regional average for the criminal market is high, at 5.58. The number of illicit arms in circulation has proliferated since the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, and Egypt's proximity to Libya, and Egyptian actors' consequent involvement in the Libyan crisis, presents

several arms trafficking opportunities, significantly increasing the size of this criminal market.

Although not as widespread as cannabis, synthetic drugs (5.25) are increasingly common across North Africa, primarily in Egypt where the country is facing a sustained Tramadol epidemic. Captagon use is also high in Libya, although experts have noted somewhat of a decline in the trafficking of Captagon

in 2020. There have been reports of the widespread availability of Ecstasy in Morocco, as well as of crystal methamphetamine and Karkoubi consumption. High-value drug markets, such as cocaine and heroin, on the other hand, are far less pervasive across the region, scoring 3.83 and 2.75, respectively. With the exception of Egypt, where a persistent and growing domestic market does exist, the heroin trade is very limited in most of North Africa, with the remaining five countries all scoring 3 or lower. The picture is slightly different when it comes to the cocaine trade. While cocaine is by no means among the most used drugs across the region, the roles of Morocco, and to a lesser extent Mauritania, Libya and Algeria, as transit points for cocaine moving from Latin America to Europe are increasing.


Finally, there is a marked variation among the various environmental crime markets in North

Africa. Although the illegal logging of cedar and fir by locals is fairly common throughout the Rif Mountains, as an organised criminal market, flora crimes have very little influence in most countries in the region (1.92). Non-renewable resource crimes, on the other hand, are far more pervasive (5.08). Oil products such as petrol and diesel are at the centre of Libya's smuggling industry, with fuel being imported into the country and then smuggled back out at heavily subsidized rates. The oil-rich nation of Algeria is also host to a significant oil-smuggling industry, which is associated with widespread cronyism leading to substantial losses to the public purse. While the relative scarcity of biodiversity in North Africa compared to the rest of the continent means that fauna crimes are not overly prominent (4.08), the illicit market for rare bird species in the region is fairly widespread, not least in Egypt, Morocco and Algeria.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.17

Criminal actors, North Africa




The Index data shows that state-embedded actors are manifestly the most influential criminal actor types operating in North Africa, scoring an average of 7.17. Unlike the case with other criminal actor types or criminal markets, no single country dominates with regard to the strength of state-embedded actors, with five of the six countries in the region scoring between 7 and 8.5. Criminal networks (5.50) also play an important role in most North African countries, engaged in the illicit trade of a whole host of commodities, from drugs to oil products, as well

as people. Foreign criminal actors have less influence in North Africa than they do in other African regions, but the porous borders between several countries in the region do nevertheless facilitate the spillover of criminal entrepreneurs from one country to the next, as well as from other countries in the Sahel region. Broadly speaking, mafia-style groups are either non-existent or have very little influence in the region. Libya, however, is a notable outlier, where a diverse range of well-armed mafia-style militia groups have operated since the end of the Qaddafi regime.

Resilience

FIGURE 4.18

Resilience, North Africa



Resilience in North Africa, as is the case generally across the continent, is very low, scoring an average of 3.79 regionally. However, unlike other regions, where the range of resilience scores is very wide, most countries in North Africa are assessed to have very similar levels of resilience to organised crime, with four of the six countries in the region scoring between 4 and 5. The only real outlier is Libya, again, with one of the lowest resilience scores in Africa – the legacy of years of conflict, state fracture and a deep intertwining of state and criminal actors.

The highest-scoring resilience indicator in the region is territorial integrity (5.00), a reflection of the emphasis placed by a number of governments in

the region on strengthening border controls, and on law enforcement and security agencies more widely. However, porous borders resulting from corrupt practices within border control agencies across North Africa are highlighted by experts, as is the pervasive nature of heavy-handed responses and often disproportionate use of violence on the part of the region's police forces, limiting the effectiveness of law enforcement (4.25) in their response to organised crime.

In line with continental trends, national policies and laws (4.40) is among the highest-scoring resilience indicators, thanks to fairly robust legal frameworks pertaining to organised crime across

the region. International cooperation (4.33) is also one of the better-performing indicators, with collaborative efforts, especially in the realm of intelligence sharing, highlighted in particular. However, the remaining two indicators in the leadership and governance grouping of resilience indicators are scored considerably worse. Political leadership and governance (3.75) is found wanting across the entire region, where a mix of weak states, vested interests, an inability to uphold the rule of law and a lack of political will to tackle the issue has hampered response measures. Government transparency and accountability (3.42) also fares poorly, reflecting entrenched corruption and general lack of transparency within the upper echelons of the political class, as well as low levels of accountability in law enforcement agencies.

While anti-money-laundering frameworks in North Africa are assessed to be satisfactory, and several countries have made considerable advances in their efforts to counter money laundering, there remains significant scope for improvement across the region, with the anti-money-laundering indicator scoring a regional average of 4.08. The scale of the informal economy in most countries in North Africa and a lack of legitimate economic opportunity are key factors in the relatively low regional score for economic regulatory capacity (3.75).

Lastly, the three lowest-scoring resilience indicators in North Africa are the three comprising the civil society and social protection grouping: non-state actors (3.17), victim and witness support (2.92) and prevention (2.75). While civil society, and journalism in particular, is vibrant across much of the region, the space in which non-governmental organisations and the media are free to operate has shrunk considerably in 2020, with several governments cracking down on activists and journalists who oppose them under the guise of COVID-19-related public health measures. Support for victims of organised crime, most notably human trafficking, is severely limited in scope at best and non-existent at worst. Support services for people who use drugs are similarly limited across most countries, and there exist very few organised crime prevention strategies across North Africa.

Changes since 2019 Index

CRIMINALITY

Overall, the situation in North Africa in 2020 deteriorated since two years before, both in terms of the scope of illicit markets and the resilience of the region to organised crime. The overall criminality score increased marginally from 4.73 to 4.86, but looking at the breakdown of criminal markets and criminal actors, there is a clear difference in the evolution of the two since 2019, with the score for the former increasing by 0.4 and the latter actually decreasing, albeit only slightly, by -0.13. The increase in the pervasiveness of criminal markets across North Africa is driven primarily by Tunisia, and to a lesser extent, Morocco. This notwithstanding, all six countries in the region registered an increase in their criminal markets score. The picture is a lot more mixed with regard to criminal actors, however, with half of the countries seeing a reduction in the influence of various criminal actor types.

The criminal market to register the greatest score increase in North Africa was arms trafficking (+0.92), followed by human smuggling (+0.83), reflecting

heightened smuggling activity patterns from the North African coast to Italy and, increasingly, the Canary Islands. Although fairly limited across the region, a number of countries have seen a considerable increase in both fauna crimes (+0.42) and flora crimes (+0.67), namely the illegal logging of cedar and fir. In Tunisia, for example, the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic saw an explosion in the number of illegal logging cases, driven by a combination of the local curfew, which provided greater cover for loggers to operate undetected, and the steep economic toll inflicted by the nationwide lockdown.⁴⁹ Human trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes both registered increases of 0.33. The drug markets in North Africa continued their expansion for the most part, with the scores for the cocaine trade, the cannabis trade and the synthetic drug trade all rising. Heroin, however, experienced no net change, with a marginal increase in one country being cancelled out by a marginal decrease in another.

Whereas all but one of the 10 criminal markets registered a score increase since the 2019 Organised Crime Index for Africa, the evolution of the different criminal actors in North Africa varied. State-embedded actors were the criminal actor type to record the largest score increase (+0.33) across the region, reflecting the strengthened links between non-state criminal actors and the government apparatus in several countries. Criminal networks also increased slightly (+0.17), but the most significant changes can be seen with regard to mafia-style groups and foreign actors. The score for the latter declined by 0.58, even though only one country in the region actually recorded a change in score, Mauritania, whose score for mafia-style groups fell from 6 to 2.5. This marked decline reflects the fact that armed terrorist groups, heavily involved in numerous illicit economies, that used to operate in Mauritania are no longer present. Meanwhile, the influence of foreign criminal actors remained stable in several North African countries, and even strengthened in Algeria, reflecting the increasing presence of criminal actors from neighbouring countries, particularly along the country's southern borders. However, the foreign actors indicator did exhibit a net decrease thanks to the notable reduction in scores for both Morocco and Egypt.

FIGURE 4.19

Criminality trends by country, North Africa 2019–2021





FIGURE 4.20

Resilience trends by country, North Africa 2019–2021




RESILIENCE

Just as the criminality situation has deteriorated in North Africa since 2019, so too has the region's resilience to organised crime. The regional resilience score decreased from 4.19 to 3.79, the largest drop of any of the five African regions, with 10 of the 12 resilience indicators registering a regional decline over the past two years. One of the greatest deteriorations is that of political leadership and governance, which decreased by 0.92. While there were moderate improvements in Mauritania and Libya (starting from very low levels), experts judged that a number of countries, notably Algeria and Tunisia, had seen a backsliding in the political will to tackle organised crime, together with an increase in societal discord and mass protests. The law enforcement score for North Africa also decreased by 0.92, as a result of the heightened use of violence and arbitrary detention by police across the region, exacerbated by the pandemic, which was often used as a cover for human rights abuses, as seen in other parts of Africa and discussed earlier. Similar patterns emerged within the judicial and detention systems across the region, which contributed to that indicator's deterioration of 0.83.

Freedom of civil society to operate is another area that has seen a worrying backwards trend, with the score for the non-state actors indicator falling by 0.83. There has been a consolidation of state control of the media environment in a number of countries in North Africa, not to mention a trend towards the imprisonment of activists and journalists for opposing government. The pandemic has provided an opportunity for governments to crack down on civil society, as many instances of government overreach, such as banning protests and restricting freedom of speech on online platforms, have been carried out under the guise of COVID-19-related public health measures. Moreover, government transparency and accountability worsened (-0.33), as did economic regulatory capacity (-0.67), reflecting the continued pervasiveness of informal trade across the Maghreb, due at least in some part to the economic downturn resulting from the pandemic and associated lockdowns, and the general economic volatility across the region. Certain country-specific developments brought about a marginal deterioration in several other resilience indicators, including national policies and laws, territorial integrity, prevention, and victim and witness support.

While several countries either deteriorated or saw no change on the international cooperation indicator, the scores increased for three North African countries, a reflection of improvements in cooperation with multilateral agencies, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and bilateral cooperation, primarily in terms of cross-border law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing. Similarly, most countries in the region increased their score for AML, largely thanks to a strengthening of institutional frameworks to counter money laundering. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of AML frameworks and associated measures is still weak across most, if not all, of the region.

4.5 Southern Africa




At first glance, criminality in Southern Africa appears moderate, as the region scores 4.67 on average – the lowest in Africa. In fact, most countries in the region do not feature markets that are beyond a moderate influence when it comes to criminality, and data from the 2021 Index shows that only four of the 13 countries in Southern Africa have high levels of criminality. However, that does not mean the region is immune to organised crime, far from it. Looking at the other side of the

coin, overall resilience – although highest on average across Africa – has been negatively affected by the virus that continues to ravage the continent and is quite poor. The fact that more than three-quarters of countries in the region are assessed as having either non-existent/extremely ineffective or moderately

effective anti-organised-crime frameworks is a testament to the limited ability of countries in Southern Africa to withstand and counter the impact of organised crime. Furthermore, this lack of resilience makes the region vulnerable to organised crime groups strengthening their grip.

Criminal markets

FIGURE 4.21
Criminal markets, Southern Africa



Southern Africa is home to the largest remaining populations of keystone species, such as elephants and rhinos, as well as to a whole host of other rare animal species that have over the past decades become decimated by human greed and credulity.⁵⁰ Although not as extensive, IUU fishing has also been cited as increasingly problematic in the region. With such precious ‘commodities’ ready for the taking, it is no wonder that Southern Africa has emerged as one of the largest source regions for live animals and animal parts. Fauna crimes are consequently

the highest scoring of the regional criminal markets (5.35), and assessed to be either significant or severe in more than half of the countries in the region. Other environmental crimes are also widespread, not least non-renewable resource crimes. The third most extensive criminal market in the region, this has been on the rise over the past few years, especially illegal mining of gold, diamonds and coloured gemstones, because of a number of factors, but most importantly the fact that Africa has an abundance of natural mineral resources.

Add to that soaring unemployment levels and extreme poverty, especially in times of COVID-19, and the result has been entire communities left to seek alternative ways, often illegal, to fend for themselves. Not only that, but people who enter illicit economies out of desperation are vulnerable to exploitation. The case of Zimbabwe is illustrative, as COVID-19 has pushed an estimated 1.3 million people into extreme poverty, bringing up the total count of people living under conditions of extreme poverty to 49% of the total population, or an estimated 7.9 million Zimbabweans.⁵¹ A significant percentage of them undertake illegal mining and come together to form small 'syndicates' who are sponsored by individuals with political ties,⁵² who earn the lion's share of the profits made. In addition, the close links between illegal miners and authorities appear to be a common theme across all countries scoring high on the indicator. Once sourced, precious stones and gold are often sold to organised crime groups that traffic them out of the region to the Middle East and Asia. Not to mention the negative impact of illicit mining on the environment, which due to the rudimentary techniques used is of colossal proportions. Flora crimes (4.38), although not an extensive market in Southern Africa overall, is quite an acute issue in about a third of the countries in the region, especially Mozambique (8.00), Zambia (8.00) and Madagascar (7.50). All three boast extensive biodiversity and host rare, highly valuable plant species, which are primarily trafficked to Asia. High-level state involvement, often reaching the top echelons of power, is another recurring theme as are the significant deforestation rates.

Although not present across the entire region, there are certain countries that are profoundly affected by the drug trade, which appears extremely resilient to the restrictions set out as countermeasures to the pandemic. Southern Africa is also the region by far the most affected by the heroin trade (5.15). It is also the second highest scoring criminal market in Southern Africa, having a significant or severe impact in five of the 13 countries in the region, most notably in Mauritius (8.00). The heroin market is particularly significant in the major trans-shipment and destination states of Mozambique and South Africa, where Afghan heroin is increasingly imported in huge quantities, as well as Mauritius and the Seychelles, small island states where heroin

consumption is rising at an alarming rate. Although not as popular, synthetic drugs (4.54) have recently grown in popularity. In South Africa, the oldest market for meth, meth use is deeply rooted in society,⁵³ and by extension the country's synthetic drugs market is the largest in the region at 8.00. That comes in light of decreasing domestic production at the expense of growing meth imports originating in Western Africa. In addition, evidence suggests that Afghan meth has been trafficked into Southern Africa along heroin maritime routes.⁵⁴ While the cannabis trade (4.54) scores on average the same as the synthetic drugs trade, national cannabis markets are much less extreme, in that country scores converge in the span of only 3 points – from the lowest (3.00) to the highest (6.00). Lastly, the cocaine trade is assessed as non-existent or of little influence in Southern Africa, as all but three countries score between 3.00 and 3.50. Only South Africa and Lesotho are assessed to have high prevalence of cocaine. The former is a key transit point for cocaine en route to Europe and the Middle East as well as a destination market. Cocaine is the most widely used drug in Lesotho and the trade is inextricably linked to South Africa, as most cocaine comes from there.

As opposed to other regions on the continent, both human trafficking (4.54) and human smuggling (3.54) are rather limited in Southern Africa. Where it does occur, the former takes on many different forms – sex trafficking, labour exploitation, trafficking of children, etc. – but all seem to be primarily rooted in poverty. The latter is the second least prevalent market in the region. Although human smuggling is of little influence in most countries in the region, illicit movement occurs at more significant rates on the coast of the Western Indian Ocean region. Illegal migration occurs primarily towards South Africa and to a lesser extent from and through Comoros towards Mayotte and subsequently to mainland France. Not least of all, Mozambique is an important transit country for migrants coming both from the East Africa region and Asia, looking to gain entry in South Africa.

Arms trafficking is the third least pervasive criminal market in Southern Africa, scoring on average 4.04. As arms trafficking in most of the countries in the region has little to moderate influence on society, the score is primarily driven to two outliers – South Africa


(8.00) and Mozambique (5.50). The arms market in the former has been fuelled by a number of flows, including arms coming from outside the country and leftover stockpiles from the apartheid era. In recent years, however, rampant corruption within the police force has been a major driver of arming gangs in the country, with a former high-ranking South African police officer having been found guilty of

selling decommissioned weapons to crime bosses.⁵⁵ Violence was also on the rise in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique in 2020, with reports indicating illicit arms were reaching insurgencies in the region. South Africa is again cited as a possible source for arms in Mozambique, as the latter continues to struggle with yet another cycle of arms circulation.

Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.22

Criminal actors, Southern Africa



Although not as widespread as in other regions, three of the four criminal actor types in Southern Africa carry significant weight, scoring between 5.50 and 5.96. Mafia-style groups, on the other hand, are less pervasive, on average scoring 2.65 – the second lowest across Africa. While mafia-style groups either do not exist or appear to hold insignificant influence over communities in most countries, the issue is far more pronounced in South Africa, where heavily armed and violent gangs are particularly active in the drug trade and involved in extortion. Mafia-style organisations have also infiltrated the mass-transit taxi industry and fight bloody wars for control over lucrative taxi routes.

As in every other region on the continent, state-embedded actors dominate the criminal landscape in Southern Africa. Almost two-thirds of countries in the region are affected by a significant or severe influence of state-embedded actors, scoring 6.00


and above. The situation is most dire in Mozambique (9.00), where officials appear either complicit in a great deal of criminal economies – especially the illicit ruby trade – or provide protection to organised crime groups. Zimbabwe (8.00), South Africa (7.50) and Madagascar (7.50), where political elites have abused their powers with impunity and have also engaged in illicit economies, do not lag far behind.

In a year of lockdowns and border closures, foreign actors (5.54) continued to exert moderate to significant influence across all 13 countries in Southern Africa, as did criminal networks (5.50). Scores for both these criminal actor types tend to cluster around the mid to high levels of the scale. That is to say that, while not as pervasive as state-embedded actors, criminal networks and foreign actors are present across the region.

Resilience

FIGURE 4.23

Resilience, Southern Africa



Southern Africa tends to outperform the rest of Africa on most resilience building blocks, apart from law enforcement and territorial integrity, where North Africa scores noticeably higher, reflecting the emphasis placed on securitization of borders in the region. In line with both continental and global trends, 'international cooperation' (5.27) and 'national policies and laws' (5.15) are the two highest scoring indicators in Southern Africa. Almost half of the countries in the region boast high levels of international cooperation, with Botswana and Namibia standing out of the bunch. At the other end of the spectrum are Comoros, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, whose efforts to cooperate are limited to the ratification of international

frameworks pertaining to organised crime. Besides the ratification of such treaties, however, national authorities there exhibit little political will to pursue tangible results.

Although scoring lower on average, the 'national policies and laws' indicator has more countries ranking moderately, compared to 'international cooperation'. However, Comoros (2.50) and Zimbabwe (3.00) are assessed as having

Almost half of the countries in the region boast high levels of international cooperation, with Botswana and Namibia standing out of the bunch.

national anti-organised-crime legislative frameworks that are weak in terms of implementation.

The other two indicators making up the leadership and governance grouping – ‘political leadership and governance’ and ‘government transparency and accountability’ – score significantly lower at 4.23 and 3.88, respectively. The low score of the former illustrates a point already made – political will to counter organised crime is somewhat weak in the region and low on the agenda. The COVID-19 crisis has, in turn, served to emphasise growing lack of trust towards corruption-ridden national authorities throughout Southern Africa. As such, it is understandable why ‘government transparency and accountability’ is among the lowest-scoring indicator in the region.

The results of the Index point to ‘law enforcement’ (3.73) being the resilience building block that fares the worst, apart from ‘prevention’ and ‘victim and witness support’. Almost half of the countries in the sample have severely limited law enforcement agencies that are crippled by flagrant corruption. Not only that, but some police officers are also directly involved in criminal economies. Additionally, severe lack of resources and professional undercapacity, as well as poor treatment of people and subsequent lack of popular trust in the police, are other factors that inhibit anti-organised-crime efforts throughout the entire region, albeit to a different extent.

Although scoring better on average, countries in Southern Africa do not for the most part maintain sufficiently effective judicial and detention systems. This is evident in the fact that six of the 13 countries score between 2.00 and 3.00 on that indicator.

Nevertheless, Botswana, South Africa, the Seychelles and Mauritius are assessed to have independent judiciaries, albeit featuring some vulnerabilities themselves. South Africa, for instance, has a prosecution service that has been beleaguered with lack of capacity and which is allegedly corrupt. That said, efforts have been made to reform the service more recently, especially with the appointment in 2019 of a new director of public prosecutions. The third building block that makes the criminal justice and security grouping – ‘territorial integrity’ (4.12), although scoring better on average compared to the other two, is still problematic for countries in the region. Borders are generally long, difficult to adequately monitor and patrol, especially the

region’s extensive coastlines, making them porous and vulnerable to illicit flows. This vulnerability is particularly evident in times of COVID-19, where illicit flows, especially illegal trafficking of drugs, continued unabated despite lockdowns and border closures.

AML responses tend to be limited or moderate throughout Southern Africa, with countries in the region scoring on average 4.42. Only two countries in the region have made progress towards advancing their AML frameworks, which are considered sufficiently effective – South Africa and Malawi. Similarly, the informal economies throughout the region flourish because of poverty and weak regulations, both exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic. Almost half of the countries in the region are assessed to have non-existent or extremely ineffective economic regulatory frameworks, and only three score above 5.50, bringing the average score for the region to 4.04.

Two of the indicators making up the civil society and social protection grouping – ‘victim and witness support’ and ‘prevention’ – tend to consistently rank if not the lowest, then among them across both Africa and globally. As indicated by the low average score of the former (3.23), support and protective services available to victims and witnesses of organised crime are virtually absent. Indeed, almost two-thirds of countries in Southern Africa are evaluated as either having limited or no victim and witness support mechanisms. Likewise, prevention measures across Southern Africa are feeble, with countries scoring 3.58 on average. Conversely, non-state actors (4.46) score towards the higher end compared to other indicators in the region. Nevertheless, civil society has not been spared by the effects of the novel virus. The lockdowns had the expected consequence of worsening the economic situation across the region, which negatively reflected on civil society. Many NGOs in Southern Africa suffered reductions in or loss of funding, severely limiting their scope of operations.⁵⁶ Similarly, the worsened economic state of affairs brought about by the pandemic has also come to seriously threaten independent media in the region.⁵⁷ Not least of all, national governments in Southern Africa used the pandemic as an excuse to crack down on independent media outlets, further curtailing press freedom.⁵⁸

Changes since 2019 Index


CRIMINALITY

During the past 18 months, COVID-19 has permeated all aspects of life. The pandemic also appears to have significantly changed crime dynamics across the Southern Africa region for the worse. Data shows that in the two years since the previous Index was published, all countries in the Southern Africa region have worsened to varying degrees, with the exception of the Seychelles (-0.25) and Malawi, which improved only marginally (-0.05). Furthermore, the region has taken a turn for the worse in all criminal markets except for fauna crimes, whose influence declined (-0.35). Conversely, the flora crimes market increased (+0.19) mostly as a result of activity in the Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which all went up by 1.5. Most notably, the lockdowns in the Seychelles meant a decline in the tourism industry and resultant loss of income, which led to a colossal increase in poaching of the coco de mer palm nut, which is endemic to the island country.⁵⁹ With about only 8 000 mature coco de mer palm trees left today,⁶⁰ the increased levels of poaching sustained over longer periods of time may well spell the end of the species. The mining sector in the region also suffered elevated levels of vulnerability because of COVID-19. As a result, influence of the non-renewable resource crimes market increased by 0.35 on average in the 2021 iteration of the Index. The rise in illegal extraction and smuggling of minerals was most evident in Mozambique and Botswana, both gaining two points compared to 2019. The former became vulnerable to illegal mining back in 2009, when the Montepuez deposit, estimated to hold a large portion of the world's known ruby supply, was discovered.⁶¹ During the onset of the pandemic in 2020, non-critical legal mining operations were suspended in Montepuez to prevent the spread of the virus, which has likely opened up space for illegal miners to operate.⁶²

Although COVID-19 measures have to an extent contained movement, they have not managed to reverse the growth of human trafficking and smuggling in Southern Africa. In fact, all over the continent the virus and the ensuing economic downturn have likely made more people vulnerable to human trafficking.⁶³ Additionally, the measures

FIGURE 4.24

Criminality trends by country, Southern Africa 2019–2021



aimed at containing the spread of the virus, which are unlikely to deter people fleeing violence or conflict from irregular migration, have had the unintended consequence of raising demand for the services of smugglers. Besides the heightened prices, irregular migrants are now facing even greater uncertainties. Allegedly, smugglers who are unable to get irregular migrants to their final destination are leaving them stranded, with some states suspending rescue efforts as well as asylum procedures, aggravating the situation for migrants.⁶⁴ In line with these hypotheses, the 2021 Index results show that the two indicators are the third and fourth most increased criminal markets, respectively gaining 0.46 and 0.42 on average against the 2019 Index.

Untangling arms trafficking dynamics in Southern Africa has proven more difficult. The 2021 Index results reveal an increase in most countries in the region, in six of the 13, with four remaining unchanged and only three recording an improvement. A likely explanation here is that these scores are driven primarily by violence and conflict, with anti-COVID-19 measures having little influence on illicit flows. So, for instance, the Cabo Delgado conflict, which gained momentum in 2020, has seen more weapons being trafficked to militants in the northern region of Mozambique. Similarly, while gang leaders in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town, South Africa, pledged a ceasefire, reports indicated that gang-related shootings continued.⁶⁵ In fact, recruitment into gangs, and gang violence, have escalated as police presence declined following COVID-19 lockdowns,⁶⁶ which suggests that it is likely that demand for arms has increased under the circumstances. Indeed, interviews with Cape Flats gang members reveal that during the lockdowns, gangs have flourished from trafficking guns and drugs.⁶⁷


As many licit businesses struggled to stay afloat, the results of the 2021 Index show that the drug markets have continued to thrive in Southern Africa, growing significantly since the previous iteration. This is also evident in the increase among people in the region

exhibiting opioid-withdrawal symptoms and seeking treatment.⁶⁸ The largest increase was observed in the synthetic drugs market, which grew on average by a point. The ample rise in synthetic drug use in the whole of Africa is a trend that precedes the COVID-19 pandemic, but all evidence points to the ensuing lockdowns only serving to intensify it. Cocaine, albeit the least pervasive criminal market in the region, is the second most increased market in Southern Africa (+0.96). This stark increase in the regional average is mostly the result of the market gaining significant traction in Lesotho (+4.00). The country is a rapidly growing destination market for cocaine, facilitated largely by corruption, reportedly, within the state apparatus. The recorded spikes in Namibia (+2.50) and South Africa (+2.50) have also contributed to the increasing regional average for the cocaine market in the 2021 Index iteration. The criminal markets for heroin and cannabis also went up in Southern Africa, by 0.27 and 0.35, respectively.

Interesting developments were also observed in criminal actors' influence across the region. Most notably, while the lockdowns had no effect on domestic criminal groups, foreign actors on average lost influence (-0.35) in Southern Africa. Coincidentally or not, the countries that brought down the average score for the region were the Seychelles, Comoros and Madagascar, all island nations. Mafia-style groups, on the other hand, increased slightly by 0.04. Although only marginal, the rise in the score for mafia-style groups was more distinct in South Africa (0.05). As emphasised earlier, police presence decreased sizeably in South Africa, which allowed gangs to take advantage of the growing demand for drugs and arms as well as to expand their operations into other black markets – notably cigarettes and alcohol – both banned periodically under the anti-COVID-19 measures set in place in the country.⁶⁹ The regional average for state-embedded actors also went up (+0.31), mostly echoing the increased influence of this criminal actor type in eSwatini (+2.00) and Namibia (+1.50), as did the average for criminal networks (+0.38).

FIGURE 4.25

Resilience trends by country, Southern Africa 2019–2021



RESILIENCE

Resilience declined overall in Southern Africa, but only marginally, by 0.08. Against this backdrop, there were six countries that showed improvements in their resilience to organised crime. However, these advances come as a result of across-the-board changes to three building blocks – international cooperation (+0.77), victim and witness support (+0.46) and prevention (+0.69). These are indicators that improved not only in Southern Africa in the 2021 iteration, but across the African continent as well. This continental trend reflects the efforts of African countries to catch up to global standards, especially in victim support and protection and prevention against organised crime. Conversely, the civil society sector has suffered the most in Southern Africa, falling by 0.65. As previously mentioned, the COVID-19-induced economic downturn severely limited the ability of civil society actors to function properly. In addition, however, the virus was arguably used as an excuse by national governments to crack down on free speech. Consequently, the handling of the pandemic and subsequent loss of trust in national governments riddled with corruption became a reason for a drop in the law enforcement (–0.62), political leadership (–0.38) and government transparency (–0.23) indicators. Although ‘national policies and laws’ (–0.23) as well as ‘judicial system’ (–0.19) indicators declined on average, the scores in the majority of countries in the region remained unchanged.

Going back to a previous argument, border closures put in place during COVID-19, although of little impact in curbing illicit flows in most countries in Southern Africa, have to some extent had a positive effect on ‘territorial integrity’. On that account, although the average score went down by 0.31, the scores for three of the four island nations either remained the same or improved, as was the case for Madagascar (+1.00). Regionally, AML worsened slightly (–0.04) due to Mauritius being blacklisted by the European Commission in May 2020. Economic regulatory capacity has on the whole remained low across Southern Africa. A slight decline (–0.27) was observed in the 2021 iteration of the Index, a result of a more noticeable decline in the scores of Namibia (–1.50) and Madagascar (–1.00).

SECTION 5

ASSESSING VULNERABILITY






5 Assessing vulnerability

As emphasised in previous sections, 2020 was marked by the turmoil caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on the one hand, and numerous episodes of violence and conflict across the continent on the other. The aftermath of these circumstances has had severe impact, leading to an increase in organised crime while limiting the ability of states to withstand its effects. These frailties are evident in the movement of African states within the criminality–resilience quadrant.

FIGURE 5.1


Vulnerability classifications map



5.1 Low criminality – high resilience

FIGURE 5.2

Low criminality – high resilience



In the 2021 Organised Crime Index Africa, five countries – Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda and Senegal – are located in the low criminality–high resilience quadrant. These five countries are arguably in the best possible position when it comes to facing organised crime. Although each has certain criminal markets that are pervasive, their overall criminality situation appears under control. Furthermore, all appear well equipped to tackle existing criminality – with room, nevertheless, for some improvement in certain regards. A notable consideration to take into account when evaluating resilience is the fact that assessments of this component were made relative to the threat a specific country faces. The dynamic

organised crime situation would therefore require countries to actively work towards improving their resilience frameworks in order to avoid situations where a rise in one or two criminal markets spawns conditions for overall criminality levels to grow out of control because of a lack of appropriate counterbalancing measures. Nevertheless, lessons and best practices can be learned from the five countries situated in this quadrant, and additional efforts should be made to document and broadcast success stories to show how other countries across the continent could move into this 'best possible scenario' quadrant.

The previous iteration of this Index saw seven nations occupying the low criminality–high resilience quadrant. However, over the past two years, two countries – Morocco and Ethiopia – have dropped into to the low criminality–low resilience quadrant. While the COVID-19 pandemic served to highlight high-level corruption in Morocco and, at least initially, caused a disruption in the country’s justice system, conflict was the main driver of declining resilience in Ethiopia. As discussed earlier in the East Africa regional summary, the Tigray conflict affected almost all aspects of resilience to organised crime in Ethiopia in the final months of 2020. The civil unrest curtailed


the ability of the government to adequately respond to organised crime and served to limit cooperation with partner states.

It is also interesting to draw a parallel with the global trends. Data shows that out of the 193 countries that were assessed under the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index, 50 countries (almost 26%) were located in the low criminality–high resilience quadrant. In Africa, however, the five countries in the quadrant represent a mere 9.26% of the total, which is indicative of the broad vulnerability that runs through the continent.

5.2 Low criminality – low resilience

FIGURE 5.3

Low criminality – low resilience



Around 54% of African countries (29) are situated in the low criminality–low resilience quadrant. Even though the organised crime threat in these countries is thought to be comparably small, states should be forward-thinking and start building better resilience to organised crime, otherwise they risk suffering the serious ramifications of the phenomenon. It is important to note that the comparably low average criminality scores of countries positioned in this quadrant do not necessarily imply there are no criminal markets of serious concern. If left unaddressed, larger criminal markets or influential criminal organisations could develop. In fact, the number of countries in this quadrant paints a worrisome picture: more than half of them are assessed as having non-existent or ineffective anti-organised-crime frameworks. At the same time, approximately a third find themselves towards the higher end of the criminality spectrum (but nevertheless within the low criminality classification), which, given the ubiquity and quick evolution of organised crime activities, exposes them to the risk of sliding into the worst possible situation, where criminality is at a very high level and resilience mechanisms are underdeveloped and incapable of adequately responding to the threat.


While the overall number of countries in this quadrant has remained steady since the previous iteration, there has been some movement, as pointed out earlier. Along with Morocco and Ethiopia, Togo has also moved into this quadrant. The criminality score of the latter has improved from the previous iteration, now standing at 5.33. This, however, is not to say Togo cannot again cross the high criminality divide in the coming years. More efforts are necessary to keep the momentum going, especially in the areas of addressing corruption as well as better implementation of the country's anti-organised-crime legislation.

Ghana, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, on the other hand, have seen their criminality go up above the 5.5 mark and have moved into the high criminality–low resilience quadrant. While resilience has also deteriorated slightly in both Zimbabwe and Ghana, the latter experienced the largest increase in criminality. This is driven primarily by the increased pace of several criminal markets across the country, not least illicit logging and poaching of wildlife. A possible explanation for the inability of Ghanaian authorities to counter the expansion of the flora and fauna crimes markets, among others, is a shift in the agenda and prioritisation of COVID-19 measures. Although rare and of significant impact, the pandemic to an extent served to demonstrate how countries assessed as having ineffective or moderately effective measures, mechanisms and institutional frameworks in place to counter organised crime become increasingly susceptible to the threat. This highlights the need for countries that are placed in the low resilience quadrants to increase their efforts to combat organised crime.

5.3 High criminality – low resilience

FIGURE 5.4

High criminality – low resilience



In this iteration of the Index, 18 African countries – a third of the continent – find themselves in the worst possible scenario: the high criminality–low resilience quadrant. The challenges posed by organised criminal activity in these states are overwhelming, and meanwhile their underdeveloped resilience capabilities expose them to criminality dynamics being further aggravated. This could have far-reaching political, social and economic consequences that are difficult to reverse.

Indicative of this increased vulnerability is the fact that nearly 70% of the countries in the same quadrant in the 2019 edition of the Index have seen their criminality situation intensify over the course of

the past two years. As mentioned, only one country, Togo, has moved below the high criminality mark, while only four other countries have seen a reduction in their overall criminality scores in 2021. Against this backdrop, however, as outlined above, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Madagascar have worsened on the criminality component and now find themselves in the high criminality–low resilience quadrant.

Looking at the resilience responses of states in this quadrant, evaluations are not unidirectional, as there are positive developments as well. On the one hand, the resilience of countries in this quadrant is on average towards the bottom end of the scale, with measures assessed as either non-existent or fragile

and fragmented. Only three of the 16 countries are assessed as having a moderately effective regulatory or institutional framework to counter the organised crime threats they face. On the other hand, however, although the number of countries finding themselves in this quadrant has increased, more than half have seen some improvement in their resilience scores, which, contrary to what was observed continentally, resulted in the gap between criminality and resilience for the countries in the quadrant narrowing slightly.


It is not uncommon for countries to focus their anti-organised-crime efforts around a criminal justice and security approach. While data shows that compared to

other resilience building blocks, legislative frameworks are somewhat robust throughout countries in the quadrant, transparency and accountability are severely lacking and corruption runs rampant. As such, it would be safe to assume that addressing resilience deficits would be a difficult endeavour, given lack of political will. It is therefore critical for alternative forms of resilience that fall outside the domain of national institutions to be developed, namely through civil society and other non-state actors. Such efforts may serve to offset disruptive state practices and promote better state engagement.

5.4 High criminality – high resilience

FIGURE 5.5

High criminality – high resilience




As discussed elsewhere, the high criminality–high resilience category is the most counterintuitive because the two concepts that define it appear incompatible. While it is usually the norm for countries to be characterised by either high criminality or high resilience, evidently certain exceptions to the rule are discernible. It is therefore not striking that the quadrant, comprising only two countries (Nigeria and South Africa) has remained the category with the least number of countries over the past two years.

But what are the conditions that give rise to a country context of both high levels of criminality and a relatively robust resilience framework? Firstly, due to a number of historical, social and economic factors and the sheer number of criminal opportunities they simultaneously provide, some

countries are inherently vulnerable to exploitation by organised crime. The criminal setting would, in turn, militate against the development of resilience measures that would effectively suppress levels of organised crime, keeping the scores above the high criminality mark. Furthermore, countries may fare comparably well on the resilience component, but follow a downward trend as far as their resilience to organised crime is concerned. Such is the case with Nigeria, where pervasive criminality, although falling somewhat since 2019, puts stress on institutions and anti-organised-crime mechanisms, inhibiting overall resilience. Compared to 2019, Nigeria's resilience score has decreased by 0.17 points to 5.50 in 2021, thus placing the country on the cusp of the low resilience classification.

FIGURE 5.6

Criminality and resilience – country classifications





LOW CRIMINALITY
HIGH RESILIENCE
(5 COUNTRIES)

● BWA BOTSWANA

● CPV CABO VERDE

● MUS MAURITIUS

● RWA RWANDA

● SEN SENEGAL



LOW CRIMINALITY
LOW RESILIENCE
(29 COUNTRIES)

● AGO ANGOLA

● BDI BURUNDI

● BEN BENIN

● BFA BURKINA FASO

● COG CONGO, REP.

● COM COMOROS

● DJI DJIBOUTI

● DZA ALGERIA

● EGY EGYPT

● ERI ERITREA

● ETH ETHIOPIA

● GAB GABON

● GIN GUINEA

● GMB GAMBIA

● GNB GUINEA-BISSAU

● GNQ EQUATORIAL
GUINEA

● LBR LIBERIA

● LSO LESOTHO

● MAR MOROCCO

● MRT MAURITANIA

● MWI MALAWI

● NAM NAMIBIA

● SLE SIERRA LEONE

● STP SÃO TOMÉ AND
PRÍNCIPE

● SWZ ESWATINI

● SYC SEYCHELLES

● TGO TOGO

● TUN TUNISIA

● ZMB ZAMBIA



HIGH CRIMINALITY
LOW RESILIENCE
(18 COUNTRIES)

● CAF CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

● CIV CÔTE D'IVOIRE

● CMR CAMEROON

● COD CONGO, DEM. REP.

● GHA GHANA

● KEN KENYA

● LBY LIBYA

● MDG MADAGASCAR

● MLI MALI

● MOZ MOZAMBIQUE

● NER NIGER

● SDN SUDAN

● SOM SOMALIA

● SSD SOUTH SUDAN

● TCD CHAD

● TZA TANZANIA

● UGA UGANDA

● ZWE ZIMBABWE



HIGH CRIMINALITY
HIGH RESILIENCE
(2 COUNTRIES)

● NGA NIGERIA

● ZAF SOUTH AFRICA

SECTION 6

MARKETS, ACTORS AND RESILIENCE





6 Markets, actors and resilience

6.1 Relationship between criminality and resilience

Worldwide, the pervasiveness of criminality exists on a spectrum, from tiny island states almost entirely isolated from most forms of organised crime to major economic powerhouses afflicted to varying degrees by almost every form of illicit activity. The same applies to resilience to organised crime: some countries have built robust institutional resilience, whereas many lack the capacity, or even the political will, to put in place the frameworks and mechanisms needed to respond to the threat posed by organised crime.

Countries that have not historically had extensive levels of criminality have not had the stimulus to develop adequate mechanisms to counter organised crime.

It is true to say that generally speaking, countries that do boast an effective set of tools to combat organised crime are, perhaps logically, less likely to be gripped by high levels of criminality. Likewise, countries with high levels of organised crime tend to have weaker resilience to criminality. But across Africa, the anomaly is that most countries do not fit this pattern. In fact, the majority of the 54 countries have low criminality and low resilience. In other words, 29 African countries have low levels


of resilience, but do not exhibit high levels of organised crime. The fact that 25 of these are either low income or low-middle income is perhaps an important factor, in that developing nations are understandably less able to implement effective measures due to limited resources. But there is another reason so many countries appear to suffer from low levels of criminality despite having fairly weak capacity, institutional and otherwise, to combat organised crime. And that can be explained by the fact that countries that have not historically had extensive levels of criminality have not had the stimulus to develop adequate mechanisms to counter organised crime. After all, why would governments expend efforts to put in place measures to tackle an issue that is, for the most part, a non-issue?

There are also a small number of countries around the world that despite their relatively high resilience are still troubled by high levels of organised crime. South Africa and Nigeria are the only two such African countries (and this particular type of country is rare not just in Africa, but across the world). Indeed, of the 193 countries covered by the Global Organized Crime Index,⁷⁰ there are only nine with both a high resilience and high criminality score. These countries tend to be on the global stage, with sizeable economies, large potential domestic markets and highly developed infrastructure, which criminal economies are able to exploit, such as the United States, France, Italy, Colombia and Malaysia, among others.

Looking at the distribution of the countries in Africa across the four quadrants (see Figure 6.1), it is clear that the relationship between criminality and resilience, therefore, is not quite as simple as it may at first appear. Indeed, the correlation between the two headline scores is extremely weak, at just -0.29 , reinforcing the notion that the relationship between resilience and criminality is not straightforward.

FIGURE 6.1

Resilience vs criminality



This apparent ambiguity is no better exemplified than by the relationship between the prevalence of the different drug markets and a country's resilience to criminality more broadly. Certain criminal markets are demonstrably more pervasive in countries with weak capacity to tackle organised crime. Human trafficking, for example, thrives in countries where security is weak, legislation is ineffective and unimplemented, economic opportunities are few and far between, and support offered to those most vulnerable to exploitation is non-existent. Indeed, the correlation between human trafficking and overall resilience is 0.52 , the strongest of any market-resilience correlations. However, for the drug markets, the picture is very different. Here, evidence suggests that, far from drugs permeating the least resilient states in Africa, in the case of some drug markets there is no discernible link to a country's resilience level; in fact, some drug markets actually thrive in countries that have implemented more robust measures to tackle organised crime.

Some drug markets actually thrive in countries that have implemented more robust measures to tackle organised crime.


One possible explanation for the anomaly is that the criminal market scores consider each country's role as a source, transit and destination country. In the context of drug markets, producer and consumer countries might fall into very different resilience categories – for example, producer countries might have a low score on resilience to organised crime, whereas consumer countries might have a high score on resilience to organised crime, which could explain the ambiguous relationships. It could also be, however, that high-value drugs are likely to be consumed far more in wealthier countries, which also tend to be those with higher resilience. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the two markets that appear to have a positive, albeit fairly weak, relationship with resilience – in other words, the higher the resilience score, the higher the market score – are the heroin and cocaine trades (0.37 and 0.31, respectively).

While some of the relationships explored above provide some interesting insights, the main takeaway is the lack of a strong relationship between criminal markets and resilience. In other words, it is very difficult to predict how strong a grip illicit economies exert in any given country simply by looking at its resilience score. Indeed, the analysis shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between criminal markets and resilience. However, as we have seen, there is in fact some relationship between resilience and criminality more broadly, so what is driving that?

It is important to remember that criminality comprises two separate subcomponents. Not only does overall criminality capture the scope and scale of criminal markets in a country, but also assesses the strength and influence of various types of criminal actors. And it is the power of criminal actors that is more strongly related to a country's resilience to organised crime. In particular, it is the strength and prevalence of state-embedded criminal actors that show the strongest links to a country's resilience to organised crime. Countries in which state-embedded actors are less prominent are far more likely to have greater resilience to organised crime. This is hardly surprising, given state actors' role in determining a country's policies and laws, but it does re-emphasise once more that one of the most significant impediments to an effective counter-organised crime strategy is the presence of criminal actors embedded within state institutions.

Nevertheless, as with most patterns identified by the results of the Index, there are exceptions. There are a handful of countries – for the most part small or developing nations, such as São Tomé and Príncipe, Malawi and Djibouti, among others – where the influence of state-embedded criminal actors is fairly limited, but which display, despite this, low levels of overall resilience to organised crime. Conversely, there are a number of countries in Africa, including South Africa and Nigeria, and to a degree Kenya, where state-embedded actors have a significant influence on society and state institutions, but that nevertheless have relatively high resilience scores, having built up a far greater capacity to respond to organised crime than most other African states. In countries such as these, which have powerful security institutions, although corrupt practices and direct involvement in criminality can be rife, there are also many officials operating with integrity. Furthermore, the underlying institutions tend to be more robust, and are thus better able to mitigate the influence of state-embedded actors. These findings are supported by the moderate correlation that exists between state-embedded actors and resilience, at -0.64.

FIGURE 6.2

Resilience vs state-embedded actors

6.2 Crime convergence

Across Africa, the presence of any given criminal market is generally indicative of the pervasiveness of a wide range of other illicit economies. Indeed, there are positive correlations between the overall criminal markets score and each of the 10 individual criminal markets included in the Index. Of course, there are certain countries where most illicit economies are extremely limited, but one or two criminal markets are exceptionally pervasive. Equatorial Guinea in the case of flora crimes, for example, and Botswana and fauna crimes are two such examples.

But the Index results also highlight the increasing convergence between illicit economies over the past decades. One such example is the increased vulnerability to trafficking in persons within conflict settings. There a number of factors contributing to

the heightened prevalence of human trafficking in the context of armed conflict, including instability, forced displacement and economic collapse, all of which create a perfect storm for exploiting vulnerable people, in addition to the breakdown of the state and the erosion of the rule of law, contributing to an environment of impunity.⁷¹ Of the 13 countries in Africa scoring at least 8 for arms trafficking, a market that thrives in (and clearly contributes to) armed conflict, all but two score 7 or higher for human trafficking, illustrating the clear overlap between these two criminal markets. From child soldiers to forced recruitment and other forms of modern slavery, human trafficking takes many forms in conflict settings, and the strong link between human trafficking and arms trafficking is underlined by the strong correlation between the two markets (0.71).


Although they are distinct and separate forms of organised crime, human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, due partly to the fact that the lines between the two are often blurred. There is considerable evidence to suggest that what may begin as human smuggling, often transforms into various manifestations of human trafficking, or that those travelling across international borders irregularly using the help of smuggling networks are simultaneously highly vulnerable to trafficking along the way.⁷² In Libya, for example, one of Africa's major human smuggling hubs, these two crime types converge as armed groups and militias have increasingly turned towards exploitation of individuals held in migrant detention centres, taking numerous trafficking forms, from kidnapping for ransom, to extortion and forced labour.⁷³ Nevertheless, while many of the structural conditions that give rise to the two markets are similar, smuggling and trafficking remain two distinct forms of organised crime and there are numerous countries where one is highly pervasive while the other is not. Guinea, for example,

is a country where forced begging, child labour, trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and many other forms of trafficking are rife, but where the human smuggling industry is fairly underdeveloped.

Finally, another area of convergence that will surprise few, given they are often subsumed under the umbrella term 'wildlife crime', can be seen in two environmental crime markets: flora crimes and fauna crimes. There are several environmental crime hotspots around the world, the most prominent being the Golden Triangle in South-eastern Asia, the Amazon rainforest and other nearby biodiversity havens in Latin America, and the Congo Basin. Many countries in Africa have an abundance of animal and plant species, which elicits criminal exploitation of these resources. As such, many countries are faced with the scourge of both illegal poaching and trafficking of rare wildlife species, and the systematic illegal logging of common timber and rare tree species. Where fauna crimes are pervasive, there is also likely to be a prominent flora crimes market, and vice versa.

FIGURE 6.3

Flora crimes and fauna crimes




Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases, the destination markets for illegally trafficked animal and flora species are similar, with demand from Asia playing a major role in driving the illicit markets on the African continent. Hence, it is not solely the countries of origin that overlap, but often also the routes along which illegal wildlife products are trafficked. It is also possible that the criminal actors involved in marketing these various commodities overlap. The correlation between African illicit fauna and flora markets is 0.62, making the relationship between these crimes one of the strongest of the 10 criminal markets included in the Index.

OTHER INTERESTING FINDINGS

- Non-renewable resource crimes have a strong, positive relationship with the overall criminal markets score (0.73), suggesting that this market tends to be a good indicator of the pervasiveness of other illicit economies.
- There is a considerable overlap between non-renewable resource crimes and arms trafficking (0.54), illustrating the key role played by natural resources, such as gold and oil, in conflict zones.
- The drugs markets in general, and cocaine in particular, are relatively independent of other illicit economies in a country.
- There does appear to be somewhat of a convergence between synthetic drugs and non-renewable resource crimes (0.41), potentially reflecting the importance of Tramadol and natural resources (as discussed above) in conflict settings, in particular in the Sahel region.
- The most prominent cocaine markets in Africa tend to align with the most pervasive cannabis markets (0.40), driven predominantly by countries in West Africa: Nigeria, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Togo, Senegal, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde all score between 5 and 8 for both drug markets.



FIGURE 6.4
Drug markets





SECTION 7

WHAT MAKES A COUNTRY SUSCEPTIBLE OR RESILIENT TO ORGANISED CRIME?



What makes a country susceptible or resilient to organised crime?

7.1 Economic and geographic vulnerabilities

What makes a country more vulnerable to organised crime?

There are certain macroeconomic indicators, such as unemployment or inequality, that appear to move in the same direction as levels of organised crime. Countries with higher unemployment rates, for example, or those with greater degrees of inequality, are likely to experience higher levels of organised criminal activity. But it is not quite as easy to see a clear link between organised crime and many other country characteristics. Do richer countries, for example, tend to attract more organised crime than their less developed counterparts? On the one hand, wealthier nations tend to have highly developed trade infrastructure, populations with greater purchasing power and often an abundance of natural resources, all of which may make them more susceptible to criminal exploitation. But they are also likely to be much better equipped to respond to organised crime, and even prevent it in the first place.

Analysis of the Index data suggests that there is merit in the argument that richer countries do tend to have higher levels of criminality. Nigeria, the African country with the largest GDP, is also the country with the highest levels of criminality in the continent. Of the 15 largest economies in Africa, nine are assessed to have high criminality (scoring above 5.5). Conversely, only two of the 10 poorest countries in Africa – Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic – score above a 5 for criminality.

This notwithstanding, the relationship between GDP and criminality is not clear-cut (the correlation coefficient between the two variables is only 0.35), and in addition to the exceptions noted above, there are several countries with sizeable economies that are not threatened by extremely high levels of organised crime, including several countries in the Maghreb, namely Algeria and Morocco, as well as Senegal and Ethiopia, among others. Nevertheless, it is an important


Analysis of the Index data suggests that there is merit in the argument that richer countries do tend to have higher levels of criminality.

finding that richer countries in Africa do tend to be more vulnerable to organised crime, which serves as a reminder that countries with developed economies and advanced trade infrastructure, and which often simultaneously serve as source, transit and destination markets, need to be aware of the opportunities for criminal exploitation and put measures in place to mitigate the threat.

Interestingly, the strength of the relationship between the size of an economy and levels of criminality varies across the world. In Europe, richer countries are also slightly likelier to have more organised crime. In the Americas and in Asia, on the other hand, there is no discernible link. Indeed, analysis of all 193 countries covered by the Global Organized Crime Index shows that, globally, there is no correlation between GDP and levels of organised crime.

FIGURE 7.1

Criminality, GDP and land area



Source: World Bank

What about GDP per capita? Is the prosperity of the average person in a country somehow linked to levels of criminality? Again, there is a relationship, albeit weak, between the two variables, but unlike with GDP, the direction of the relationship is the other way around. In other words, on average, higher levels of wealth per capita are associated with lower levels of

organised crime. This may be explained by the fact that citizens with less disposable income may be less able to access formal economic opportunities, leaving some with little choice but to engage in the informal sector which is often highly interlinked with organised criminal activity. Nevertheless, the weak correlation suggests there are other forces at play. Individuals

with higher earnings, for example, may have the disposable income to purchase expensive illicit commodities such as cocaine, heroin and exotic wildlife species.


In terms of geographic and demographic characteristics, Africa is the only continent where both larger populations and greater land area are associated with higher levels of organised crime. One explanation may be that biodiversity in Africa is greater than in other continents, so it is only logical that bigger countries would have a greater abundance of biodiversity and natural resources, which means there is greater opportunity for criminal exploitation. Moreover, weaker governance and heightened insecurity in Africa, in addition to the hostile natural geography of the continent and long borders, may make it more difficult to control larger land masses, with territory harder to patrol. From Figure 7.1, it is fairly clear that while larger countries can have varying levels of organised crime – compare Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example – smaller countries are all located at the lower end of the criminality spectrum. That is not to say that certain illicit economies cannot prosper, nor is it to diminish the damage done by certain insidious criminal actors within certain smaller nations, but rather is a recognition of the fact that small states are unlikely to ever be a place where a wide range of criminal markets can take root and expand.

Are certain types of countries more resilient?

Just as richer countries are somewhat – albeit marginally – more likely to have higher levels of criminality, they are also associated with higher levels of resilience. This is also to say that smaller economies across Africa tend to have lower resilience to organised crime. Given that the majority of countries in Africa have both low criminality and low resilience, and in light of the discussion pertaining to the ambiguous relationship between criminality and resilience, the finding that countries with lower GDPs are simultaneously likelier to have lower levels of organised crime and less robust frameworks and mechanisms in place to tackle organised crime makes intuitive sense. In this respect, Africa is in line with global trends. Richer countries are able to pour more resources into their judicial systems and law enforcement agencies, for example. Likewise, funding available for support services is greater in countries with a larger economy, not to mention the fact that poorer countries simply do not have the luxury of prioritising any agenda that is not part of the bare minimum expected by a state – the provision of basic services. That is not to say, however, that economic growth necessarily leads directly to greater resilience, but there are likely to be several commonalities between wealthier states and states with greater resilience to organised crime that explain the correlation, including factors related to conflict, rule of law, economic stability and a whole host of others.


Where African countries deviate from the global pattern, however, is with regard to GDP per capita. Whereas, globally, countries with a greater average economic output per person tend to be more resilient to organised crime, the same cannot be said for countries in Africa. In fact, there is seemingly no relationship between GDP per capita and resilience. In Figures (7.2 and 7.3), a marked difference is apparent when assessing all countries globally, and when examining the relationship between the two variables for Africa alone.

FIGURE 7.2

Global resilience by income level

Source: World Bank

FIGURE 7.3

Africa resilience by income level

Source: World Bank



Of course, the fact that there are only two high-income countries in Africa makes comparing the continent with the rest of the world more difficult. But even still, the differences between countries in the upper-middle income band, for example, are stark. South Africa, for example, the country with the second-highest resilience score, is in the same income band as Libya, the country with the lowest resilience score on the continent. Many low-income states have extremely low levels of resilience to organised crime, such as Somalia, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, to name but a few, but there are also states in the same income band who buck the trend, namely Ethiopia and Rwanda.


There are good reasons why countries with lower GDP per capita may be less resilient to organised crime. For one, in countries in which the provision of basic services, such as clean water, food, education and healthcare, are guaranteed for the overwhelming majority of the population,

governments have greater time and resources at their disposal to dedicate to the strengthening of institutional and non-state frameworks that counter organised crime. There may also be indirect mechanisms at play – for example, democracies tend to have higher GDP per capita, and democracies on average have much higher levels of resilience. But it is evident that there are many other key factors that determine resilience to organised crime.

Finally, the geographic and demographic indicators – land and population size – are found to have no apparent link to a country's resilience. Countries of many different sizes, from the small island states of Cabo Verde and Mauritius to large countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, dominate the top end of the resilience ranking. Likewise, tiny states like Comoros, Burundi and Equatorial Guinea all have extremely low levels of resilience, similar to African giants Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

FIGURE 7.4

Resilience vs land size



Source: World Bank

Figure 7.4 highlights the absence of any particular relationship between the land size of a country and its level of resilience to organised crime. At any given land size (i.e. between any particular set of vertical gridlines in Figure 7.4), the number of countries with low resilience is just as high as the number of countries with relatively high resilience. Likewise, for any particular resilience score, there are just as many small countries as large. There is, however, a cluster of the continent's smallest countries that do have higher than average resilience scores, all of which are small island states: Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritius

and Cabo Verde. Globally, small island states tend to be more democratic, and this holds true for Africa too, which may partly explain why they tend to have higher levels of resilience to organised crime.⁷⁴ Furthermore, although the closeness between political leaders and their citizens common in small island states can be a catalyst for corruption and clientelism, their 'islandness' is often a key driver of community cohesion and 'provides a buffer against instability and conflict in neighbouring states',⁷⁵ which, as will be explored in the following section, is a major impediment to an effective response to organised crime.

7.2 Democracy, development, fragility, corruption

There is no doubt that organised crime, as well as a country's resilience to the same, interplays in some way or another with a multitude of other phenomena, be they geographic, economic, social, political or historical, among others. It is also true to say that more often than not, there is a symbiotic relationship between criminality and other types of security threats and social issues, which often reinforce each other in a vicious cycle.

Africa has realised important successes on numerous fronts in recent decades, with citizens' health, access to education and general living standards improving considerably, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa,⁷⁶ and the economies of the continent grew at almost double the pace of the global average. But in a year dominated by a global health crisis, swathes of Africa found themselves at their most vulnerable in decades. In 2019, the year preceding the outbreak of the pandemic in Africa, overall standards of governance in Africa had declined for the first time since 2010.⁷⁷ Some political leaders then took advantage of the health emergency, with corrupt practices intensifying across the continent amid the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷⁸ There has been a noticeable democratic backsliding over the past year, with more people in Africa living in either fully or partially authoritarian states than at almost any other point in the past two decades.⁷⁹

But how do these phenomena interact with the illicit economy in Africa? Are issues like corruption or

conflict major red flags when assessing the threat of organised criminal activity in a country? And how do different political and social environments shape a country's resilience, or lack thereof, to organised crime? To explore some of these questions, correlation analysis was carried out on the Index's headline scores and a number of other pertinent indices. For this analysis, the following indices were assessed:

- Human Development Index 2019 (HDI)⁸⁰
- Democracy Index 2020⁸¹
- Freedom in the World Index 2021 (FWI)⁸²
- Global Peace Index 2020 (GPI)⁸³
- Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 (CPI)⁸⁴
- Fragile States Index 2021 (FSI)⁸⁵
- Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2020 (IIAG)⁸⁶

Crime thrives in all manner of places

The fact that corruption is a major facilitator of organised crime globally is so widely acknowledged among experts that it can almost be considered a truism.⁸⁷ Not only do criminal actors use corruption to facilitate criminal activity, but they also seek to exploit relationships with officials from law enforcement bodies or from the judiciary to avoid arrest and subsequent prosecution. Corruption is not

only pervasive at lower levels of the state apparatus – political leaders across the continent have been widely accused of corruption, embezzlement, fraud and other forms of abuse of office. There exists a self-reinforcing spiral of corruption and organised crime, both simultaneously feeding off, and sustaining, each other. The fact that there is a positive correlation, albeit a moderate one (0.41), between the overall criminality score and the CPI, therefore, is perhaps unsurprising.


While there are a number of stable and prosperous countries in Africa – Mauritius, the Seychelles, Botswana and Ghana, to name but a few – many states on the continent are either only just recovering from, or still experiencing, conflict, violence and instability more broadly. Not only does unrest and violence create a breeding ground for illicit economies, but organised crime is also a key factor in creating the conditions for the onset of civil conflict,

mass protests and generally fractious societies.⁸⁸

The vast majority of countries scoring highest on criminality are those mired in internal conflict or plagued with issues such as banditry, kidnapping and other forms of violence against civilians. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Sudan and South Sudan are all countries afflicted by conflict, violence and extremism, while also having among the highest criminality scores on the continent, all scoring above 6. The correlation between criminality and the FSI is 0.49, but it is the GPI, the index measuring levels of peacefulness in a country, including ongoing conflict as well as measures of societal safety and security and the degree of militarization of a country, that is most strongly correlated with levels of criminality (–0.61). In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be gripped with high levels of organised crime.

FIGURE 7.5

Relationship between conflict and criminality



Source: Global Peace Index, Vision of Humanity (Institute for Economics and Peace)



The findings thus far are unlikely to surprise many. However, exploring the relationship between criminality and measures of the broader issues of governance, development, democracy and freedom raises some interesting questions. Firstly, the relationship between levels of organised crime in a country and development, as measured by the HDI, which captures human development in terms of health, education and economic outcomes, is fairly weak. The analysis does show that more developed countries tend to have somewhat lower levels of criminality and vice versa. Looking at the criminality rankings, this apparent pattern can be identified: the Seychelles, Tunisia and Botswana,⁸⁹ for example, are among the best-performing countries on the HDI and also have fairly low levels of organised crime. Conversely, those countries facing the most severe developmental obstacles, such as Niger and the Central African Republic, for example, are host to a wide range of illicit economies and criminal actors. However, there are also a number of poorly performing countries in the HDI, such as Burundi, Eritrea or Malawi, that are not among the African countries most affected by organised crime. Likewise, at the other end of the HDI spectrum, there are several countries with notable criminality levels, not least South Africa and Ghana.

A similar picture emerges when exploring the links between countries' political systems, levels of governance and degree of freedom enjoyed by citizens on the one hand, and criminality on the other. Transparency is one of the key features of a democratic state and in its absence, corrupt practices are able to thrive.⁹⁰ As discussed previously, countries with higher levels of (perceived) corruption tend to have higher levels of organised crime. Indeed, most of the least democratic states in Africa are hotbeds for organised crime: the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan, among others. Of the 20 highest-scoring countries for criminality, 16 are classified by the Democracy Index as either authoritarian or hybrid regimes. At the same time, however, not only are there numerous authoritarian states that are actually fairly insulated from the scourge of illicit economies, for example eSwatini and Rwanda, but there are also a handful of African democracies that are major organised crime hubs too, such as South Africa and Ghana.

As with human development, the correlation between criminality and levels of democracy, as measured by the Democracy Index, is very weak, at just -0.27 . The relationship is even weaker between criminality and the FWI (-0.13), which assesses the robustness of political rights and civil liberties. Similarly, the quality of governance across Africa does not appear to be a strong indicator of the levels of organised crime in a country: the correlation between criminality and the IIAG is just -0.25 .

What these findings show above all else is that the drivers of organised crime are extremely complex and there are likely to be few, if any, unambiguous and unequivocal predictors of levels of criminality in a country.

Conflict and corruption undermine resilience

As discussed earlier, a significant number of African countries find themselves with low levels of criminality despite also having fairly low levels of resilience to organised crime. It is understandable perhaps why countries in which illicit economies and criminal actors have little influence would seek to invest in enhancing resilience to organised criminal activity. But given the ever-increasing flexibility of criminal networks, a fact that was only highlighted further amid the COVID-19 pandemic, states should seek to ensure institutions and the rule of law are robust, as these are among the key bulwarks against illicit activity. Good governance, in the form of the successful provision of political, social and economic goods and services to citizens,⁹¹ is in fact one of the strongest indicators of high levels of resilience to organised crime. The correlation between good governance, as captured by the IIAG, and resilience is 0.81 , highlighting the importance of the rule of law, civil rights, economic opportunity and human development, among others.


An important pillar of good governance is transparency, accountability and the absence of corrupt practices. As discussed in the previous section, the symbiotic relationship between corruption and organised crime is well established. But the role of state-embedded actors, from local government officials to agents of law enforcement

bodies and members of the judiciary, is actually more one of creating the environment that allows organised crime to thrive than it is the direct involvement in criminal activity. The extensive remit of government action allows state-embedded actors ample opportunity to exploit and abuse their power for personal gain, thus eroding the frameworks and mechanisms required to effectively combat organised crime. Therefore, countries with higher perceived levels of corruption are far more likely to have lower levels of resilience to organised crime (the correlation between resilience and the CPI is 0.77).

Another important factor to consider when assessing a country's resilience to organised crime is the degree to which it is troubled with unrest, violence, armed conflict and fragility more generally. Countries mired in conflict, or facing extreme political, security and social pressures, are much less likely to have high levels of resilience to organised crime for several possible reasons. At the most basic level, if a country is engaged in a civil conflict, for example, the state's overriding priority will in all likelihood be to tackle the immediate threat of violence. Furthermore, if there is an ongoing struggle between the government and other armed factions, effective control over territory as well as social cohesion are likely to be weakened, both of which are key in developing an effective response to organised crime. Indeed, the results show a moderately strong relationship between resilience and state fragility (-0.63), as measured by the FSI. These hypotheses are also supported by the finding of a moderately strong correlation between resilience and peace (0.51), as captured by the GPI.

Finally, if the relationship between levels of democracy and susceptibility to organised crime can be described as ambiguous, no such characterisation can be made of the link between the former and the strength and effectiveness of a country's mechanisms and frameworks to counter organised crime. By and large, the more authoritarian tendencies a state exhibits, and the less space citizens have to enjoy political and civil liberties more specifically, the lower the country's resilience to organised crime (see Figure 7.6).

FIGURE 7.6

Africa resilience by regime type

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2020


Democratic states across the continent, such as Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, for example, are assessed to be far more resilient to organised criminal activity than highly authoritarian regimes. Conversely, there is not a single democratic state in Africa among the 27 lowest-scoring countries for resilience, a cluster of almost exclusively authoritarian states, as measured by the Democracy Index. It is no coincidence that the best-performing country on the resilience ranking – Cabo Verde – also tops the FWI. The correlation analysis lends support to the notion that democratic states are more resilient to organised crime, showing a strong correlation between resilience and the Democracy Index (0.71), as well as a moderately strong correlation with the FWI (0.62).

Perhaps the most obvious explanation for this strong relationship is the degree of transparency manifested by governments. Countries exhibiting lack of transparency at the upper echelons of the political elite are inherently more susceptible to individuals embedded within the state engaging in illicit activity. Furthermore, as the bastion of liberal democracies, freedom of the press is likely to be an important driver of the strong relationship. A free press that is able to robustly question, investigate, report on and hold to account political and criminal elites (and the overlap between the two) is much more common in democratic states than in authoritarian ones.

The purpose of the analysis presented in this section is not to conclusively determine causal mechanisms explaining levels of criminality and resilience in a country. However, as longitudinal evidence continues to be collected, the Index will offer more insights into the relationship and causal factors between these dynamics. The robust dataset provided by the Index does allow users to start thinking in greater depth about what kinds of factors may play a role in organised crime and the state's ability to counter it. The results suggest that while there are certain country characteristics – economic, political and geographic – that may be associated with higher criminality, such as larger economies or populations, the phenomenon of organised crime is so complex and nuanced that there is no definitive explanation for the different strengths and vulnerabilities across the world. Where certain factors may be strongly associated with a particular level of criminality in one region, they may have no bearing on criminality in another. These results serve to emphasise the need for on-the-ground analysis and tailored responses to the issue of illicit economies and organised criminal actors. What does appear to be a robust finding, however, is the importance of democratic values in ensuring an effective response to organised crime. The results highlight the corrosive effect of corruption and fragility on a state's ability to implement effective mechanisms and frameworks to counter illicit economies and criminal actors.

FIGURE 7.7

Correlation coefficients between Organised Crime Index resilience scores and selected external indices



Source: Transparency International; The Fund for Peace; Freedom House; United Nations Development Programme; Vision of Humanity (Institute for Economics and Peace); Economist Intelligence Unit; Mo Ibrahim Foundation

SECTION 8

CONCLUSION





8 Conclusion

If the results of the 2021 Organised Crime Index Africa show one thing, it is that the threat posed by organised crime to a large number of countries in Africa is real and should not, and cannot, be underestimated. That almost two-thirds of the continent's population live in countries with high levels of criminality is testament to that. What's more, this increasing threat shows no signs of slowing down. During the initial months of the outbreak of the novel coronavirus back in early 2020, there was hope in some circles that the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic would not just be limited to the formal economy and people's everyday freedoms, but that it would extend to the underworld, impeding illicit operations and bringing the transnational criminal economy to a halt.

Alas, COVID-19 did not prove to be a decisive blow to the global illicit economy, in Africa or across the globe more broadly. Compared to two years prior, in 2020, levels of criminality had increased, with the gap between criminality and resilience widening; the cocaine trade spiked; state-embedded criminal actors strengthened their hands; and social protection resilience measures remained weak. The pandemic did not only fail to impede illicit flows throughout the continent, and indeed the world, but exacerbated many of the social and structural conditions that often give rise to organised crime – inequality, lack of livelihoods, instability and underdevelopment.

Similarly, COVID-19 revealed the harsh reality of countries' structural weaknesses in their ability to tackle these conditions as a way to counter organised criminal activities. As the results of the 2019 Index showed, even before the world plunged into a global health crisis, responses to organised crime on the African continent were heavily skewed towards security and criminal justice, falling short in addressing the social and structural vulnerabilities which organised crime takes advantage of to flourish in the first place. Today, amid the backdrop of COVID-19, these imbalances

remain, and countries find themselves in an even more difficult situation, having to balance addressing the growing organised crime threat, while managing a once-in-a-lifetime health crisis. While border closures and constraints on freedom of movement acted as obstacles to certain illicit markets in the short term, it was the very restrictions imposed by governments in response to the global health crisis that in many instances amplified the conditions in which organised crime thrives. The scourge of human trafficking is a prime example of a criminal market that was adversely affected by the pandemic, as trafficking networks took advantage of the fact that victims were left

The pandemic did not only fail to impede illicit flows throughout the continent, and indeed the world, but exacerbated many of the social and structural conditions that often give rise to organised crime.

unable to escape due to restrictions on movement. But moreover, it was the economic devastation caused by response measures to the pandemic that exacerbated vulnerability to exploitation. Where economic opportunities are few and far between, millions of people across the continent are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation and recruitment into gangs, often left with little choice but to engage in illicit activity to put food on the table.

The effects of these strained and often asymmetrical governance and response frameworks are all too evident, with the 2021 Index results revealing that nearly eight in 10 people in Africa live in countries with low levels of resilience to organised crime. What is clear is that past shortcomings in the approach to tackling organised criminal activities remain and are heightened in today's unique global environment.

Even in countries currently somewhat insulated from the greatest harms caused by organised crime, fragile, ineffective, and in some cases even absent, institutions, frameworks and mechanisms leave societies vulnerable to future threats. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the unpredictability of governance challenges, it also highlighted the urgency in recognising the scale of the organised crime phenomenon and its ability to adapt to the unpredictable. In doing so, organised crime in Africa can and should become prioritised and addressed through a real commitment to tackle it in a holistic way by taking a balanced approach in addressing societal vulnerabilities such as eliminating poverty and inequality to reduce incentives to engage in illicit behaviour and the inclusion of non-state actors as fundamental in advancing anti-organised crime efforts.

While this is easier said than done, countries do have opportunities to effectuate realistic and impactful changes that can build resilience frameworks that can withstand the organised crime threat. For example, rather than focusing efforts on building new livelihoods, turning attentions to improving countries' existing economic environments to better regulate informal sectors would help alleviate the pressure on citizens to engage in informal and illicit activities to gain income. By implementing safety nets and a means of recourse in sectors that are prone to criminal capture, including where foreign investments from outside Africa are concentrated, stakeholders

can work towards integrating informal activities into the formal sector as the first steps in regaining the economic growth lost amid the pandemic.

Beyond economic development, good governance has been shown to be an integral part of discussions surrounding organised crime. As the Index highlights, while

criminal militias, insurgencies, loose criminal networks and various forms of foreign criminal actors all play an important role in the criminal landscape across Africa, it is state-embedded actors that are the most dominant vectors of organised crime, facilitating and even taking part in illicit economies up and down the continent. What's more, state-embedded actors are also the fastest-growing criminal actor type since 2019, due in large part to the COVID-19 pandemic. Actors from all echelons of power have been observed to either facilitate or directly engage in organised crime. At the lower levels, petty corruption – often the result of low income – as well as lack of resources stymie anti-organised crime efforts. While criminality undermines governance, the promotion of good governance structures is key to building resilience to illicit activities.

It is therefore crucial for national authorities and international funding partners to turn their attention to building capacity across justice and security structures. Investing in institutions that have shown integrity in the implementation of their functions through processes that increase transparency and accountability or that have the capacity to deliver oversight roles (or the creation of new ones) is key. In strengthening the response of national bodies and improving international cooperation with relevant counterparts, authorities could build up their resilient to crisis, such as those brought about by COVID-19, and better withstand its ramifications.

At the same time, effective oversight mechanisms that allow the government to be held to account, both internally and by external actors from non-state actors, including civil society, among others, are crucial in ensuring that the avenues for potential collusion of

It is state-embedded actors that are the most dominant vectors of organised crime.

individuals operating from within the state apparatus with criminal actors are closed down as much as possible. The deterioration of the non-state actor resilience indicator illustrates a tendency of some governments to crack down on dissent, particularly from the media but also in the form of popular protests, under the guise of public health measures. Freedom of the press is a bastion of liberal democracies, and so it may be of little surprise that one of the most robust findings of the Index is that countries exhibiting authoritarian tendencies are considerably less resilient to organised crime. As such, directing investments and prioritising the protection of non-state actors, as unique oversight agents, would allow for a more balanced approach to building resilience against criminality, particularly when linked to state-embedded actors.

Illicit economies, from the various drug markets to illicit gold mining and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, are known to be key drivers of conflict and instability. But from the opposite perspective, conflict settings and fragile states often provide perfect environments for organised criminal activity to flourish, and the African continent is no exception. Not only are criminal economies able to embed and intertwine themselves within the formal economies and market institutions of countries experiencing violence, terrorist attacks, insurgency and war, but the instability caused by conflict and other forms of unrest is also in many cases a significant impediment to an effective government response to organised crime.

Where organised crime and conflict converge, often motives for engagement are economic and social or political.⁹² When international and state-based instruments, particularly economic sanctions, are imposed to address conflict, their impact can result in unintentionally further embedding illicit activities, as limited access to certain goods may lead communities to rely on the informal or illicit economy to address their needs. To break the vicious cycle of heightened crime together with weakened response, it is imperative that solutions for long-term

peace are prioritised, including ensuring that conflict actors that are resourced by illicit economies are allowed the space to voice their concerns. In many cases, implementing processes that work to provide alternative livelihoods and/or address social priorities for conflict actors, such as community-based initiatives, particularly those who have shown a willingness to lay down their arms, can allow countries to take the first steps towards peace and reduce criminality.

Despite the presence of sound anti-organised-crime international frameworks throughout the continent, the need to engage with both state and non-state counterparts to better implement international obligations to local contexts is key to build resilience to withstand the impact of organised crime, even amid major global disruptors like the pandemic. Although indicators such as victim and witness support and prevention were found to be the most improved across the continent over the past two years, social protection and civil society measures more generally remained the weakest of the 12 building blocks that constitute an effective response to organised crime. The discrepancy between the emphasis placed on social protection measures and the institutional and security frameworks is symptomatic of an overreliance on law enforcement and criminal justice approaches to reducing organised crime, while at the same time neglecting harm reduction measures and failing to provide the necessary support to non-state actors. Civil society actors are supporting those most vulnerable and affected by criminality, keeping authorities in check and promoting tenable organised crime responses through their unique ability to engage with communities at a local level. A careful discussion is needed at a continental, subregional and national levels on how to ameliorate these discrepancies, with greater attention to social protection measures and the social harms caused by criminality, drawing on the experience and expertise of key non-state actors, to ensure that a truly holistic approach is taken to tackling organised crime.




Ranking by
Criminality

ORDER AND FILTER

SECTION 9


ENACT ORGANISED CRIME INDEX WEBSITE

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
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO

7.75 ↗ 0.46




NIGERIA

7.15 ↘ -0.55




CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

7.04 ↗ 0.17




LIBYA

6.55 ↗ 0.28



MOZAMBIQUE

6.53 ↗ 0.66




SUDAN

6.47 ↗ 0.09




ENACT Organised Crime Index website

A dedicated website – africa.ocindex.net – has been created to present the results of the Africa Organised Crime Index. The website has a home page that introduces the Index, featuring the criminality heatmap as the landing page. The ‘Heatmap scores’ webpage allows users to visualise the scores map for any of the 10 criminal markets, four criminal actor types and 12 resilience indicators included in the Index, in addition to the aggregate component and subcomponent scores. Furthermore, the website allows for a side-by-side comparison of any of the Index’s scores, both aggregated and disaggregated. Importantly, users are also able to make longitudinal comparisons using historical data from the ENACT Organised Crime Index 2019.




9.1 Sort and compare

Although organised crime and responses differ from country to country, it is nevertheless a global problem. Under both the criminality and resilience components of the Index, countries are ranked based on their scores in order to offer users the option for comparative analysis across the continent. Above all, country rankings are meant to start a conversation among policymakers and regional bodies, encouraging them to delve deeper into how and why organised crime affects their respective countries, and learn from one another in order to develop effective resilience strategies.




9.2 Country summaries

In addition to the scores and rankings, the Organised Crime Index website allows users to explore country summaries that explain the context behind each country's scores. Country summaries highlight the background for each component (i.e., criminality and resilience), subcomponent (i.e., criminal markets and criminal actors) and indicators, while highlighting key trends based on expert assessments.



9.3 Make your own comparisons

The Organised Crime Index offers a holistic framework of a country's overall relationship to organised crime. At the same time, its subcomponents and indicators allow users to disaggregate such information and determine correlations with various impact areas in any given country and/or region. Policymakers and other users are able to compare data geographically, substantively and, with future iterations of the Index, temporally, so that they can identify key trends.





Appendix 1

Results interpretation – considerations

A1.1 Information availability

As a data-driven tool, the Index aims to standardise the complex concepts of criminality and resilience across 54 countries in Africa. While standardisation promotes comparative analysis and easy interpretation, it does not come without challenges. The collection of data may vary across countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. These issues are even more pronounced, given the inherently clandestine nature of organised crime that the Index captures. While the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges by expert cross-checks and triangulating sources, another challenge arises when there is abundant information on a particular country or component.

Research and information promote greater understanding of the organised crime situation in a given country and its resilience, informing better policymaking and responses. Nevertheless, for comparative tools such as the Index, an information bias – where more information is published on some areas rather than others – may risk skewing results and/or interpretation of findings. In other words, an organised crime problem may appear to be more acute in countries where more information, research and reporting have occurred. One of the main goals of the Index is to highlight areas where information is lacking in an effort to promote further research. It is important for stakeholders to accept indices for what they are and the information they provide, as supplementary to other means of gathering information.

Similarly, instances arise where published information and evidence is lacking but experts with in-depth knowledge of a specific context acknowledge that problems exist. In such cases, the Index, as an expert-led assessment, heavily relies on expert knowledge in evaluating country contexts.

The challenge of information scarcity is exemplified by the case of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, often referred to as Western Sahara. Given the issues of data availability (both in terms of Western Sahara's non-inclusion in the vast majority of international state-based databases and external indices; and in terms of local, on-the-ground organised crime expertise in the territory) the decision was taken to not include Western Sahara in the Index. However, it is our hope that the Index catalyses a debate around issues of criminality in the region, thus contributing to a strengthened evidence base, and that in future iterations of the Index, the inclusion of Western Sahara will be considered.

A1.2 Diversity in Index components

Countries' unique historical, geographic, cultural, social and economic contexts means that organised crime will develop and adapt to distinct environments. In other words, organised crime looks different for every country, and users' approach to the Index results should stem from a staunch understanding that countries may start off on unequal footing – what makes a country more or less vulnerable to organised crime will vary. Countries that differ in their criminality and resilience may nevertheless be assigned the same scores, while those that host a particularly acute organised crime problem may appear to score lower than other countries. These results can be explained by the structure of the Index. Because overall criminality and resilience scores are assigned based on a simple average of their respective composite indicators, countries that feature a diverse range of criminal markets and criminal actors will score higher than those that have fewer, albeit more pervasive, criminal characteristics.

The same can be said to describe resilience indicators. Even in the same country, resilience efforts that may have proved effective in the past may be unable to address new and emerging criminal trends. Just as criminality dynamics differ across states, countries must implement tailor-made responses to their unique situations in order to effectively address organised crime within their borders. Overall resilience scores will be dependent on countries' ability to tackle the organised crime situation in their country based on a holistic and multi-faceted approach, rather than a criminal justice or economically driven approach.

A1.3 Limitations

Recognising the difficulties in creating a tool that studies a subject matter that is incredibly varied and inherently clandestine, the Index, framed as an expert-led assessment, naturally comes with limitations. Nevertheless, the Organised Crime Index can be described as a flawed but worthwhile exercise that we hope will become a catalyst for further debate and a source of trend identification and analysis.

On a methodological note, there are considerations that must be taken into account when interpreting the scores. First and foremost, the Index relies heavily on individual expert knowledge and experience, which introduces the possibility for an implicit bias, where experts' personal convictions would affect their judgement. The ramifications in this case are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, experts might have been too critical, knowing all of a specific country's deficiencies, and on the other, they might have been tempted to be too lenient. Although the latter was presumed more probable prior to the evaluation rounds, it was observed that experts tended to be more critical and often held countries, especially developed ones, to a higher standard. Throughout the development of the tool, we have attempted to control that bias by providing preliminary country profiles as a basis for experts to make their assessments on as well as specifying scoring thresholds

to guide the scoring process, as outlined in the methodology section. In addition, all countries underwent a number of anonymous verification rounds, comparing the scores across indicators and regions in an attempt to account for the implicit bias.

Experts in the initial scoring round provided scores, which were presented to experts in the following geographic and thematic scoring rounds. This opened the possibility for a confirmation bias, where experts would confirm the scores assigned in previous rounds. To address this, an additional score verification round was carried out, where groups of representatives from numerous areas of expertise came together in moderated regional discussions to debate and scrutinise the scores and justifications for each country.

In addition, as one aspect of the Index tool is to help policymakers improve their approach towards organised crime, it is fundamental to understand where harms for different markets are coming from. It is undeniable that many of the harms associated with specific markets stem from existing policies. One example for that would be the cannabis trade. Policies related to the policing and use of cannabis differ across and even within countries. Thus, evaluating the impact associated with that market has been rather ambiguous. While an increasing number of states are moving to decriminalise or legalise cannabis, there is some room for illegality, like trafficking cannabis to countries with stricter policies, for instance. Thus, to be as consistent as possible, the importance of capturing that aspect of illegality when evaluating the market was stressed to expert scorers. Still, consistency in that case has been difficult to achieve.

Another critical issue of concern during the scoring process was the debate on harm/impact of markets. In other words, whether harms are comparable across markets. From here stems another limitation of the tool – the weighing of different components of the Index. Currently, as has already been specified, indicators are weighed evenly. Nevertheless, four of the 10 markets are drug-related, which puts implicit weight on the impact of drugs, which, depending on the context, may pose issues. Flora crimes in North Africa, for example, are almost non-existent. Yet they are weighted equally with more pervasive markets, such as human smuggling and the cannabis trade. That has, on a number of occasions, raised the obvious question among experts whether this

approach was justified. However, this environmental market has had a significant impact in other regions in Africa, where it has endangered entire ecosystems. Arguably, the impact of environmental crime markets has been more severe in other regions than human smuggling, for example, which is perceived as problematic in a North African context.

Thus, the current weighting of indicators might lead to some curious results. What often occurs is that two countries that perhaps would not be expected to rank on the same level criminality-wise, turn out to be very similar to one another. This is where we advise caution and recommend readers to look at the disaggregated scores, as we have stressed in the beginning of the report, because countries might have similar or same overall ranking but for different reasons.

The Index has been somewhat limited in its scope as well, currently covering only 10 criminal markets. It is therefore arguable that the criminality score does not paint a full picture of the organised crime landscape in a particular country and across regions. It is our hope that in due time, more criminal markets will be included in the Index and the tool will be able to provide a fuller account of the phenomenon across the continent.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has been the overarching theme of 2020, having an all-permeating effect on all aspects of life, including organised crime. Yet, the dynamics brought about by the pandemic were difficult to untangle, not least of all because of scarcity of information in the first months of the pandemic. As borders closed in early 2020 and air travel was restricted, it was thought that organised crime would suffer significant financial losses, similar to the legal economy, and shrink. Criminal actors, however, quickly adapted to the situation, and although there was some displacement in criminal activities, some illicit flows continued to operate. A case in point is the drug trade, which, driven by large demands, continued to function facilitated by the mostly unaffected maritime trade. Nevertheless, since the Index was developed as the pandemic unfolded, we recognise that its full effects on organised crime would be properly evaluated at a later stage. Therefore, we consider the COVID-19 pandemic as an obstacle that, to an extent, impeded proper data collection and analysis, and by extension the conclusions that could be drawn.

Appendix 2

Definitions

A2.1 Defining organised crime

An index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring organised crime, the parameters that this Index relies on are informed by definitions of organised crime, and related activities and concepts.

Organised crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Although there is an awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by different actors that fluctuate and adapt to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organised crime, came into force, compelling member states to consider defining organised crime. Unable to reach a consensus, however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition of the term, but rather offers clarity on two constants within the broad context of organised crime.

The terms 'organised criminal group' and 'serious offence', outlined in the convention, offer the basic conditions for an activity to be deemed to be 'organised crime' and the flexibility to address the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organised criminal group may refer to a broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely connected networks. Likewise, the convention's focus on the term 'serious offence' ensures a distinction is maintained between low-level criminality and organised criminal activity. Moreover, the convention specifically speaks to activities that are profit-driven, allowing for policies and responses to distinguish organised crime from solely politically motivated actions, such as terrorism. Today, the consensus among the convention's member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional debates surrounding the term 'organised crime' and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in

which the term can be understood and conceptualised. Nevertheless, for an index to offer true insight and value, some form of definition is essential. While relying (though not exclusively) on international instruments to define various criminal markets, the Index considers both transnational organised crimes and organised criminal activities occurring within state boundaries.

By defining organised crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and perpetrators to be considered and measured. One key point to note in this definition is the issue of legality. Activities that are not designated as illegal or that have been legalised in a country fall outside of the scope of the assessment

DEFINITION OF ORGANISED CRIME

For the purpose of the Africa Organised Crime Index, 'organised crime' is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

of that particular country, even if considered illegal in another. At the same time, activities that are not illegal but that violate international human rights

standards are included under the Index. Under the organised crime ‘umbrella’, the following section offers highlights of the subcomponents of the Index.

A2.2 Criminal market definitions

People

Human trafficking

Drawing from a range of sources, the Index covers human trafficking within a modern slavery context and includes the trafficking of organs. In line with common interpretations of human trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men, women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows (such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the Index, human trafficking includes activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and transfer, to harbouring and receipt of persons. To distinguish this market from that of human smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent. In line with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC, exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Human smuggling

Under the Index, human smuggling requires the criminalisation of the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organised criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit activity, including the producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents when committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants. Although distinct crimes, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

Trade

Arms trafficking

The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well as intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. ‘Firearms’ refers to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UNTOC. ‘Small arms’ and ‘light weapons’ refer to a range of specific weapons, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often the trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organised crime activities.

Environment

Flora crimes

Crimes related to flora involve the illicit trade as well as possession of species covered by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) as well as other species protected under national law.

Fauna crimes

Like flora crimes, crimes involving fauna species reflect the poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES, as well as any other species protected by national law. The Index also considers protected marine species, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing falls under this category.

Non-renewable resource crimes

The Index includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. It also covers any illicit activities related to the trade of such products, including price misinvoicing. The Index covers commodities including, but not limited to, oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

Drugs

Heroin trade

The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while not in and of itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

Cocaine trade

Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market.

Cannabis trade

The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Recognising the growing legalisation of cannabis production, sale and consumption across countries, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalised and/or where criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

Synthetic drugs trade

As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as Tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants, methamphetamines and Fentanyl are included in this criminal market, as well as any other narcotic included in the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Notably, 'substandard and falsified medical products', as outlined by the World Health Organization, has been excluded.

A2.3 Criminal actor definitions

Mafia-style groups

Refers to clearly defined, organised criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining features of a mafia-style group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

Criminal networks

Refers to a loose network of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or with a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial

control or any of the other defining features of mafia-style groups. In essence, criminal networks and entrepreneurs are defined by their failure to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

State-embedded actors

Refers to criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus.

Foreign actors

Refers to state and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. This can include not just foreign nationals but also various diaspora groups that have created roots in the country over multiple generations.

A2.4 Resilience indicator definitions

Political leadership and governance

Refers to the role a state's government plays in responding to organised crime and its effectiveness in doing so. Strong political leadership and governance indicate higher state resilience to organised crime.

Governments orient citizens toward a state's stance on organised crime, championing its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. The platform in which anti-organised crime rhetoric is made reflects to some degree the level of prioritisation of organised crime on the national agenda.

Governance serves as a function of the relationship between the state and its governed populations. Leaders send messages that are seen as legitimate, and in turn unify society. People's confidence in those who govern them can be directly linked to conflict in a society. The presence of organised crime can tangibly reduce the capacity for governance and the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. When there is no or little confidence in government, society can become unstable, creating (further) opportunities for organised crime to fill the void between the state and its populations.

Government transparency and accountability

Refers to the degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities – in other words, whether or not the state creates opportunities for the reduction of state corruption and to obscure the illegitimate control over power or resources, including resources linked to organised crime.

As representatives of their citizens, governments are entrusted with powers to oversee and maintain the rule and order of societies. When this contract is abused, it both undermines citizens' trust in state institutions (which may lead to vulnerabilities to organised crime) and can imply state collusion in organised crime. Efforts to increase transparency, such as adequately resourcing anti-corruption measures, work to close opportunities in which organised criminals may exert their influence. Thus,

DEFINITION OF RESILIENCE

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries' measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

the more transparent governments are, the more resilient a state is to organised crime.

International cooperation

Refers to the structures and processes of interaction, policymaking and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level in order to respond to organised crime. Strong international cooperation indicates high state resilience to organised crime.

As organised crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, with actors and supply chains able to span national and continental boundaries, it is essential that states work together on a global scale to combat the threat.

The ratification (and timeliness of ratification) of relevant international organised crime treaties implies state willingness to effectuate responses to organised crime, in line with international standards. These treaties are:

- The UNTOC and its three protocols
- The UN Convention against Corruption
- The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)
- The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
- The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
- The Arms Trade Treaty (2013)
- CITES

At the international level, for states parties, these instruments constitute sufficient legal grounds to carry out response measures to organised crime. Such responses include cooperation in criminal matters, particularly mutual legal assistance, extradition, the transfer of sentenced prisoners and transborder asset confiscation. The presence of such structures and policies, and evidence of their effective use, implies higher state resilience to organised crime.

National policies and laws

International cooperation is an essential component to combating organised crime because it sets the basis for national responses. Thus, national policies and laws refers to state legal action and structures put in place to respond to organised crime. National organised crime strategies and legislation are adapted to the needs of the state, its legal tradition and social, economic cultural and geographic conditions. As such, the presence of these reflects higher state resilience to organised crime.

Judicial system and detention

Refers to a state's judiciary's power to effectively try to enforce judgments on organised crime-related cases. The ability of a country's judicial system to do so depends on whether it is adequately resourced and operates independently and effectively at all points along the juridical chain.

Although passing judgment on cases is its primary function, the ability to enforce is also an essential component of a judiciary's activities. Things such as evidence that key organised crime criminals are successfully prosecuted and, in particular, the degree of organised crime influence from within the prison system are factors to consider in assessing a state's judicial capacity. Where the prison system is notably captured by organised crime, this should significantly impact the score.

Thus, while having more resources and independence to pass judgment on organised crime cases implies higher state resilience, high impunity implies lower state resilience.

Law enforcement

Refers to the state's ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures regarding organised crime.

As the front line of a state's criminal justice system, law enforcement and intelligence are often in direct contact with organised criminal activities. In order to bring criminal perpetrators to justice, the capacity of a state's law enforcement to combat organised crime rests on things such as whether it is adequately resourced, and whether the state has invested in law enforcement mechanisms that are specifically organised-crime-focused. It can therefore be said that higher law enforcement capacity makes a state more resilient to organised crime.

Territorial integrity

Refers to the degree to which states are able to control their territory and infrastructure against organised criminal activities, including border control personnel capacity.

A country's physical location and geography may increase the risk of exploitation by organised criminal groups. As lengthy borders are less likely to be regulated, criminals are more likely to take advantage of the vast expanse by smuggling illicit commodities and people unnoticed. Moreover, the level of a state's economic engagement internationally, marked by things such as its port and airport infrastructure, can increase the feasibility with which to move goods and people (both legitimately and illegally) between countries.

As such, the greater resources and structures put in place by states to manage their territorial integrity against organised crime, the higher its resilience.

Anti-money laundering

Refers to a state's ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

Profits that criminals make from organised crime are often concealed by being funnelled through legitimate businesses. Through the development of anti-money-laundering mechanisms, states become more resilient to the threat of money laundering, which potentially underlies all forms of organised crime.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a policymaking body that has developed a series of recommendations that are recognised as the

international standard for combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis for a coordinated response to these threats to the financial system.

States are assessed through mutual country evaluations to determine their level of compliance with these international standards. The higher compliance, the more resilient states are to organised crime.

Economic regulatory capacity

Refers to the ability to control and manage the economy, and to regulate financial and economic transactions (both nationally and internationally) so that trade is able to flourish within the confines of the rule of law. In other words, whether an actor has put into place and can effectively oversee the mechanisms that ensure economic transactions and businesses operate in a predictable, fair way, free from distortion, including criminal activities such as extortion and illicit taxation.

When actors are able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, it allows for options and opportunities for legitimate, regulated business to expand. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for informal, illegal business to arise, or for criminal groups to unduly influence economic forces, through alternative regulation, extortion or criminal practice.

States under protracted sanctions by the international community have been shown to develop illicit means by which to circumvent or soften the impact of those sanctions.

The larger the number of sound economic regulations that are in place and the lower number of (and duration of) sanctions placed on a state, the higher resilience a country has to organised crime.

Victim and witness support

Refers to the existence of assistance provided to victims of various forms of organised crime (for example, human trafficking, drug trafficking, extortion or fraud).

Support mechanisms, treatment programmes for victims and resources allocated to these initiatives

create an environment in which citizens are able to recover more quickly from the effects of organised criminal activities.

Moreover, initiatives such as witness protection programmes are essential, and often the only way to successfully prosecute organised criminals. The more such support programmes are put in place, the more resilient states are to organised crime.

Prevention

Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organised crime. While prevention considers mainly state initiatives, these frameworks often use a holistic approach to preventive measures through community outreach, recognising that citizens that are engaged in prevention to organised crime help make the state more resilient.

Through prevention, states can build safeguards to protect against organised crime by effecting behavioural change in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities. Thus, the more robust a state's prevention scheme is, the more resilient it is to organised crime.

Non-state actors

From a resilience perspective, non-state actors play a role in responding to organised crime to supplement government care and by ensuring 'checks and balances' against governments to ensure resilience to organised crime. The non-state actors indicator is also a measure of the degree to which civil society organisations are able and allowed to play a role in responding to organised crime across the spectrum, from victim support to crime prevention.

Civil society organisations are engaged in local communities, where ownership of initiatives against organised crime is formed, leading to more sustainable response measures. Similarly, the media is critical in the role it plays holding governments to account and provides a voice for communities by mobilising civil society against the threat of organised crime among local populations. Thus, the more civil society capacity a state has, the more resilient it is to organised crime.



Appendix 3

Rankings tables

A3.1 Criminality scores

COUNTRY	2021	2019-21 SCORE CHANGE
1. CONGO, DEM. REP.	7.70	↗ 0.46
2. NIGERIA	7.38	↘ -0.55
3. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.29	↗ 0.18
4. KENYA	6.86	↗ 0.81
5. SOUTH AFRICA	6.40	↗ 0.47
6. LIBYA	6.40	↗ 0.29
7. MOZAMBIQUE	6.38	↗ 0.67
8. SUDAN	6.26	↗ 0.08
9. SOUTH SUDAN	6.23	↘ -0.06
10. CAMEROON	6.20	↗ 0.33
11. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.16	↘ -0.08
11. TANZANIA	6.14	↗ 0.52
13. UGANDA	6.05	↗ 0.09
14. GHANA	6.04	↗ 1.12
14. NIGER	5.98	↗ 0.27
16. MALI	5.86	↘ -0.31
17. CHAD	5.84	↗ 0.02
18. SOMALIA	5.79	↘ -0.61
19. ZIMBABWE	5.74	↗ 0.25
20. MADAGASCAR	5.63	↗ 0.21
21. BURKINA FASO	5.56	↗ 0.51
22. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.41	↗ 0.46
23. SIERRA LEONE	5.41	↗ 0.40
24. TOGO	5.39	↘ -0.23
25. ANGOLA	5.38	↗ 0.51
26. BENIN	5.14	↗ 0.42
27. GUINEA	5.00	↘ -0.19

COUNTRY	2021	2019-21 SCORE CHANGE
28. EGYPT	4.99	↗ 0.02
29. LIBERIA	4.98	↗ 0.21
30. CONGO, REP.	4.89	↗ 0.18
31. ZAMBIA	4.88	↗ 0.07
32. GABON	4.86	↗ 0.22
33. GAMBIA	4.85	↗ 0.22
34. SENEGAL	4.84	↗ 0.21
35. ETHIOPIA	4.83	↗ 0.21
35. MOROCCO	4.78	↘ -0.09
37. ALGERIA	4.68	↗ 0.30
37. BURUNDI	4.61	↗ 0.12
37. MAURITIUS	4.60	↗ 0.35
40. MAURITANIA	4.60	↘ -0.22
41. ERITREA	4.58	↗ 0.08
42. NAMIBIA	4.39	↗ 0.52
43. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.26	↗ 0.58
44. CABO VERDE	4.24	↗ 0.30
45. DJIBOUTI	4.21	↗ 0.26
46. LESOTHO	4.16	↗ 0.25
47. COMOROS	4.09	↗ 0.12
48. MALAWI	3.93	↘ -0.05
49. TUNISIA	3.88	↗ 0.53
50. BOTSWANA	3.81	↗ 0.37
51. RWANDA	3.74	↗ 0.34
51. SEYCHELLES	3.74	↘ -0.25
53. ESWATINI	3.73	↗ 0.14
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	3.65	↘ -0.10

A3.2 Criminal market scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. ARMS TRAFFICKING	4. FLORA CRIMES	5. FAUNA CRIMES
1. NIGERIA	7.05 ↘ -0.60	7.5 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0	8.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	6.5 ↘ -1.5
2. KENYA	6.65 ↗ 1.00	7.5 ↗ 1.5	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 2.0	7.0 ↗ 0.5
3. TANZANIA	6.55 ↗ 0.30	6.5 ↗ 0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 – 0.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	8.0 ↗ 1.0
4. CONGO, DEM. REP.	6.50 ↗ 0.05	7.0 ↘ -0.5	5.5 – 0.0	9.0 – 0.0	8.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0
5. CAMEROON	6.25 ↗ 0.30	6.5 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↘ -0.5	7.5 – 0.0
6. GHANA	6.15 ↗ 1.00	6.5 ↗ 2.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 2.0	6.5 ↗ 2.0	6.0 ↗ 2.0
6. MALI	6.15 ↗ 0.25	7.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	8.0 ↗ 1.5	5.0 ↘ -1.5	5.5 – 0.0
8. LIBYA	6.10 ↗ 0.20	9.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	9.5 ↗ 1.0	1.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 1.5
9. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.05 ↗ 0.10	6.5 ↘ -0.5	6.5 ↗ 1.5	7.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -1.5	6.5 – 0.0
9. MOZAMBIQUE	6.05 ↗ 0.70	4.0 ↘ -1.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 1.5	8.0 ↘ -0.5	8.0 ↗ 0.5
11. SOUTH AFRICA	6.00 ↗ 0.80	4.5 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	8.0 ↗ 1.0	3.5 ↗ 1.5	7.5 – 0.0
12. NIGER	5.90 ↗ 0.55	7.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 2.0
13. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.70 ↘ -0.15	7.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↘ -0.5	8.5 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0
14. UGANDA	5.65 ↗ 0.30	7.0 ↗ 2.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	6.5 ↗ 1.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	6.5 – 0.0
15. SUDAN	5.55 ↘ -0.20	8.0 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5	8.5 ↘ -0.5	1.5 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5
16. BURKINA FASO	5.35 ↗ 0.40	6.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0	8.0 ↗ 2.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.0
16. CHAD	5.35 ↗ 0.30	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 ↗ 2.0	8.0 ↘ -0.5	1.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↘ -1.5
18. MADAGASCAR	5.30 ↗ 0.30	6.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↘ -1.0
18. SOUTH SUDAN	5.30 ↗ 0.25	8.5 ↗ 1.5	5.5 ↗ 1.5	8.0 – 0.0	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5
20. BENIN	5.25 ↗ 0.10	6.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 2.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	5.5 – 0.0
21. ANGOLA	5.20 ↗ 0.65	6.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 1.5	6.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
21. ZIMBABWE	5.20 ↗ 0.50	5.5 ↗ 0.5	3.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 1.5	7.5 – 0.0
23. GAMBIA	5.15 ↗ 0.05	7.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↘ -1.5	7.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↘ -0.5
23. GUINEA	5.15 – 0.00	7.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -0.5	6.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 0.5
25. LIBERIA	5.10 ↘ -0.45	6.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -2.0	5.5 ↘ -1.5	6.0 – 0.0
26. SIERRA LEONE	5.05 ↗ 0.05	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.5	3.5 ↘ -1.5	6.5 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	6. NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	7. HEROIN TRADE	8. COCAINE TRADE	9. CANNABIS TRADE	10. SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE
1. NIGERIA	7.05 ↘ -0.60	8.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	6.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	8.0 ↘ -0.5
2. KENYA	6.65 ↗ 1.00	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 2.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5
3. TANZANIA	6.55 ↗ 0.30	6.5 ↗ 0.5	7.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↘ -1.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5
4. CONGO, DEM. REP.	6.50 ↗ 0.05	9.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 1.0	7.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0
5. CAMEROON	6.25 ↗ 0.30	7.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	3.5 ↗ 1.5	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 – 0.0
6. GHANA	6.15 ↗ 1.00	7.5 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 1.0	5.5 ↘ -1.5	7.0 ↗ 1.5
6. MALI	6.15 ↗ 0.25	7.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	6.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 2.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5
8. LIBYA	6.10 ↗ 0.20	8.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↘ -0.5
9. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.05 ↗ 0.10	7.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↗ 2.0	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0
9. MOZAMBIQUE	6.05 ↗ 0.70	8.0 ↗ 2.0	7.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 3.5
11. SOUTH AFRICA	6.00 ↗ 0.80	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 2.5	3.5 ↗ 0.5	8.5 ↗ 1.5
12. NIGER	5.90 ↗ 0.55	7.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0
13. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.70 ↘ -0.15	9.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↘ -1.5	1.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
14. UGANDA	5.65 ↗ 0.30	7.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5
15. SUDAN	5.55 ↘ -0.20	7.5 ↘ -1.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5
16. BURKINA FASO	5.35 ↗ 0.40	8.5 ↗ 1.5	4.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -1.5	6.0 – 0.0
16. CHAD	5.35 ↗ 0.30	7.0 ↗ 3.0	2.0 ↘ -1.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
18. MADAGASCAR	5.30 ↗ 0.30	7.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 2.5	2.5 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5
18. SOUTH SUDAN	5.30 ↗ 0.25	8.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.0	1.0 – 0.0
20. BENIN	5.25 ↗ 0.10	5.0 ↘ -2.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0
21. ANGOLA	5.20 ↗ 0.65	8.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 2.0	4.5 ↗ 1.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5
21. ZIMBABWE	5.20 ↗ 0.50	8.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.5	5.0 – 0.0
23. GAMBIA	5.15 ↗ 0.05	4.5 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↘ -0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 1.5
23. GUINEA	5.15 – 0.00	6.5 ↘ -1.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 1.5
25. LIBERIA	5.10 ↘ -0.45	6.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 – 0.0
26. SIERRA LEONE	5.05 ↗ 0.05	6.5 ↘ -0.5	2.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. ARMS TRAFFICKING	4. FLORA CRIMES	5. FAUNA CRIMES
27. SENEGAL	5.00 ↗ 0.55	5.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 1.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5
28. EGYPT	4.95 ↗ 0.30	5.5 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0	1.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
28. ETHIOPIA	4.95 ↗ 0.55	6.0 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	3.5 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 2.5
28. MOROCCO	4.95 ↗ 0.45	5.5 ↗ 1.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.5	3.0 ↗ 0.5	4.5 – 0.0
31. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.90 ↗ 0.55	5.5 ↗ 2.5	2.5 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 1.0	8.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 – 0.0
31. TOGO	4.90 ↘ -0.10	6.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.5	5.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0
33. CONGO, REP.	4.80 ↗ 0.35	6.5 ↗ 2.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	8.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
33. GABON	4.80 ↘ -0.05	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.5 ↘ -0.5	4.5 – 0.0	8.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0
35. ALGERIA	4.65 ↗ 0.35	4.5 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 1.0	5.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
36. ZAMBIA	4.60 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -1.5
37. SOMALIA	4.45 ↘ -0.35	8.0 ↗ 1.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	8.5 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↘ -1.5
38. BURUNDI	4.40 – 0.00	8.5 ↗ 1.0	5.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5
38. MAURITIUS	4.40 ↗ 0.45	4.5 ↗ 2.0	3.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5
40. TUNISIA	4.20 ↗ 0.80	4.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 2.0	5.0 ↗ 1.5	3.5 ↗ 2.5	3.5 – 0.0
41. MALAWI	4.15 ↗ 0.15	4.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5
42. RWANDA	4.10 ↗ 0.30	5.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
43. ERITREA	4.05 ↗ 0.15	9.0 ↗ 0.5	9.5 ↗ 1.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
44. MAURITANIA	4.00 ↗ 0.30	7.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.5	4.0 ↗ 0.5	1.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5
45. NAMIBIA	3.90 ↗ 0.40	3.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↘ -1.0
46. COMOROS	3.85 ↗ 0.75	5.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 2.0	3.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5
46. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.85 ↗ 0.30	4.5 ↗ 1.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	8.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0
48. BOTSWANA	3.80 ↗ 0.50	4.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	2.0 ↘ -1.0	7.5 ↗ 2.5
49. CABO VERDE	3.70 ↗ 0.10	4.5 ↗ 2.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.0
50. DJIBOUTI	3.60 ↗ 0.15	6.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
50. SEYCHELLES	3.60 – 0.00	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↘ -2.0
52. LESOTHO	3.55 ↗ 0.50	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -2.5	1.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5
53. ESWATINI	3.25 ↘ -0.10	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.80 ↘ -0.20	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 ↘ -1.5	2.0 ↘ -1.0	2.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 – 0.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	6. NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	7. HEROIN TRADE	8. COCAINE TRADE	9. CANNABIS TRADE	10. SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE
27. SENEGAL	5.00 ↗ 0.55	3.5 ↘ -1.0	2.5 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 3.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0	2.5 – 0.0
28. EGYPT	4.95 ↗ 0.30	4.0 ↗ 1.0	5.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0
28. ETHIOPIA	4.95 ↗ 0.55	5.5 ↗ 1.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0
28. MOROCCO	4.95 ↗ 0.45	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	9.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0
31. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.90 ↗ 0.55	1.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	8.0 ↗ 1.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 – 0.0
31. TOGO	4.90 ↘ -0.10	6.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	6.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0
33. CONGO, REP.	4.80 ↗ 0.35	3.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↘ -1.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
33. GABON	4.80 ↘ -0.05	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
35. ALGERIA	4.65 ↗ 0.35	6.5 ↘ -0.5	2.0 ↘ -0.5	3.5 – 0.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 1.5
36. ZAMBIA	4.60 – 0.00	5.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0
37. SOMALIA	4.45 ↘ -0.35	2.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 – 0.0
38. BURUNDI	4.40 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 ↘ -2.0	2.5 ↗ 1.0	3.5 ↘ -0.5	2.5 – 0.0
38. MAURITIUS	4.40 ↗ 0.45	4.0 ↗ 1.0	8.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 1.0	5.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↗ 1.0
40. TUNISIA	4.20 ↗ 0.80	5.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
41. MALAWI	4.15 ↗ 0.15	4.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5
42. RWANDA	4.10 ↗ 0.30	8.0 ↗ 2.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0
43. ERITREA	4.05 ↗ 0.15	2.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0
44. MAURITANIA	4.00 ↗ 0.30	3.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↘ -0.5
45. NAMIBIA	3.90 ↗ 0.40	4.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 2.5	3.0 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 1.5
46. COMOROS	3.85 ↗ 0.75	1.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 ↗ 4.5
46. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.85 ↗ 0.30	6.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	3.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0
48. BOTSWANA	3.80 ↗ 0.50	3.5 ↗ 2.0	3.5 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0
49. CABO VERDE	3.70 ↗ 0.10	1.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0
50. DJIBOUTI	3.60 ↗ 0.15	2.0 ↗ 1.0	2.5 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↘ -0.5	1.5 – 0.0
50. SEYCHELLES	3.60 – 0.00	1.0 – 0.0	7.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -1.5
52. LESOTHO	3.55 ↗ 0.50	5.5 ↗ 0.5	3.5 ↗ 1.0	5.5 ↗ 4.0	4.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0
53. ESWATINI	3.25 ↘ -0.10	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 0.5
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.80 ↘ -0.20	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↘ -0.5	1.0 ↘ -0.5

A3.3 Criminal actor scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS
1. CONGO, DEM. REP.	9.00 ↗ 0.87	9.0 ↗ 0.5	9.0 ↗ 1.0	9.0 ↗ 1.0	9.0 ↗ 1.0
2. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	8.38 ↗ 0.50	9.0 ↗ 0.5	8.0 – 0.0	8.5 ↗ 1.0	8.0 ↗ 0.5
3. SOUTH SUDAN	7.38 ↘ -0.37	4.5 ↘ -2.0	8.0 – 0.0	9.0 ↗ 0.5	8.0 – 0.0
3. SUDAN	7.38 ↗ 0.38	6.5 ↗ 1.5	7.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	7.5 – 0.0
5. KENYA	7.25 ↗ 0.62	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.5 ↗ 0.5	8.0 ↗ 0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5
5. NIGERIA	7.25 ↘ -0.50	5.5 ↘ -0.5	9.0 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↘ -0.5
5. SOUTH AFRICA	7.25 ↗ 0.12	7.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	7.5 – 0.0	7.5 – 0.0
8. SOMALIA	7.13 ↘ -0.87	9.5 ↗ 1.0	7.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -2.0	4.5 ↘ -2.5
9. LIBYA	7.00 ↗ 0.37	8.0 – 0.0	7.5 ↗ 1.0	8.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0
9. MOZAMBIQUE	7.00 ↗ 0.62	3.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↗ 1.5	9.0 ↗ 1.0	7.5 – 0.0
11. UGANDA	6.63 ↘ -0.12	5.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	7.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -0.5
12. CAMEROON	6.38 ↗ 0.38	4.0 ↗ 0.5	7.5 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0
12. CHAD	6.38 ↘ -0.25	5.5 ↘ -2.5	6.5 – 0.0	8.5 ↗ 1.5	5.0 – 0.0
14. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.25 ↘ -0.25	3.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↘ -1.0	8.0 ↗ 0.5
15. NIGER	6.13 – 0.00	4.0 ↗ 2.0	7.0 – 0.0	8.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -2.0
15. ZIMBABWE	6.13 – 0.00	3.5 – 0.0	7.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↘ -0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5
17. GUINEA-BISSAU	6.00 ↗ 0.37	1.0 ↘ -0.5	8.0 ↗ 0.5	8.5 ↗ 1.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5
18. GHANA	5.88 ↗ 1.25	3.0 ↗ 2.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	7.5 ↗ 1.0	6.5 ↗ 1.5
18. MADAGASCAR	5.88 ↗ 0.13	4.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.5	7.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -1.0
20. SIERRA LEONE	5.75 ↗ 0.75	3.5 ↗ 2.5	5.5 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 0.5
20. TANZANIA	5.75 ↗ 0.75	3.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 ↗ 1.5	6.0 ↗ 0.5
20. TOGO	5.75 ↘ -0.38	1.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5	7.5 ↘ -0.5
23. BURKINA FASO	5.63 ↗ 0.63	3.5 ↘ -1.0	6.5 ↗ 1.5	6.5 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 2.0
23. MALI	5.63 ↘ -0.87	3.0 ↘ -2.5	7.0 ↘ -0.5	8.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 – 0.0
25. ANGOLA	5.38 ↗ 0.38	3.0 ↗ 2.0	5.5 – 0.0	8.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0
25. EGYPT	5.38 ↘ -0.25	3.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	8.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↘ -1.5
27. BENIN	5.25 ↗ 0.75	1.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.5	8.0 ↗ 2.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS
27. CONGO, REP.	5.25 – 0.00	3.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	8.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
27. GUINEA	5.25 ↘ -0.38	1.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5	8.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 – 0.0
27. ZAMBIA	5.25 ↗ 0.12	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
31. GABON	5.00 ↗ 0.50	1.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.5	8.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0
31. LIBERIA	5.00 ↗ 0.87	3.0 ↗ 2.0	6.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0
33. MAURITANIA	4.75 ↘ -0.75	2.5 ↘ -3.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
33. NAMIBIA	4.75 ↗ 0.62	3.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.5	6.0 – 0.0
35. BURUNDI	4.63 ↗ 0.25	1.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↗ 1.0	9.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0
35. ERITREA	4.63 – 0.00	1.0 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	9.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0
35. ETHIOPIA	4.63 ↘ -0.12	2.0 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0
35. MAURITIUS	4.63 ↗ 0.25	2.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
35. MOROCCO	4.63 ↘ -0.62	1.0 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0	7.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -2.0
35. SENEGAL	4.63 ↘ -0.12	2.5 ↘ -1.0	5.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0
41. GAMBIA	4.50 ↗ 0.37	1.0 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0	6.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↗ 2.0
42. ALGERIA	4.38 ↗ 0.25	1.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↗ 1.0
42. CABO VERDE	4.38 ↗ 0.50	2.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↗ 2.0	7.0 – 0.0
42. DJIBOUTI	4.38 ↗ 0.38	1.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 – 0.0
42. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.38 ↗ 0.88	1.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	9.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 3.5
46. LESOTHO	4.25 – 0.00	1.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
47. ESWATINI	4.00 ↗ 0.37	1.5 ↘ -0.5	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 2.0	4.0 – 0.0
48. COMOROS	3.88 ↘ -0.50	1.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -2.0
49. SEYCHELLES	3.75 ↘ -0.50	2.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -2.5
50. BOTSWANA	3.63 ↗ 0.25	1.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0
51. MALAWI	3.50 ↘ -0.25	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0
52. TUNISIA	3.38 ↗ 0.25	1.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0
53. RWANDA	3.25 ↗ 0.37	1.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0
54. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.75 ↘ 0.00	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	2.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5

A3.4 Resilience scores

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. CABO VERDE	6.33 ↘ -0.21	6.5 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	8.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0
2. SOUTH AFRICA	5.79 ↗ 0.21	6.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -1.0	6.5 ↗ 1.0	6.5 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0
3. MAURITIUS	5.67 ↘ -0.75	6.0 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↘ -0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -1.5	5.5 ↘ -1.5
4. BOTSWANA	5.63 ↘ -0.62	6.0 ↘ -1.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0	8.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	6.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.5
5. SENEGAL	5.58 ↘ -0.46	5.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0
6. NIGERIA	5.50 ↘ -0.17	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↘ -1.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↘ -1.5
6. RWANDA	5.50 ↘ -0.25	5.5 ↘ -1.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
8. ETHIOPIA	5.38 ↘ -0.62	5.0 ↘ -1.5	5.0 ↘ -1.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -2.0
8. GHANA	5.38 ↘ -0.08	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -1.5
10. KENYA	5.21 ↗ 0.17	5.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↗ 0.5	7.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 ↘ -1.5
11. GAMBIA	5.00 ↗ 0.37	5.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5
12. NAMIBIA	4.96 ↘ -0.08	5.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -1.0	7.0 ↗ 0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0
13. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	4.92 ↗ 1.13	6.0 ↗ 2.0	5.0 ↗ 2.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0	7.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 – 0.0
14. TUNISIA	4.83 ↘ -0.46	4.5 ↘ -2.5	5.0 ↘ -1.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	6.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0
15. ALGERIA	4.63 ↘ -0.12	4.5 ↘ -2.0	4.0 ↗ 1.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0
15. MOROCCO	4.63 ↘ -1.70	4.5 ↘ -1.0	3.5 ↘ -2.5	6.0 ↘ -1.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 ↘ -3.0	5.5 ↘ -2.0
17. SEYCHELLES	4.58 ↘ -0.80	5.0 ↘ -1.5	5.0 ↘ -1.5	6.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -3.0
18. DJIBOUTI	4.50 ↘ -0.17	4.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	6.5 ↘ -1.0	5.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0
19. ANGOLA	4.42 ↗ 0.09	5.0 ↘ -1.0	4.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5	3.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5
19. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.42 ↘ -0.12	4.5 ↘ -1.5	4.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0
21. ZAMBIA	4.33 ↗ 0.37	4.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	6.5 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5
22. MALAWI	4.29 ↘ -0.09	5.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5
23. EGYPT	4.04 ↗ 0.08	3.5 ↘ -1.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 1.5	4.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↘ -1.5	5.0 – 0.0
23. TANZANIA	4.04 ↘ -0.09	5.5 ↘ -1.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0
25. TOGO	4.00 ↘ -0.04	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↘ -1.0	4.5 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
26. UGANDA	3.96 ↗ 0.33	5.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.5	4.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↗ 1.0
27. LESOTHO	3.67 ↗ 0.09	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 1.0	5.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY- LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
1. CABO VERDE	6.33 ↘ -0.21	7.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.5	6.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 1.0
2. SOUTH AFRICA	5.79 ↗ 0.21	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↗ 3.0	7.0 – 0.0
3. MAURITIUS	5.67 ↘ -0.75	5.5 ↘ -1.5	3.5 ↘ -2.5	7.0 – 0.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -1.0
4. BOTSWANA	5.63 ↘ -0.62	5.0 ↘ -1.5	4.5 ↘ -1.0	5.5 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5	6.0 ↘ -0.5
5. SENEGAL	5.58 ↘ -0.46	6.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.5	5.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	7.0 – 0.0
6. NIGERIA	5.50 ↘ -0.17	4.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↘ -1.0	6.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 – 0.0	6.5 – 0.0
6. RWANDA	5.50 ↘ -0.25	6.0 ↘ -1.5	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 1.5
8. ETHIOPIA	5.38 ↘ -0.62	6.0 ↘ -1.0	7.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5
8. GHANA	5.38 ↘ -0.08	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↘ -0.5	3.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0	7.0 ↗ 0.5
10. KENYA	5.21 ↗ 0.17	6.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	3.5 ↗ 2.0	6.5 ↘ -0.5
11. GAMBIA	5.00 ↗ 0.37	6.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	6.5 ↗ 0.5
12. NAMIBIA	4.96 ↘ -0.08	3.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.5	4.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0	6.0 – 0.0
13. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	4.92 ↗ 1.13	5.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 3.0	3.0 ↗ 2.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0
14. TUNISIA	4.83 ↘ -0.46	5.5 – 0.0	5.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.5	4.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	5.5 ↘ -1.5
15. ALGERIA	4.63 ↘ -0.12	6.5 ↘ -1.0	4.5 ↗ 1.5	4.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0
15. MOROCCO	4.63 ↘ -1.70	6.0 ↘ -0.5	3.5 ↘ -2.5	4.5 ↘ -1.0	4.5 ↘ -1.5	4.0 ↘ -2.0	3.5 ↘ -2.5
17. SEYCHELLES	4.58 ↘ -0.80	4.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -2.0
18. DJIBOUTI	4.50 ↘ -0.17	6.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0	5.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0
19. ANGOLA	4.42 ↗ 0.09	6.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 2.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0
19. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.42 ↘ -0.12	4.0 ↘ -0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	3.5 ↘ -1.5	3.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
21. ZAMBIA	4.33 ↗ 0.37	3.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 3.0	5.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 – 0.0
22. MALAWI	4.29 ↘ -0.09	3.0 ↗ 0.5	6.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	5.5 ↘ -0.5
23. EGYPT	4.04 ↗ 0.08	6.0 – 0.0	6.0 ↗ 1.5	4.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0
23. TANZANIA	4.04 ↘ -0.09	4.5 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↗ 2.0	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↘ -0.5
25. TOGO	4.00 ↘ -0.04	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0
26. UGANDA	3.96 ↗ 0.33	5.5 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↘ -0.5
27. LESOTHO	3.67 ↗ 0.09	2.5 – 0.0	5.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT
28. BURKINA FASO	3.63 ↘ -0.25	3.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -0.5
29. BENIN	3.54 ↘ -0.79	4.0 ↘ -2.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
30. SIERRA LEONE	3.46 ↗ 0.13	3.5 ↗ 0.5	3.5 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 – 0.0
31. MADAGASCAR	3.38 ↗ 0.13	4.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↘ -1.5	3.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5
32. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29 ↗ 0.46	3.0 ↗ 0.5	3.5 ↗ 1.5	5.0 ↗ 3.0	5.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	2.0 – 0.0
33. CONGO, REP.	3.25 ↗ 0.17	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
33. ESWATINI	3.25 ↗ 0.29	3.0 ↘ -0.5	2.5 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 2.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 – 0.0
35. NIGER	3.21 ↘ -0.33	3.5 ↘ -0.5	2.5 ↘ -1.5	5.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↘ -1.5	2.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↘ -0.5
36. GABON	3.17 ↗ 0.46	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.5 ↗ 0.5
36. LIBERIA	3.17 ↘ -0.66	3.5 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -2.5	3.0 ↘ -1.5	3.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0
36. ZIMBABWE	3.17 ↘ -0.16	2.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -0.5
39. CAMEROON	3.13 ↘ -0.20	2.0 ↘ -0.5	1.5 ↘ -0.5	5.0 – 0.0	4.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	4.0 – 0.0
40. MAURITANIA	3.08 ↗ 0.41	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.5 ↗ 1.5	3.0 ↘ -0.5	3.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0
41. SUDAN	2.96 ↗ 0.13	3.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↗ 1.0	4.5 ↘ -2.0	3.5 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0
42. GUINEA	2.83 ↗ 0.08	2.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5
43. CHAD	2.46 ↗ 0.42	3.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 2.5	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 1.0
44. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.42 ↘ -0.25	2.0 ↘ -0.5	2.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5
45. COMOROS	2.38 ↘ -0.12	2.0 ↘ -0.5	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
45. MALI	2.38 ↘ -0.25	2.0 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
47. ERITREA	2.33 ↘ 0.00	1.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0
48. CONGO, DEM. REP.	2.29 ↗ 0.33	1.0 – 0.0	1.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↗ 2.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	2.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 ↗ 0.5
49. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.17 ↗ 0.13	1.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
50. BURUNDI	2.08 ↗ 0.20	2.5 ↗ 1.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0
51. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.92 ↗ 0.42	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	2.5 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5
52. SOUTH SUDAN	1.83 ↗ 0.33	2.0 ↗ 0.5	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	2.0 ↗ 1.0
53. SOMALIA	1.67 ↗ 0.25	1.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↗ 0.5	1.5 ↗ 0.5
54. LIBYA	1.54 ↘ -0.59	1.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 ↘ -1.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↘ -1.0	1.5 ↘ -2.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY- LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
28. BURKINA FASO	3.63 ↘ -0.25	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	5.0 ↘ -1.0
29. BENIN	3.54 ↘ -0.79	3.5 ↘ -0.5	3.0 ↘ -2.5	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	4.5 ↘ -2.5
30. SIERRA LEONE	3.46 ↗ 0.13	4.0 – 0.0	3.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↘ -0.5
31. MADAGASCAR	3.38 ↗ 0.13	5.0 ↗ 1.0	5.0 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5
32. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29 ↗ 0.46	3.5 ↘ -1.5	3.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 2.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5
33. CONGO, REP.	3.25 ↗ 0.17	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 ↘ -1.0	2.0 – 0.0	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0
33. ESWATINI	3.25 ↗ 0.29	3.5 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↗ 2.0	2.5 – 0.0
35. NIGER	3.21 ↘ -0.33	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -1.5
36. GABON	3.17 ↗ 0.46	4.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 2.0	3.5 ↗ 1.5	2.5 – 0.0
36. LIBERIA	3.17 ↘ -0.66	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -0.5	4.0 ↘ -2.0
36. ZIMBABWE	3.17 ↘ -0.16	5.0 ↘ -1.0	4.0 ↘ -1.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 ↗ 1.0	4.0 ↘ -2.0
39. CAMEROON	3.13 ↘ -0.20	2.0 ↘ -1.0	3.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↘ -0.5	2.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 0.5	5.0 – 0.0
40. MAURITANIA	3.08 ↗ 0.41	4.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 ↗ 1.0	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 0.5
41. SUDAN	2.96 ↗ 0.13	2.5 ↗ 0.5	4.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0	2.0 ↗ 1.0
42. GUINEA	2.83 ↗ 0.08	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0
43. CHAD	2.46 ↗ 0.42	3.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5
44. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.42 ↘ -0.25	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	3.0 ↘ -1.0
45. COMOROS	2.38 ↘ -0.12	3.0 – 0.0	4.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↘ -1.5
45. MALI	2.38 ↘ -0.25	1.5 ↘ -0.5	2.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	1.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	3.0 ↘ -2.0
47. ERITREA	2.33 ↘ 0.00	7.0 – 0.0	3.0 – 0.0	2.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0
48. CONGO, DEM. REP.	2.29 ↗ 0.33	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	1.5 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	5.0 ↗ 1.0
49. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.17 ↗ 0.13	3.5 – 0.0	2.0 ↗ 0.5	1.5 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 – 0.0
50. BURUNDI	2.08 ↗ 0.20	3.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -1.5	2.0 – 0.0	1.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 1.5	2.5 ↗ 1.0
51. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.92 ↗ 0.42	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↗ 1.0	1.5 – 0.0	3.0 ↗ 2.0	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 – 0.0
52. SOUTH SUDAN	1.83 ↗ 0.33	1.5 ↘ -0.5	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↗ 1.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.0 ↘ -0.5
53. SOMALIA	1.67 ↗ 0.25	1.5 – 0.0	2.5 ↗ 0.5	1.5 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↗ 0.5	2.5 ↘ -0.5
54. LIBYA	1.54 ↘ -0.59	1.5 ↘ -0.5	1.0 – 0.0	2.0 ↘ -1.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.0 – 0.0	1.5 ↘ -1.5

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