



THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME



2016

Trails of Insecurity

ILLICIT MIGRATION AS A SOURCE OF THREAT FINANCING
AND CRIMINAL RESOURCING IN AFRICA

CONFERENCE REPORT, FEBRUARY 2016



I. Background & Introduction

Migration has come to dominate the policy agenda in Europe, as the scale of migrants entering Europe has reached proportions unparalleled since the Second World War. After having received over 1.5 million migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from numerous different countries, Europe has been unprepared to deal with the sheer numbers, and the political, economic and social implications.

This comes in an era of global mobility and displacement. There are currently approximately 60 million forcibly displaced people, 38 million internally displaced people, a 40 per cent increase since 2011, and this is an African driven phenomenon. Whilst the conflict in Syria has contributed significantly to this spike, in fact seven of the ten largest countries of origin of refugees are African: Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea. African policymakers, therefore, need to urgently come to terms with and respond to the forces and vectors that are enabling their citizens to migrate on a mass scale.

A rising security threat

While migration is a livelihood strategy and valuable for local economies and the individual migrants, there is increasing concern that the levels of migration are triggering a far more pernicious threat. Warning bells are ringing at the potential connection between terrorism, organised crime and armed and violent conflict actors profiting from the migration flows facilitated by smuggling and human trafficking.

Smuggling has become a major business for criminal network and it is still unclear to what extent migration is thriving off criminality and feeding back into it. The intersection between migration and threat financial as well as terrorism needs to be assessed better in order to understand the impact of migration flows through regions of insecurity.

While the evidence basis is still thin, there is increasing indication terrorist groups are able to tax migration flows just as much as any other financial flows within their reach and the profits are significant. This is contributing to their ability to serve as actors of violence, destabilising states and undermining state consolidation.

The role of corruption and the complicity of local actors affiliated to the state cannot be understated either. These are among the key factors allowing criminal networks to remain profitable and keeping on with their activities. While there are varying degrees, corruption – at whatever scale – always benefits criminal networks. This further undermines the efficacy of policy responses from within.

On 19 January, the Institute for Security Studies and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime hosted a conference in Addis Ababa aimed at better understanding the extent to which smuggling is a possible source of threat financing. The event, funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, brought together policy makers, researchers and migration experts.

The smuggling industry

The push factors driving an unprecedented number of refugees and migrants to Europe are numerous: conflicts, terrorism, long-standing repressive governments, chronic poverty and inequality. An increasingly violent and opportunistic smuggling industry is assisting and facilitating these journeys. Illicitly facilitating migration has become an industry and the networks involved are increasingly well organised and transnational; they have developed



where they previously did not exist. Illicit smuggling networks now spread from a migrant's country of origin all the way into Europe. At the same time these networks and actors have become more and more responsive to migration trends as well as policy attempts to curb the phenomenon.

2015 saw an unparalleled expansion of unregulated migration: new routes, new nationalities and groups of people joined in. The story of this so-called 'migration crisis' is not only about smuggling. Smugglers did not create the market, but their role in migration has certainly amplified its scale. Furthermore, smuggling is arguably responsible for the most severe cases of human suffering we have seen, including deaths on the Mediterranean.

What is a smuggler?

A smuggler is paid to assist migrants to move from one country to another. Often, the migrant would resort to being smuggled because of existing barriers or obstacles to legal entry. These barriers may be physical (walls or borders); geographical (challenging terrain such as a desert or a sea); political (visa regimes or conflict and insecurity); or cultural (where the migrant does not speak the local language, or stands out and is at risk of persecution or abuse). Smuggling markets and major migrant routes are highly responsive to security developments and changes of EU policies. As barriers change, the entire market adapts to new opportunities, with available routes and prices changing in response to the environment and the market.

A smuggler serves as a relocation broker might for legal migration, and they are often specialised service providers. Networks are not uniform and are distinct from one region to another. However, broadly the industry shares some operational commonalities. The industry contains a wide spectrum of actors, of varying degrees of criminality, involved in the "smuggling" of migrants. The motivation of some may be merely humanitarian, yet according to the UN definition of human trafficking and migrant smuggling the key distinction is that the smuggler derives material benefit from helping a migrant enter a state illegally.

Human trafficking is the acquisition of people by improper means, such as force, fraud or deception, *with the aim of exploiting them*. Smuggling of migrants involves the procurement *for financial or other material benefit* of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident."¹ Both are identified as crimes, count as forms of organised crime, and there are some overlaps. However human trafficking and human smuggling are not identical. Most significantly, "the relationship between a smuggler and a migrant is largely consensual and typically ends once the agreed journey is over."²

There are two typologies of migrant smuggling: the "pay-as-you-go" versus the "full-package" model.³ These are chosen depending on nationality and financial abilities. The commodification of the migrants, however, reveals a general trend of changing ownership of the migration journey: Migrants themselves are now increasingly victimised, extorted and the number of casualties has spiked. Overall, migration has been an evolving story and four major landmarks have shifted how the crisis has evolved: the Syrian crisis, the activated second flow of migration routes in the Horn of Africa, the migration gateway of Libya and the opening of the European Balkan route.

One important lesson to be drawn from these developments is that security situations and policies matter, even if knowledge of the latter is just based on rumours and fear. Migrants become increasingly vulnerable and are pressured to make their journey as soon as possible to avoid missing a window of opportunity. Simultaneously, the higher the barriers of a specific route are, the more smugglers can charge and extract from migrants. Europe's policy choices have a significant effect on the smuggling industry. The national differences of



how migrants are received and which rights they are accorded to, matter starkly because it creates a pull towards some countries rather than others.

Terrorist financing?

The line between criminal networks and terrorist networks has become increasingly blurred, particularly in some areas in sub-Saharan Africa where longstanding cycles of conflict, enriched by criminal activities, have financed protracted insurgencies and a fragmenting series of armed groups.

There is currently no concrete evidence of terrorist groups financially profiting from the migration flows in the past years, but there has been no systematic study of this. Nascent evidence from certain conflict zones suggests that human trafficking and the detention and extortion of migrants has historically been a source of financing for militia groups in Libya, the Sahel and in the Sinai Peninsula. The growing flow of migrants represents a significant source of profits, and so there is little reason to suggest that past trends would not have evolved into future trajectories.

The logic that would motivate terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIS or Islamic State), al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to use the same networks and mechanisms to generate and move illicit money as more conventional criminal networks is compelling. Terrorist groups are likely to be involved in an activity as migrant smuggling that currently has no competition of similar economic value. Extracting an industry that already exists and within their reach seems like a logical move for a multiplicity of criminal networks. In addition to access, terrorist organisations already exhibit the high level of organisation that is required to make migrant smuggling a truly profitable business model that can finance other illicit activities.

In addition, there seem to be incidents where states are involved in facilitating some of the crimes. At the same time there are clear indications by those smuggled by different groups that some form of taxation of the smugglers was conducted. Terrorist involvement might be drawn from videos of ISIS execution of prisoners along the coastline and the desert: the different coloured jumpsuits of the prisoners may well indicate different smuggling networks and one of the executed individuals has been presumed a smuggler.

However, the smuggling networks terrorists use themselves may differ from already existing smuggling networks utilised by migrant smugglers. There is no indication of a significant change of the number of refugees coming out from Syria from areas under ISIS control, and ISIS smuggling terrorist from abroad into Syria seems completely separate from migrant smuggling.

II. Regional Conclusions

Different regions give us a different picture of common practices and the way illicit groups are able to extract profit from migration flows. It is, however, difficult to separate individual financial flows as different routes and groups are connected in a complicated network spanning across different African regions all the way into Europe. In all regions there are networks, but often there are no clear hierarchies. Instead there are loose confederates of networks than are regional, national and sub-national.

Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is a migration hub with different flows turning towards Yemen, the South and also towards Europe. Eritrean and Ethiopian migration highlights the importance of the diaspora in facilitating and financing migrants' journeys.



The Horn of Africa exposes two critical elements: first, internally displaced persons (IDPs) as potential future migrants. More regional stability and development may not mean an immediate end to migration flows because the motivation to migrate is multifaceted. With improved economic capabilities, present IDPs may migrate in the future. Second, insecurity and instability do not deter migration. That violence and conflict may attract migrants seems like a counter-intuitive. However, in 2015, Yemen experienced the highest influx of migrants. Illicit networks in Yemen are equally brutal compared to the experience from Sinai. Smuggling has adopted a trafficking-like behaviour that puts migrants into a crisis of protection.

West Africa

The migration flow and smuggling operations in West Africa have changed radically. Facilitated by the ECOWAS' freedom of movement, there is no need to hire smugglers until the northern borders of Niger and Mali. However, the Sahara presents a significant boundary making smuggling networks necessary. West African smuggling groups are usually traditional trans-Saharan nomadic and semi-nomadic groups who used the same smuggling routes for different commodities.

With the opening of the Mediterranean crossing from Libya these routes mushroomed and made the migrant trade profitable. In reaction, recruitment of migrants, fights over convoys and criminality increased. Along the West African route and into Libya migrant-holding centres there have been experiences forced labour, forced domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. The Sahara crossing has become one of the most violent. With the increasing profit and control of different smuggling networks, the security situation has shifted as well. With the professionalization of illicit groups and collaboration of the state, "human smuggling may just be the activity that paves the way for genuine, transnational crime".⁴

Sinai Peninsula

Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula has been a particularly unique phenomenon with its high levels of abuse and exploitative practices. Forced begging, debt bondage, assault, killing and torture camps have been reported.

Despite the lack of clarity regarding the linkage between various forms of threat financing and human smuggling, migrants often fall prey to numerous other abuses: Research based on interviews has shown, for instance, the extent of human trafficking, levels of abuse and exploitative practices of migrants in Sinai.⁵ These crimes are often interlinked with others such as kidnapping from refugee camps, torture and organ trafficking. The total value of ransom between 2009 and 2013 is estimated to be \$600 million, with a conservative estimate of around 25 000 to 35 000 victims.⁶ This high amount of profit was easily extracted from migration and invested into other forms of illicit business by the groups involved.

While the worst extortion and abuses in the Sinai have been suppressed as a result of military action by the Egyptian government, there is little knowledge of where those networks have located themselves, or where and how their profits were invested.

Maghreb

After the closure of Egypt to Syrians following a change in the visa regime, Libya clearly became the preferred gateway into Europe during 2015. In Libya there have been indications of the taxing of smugglers by other illicit groups, and in general high money turnovers. The last leg of a migrant's journey into Europe has also clearly shown the commoditisation of the migrant: being of financial value until the coast, each part of the journey could be paid in steps. However, the boat journey has to be paid in advance, and



the seaworthiness of migrant filled boats diminished dramatically once Mare Nostrum was introduced.

Egypt remains part of the route from the Horn of Africa and Sudan towards the north. Groups that have specialised in the movement but also trafficking of Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopian migrants, and are well known for the brutality run networks. Kidnapping for ransom that requires relatives and whole villages to sacrifice all their savings have been reported. With the increasing violence in Libya the balance between Libya and Egypt as chosen gateway into Europe may shift again.

III. Conclusions and Implications

Migration and its complexity allow for a rich discussion: Migration is a complex problem, and smuggling networks are difficult and still not well understood, neither are their linkages to other crimes such as terrorism and their overall implications on regional and global insecurity.

It is crucial to realise from the outset that migration is neither a new nor a specifically European issue. Equally, it is unlikely to cease in the coming years as global wealth disparities present a structural dilemma and various so-called push factors such as war, political persecution, natural disasters, poverty are added motivations to pursue a better life elsewhere. Migration is at the same time local, regional, national and international. Therefore, migration has become a shared responsibility of all countries, be they the origin, the transit, or the destination of migrants.

Effective policy responses will require a better understanding of the drivers and dynamics of the crisis. This understanding should start by recognising the diversity of the migrants' stories: each journey of migration is defined by the ethnicity, income level and country of origins of the migrants, as well as by a highly responsive smuggling industry.

The generic trends of migration can be summarised as follows:

1. More complex (multiple drivers of migration)
2. More mixed (more people from many different countries on the move)
3. More versatility (facilitated by smugglers)
4. Less protection, higher vulnerability
5. More exploitation (not just by smugglers but also through state collusion)
6. Less tolerance (migrants are unpopular and unwanted)
7. Migration as a high profit, low risk business models (high impunity and collusion)

The real size of the migration market remains unknown, prices seem to fluctuate and differ a lot between migrants. Thus, while it is clear that migrant smuggling has become a lucrative criminal industry, this should be substantiated with a strong evidence base. More research into the linkages between migrant smuggling and terrorist financing is needed to fully understand what might be going on, and how illicit migration is potentially fuelling insecurity and criminality in other ways.

The Migrant: a commodity

Migration has become more complex and more mixed with smugglers exploiting this opportunity. The vulnerability of migrants has risen and they have become increasingly exploited and lack protection. Thus migration has become a high profit and low risk enterprise for smugglers and traffickers.



The increased commodification of migrants is critical to the smugglers' model. Especially in the pay-as-you-go variant of migrant smuggling, where migrants are almost bought and sold like cattle or any other good from one migrant smuggling group to the next, as interviews with migrants revealed. In addition, migrants are criminalised along their journey and often imprisoned for crossing borders without documentation. However, there has been a constant criminalisation of the smuggling culture and increased violence and criminality of smuggling networks: migrants experience abuse and extortion to which they have not consented. Smugglers today are more and more criminal, and the corruption and collusion of state officials is another critical part enabling the business. The linkage of this form of migration and threat financing shows in the fact that the migrant as an illicit commodity draws other illicit actors.

Despite these vulnerabilities, however, migration remains a desirable option for potential migrants in their search for a safer and better life. The credibility of routes is tested and then communicated back to those who still aspire to take the journey to Europe. Whilst migrants agree that their smugglers are criminals, they are necessary to overcome obstacles and make the trip as safely as possible.

A migrant's vulnerability is also rooted in the access to information or the lack thereof. On his journey through countries in which he does not speak the language, a migrant is completely left in the hands of his smugglers. Whilst migrant networks on social media and constant feedback are crucial, migrants often lack the ability to test available information before making the decision to move from one of the overall migration leg to another. Smugglers are left with the power to pressure migrants into moving quickly based on a logic of "now or never" windows of opportunity.

Europe's policy choices have a direct impact on this vulnerability, and in several ways it has been directly fuelling the migrant smuggling industry. The 2013 [Dublin Regulation](#)⁷ forces migrants to use smugglers and risk their illicit journey into Europe because they can apply for asylum only once inside an EU country. In addition, smugglers help them to remain unregistered until they have reached their desired destination country. These contested issues favour those profiting from smuggling because it is almost impossible to go to a desired location legally for migrants.

Lack of guidelines for protection

The international community, and particularly those responsible for refugee and migrant protection and upholding international human rights standards, do not have set and clear guidelines to protect migrants in vulnerable situations and to prevent their exploitation. Europe, overwhelmed by the masses of incoming migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, is still without a coherent response. Recruitment, for instance, remains a huge push factor in getting migrants started on their journey. Smugglers use refugee camps to operate from the inside and migrants opt to be smuggled mainly because they lack of other (or better) options.

Thinking about this context and rethinking the drivers that push migrants to use smuggling networks will be crucial to address migrant smuggling. While smugglers may view migrants as commodities in a lucrative trade, for most migrants the smuggler is a dream fixer. Multiple identities are possible for both actors; mixed migration means there are mixed drivers, mixed motivations and mixed role often simultaneously playing out. A vulnerable migrant can be both seen as victim of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and as a terrorist threat by states.

Currently, the lack of adequate protection mechanisms directly benefits criminal smuggling networks. Smuggling migrants across Africa and Europe is a lucrative business, generating



high profits whilst currently involving only few risks. The absence of violent conflicts between different smuggling networks indicates that the easy profit sharing among these actors and the high level collaboration is highly profitable in the context of policy chaos.

IV. Policy and Responses

There are no quick fixes to controlling the current migration crisis, addressing smuggling markets, or breaking their possible linkages to sources of insecurity. There is a need to do more together in order to find a consistent and coherent response to the rise of illicit migration and the criminality thriving off it that we have observed in the past years. This requires cooperation between different actors, across different regions, as well as starting to address the root causes of migration. Mehari Maru's six gaps related to migration can serve as first indicators or categories of what needs to be considered.

First, there is an *urgency gap* related to the low level of urgency and importance accorded to migration at the national level in some regions, such as the Horn of Africa. Second, there is a *Policy-Implementation gap* with the low level of implementation of existing continental and regional policy documents, such as those crafted by the AU and IGAD. Third, there is a *Comprehensiveness gap* related to the current fragmented and *ad hoc* approach to migration governance. Fourth, there is a *Knowledge gap* related to limitations in understanding the complexity, determinants and trends of migration and on how to govern migration. Fifth, there is a *Capability gap* attributed to the meagre resources allocated to migration governance and institutional inadequacies. Last, but certainly not least, is the *Collaboration gap* related to the cross-cutting nature of migration that involves several national and regional authorities with mandate on foreign affairs, security, border, customs, social and labour, tourism, immigration, and gender etc. and associated challenges.⁸

The primary immediate task remains to better understand the challenges Europe and Africa is facing now, and the current gaps in responses to migration. Well-thought out policy responses that respond to key problems are imperative. These should be framed to cater for both the short-term and long-term. These policies should be geared towards finding sustainable solutions to the high migrant influx in Europe as well as root causes in the regions of origin of migrants, taking into account the high number of potential future migrants there. Policies need to address all key problems, and above all focus on protecting migrants from criminal networks. However, it should be understood keep that these networks are incredibly flexible, constantly responding and adapting to policy changes. Policy reactions from Europe as well as elsewhere have both a direct and indirect impact on the business of smuggling migrants.

Strengthen the evidence basis

The role of smugglers is becoming crucial in understanding the nature of migration, and for policymakers seeking to prevent, respond to and protect those vulnerable to migrating illicitly. Better capacity to monitor smuggling markets and networks would be required to shift policymaking from reactive to proactive, and to begin to put in place counter-measures that are effective, and breakdown the market advantage that smugglers have created for themselves.

Given the specificity of actors enabling the market, research that seeks to identify and explain the linkages between smugglers, militia groups, criminal networks and terrorist groups will need to take a granular approach. These are localised actors making transnational connections around global flows. In seeking to find an incentive framework that would break down smuggling networks and propose alternative livelihoods for those who profit from the smuggling market will require a nuanced understanding of local



dynamics, not a comprehensive blanket approach. Law enforcement tools have been proven to be of little efficacy: instead smuggling should be understood within the political economy of their local environment.

Immediate research priorities that can be suggested include:

- Analysis of the dynamics of the smuggling market (prices, routes, growth potential)
- Better and more nuanced understanding motives for migration for the different kinds of migrants we see
- Understanding of the dangers of different routes that have been previously overlooked such as the Sahara route,
- Analysis of the financial flows in the context of illicit migration (the actors profiting and the market share of criminal groups).

In addition to these research efforts, better effort needs to be made to translate these findings into policy accessible findings. This work should be more accessible to all relevant actors, and connect practitioners and first-line responders with policy makers.

Redress criminality and criminalisation

While the recent increase in migration threatens human and state security, and is a challenge in its own right, there is a clear danger in securitising migration and approaches to it. The current mood in Europe has shifted from a careful welcoming of migrants and refugees to limiting the influx and rethinking the validity of and need for national borders keeping future migrants out. In 2015, migration routes constantly shifted and reacted to the closing of borders of some Balkan countries, resulting in a fluctuating need for migrant smugglers in different places. The uncontrolled influx and the inability to check every incoming migrant also resulted in a fear of terrorists and criminals being amongst the ones seeking refuge from war, political persecution and poverty.

In some instances it is important to look at these challenges, both how they affect global security challenges and how these in turn are impacting on a local level, as well as vice versa. However, resorting to entirely security-based responses will not only be counterproductive in the long run but also contribute to an increased victimisation and commoditisation, resulting in increased vulnerability, of each migrant. The important role that smugglers play for migrants must also be considered – long term, sustainable solutions will need to address the demand dynamics also.

European policy options: legalising versus reducing incentives to migrate illegally

Criminalising migrants will only contribute to their increased vulnerability. It has been highlighted that the EU's policy framework of the Dublin agreement incentivises migrants to risk their journey into Europe through illicit means because they can only seek asylum once they are in a European country. At the same time, the policy differences applied within individual EU countries play another factor for migrants depending on their nationality, age and the life offered under asylum. Some nationalities have a higher chance of acceptance when they apply for asylum in Europe: ironically this directly impacted on the counterfeit and trade of Syrian and Afghan passports which are seen as most desirable as they are among the two most accepted nationalities.

In addition, the policy differences towards refugees once accepted in the differing European countries – especially regarding family reunion and the financial allowances paid out – make a huge difference for migrants to consider in which country to apply for asylum. In that sense, European policies have not only encouraged the use of smugglers but also facilitated an uneven flow of migrants into some countries instead of others. Harmonisation of policies



across Europe would go a long way to redressing this, and reducing the appeal of smugglers.

The logic of migrations follows a double-mechanism of push and pull factors. The promise of peace, freedom, economic opportunities, social grants and education for children are among the pull factors that motivate migrants to dare their dangerous and illicit journey to Europe. European policy makers have already responded to this by considering a range of different policy options to affect these pull factors their countries have on potential migrants. The Dublin agreement has been partially suspended by some or revised in order to achieve a fairer distribution of migrants across European countries. Many countries have rethought and re-established their border controls to control the influx of migrants, and keep them out. Many have also debated and already implemented an upper limit of migrants they will accept in the coming years.

It is clear that an “open door” policy is not sustainable. Given the higher living standards and promises of a better life in Europe, it would increase the pull factor and the already unmanageable influx of migrants into European societies that are struggling to keep up. However, policy responses must tread carefully between raising boundaries and welcoming refugees if illegal migration is to be tackled effectively. There is a need to revise the language and images used when we describe and talk about migration. Full on security responses that seem to have achieved little in different areas of transnational organised crime, and therefore should be avoided as they have often proven to be only minimally effective and to exacerbate the problems. Anti-immigrant hostility is a dangerous route that policymakers need to counter early on.

A sustainable policy option would be to delink the control of illegality from the reduction in overall immigration. By introducing a balanced package of measures, Europe could make its controls against illegal immigration effective while being more welcoming to legitimate migrants. Nonetheless, this also includes a careful but necessary rethinking of who those migrants are and how to identify the “real refugee” and differentiate him from the “illegal economic migrant”.

Tackling root causes: moving towards sustainable, regional solutions

However, it is equally – if not more – crucial to think about the lack of sustainable solutions tackling root causes in the regions which are the origin of migrants. Unfortunately, most of these root causes are of a broad and long-lasting nature: global demographic projections and population growth indicate an ever increasing gap between growing developing countries with a high percentage of youths opposed to an aging and shrinking Europe. Labour demands move towards the global north. Other push factors of migration are poverty, natural disasters, insecurity and conflict and political oppression and persecution, and an overall perceived and real lack of opportunities to sustain a livelihood, amongst others. The reason different people decide to migrate regionally or globally are mixed and differ from story to story.

Overall, long-term measure must be rooted within development cooperation and enhance peace, stability and economic development. Within the regional (as well as global context), effective law enforcement cooperation is as necessary as creating “safe havens” for refugees near their country of origin. In addition, managing expectations of potential migrants will have a long-term impact as it is to be expected that recruitment within refugee camps will continue to drive the market, and there have been indications that poverty is an inhibiting factor to some degree: a high number potential migrants could be undertaking the journey to Europe once they have gathered the financial means to do so.



Whilst responding to migration is on the forefront of Europe's policy agenda, it is yet to be seen whether there is enough political will to invest into long-term strategy in the countries of origin of migrants? And is there sufficient political will to curb illegal migration at the source country level? Policy makers need to be informed of the destabilising impact of human smuggling, and of the longevity/resilience of the phenomenon if it is not tackled from the root upwards.



Annex I: References

- ¹ UNODC (online). UNODC on human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Available at: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ² Reitano, Tuesday and Tinti, Peter (2015). Survive and advance: The economics of smuggling refugees and migrants into Europe. Available at: <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper289-2.pdf> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ³ Reitano, Tuesday and Tinti, Peter (2015). Survive and advance: The economics of smuggling refugees and migrants into Europe. Available at: <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper289-2.pdf> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ⁴ Reitano, Tuesday and Tinti, Peter (2015). Survive and advance: The economics of smuggling refugees and migrants into Europe. Available at: <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper289-2.pdf> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ⁵ Human Rights Watch (2014). "I wanted to Lie Down and Die" – Trafficking and Torture of Eritreans in Sudan and Egypt. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/11/i-wanted-lie-down-and-die/trafficking-and-torture-eritreans-sudan-and-egypt> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ⁶ Reisen, Mirjam van, Estefanos, Meron and Rijken, Conny (2013), 'The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond', *Europe External Policy Advisors*. Available at: <http://www.eepa.be/wcm/320-eepa-news-and-activities/3433-the-human-trafficking-cycle-sinai-and-beyond.html> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ⁷ European Parliament, Council of the European Union (2013). Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604> [Accessed 29 February 2016]
- ⁸ Maru, Mehari Tadelle (2015). Migration Priorities and Normative and Institutional Frameworks In the IGAD Region. Available at: <http://life-peace.org/hab/migration-priorities-and-normative-and-institutional-frameworks-in-the-igad-region/> [Accessed 29 February 2016]

Annex II: List of participants

- African Union
- European External Action Service
- Embassy of Denmark in Ethiopia
- Embassy of Switzerland in Ethiopia
- Embassy of Germany in Ethiopia
- Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ethiopia
- Embassy of Norway in Ethiopia
- Danish Refugee Council
- International Organization for Migration
- Life and Peace Institute
- Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
- RHIPTO Norwegian Centre for Global Analysis
- United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
- United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees