THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Development Responses to Organized Crime:

new agendas, new opportunities



A Conference Report
November 2015


A NETWORK TO COUNTER NETWORKS



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Conference Report

November 2015

Department for International Development

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About the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

The Global Initiative (www.globalinitiative.net) is a network of prominent law enforcement, governance and development practitioners who are dedicated to seeking new and innovative strategies and responses to organized crime.

Nature of the challenge

The problem of organised crime is not new, but the scope, scale and spread of the phenomena is now unprecedented. It affects all countries, developed, middle-income and developing, as well as states beset by political instability and conflict. The impacts can be diverse, but the common feature is that organised crime negatively affects the life chances of ordinary people: it undercuts key institutions, damages the environment, distorts or impedes economic growth and it fuels conflict.

While there is growing consensus as to the rapid evolution and detrimental impact of organized crime, there is much less agreement around what constitutes an effective response.

Catalyzing a new approach

The Global Initiative was born from a series of high-level, off the record discussions between mainly (though not exclusively) law enforcement officials from both developed and developing countries, hosted by the International Peace Institute in New York in 2011-12. At these meetings, the founding members of the Global Initiative, many of whom stand at the front line of the fight against organised crime, illicit trafficking and trade, concluded that the problem and its impacts are not well analysed; they are not systematically integrated into national plans or strategies; existing multilateral tools are not structured to facilitate a response and existing forms of cooperation tend to be bilateral, slow and restricted to a limited number of like-minded states.

The result was a decision to create a new initiative: the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, which would seek to provide a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organised crime.

Analysis, Strategies and Response

Launched formally in New York in September 2013, the Global Initiative comprises a growing network of independent global and regional experts working on human rights, democracy, governance and development issues where organised crime has become increasingly pertinent.

The Global Initiative is an international civil society organisation, has an office in Geneva, Switzerland, a core Secretariat and a high-level advisory board. Through a range of channels, the Global Initiative seeks to project the expertise of its Network members outwards and to make it available to a broader range of stakeholders.

For more information please visit our website at www.globalinitiative.net
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Table of Contents

I. Introduction

There are a number of significant policy processes advancing that are changing the way that development actors will engage with organized crime programming. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ASD2030) by the General Assembly on the 25 September 2015 places the issue of organized crime firmly within the realm and mandate of development actors. The shifts in the rules for recording development assistance contributions under the revised Financing for Development framework and the clarification of the ODA rules will make it easier for development actors to engage in programming directly related to tackling organized crime, mitigating its impact and building the resilience of communities to criminal flows.

In addition, as preparation for the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) intensifies, this will shine a spotlight on the debates around what are the appropriate responses to transnational organized crime, and how we achieve balanced, integrated approach that can include both criminal justice, security and development responses.

The Development Dialogue is a process that the Global Initiative has facilitated since early 2013, and it is clear that a lot of ground has been covered since those initial discussions, in which development actors were only beginning to come to terms with organized crime, and the evidence base was still largely yet to be determined. A number of the most pressing challenges which the international community and individual states are grappling with have highlighted the importance: illicit migration, but also debates around reducing the harm from drug trafficking, or protecting key species from extinction for example.

This conference is the fourth meeting of the Development Dialogue: the first was held in the Hague in April 2013, the second in Berlin in November 2014, and the third in Oslo in March 2015.1 In each meeting, the hosting country partnered with the Global Initiative to use the discussion to learn from thematic and regional specialist, and to raise awareness and catalyze the debate internally. In a small way, this has contributed to the growing momentum around the debate, and has provided policymakers an opportunity to benchmark and compare approaches.

This meeting brought together some 50 policymakers, experts and development practitioners at the HMS President facility in London, offered by the UK Ministry of Defense, and co-hosted between the Global Initiative and the UK's Department for International Development. Representatives from twelve separate UK Government departments participated in the meeting, highlighting how wide the debate has become, and the ever-increasing need to build bridges between different departments, build a common language and create whole of government approaches. The meeting was held under the Chatham House rule.

The debate has unquestionably progressed. The ASD2030 outcome shows us is that there is no longer a question that development actors have a role to play in countering organized crime – this was less clear when the Development Dialogue process began – but the challenge remains complex, without simple solutions. Debating the complexity, discarding simple solutions, innovating new response and seeking ways to measure progress are the key things on the agenda now, and there is a hope that the Development Dialogue can continue to add value to that process.

1 Reports of past Development Dialogue meetings are available at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/programs/governance/the-development-dialogue/

II. Unresolved Issues and Unanswered Questions

The realization of the two-way connection between organized crime and development is gaining widespread acceptance in the development policy community, but the need for a more nuanced understanding of this relationship is required.

As we move away from a criminal justice response to the issue of organized crime, towards the toolbox of governance and development, greater political will from both national actors and the international community will be required to address the issue. It will require addressing issues of elite corruption, incentives and integrity, which have proven challenging for the multi-lateral system thus far. Typically, the international community has shied away from dealing directly with illicit flows and their impact on peace and stability – even in ongoing peace processes such as Mali or Libya, where significant development investments are being considered, organized crime is left aside as a marginal issue, or at least one which it is 'too hard' to consider within the framework of political negotiations.

Yet the failures of explicitly failing to address illicit flows are beginning to come with increasingly high costs, and in ways that are very central to global governance and peace and security. There is arguably an opportunity now, while the 'iron is hot' on a number of issues like illicit migration, or around the UNGASS, to move organized crime into a more central position on the global policy agenda.

Responding to organized crime in a convincing way is often a long-term agenda, and the political realities of public opinion, short budget and electoral cycles, tend to result in short-term "high impact" decision making. And with the proliferation of humanitarian crises and unresolved wars, in some cases there is a politically expedient choice being made rocking the boat on stable but unpalatable realities over creating still further instability.

Having a clear body of evidence to support the case for moving organized crime up the agenda with senior leadership is essential.

Is organized crime really a development issue?

While the evidence basis around organized crime as a development issue has grown, for some, there are still some outstanding questions that need to be better understood:

- Do we know enough about the market and network involved? How much do we know?
- Is it possible to have a chain orientated approach? Can you intervene in different places along the chain?
- Do we recognize enough the role of state empowered criminal actors?
- Can we measure the success of our development interventions?

USAID presented the results of a year-long research project, "Organized Crime, Conflict and Fragility: assessing relationships through a review of USAID programmes" with country case studies in Guatemala, Nigeria and the DRC, which examined the interaction between organized criminality and USAID development programming in conflict and fragility.

The study found that organized crime is both facilitated by, and a contributor to, state fragility. Much as the 2015 "States of Fragility" by the OECD also concluded, organized crime is becoming one of the principle spoilers holding back development. Characteristics of fragile states that render them susceptible to exploitation or partnership by organized crime include widespread corruption, weak or unaccountable security forces, ineffective judicial systems, limited border controls, high levels of unemployment and inequality. Where institutions are already weak, criminal networks further erode state authority, legitimacy and effectiveness by fueling corruption,

distorting state functions, depriving the government of tax revenues and challenging the monopoly of force and the legitimacy of the state.

In areas of high-crime, the capacity of development actors to deliver even within their usual mandate can be seriously compromised. The case studies provide concrete examples of how organized crime affects the design and delivery of USAID conflict and fragility programs. In some instances, insecurity stemming from organized crime has led to disruptions in program delivery and prompted adjustments in program design. For example, the local governance program in Nigeria envisages close collaboration with local government councilors, but the threat of kidnapping and extortion by local gangs has caused many local councilors to stay at home and not participate in program activities.

Driven by necessity, USAID staff and implementing partners have devised a range of protective measures to reduce risks from organized crime to program staff and participants, and safeguard program results more broadly. These include security measures as well as design and implementation considerations that can mitigate risks, as well as strategic measures, such as re-profiling programmes, or even changing where programmes would be deployed. Alongside these protective measures, the violence and corruption associated with organized criminality have galvanized some pressure for change among civil society, the general population and government officials.

Mobilizing development responses to organized crime remains a significant problem, however, in part because its impacts mirror and overlap other issues, like governance and terrorism. While we know that organized crime has a negative impact on core issues like poverty, governance and justice, there is far less of an understanding of how to achieve real engagement at a more serious level. The OECD States of Fragility report highlighted that development spending on security and justice remains an extraordinarily low proportion of ODA, and the development community is still unsure of how to have an impact through livelihoods and employment programming, though this clearly must be a priority.

Development programming in needs to be "crime-proofed." It is insufficient, and perhaps even counterproductive, to assume that the simple fact of starting to implement development activities in a country, no matter what type of activities or how they are implemented, will lead to progress against organized crime. "Crime-proofing" should consist initially of thoroughly investigating the ways in which development work can facilitate crime, which are currently only known on broad, theoretical levels: the injection of cash into the banking system, the development of communications infrastructure, and other processes.

On what scale do you measure the harm of organized crime?

Typically, the default prioritization around organized crime has been for the levels of violence that a criminal market incites or perpetuates. It is for this reason that debates around drug trafficking and the Americas have long been the priority concern for much of the international community attention and responses. In parallel, organized crime has been prominent within the debates around conflict and fragile states precisely for its linkages with protracting and exacerbating conflict.

Yet even within the advanced discussions and analysis around organized crime as a source of violence, the debate lacks nuance, and is often viewed through a very short term lens. In post-conflict contexts, organized crime is always perceived as a barrier to peace, but this is too linear. While it is true criminal groups can be spoilers, but can also be collaborators or partners. Deciding who is at the negotiating table is a crucial decision, and one which can have major impact on effectiveness and durability of peace. In some post-conflict scenarios in West Africa, demobilization has expanded criminal control over the state, and has pushed former combatants into criminal markets. Merely reducing violence is not a long term solution to a lasting peace.

Criminal groups and access to criminal markets can be advocates for peace and violence reduction in some contexts. In Bosnia, criminal industries sustained large segments of the population through rents and wages, and they perceived incentives for peace because it brought stability that would allow their criminal markets to flourish. In Myanmar, the government engaged in tacit agreements with criminal groups to regain security in border regions, but gave tacit control to illicit markets and used as bargaining chips in the peace process.

The international community tends to trade off post conflict privileges for stability / security. Evidence is increasingly demonstrating that rushed transitions from war to peace increases risks rather than reducing reducing them. Similarly, in the efforts to preservation of security, trade offs are made between stability and political economic reforms, and the consequence comes in the criminalization of the state. In post-conflict Kosovo, for example, political elites and criminal networks granted large numbers of the Kosovo Liberation Army a dominant role in determining and maintaining the state security architecture and subsequently accorded them significant political influence. This was intended to limit instability, but what emerged was a symbiotic relationship between new institutions of state and organized crime groups. Rarely do our analytical tools for viewing 'crime' have the nuance to understand or account for these types of scenarios which reinforce vested interest and build criminality into the institutions of the state.

Goal 16 of the ASD2030 agenda contains the governance and rule of law principles that were absent in the MDG framework, and with such largely nebulous and qualitative concepts at play such as quality of governance and justice, the ability to find suitable quantifiable indicators of success has proven a subject of significant debate. Within this agenda, the direct reference to organized crime is found in Goal 16.4, "By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime". As the debate on how to identify the best indicators for each target against a range of criteria proceeds, availability and measurability of data were key factors. Despite the fact that Goal 16.4 aggregates a number of diverse concepts under one unwieldy chapeau, measurement of inwards and outward IFFs has come to the foreground as the likely primary (sole) metric against which success will be measured.

The work of Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has created widespread acceptance of the use of the IMF balance of payments and residual trade statistics as an acceptable measure for IFFs, and thus for organized crime as a whole. Yet GFI's work that focuses on the reporting of licit trade, therefore by definition excludes the actual volume of criminal activity that occurs outside of the legitimate economy – activities like drug trafficking, the wildlife trade or human trafficking – are precisely what would be sought in a response to organized crime. Furthermore, whilst GFI's metric focuses on volume, it does not speak to the impact of such flows and therefore provides little assistance to policymakers and practitioners who are seeking to understand the implications for development response and prioritize their assistance.

A focus on trade and mispricing might identify some aspects of the weakness of state institutions to regulate trade, but it will not capture the broader framework of state erosion or impunity and the broader development. Furthermore, as the responses to this agenda have already shown, the 2015 report of the *High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows* from Africa being one example, the types of initiatives to counter an IFF-centric view of organized crime have been embedded in discussions around tax policy and regulation, and have placed the onus on foreign corporations to achieve higher standards of business ethics. While important, these are measures that will have little impact on the 60 per cent or more of the underserved and vulnerable populations operating in the global shadow economy; nor do they address the grand corruption that systematically perpetuate and protect such flows.

To try and explore these issues, the OECD commission a study authored by the Global Initiative, "Bad Trades and Global Trails: criminal economies and illicit financial flows from West Africa". This was an effort to redefine the issue of illicit financial flows (IFFs), which has gained prominence in the mainstream understanding of organized crime in a development context.

The OECD study, which looks at 13 different forms of illicit trade and criminal economies that are present in West Africa, dividing them into three categories: (i) illegal activities, like drug trafficking or human trafficking which are illegal in all their aspects and anyone involved with them would be committing a criminal act; (ii) illicit trade in normally legal goods, which are typically not sourced in West Africa but have a local market; and (iii) illicit resource extraction – those natural resources that are indigenous to West Africa but that are illegally sourced, or transition out of the formal economy at some point during their supply chain. In the latter category includes metals and minerals, but also natural resources such as flora and fauna.

Illegal Activities	Illicit Resource Extraction	Illicit Trade in Normally Legal Goods
• Drug trafficking	• Illicit mining	• Illicit tobacco
• Kidnapping for ransom	• Oil bunkering	• Counterfeits
• Arms smuggling	• Environmental crimes (including IUU Fishing)	• Commodity smuggling
• Human trafficking		
• Smuggling of migrants		
• Cybercrime / fraud		
• Maritime piracy		

Figure 1: Forms of Illicit Trade analysed in the OECD West Africa Study

The OECD report included six deep-dive case studies into different criminal economies: drug trafficking, human smuggling, counterfeit goods, artisanal gold mining and terrorism financing. Each case study highlighted a panoply of ways in which the criminal networks and illicit trades negatively impact governance, development, justice and the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions.

While there are many challenges to quantifying the scale of illicit flows – and on many occasions the report intentionally avoids doing so – there is an analytical exercise worthy of undertaking when looking at the way that the IFFs are causing harm in the region. The chart below quantifies the scale of the IFF, but divides the total flow by where it the IFF is realized: inside the ECOWAS region, or outside of it.



Figure 2: Comparing the scale and distribution of IFFs in West Africa for a selected group of illicit trade (OECD)

The report found that there is a distinctive difference in the type of harm that is realized, depending on three key questions: (i) whether or not it is a locally sourced good; (ii) whether there was a local market for the good; and (iii) where the IFFs are earned and invested. These questions can guide the prioritization of actions both for international, regional and national actors in response.

- **Labour intensive criminal industries**, such as that found facilitating artisanal and small scale gold mining in Liberia and Ghana, where the majority of the value of the trade remains in the region, are arguably less criminal economies but informal economies. The priorities in response should be to enhance protection for those engaged in the trade, minimise the environmental damage, and seek to regulate and shift the trade from the informal to the formal economy.
- **Natural resource driven criminal industries** where IFFs are extracted from the region are arguably the most damaging, with illicit, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU), or illegal logging being prime examples. Not only do they harvest a resource from the region that would otherwise be available to drive livelihoods and development, but they are often extracted in a means that causes irreparable damage to the environment, and there is little trickle down to the local economy, but promote procurement fraud and corruption related to the issuing of licenses which in turn contributes to widespread impunity and the infiltration of illicit finances into the political process.
- **Transit trade goods** with little local market, such as drug trafficking, are the most likely to result in high-level corruption and protection networks.
- By contrast, **criminal industries with a significant local market,** that become embedded in the economy of the communities where they are sourced, transit or are sold, are most likely to create widespread corruption, resource conflict or terror. They are also the hardest to address without finding alternative livelihoods and legitimate alternatives.

While there are many ways to understand and measure harm, and this a conceptual framework worthy of open debate within the context of specific countries or illicit economies. The multi-dimensional measurement of harm is discussed further below.

Is 'organized crime' even the right term to use?

In many ways, the term 'organized crime' is becoming increasingly unsatisfying to describe the multi-dimensional phenomenon of criminal networks, illicit trades and criminal economies that are currently encompassed under the term. Maybe the question that we should be asking is less about metrics, than reframing the understanding of organized crime and its impact altogether. Arguably, how we understand the impact of a phenomena really shapes what we measure.

The term 'crime' invokes a set of criminal justice responses that have clearly fallen short of producing results, and has difficult associations for development professionals and can exclude important aspects of the problems facing development actors. Participants raised concerns about the potential exclusion of economic and market-based analyses from the ambit of 'organized crime'. Still others posited that the use of the word "crime" makes it hard to include in programming situations in which criminal actors arguably provide benefits for local populations, such as by providing goods and services that fragile or embattled states cannot.

Finding alternative terminology that would be more appropriate is not a straightforward exercise, however. Participants noted that while there are several related fields that have developed literatures with relevant insights for programming against organized crime, such as work on countering violent extremism (CVE) or chronic violence, organized crime does not always display characteristics that would make these other fields applicable. For example, while 'chronic violence' might describe organized crime in the ***favelas*** of Brazil, it would be far less applicable to white-collar financial crime in the world's banking centers or to the production and distribution of counterfeit medicines. Similarly, on the level of constructing responses, terms like 'resilience' receives mixed receptions. Some attendees praised their more constructive, less law-enforcement-centric connotations, while others argued that they may be too vague or general to provide significant practical guidance for those in charge of developing policy and/or programming.

The discussions highlighted the myriad of ways in which organized crime operations mirror the corporate sector. Good business practices are equally applied to both the trade of illicit and legal goods. As previously mentioned, the lines between drugs (illicit) and cigarettes (legal – but untaxed) are becoming blurred and both sides utilize similar tools and processes, and often include the same actors.

The consequences of this "legalization" of criminal enterprise have lead, in some cases, to a reduction in the violent behaviour which has long been considered a hallmark of organized crime. For example, Chinese gangs operating in South Africa's Western Cape prefer not to use violence as it attracts attention to their operations. Increasingly, therefore organized crime in Southern Africa and particularly in its more sophisticated incarnations, is turning to other levers of protection to ensure a safe space to conduct their illicit trade.

With a shift away from violence, as with the earlier discussions on politics and crime, the use of widespread and high-level corruption has become more prominent, and criminal economies are centred around an increasingly blurry triumvirate of criminal groups, big business and politics, and this is particularly prevalent in failing states and those with significant natural resources.

Some have proposed that 'enterprise crime; or a similar equivalent that emphasizes the financial, profit orientated nature of organized crime. One of the biggest themes of the meeting was the need to do away with the common misconception that organized crime is an exclusively profit-driven activity. This idea is so widespread that it can even be seen in the UNTOC definition of organized crime quoted above, which stipulates that the illicit activities of an organized criminal group must be conducted in order to obtain 'financial or other material benefit'. This thinking owes much to the work of Paul Collier on "greed versus grievance" in conflict situations, in which "organized crime groups were understood as supplying conflict actors with the means (arms, conflict, finance) to wage war" (de Boer et Bosetti 2015).

It is the state at the defines what is considered 'crime' and the boundaries of legality, and thus in some conceptions it is considered a highly subjective term. In fact, the licit and illicit have become increasingly interwoven, particularly in contexts when there are significant informal economies and illicit trade generates livelihoods that fall outside of regulated economies and the control of the state.

Have the goals of organized crime changed?

As discussed quite extensively during the Oslo Development Dialogue meeting, "Old Frontiers, New Boundaries: Reconsidering Approaches to the Security Development Nexus" organized criminal groups often have a wide variety of motivations. To be sure, many if not most organized criminal groups are very much interested in making money, often very large quantities of it. But the lines between criminal organizations, insurgents, and other non-state actors are often blurry. The theoretical basis for this argument is quite strong, and draws heavily on the work of Charles Tilly: "if protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making—quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy—qualify as our largest examples of organized crime" (Tilly 1985, 169).

Organized criminal groups have demonstrated their political and social aspirations in a wide variety of geographical and historical contexts. In 1993, for example, the United Nations and the government of El Salvador created the Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed Groups with Political Motivation in El Salvador, which "argued that criminal and politically-motivated organizations were impossible to differentiate" (Washington Office on Latin America 2007, 6). In the European context, a classic example of a group with simultaneously criminal and political motivations is the Irish Republican Army, which at the height of the Troubles was taking millions of pounds per year from criminal activity and using that revenue to fund its armed insurgency (Williams 2007).

This political side to organized criminal groups, participants argued, has implications for the design of organized crime-related development programming. In contexts in which organized criminal actors have established some legitimacy for themselves as political and/or social actors, technocratic programs focused primarily on training and equipping law enforcement and security personnel will not be sufficient. Criminals' reasons for acting, and therefore the often-elusive root causes of crime and insecurity, may lie in local history or seemingly idiosyncratic grievances, rather than "classic" motivations such as profit-seeking or political underrepresentation.

III. Case Study: "Borders at Breaking Point": Addressing Illicit migration

Illicit migration has proven itself an evocative illustrator of why organized crime is increasingly an issue that demands development responses, and why security, justice and development cannot be disentangled from the development domain.

Both in Europe and in the Americas, the concept of viable maintenance of state control of borders are at a breaking point. In June 2015, UNHCR announced that the global displacement at the highest levels since WW2, with over 60 million people currently displaced. In the few months since that statistic was released, the numbers are still rising. 600,000 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants have crossed the European borders this year, and a significant number have lost their lives in the journey. Migrants have died in Asia as chronic insecurity has pushed them into the arms of smugglers, on to the sea and onto the shores of states reluctant to deal with their care. In the last year, the southern border states of the United States were overwhelmed by a crisis of child migration prompted by the violent drug wars of the Northern Triangle countries.

While the word 'unprecedented' is used prolifically in the humanitarian domain, it is not inappropriate in the current context of human movement. The world is characterized now by a spate of new crises, all of which have triggered significant displaced populations, in the Central African Republic, in Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen. A number of protracted crises remain unresolved, in Afghanistan, DRC, Myanmar and Somalia. New waves of displacement have been triggered, while existing refugee populations are unable to return: levels of refugee repatriation are at 25 year low, with little sign of improvement. While 85% of refugees are found in developing and middle-income countries, mobility is growing phenomenon. Access to communication, information, diaspora networks and smugglers has lead to a growing number of people 'voting with their feet', abandoning camps and moving to cities and countries with better facilities, employment, education and healthcare. They will use whatever routes and means of transport to meet their objectives, and in this extraordinary movement has profited criminal networks who facilitate illicit migration.

In seeking to understand and analyze the current 'migration emergency' in Europe and elsewhere, there are a number of characteristics that should be considered.

Firstly, this is a phenomenon that might have been predicted, especially given the money that is spent on intelligence and forecasting. Syrian refugees represent the largest number of arrivals in any environment. Over the course of nearly 5 years of conflict, 4 million people have been displaced inside of the country; a further 6 million are outside. The levels of violence during the conflict have only intensified, forcing people to take refuge in neighbouring countries, where the levels of humanitarian assistance have declined and support to host countries failed to materialize. The result is that attitudes towards the refugees by local communities have hardened, local support has declined, and the emotional and financial resources of the refugee population has been eroded. Countries of first asylum have proven unable to offer a dignified future, and thus Syrian migrants

have decided to make the journey now, before weather and state borders harden. This could have been predicted, and was predicted by some, but the warnings were not heeded, and no preparations were made to deal with a large migrant community. This is arguably "a self-inflicted refugee emergency".

Secondly, it must be realized that the while the movement of people across frontiers is primarily a subject that falls under sovereign power of states, and that for the majority, states have been able to control those flows in normal conditions. However, to assume the same where large and sudden refugee movements are prompted by conflict or human rights abuses is a fallacy. These are purposeful actors not prepared to take no for an answer when states try to prevent their intention to get to chosen destination. The limitations of state control are further shown in the failure of government to change public opinion, where a sympathetic public outcry and significantly change government policy.

Third, this refugee crisis in particular has highlighted the failure of the multilateral system. The United Nations was established at the end of WW2 with a peace and security charter to "save future generations from the scourge of war". The international refugee protection regime was designed in that framework to address one of the principal consequences of WW2, but as the UNHCR High Commissioner has pointed out, these peace, security and protection systems no longer working. The Security Council has proven unable to end old crises or prevent new ones, or provide protection from the consequences of these conflicts even to those most vulnerable. Forms of international cooperation have not manifested even in the best case scenarios: the EU, which is uniquely prosperous, largely homogenous and committed union has failed to achieve a credible common position to basic international responsibilities or burden sharing.

Fourthly, by default and by design, there has been an increasing securitization and militarization to the international response. While migration has deep roots in political economy drivers, states prefer to couch this within national security and pursue militarized responses to refugee movement, often at the expense of humanitarian and human rights principles. This is not restricted to Europe, but is a phenomenon seen globally: the deployment of warships to police borders to prevent illicit migration; the fortification of borders; the focus on seizing and destroying criminal assets have been paramount in the dialogue around responses.

Consequently, smugglers and criminal networks have become the Bête Noire of the response framework, vilified fro their ruthless and inhumane activities, lack of respect for human rights and life. The dominant messaging is to speculate about the scale of money earned, their involvement in other activities such as drug trafficking or terrorism. However, this fails to acknowledge the nuances in the smuggling debate and the role that smugglers play for migrants and refugees, and it is far from being a comprehensive response.

Can smuggling networks be dismantled without depriving refugees of their international privileged rights to seek asylum? Smugglers provide assistance and options to those determined to move where there are no safe, legal or legitimate alternatives. While illicit migration is unquestionably a criminal act, there are a very broad spectrum of actors supporting migrants to move: from very ordinary people who assist for humanitarian reasons, to opportunistic local communities providing food, lodging, transport or supplies to the refugee communities. There are travel agents, border guards, local consulate officials helping migrants to pass borders or access documentation.

As with many criminal markets, smugglers did not create the market that they support and perpetuate. Many of these are entrepreneurial actors of a very venal kind, responding to a market opportunity and demand created by authoritarian states, terrorist groups and interventionist governments. You cannot dismantle the smuggling market without addressing the question of demand, and increasing the levels of control merely heightens the costs of doing business, and thus the costs to migrants, enriching smugglers, favouring those that are most professional, violent and ruthless, and driving the industry more deeply underground where it is harder to break down and protect the vulnerable.

The strategies used by the US to control migration over the Southern Border offer a number of lessons, particularly in terms of government responses. The upward trend of child migrants is similarly a manufactured crisis that was long in the making, and the responses have highlighted a number of important dichotomies: should the focus be on prevention or control? Do you invest in the systemic challenges of countries down range, or do you control the border? Should humanitarian or security focused responses have priority? The militarization of the US border and attitudes toward migration has been described as a multi-decade mistake, and possibly the largest failed policy of the US government. It has forced people to live in the shadows for generations, whilst increasing and empowering smuggling networks and their association with organized crime.

In the Northern Triangle, migration is a phenomenon that defines the region. Much like with much of sub-Saharan Africa, migration is a release valve and a resilience strategy. Porous borders and mobility are endorsed by political elites and remittances a significant part of regional economies, exceeding levels of ODA. There are very strong incentive for individuals to migrate, and for the most part, migrants only benefit from a successful migration journey.

As with the European crisis, subtle distinctions in nomenclature and definitions have come to be very important. Whether those moving are described as migrants or refugees invokes a completely different set of protection entitlements, and the ambiguities and loopholes that have been designed into the system are heavily exploited by criminal groups.

US strategies to dismantle smuggling networks have been manifold, but almost completely ineffective. Building barriers or addressing specific routes has simply displaced those routes and made journeys for migrants more expensive and dangerous without presenting an effective deterrent. Returning those declared of having entered illegally has cast a shadow on the US's international and human rights obligations, as vulnerable people including children have been returned into dangerous environments – and smuggling markets have adapted to offer migrants bulk prices for multiple attempts.

Finally, the US is beginning to look at root causes, and to invest in the source countries to address long-term questions governance, prosperity and security. Efforts are being made not only to rely on control strategies, but also on prevention.

The EU could and should consider a similar set of options:

- Increasing level of humanitarian support to meet basic needs in first country of asylum
- Compliment humanitarian assistance with longer and development orientated assistance for host countries and refugees.
- Establish "safe and legal routes" into Europe, and there are a a range of options, including refugee resettlement, private sponsored schemes, humanitarian visas, and labour regimes.

Responses to the migration crisis require a reassertion of principles of global governance, solidarity and burden sharing, which are at risk. The role for development actors is arguably in closing down opportunities for smugglers: by promoting conflict and conflict resolution; by creating the conditions for people to live a dignified future in home and host countries; by maximizing opportunities presented by economic development and remittances, not only for migrants, but also for the individuals and communities whose prospects have been swelled by supporting the smuggling industry.

IV. New Approaches for Analysis and Programming

As the importance of the issue of organized crime for development actors becomes more evident and more pressing, the participants of each of the Development Dialogues have steadily been to push toward what are the implications of this for programming. What in fact, is being asked of development actors? Should we be doing more of the same, or something different?

If organized crime is to be reinterpreted for a development audience, then a new set of analytical and programmatic frameworks will be required that are cognizant of market forces, of vested interests and the legitimacy of the intervention. And these will be required, as the USAID example showed, for development programmes whether they are working to weaken organized crime groups and networks directly, whether they seek to mitigate the impact that organized crime can have on development, or whether they seek to build the resilience of communities and the state to counter organized crime.

The discussions of the second day centered around four ways in which this might be enhanced, and looked the roles that can be played by state actors and civil society in achieving these four goals:

1. Improving capacity for identification and analysis
2. Determining, prioritizing, and mitigating harm
3. Reducing impunity / increasing exposure
4. Building resilience and changing incentives

One of the key challenges for interventions, as the migration case study highlighted very aptly, is that responses need to take place at different levels, and address all aspects of the challenge, from short term manifestations to long-term root causes; from the security implications and criminal actors, to the communities in which the phenomena is embedded. This is hard to conceptualize and hard to coordinate, as it requires interventions from a number of levels and departments.

Three themes emerged clearly as being essential to responding to organized crime redefined: the need to focus on power and power relationships and the networks behind the crimes; the need to look at resources, both legitimate and illegitimate – how they are accrued, transferred and spent; and finally to address the issue of legitimacy, and similarly how it is earned and who is perceived as being 'legitimate'. It was observed that frequently the international community promotes democratic process as form, rather than substance: the rush to sign peace agreements or conduct elections often reinforces rather than breaks down the status quo, and favours those who have ready access to funds and arms. The result is self-perpetuating cycles of clientalism and 'isomorphic mimicry' rather than genuine development.

In seeking to intervene in criminal markets, we have to recognize that development assistance and foreign aid is, in itself, a resource flow, and thus has the ability to also impact on incentives and vested interests. In the past, failure to account for the way that development assistance is channeled has distorted the nature of post-conflict economies, particularly in those which favour informal or shadow economies. Where donor support is provided off budget, particularly in weak states or those characterized by a high degree of clientalism, foreign aid will work in the similar ways to illicit resources, enabling one set of actors in favour of another. It might by pass government corruption and shield money from flowing into the wrong hands, but it may well also enrich a competing group. At the same time, off budget support and direct institution fail to build government capacity for financial management and oversight, and organized crime expressly thrives in places where state institutional capacity are fragile and capacity for oversight is weak (property rights, contract enforcement, land tenure, lack

of capital financing). Consequently, the issue of resources, both licit, illicit and externally provided, have to be considered with care, as they potentially come with large consequences for society and at a high cost for the legitimate economy.

Finally, the discussions emphasized that Illicit markets and illicit activities cannot be removed from their context, which is unique in each case, and programmatic responses need to be cognizant of this context, both the past and present, and while there may arguably be a toolbox of responses and interventions that can be successful, they cannot be replicated without a consideration of their applicability to the local environment.

Improving capacity for identification and analysis

Any programming intervention to counter organized crime needs to be predicated on an analysis of markets and power. In order to build development interventions that can address what were seen as priority concerns - power, resources, legitimacy - then a better understanding of the criminal market is required.

Recognition of an analytical bias must be introduced into this process: who conducts the analysis is as important a questions as how it would be conducted. Frequently, the capacity for analysis is stove-piped within certain parts of a state, and not always those who have the best geo-political and economic context understanding. Furthermore, incorporating the perspectives of those that are marginalized, particularly in the context of power relationships, may again reinforce patterns of behavior and response that do not further the goals of the programme. Finally, analysis cannot be a point-in-time exercise, but needs to evolve and keep pace with changing local dynamics. People are constantly calculating their trade-offs, particularly in transition periods – the negotiation of a peace treaty, for example - and thus the mapping process need to be continuously applied and reassessed as the process is ongoing.

Addressing markets specifically addresses some of the earlier highlighted ambiguity about definitions, and what is defined as 'criminal'. Through a market analysis it is possible to define the lines of political control and power relations, without necessarily drawing a line at what are the 'criminal' elements. A market focused analysis would automatically include all of the actors who facilitate the sourcing, movement or sale of the illicit good, whether these are part of the community or the political hierarchy. Organized crime cannot just be viewed by its commodities – and in many ways this was the flaw of prior approaches that looked at flows and interdiction. Instead, it needs to be understood a criminal economy that is both economically and socially embedded in communities and local power structures.

In the diagram below, for example, which depicts a fictional market for a wildlife product. Mapping the criminal market in this way identifies a number of key actors at different points along the supply chain, and it highlights clearly the points in which the core 'criminal group' (buyers, transporters, sellers) engage with 'legitimate' actors in the state and the community (hunters, local government and security officials).



Figure 3: Analysis of a market and supply chain for a wildlife product (Source: Shaw and Kemp, 2012)

In order to develop a mapping like this (and there are other ways that a market can be depicted, see *Spotting the Spoilers*, for example) will require information around five variables:

- **Price:** When analyzing markets, having data about price - and particularly price changes - is critical information. Criminal networks manipulate prices to grow markets and to maintain their competitiveness. Rising prices may be the result of external intervention, regulation or control higher up in the supply chain, or in the market place. Price, its control and the impact of changes in price must be central to understanding the criminal market.
- **Market entry:** Analysing how difficult it is to enter the market, who can enter it, and who needs to be paid to enter, are means to understand the level of consolidation of the market and its gatekeepers. The more consolidated a market is, the harder it is to eradicate. Continuous monitoring of the state of the market may indicate windows of opportunity to intervene when the market is in a state of flux.
- **Violence:** Assessing the level of violence in a market provides us a measure of harm to ordinary communities. Again, monitoring the levels of violence, who violence is targeted against, who are the actors who wield violence are a useful entry point to understanding power relationships behind a market. Violence and the threat of violence is a principle instrument in criminal markets, and is used strategically: sometimes violence is used symbolically, in other cases avoiding or reducing violence is used as a strategic means to gain legitimacy (for example in gang truces) and in some criminal markets, violence becomes a commodity in its own right.
- **Protection:** There are two dimensions to the 'protection' industry that consolidates around illicit flows and criminal markets: corruption and violence. Analyzing who provides protection, how much it costs, how are transactions arranged is again a means to understanding and analyzing a criminal market. Asking key questions such as 'Can the price of protection be increased?' offer possible entry points for intervening against criminal markets. People who move goods are paying others for protection and that is priced into

the market. If you can increase the cost of protection you can weaken the market. In cases where the state is not strong, the state of protection is key, as it is often in this framework that organized groups can challenge the state.

- **Legitimacy:** Meeting pre-requisite basic needs such as safety and livelihoods, service delivery, and the provision of predictable justice and market regulation are the basic functions of a state. Where states are unable to provide the specific services that communities prioritise, opportunities are opened for alternative sources of governance and service delivery, and these providers gain legitimacy with local populations. Organized crime groups, often for their ability to provide lucrative livelihoods and control violence, have been known to garner considerable legitimacy with communities, such that a community will orientate around protecting the criminal market. In these instances, efforts to counter criminal networks or break down markets may be met with considerable resistance, or prove damaging to development objectives and state authority. Any intervention must be predicated on an understanding of which groups have legitimacy, and thus who could be harnessed as a change agent within the market environment.

Once a thorough and nuanced analysis of the criminal market and its political economy interests are in place, interventions can be designed to either counter the criminal market and networks directly by intervening along the supply chain, mitigate their harm to communities, the state or the environment state, or build the resilience to counter the market in the long term.

Determining, Prioritizing and Mitigating Harm

It is clear that 'harm' from organized crime is a multifaceted concept, which will differ from market to market, and context to context, and it is thus an issue that must be approached from a nuanced perspective. Understanding and categorizing the harms of organized crime is a critical step in the exercise however. Resources and political capital are not infinite, and therefore there must be a means by which to prioritizw actions and interventions. Quantifying the harms also offers a means by which impact can be understood and measured.

As the discussions around the OECD IFF study highlighted, the nature of the flow: its sourcing, its market and where the profits are invested will all impact how the criminal market will cause harm. There are a number of harm frameworks already on offer, which have examined the impact of organized crime on specific issues. One harm framework developed by the UK Serious and Organised Crime Divison (SOCA – now the National Crime Agency) developed a five-part harm framework model, which as shown in the diagram below, quantifies harm against five categories:



Figure 4: Towards a harm framework for organized crime

The tool developed by the UK not only looks at harm defined within these categories, but also the level of harm: is it individual? At the community level? Or more broadly at the national or regional level? Whether the harm is a short term phenomena or a long term systemic issue also needs be considered.

Harm is, of course, a subjective concept. Development practitioners will have to recognize that not only are their multiple forms of harm, but harms will be experienced differently by different parts of the community and the state. As we external actors consider the issue of harm, we also need to be self-reflective on how we as representatives are defining harm.

As previously noted, the default priority within most assessments of harm is often the level of physical violence, though this has typically been very narrowly conceived, and responses have largely concentrated on short term violence reduction, concentrated on the immediate violent actors – on combatants to be demobilized, or gangs to be pacified. Even here, however, the analysis tends to fall short in the responses it delivers. Short term efforts to reduce violence (gang truces for example) rarely address the underlying criminal enterprises that are left to continue unabated, and rarely are genuine, viable and sustainable long term alternatives provided for those engaged in or profiting from the market.

Furthermore, the short term reduction of violence only scratches the surface of the harm that chronic violence impacts on individuals and society. Organized crime often flourishes in and perpetuates contexts of 'chronic violence' that affects at least 25% of the global population, especially people in countries or regions with long term state fragility, state absence or capture and it often most severely affects those who cannot in the short or medium term fundamentally change these conditions. Chronic violence has been shown to have widespread and long-term impacts on human security that focuses less on measuring and reducing homicides, but arguably need to be understood in a wider human development framework that is cognizant of this long term damage and builds resilience over time.

Moving beyond violence to identify other forms of harm is essential. The newly-adopted ASD2030 provides the beginnings of an overarching framework for organizing development efforts, and as the Global Initiative has noted in its publication "Organized Crime as a Cross-Cutting Spoiler to Development", the ASD2030 acknowledges the breadth of organized crime's possible impact on development in everything from economic to environmental impact. Work on identifying, prioritizing, and mitigating harms could therefore be quite useful in the further elaboration and implementation of the ASD2030, and can be used to break down silos between development actors, and draw a more diverse set of respondents to the table. If you can prove, for example, the link between organized crime and damage to the environment, those working in the environmental sector can be incited to align their tools and programmes in a way that is more 'crime sensitive', and reinforces common goals.

Reducing impunity, increasing exposure

It has become increasingly clear that corruption and impunity are not issues that can be ignored, and attempting to programme in environments where these are present is not a viable strategy for long-term governance and development. However, the track record of rule of law and justice interventions have been mixed and effective strategies to respond to these challenges remain largely elusive.

Responses to impunity and corruption typically fall along a spectrum that runs from building systems by which corruption and criminality can be exposed, to addressing impunity through systems of prosecutions at varying levels.



Figure 5: Interventions on a spectrum of impunity and exposure

Successful prosecutions of top leaders, even if carried out by external actors, can be extremely powerful symbolically and send strong messages to criminals, as evidenced by the after-effects of the American Drug Enforcement Agency's intervention in Guinea-Bissau targeting General Bubo Na Tchuto. Such focused, precise operations have more impact than generalized 'rule of law programming', which often spreads out funding too thinly for it to have the desired impact. While these are often characterized as justice initiatives, in fact the focus is less on the prosecution component, but to make a clear and symbolic interventions into the existing power relationships, and to signal a change from business as usual.

Ideally efforts to combat high-level impunity are more effective if they are carried out by national or regional initiative, rather than externally imposed. Regional models for ending impunity, such as the CIGIG in Guatemala, have had some impact, and they send a very strong message downwards that systems are changing. As indicated in the diagram above, however, there are a number of pre-requisites that will have to be in place before action of this type can expect to be initiated, namely political will and a political opening; furthermore, for an effort to be regionally or nationally lead, a certain set of skills and the ability to protect the integrity and safety of key actors may be required.

This speaks again to the importance of timing, and seizing opportunities to bring these issues to the table. Arguably, windows of opportunity can also be created – the wake of a high-level sting operation can be one way of forcing a national or regional agenda to tackle impunity. Addressing impunity does, to a certain extent, mean implying surgical levers against specific nodes in criminal markets, and there are a number of means to do so that are not solely prosecution based. There are a number of other means – sanctions, asset seizure, communication and image based efforts to improve legitimacy and accountability. The analytical mapping of power relationships proposed in allows these instruments to be applied against mapped network, and to refine parameters of the toolkit of the international community to make them context specific.

But while important, high level targeting and prosecutions are not by themselves sufficient to prop up a weak justice sector and support it in a fight against organized crime. In order for actions taken to reduce impunity

have a lasting effect, they must be coupled with measures to increase the exposure of criminals and other drivers of illicit activities and organized crime in general. Such programmes complement the high-level interventions to reduce impunity by making it more difficult to achieve impunity in the first place.

In this effort, civil society associations and community leaders in affected countries can be key interlocutors and partners in efforts to increase exposure. Development actors, investigative journalists, and others can assist by describing and otherwise demystifying criminal networks—for example, by publishing lists of known traffickers. In addition to increasing general awareness, this both puts pressure on affected countries to act and makes it harder for them to justify not doing so.

Civil society organizations have carved out niches for themselves in several relevant areas. Transparency and watchdog groups monitor government officials and parliamentary reports for signs of political and financial corruption. Advocacy groups lobby lawmakers to implement policies in the areas of security, governance, and public health. Community assistance and public health organizations attempt to mitigate the harmful effects of organized criminal activity in communities. On a less tangible, but no less important, level, civil society leaders and activists do vital work building constituencies in the name of accountability, change, and the rule of law.

This is not without obstacles and complications, however. Without strong leadership and sufficient organizational capacity, attempts by civil society to stand up to organized crime can, unfortunately, degenerate into intra-communal violence and vigilante justice. In Mexico, for example, the *fuerzas autodefensas* (self-defense forces) have had a mixed impact on civilian security—in their attempts to rid local communities of drug dealers and corrupt officials, they have at times provoked even more violence and insecurity (Asfura-Heim et Espach 2013). A more somber example is that of the Central African Republic, where Christian "anti-balaka" militias, formed in response to abuses committed by Muslim Seleka rebels, have targeted Muslim communities in large-scale reprisal attacks (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Organized criminal groups, corrupt politicians, and separatist militias possess the same survival instinct as any other organization or individual, and are often not hesitant to retaliate against whistleblowers and investigators. In Russia, for example, several notable journalists and opposition figures have been murdered in recent years, perhaps none more celebrated than Anna Politkovskaya (Mainville 2006). Elsewhere, in many Central American countries persistent violence and threats have led activists and journalists to curtail their activities, a development reflected in these countries' low rankings in press freedom indices and other related measurements (Cawley 2014).

If international actors are going to encourage civil society to engage in oversight and reporting to expose criminality and corruption, it is critically important that safeguards and capacities to protect them are also built into the programming framework and delivery model. In this regard, advances in technology may have a key role to play.

Building resilience, changing incentives

The final category of intervention is building resilience and changing incentives. The choice of the term "resilience" represents a conscious attempt to borrow from the language of development actors in order to minimize the amount of adaptation necessary. Interventions in this category are divided into two groups: those focusing on changing power relations, and those focusing on changing the legitimacy that actors have.



Figure 6: Changing the drivers of power and legitimacy

In the first instance, an understanding of what are the dynamics, or levers, that drive both power and legitimacy allows for the designing of interventions that counter or change those dynamics. Analysis of the drivers of power in the community will each be unique, but core components include capacity to wield influence through patronage, violence and control of resources. Unlike the discussions of harm, the goal in designing interventions is to build the overall resilience of the community and in the systems of governance that would allow them to be more robust against criminal enterprises and networks. These look at addressing structural and systemic changes in the way that governance and development are delivered. None of these are short-term endeavours.

As earlier discussions highlighted, organized criminals very often benefit from support or protection by high-level political actors, and no serious challenge to entrenched criminal networks can succeed without changing these patronage relationships. As discussed in the previous section, raising the capacity for regulation, promoting transparency and reform, can all undermine the efficacy of patronage systems and thereby reduce the influence of those who utilize them.

The second dynamic is the use of violence and having the monopoly on force. Violence must be devalued and credible alternatives provided and promoted. While this is by no means straightforward, addressing how violence is wielded, who has the capacity to wield it, and who can provide protection from violence are all necessary questions that will be highly context specific.

Building resilience, reducing violence

Reducing violence and building society's resilience will always be a primary goal of development interventions. Shifting towards a longer-term approach that recognizes the damaging impact of chronic violence and creates systemic changes that will enhances human development must be a priority. What might this include in the context of organized crime?

- Moving from illicit trade as a diverse array of discrete problems to a phenomenon that forms part of a larger system and which has multiple causes and effects.
- From isolated "siloed" approaches to holistic strategies -- inter-sectorial, inter-disciplinary, and relational.
- From "crime reduction/prevention" to "strengthening human development": enabling vulnerable groups to thrive as individuals, social beings and citizens.
- Crime and violence reduction become strategic indicators of change.
- From a top-down (state-centered) approach to security and crime reduction to include a bottom-up (social) focus on how illicit trade and violence is actually ***experienced*** by groups, and a research-driven focus on the drivers that reproduce it.
- Moving beyond the normative focus on violence to incorporate an experiential focus.
- From a focus on specific kinds of illicit trade to specific vulnerable groups/regions and multiple forms of illicit realities and violence that affect them.
- Finally, since illicit trade (and chronic violence) are 'complex' and systemic challenges, they require a shift from linear cause-and-effect approaches to systemic approaches.

See: International Learning Programme

Third, as discussed, resources are central to power dynamics. In many ways, this is one of the easiest areas for external actors to intervene: market frameworks can be altered and resources redistributed by manipulation along a number of points along supply chains, in order to break the hold on power enjoyed by those favored in the current system of wealth and income distribution. Raising the costs through better regulation, interdiction, injecting new forms of resources into the economy (through aid) or reducing costs through legalization are all strategies to change the status quo in terms of resources.

Addressing, affecting and building legitimacy is an area that is long familiar to development practitioners, and the development community has a considerable body of experience and lessons learned on which to draw.

Traditionally, efforts to build legitimacy have focused on the delivery of service provision and development dividends, which has resulted in the formulaic roll-out of programmes of health and education. However, experience has begun to show that these 'social goods' matter less for legitimacy than we would perhaps prefer to believe. Legitimacy is garnered from far more basic requirements: secure livelihoods, from identity and ideology, and from a sense of durability. Short term quick-wins do little to change peoples' sense of where legitimacy is garnered. Instead, confidence in delivery is built over time, and quickly lost.

As with changing power relations, changing legitimacy is also a difficult, three-part endeavor. Illicit economies must be formalized, or formal alternatives to illicit livelihoods provided, such that citizens can feasibly expect to support themselves and their families without having to resort to the gray or black markets.

The argument that criminal economies or criminal groups are a source of resilience can be a short term view, but one which requires analysis. In the Sahel, for example, illicit trade is the resiliency response to long-term livelihood insecurity. At the same time, the formation of youth gangs which may or may not be involved in illicit

trade is a means for youth to gain value from a common identity. Therefore, the analytical framework is critical in understanding from where sources of legitimacy are derived. Again, this is something that can change – or be changed – over time. In Northern Mali, trafficking was a resilience strategy that reduced violence, until regional dynamics changed and it broke down and instead became a source of insecurity and violence. This again presents an opportunity to intervene and provide alternatives.

Building security and law enforcement remains a critical component of the response, but this is less an issue of building border security capacity, or the normative and legislative framework. Instead, building state capacity and orientation towards citizens, rather than merely elites, in order to garner popular support and buy-in for governmental initiatives and programs. Finally, the justice system must be reformed in order to increase transparency and accountability.

V. Conclusions and the Way Forward

The discussions have potentially thrown up a new set of analytical and response framework for development actors to respond to organized crime as a development issue, and the current policy environment provides a number of strategic opportunities to raise awareness and the profile of this issue amongst the policy community.

While the Development Dialogue process thus far has been useful for aligning thinking, informing and sensitizing a growing body of policy makers, if the processs it to continue to add value, there is a clear need now to translate this practically into impact in the way that programming is tangibly delivered, and to learn lessons from early efforts in this regard.

Two subsequent meetings are planned for 2016: in the United States hosted by USAID, and in Germany hosted by the German Federal Foreign Ministry and GIZ. A number of concrete outcomes were proposed as a result of this conversation which could be taken forward in future meetings of the Development Dialogue:

1. Development of an analytical and programming tool for development practitioners

Synthesizing some of the conceptual frameworks that were developed and discussed in the course of this meeting could prove a useful tool for development practitioners programming for, in or to counter organized crime. Such a tool could subsequently be piloted and further refined in application to specific case studies.

2. Reviewing the lexicon of organized crime

Having recognized the distinct challenges in the terminology being used to define and describe organized crime and its related manifestations, in a parallel process or in subsequent meetings, effort could be made amongst policy makers to reconsider how terminology could be more productively used.

The question on appropriate metrics to measure organized crime is a related challenge. One key part of this conversation will continue as the UN Statistical division develops its indicators for measurement of the ASD2030 goals and targets. Could the Development Dialogue provide a (formal or informal) support network during the process of indicator development, that could allow for brainstorming, alignment of ideas and positions with the like minded, as well as access to expertise. Could the Development Dialogue play this role? Could a task team be set up to accompany the process, as this support is not being provided elsewhere?

3. Raising organized crime higher up the political agenda

Political will be essential if the more difficult issues of corruption, clientalism and elite engagement around organized crime are to be addressed. Even at a technical level, it is clear that a common mandate and coherence will be required if efficacious solutions are going to be found to the more pressing of organized crime related challenges. The ASD2030, the UNGASS and the ongoing migration crisis all offer opportunities to engage a higher level of political dialogue and momentum around the issue of organized crime. The OECD DAC IFF report and the processes that are likely to follow that is another avenue for engaging politically around this debate.

As the ramp up for the UNGASS begins, there is an urgent need for a better understanding of the development impacts of drug policy. Member States are going into this process relatively uninformed, or at least lacking coherence, and the outcomes are unclear. While there are resources on the topic, and NGOs active, civil society has not coalesced well into a support structure that could guide policy development. Thus, could this be considered within the above discussions on building evidence bases and using the Development Dialogue as a more active standing capacity to support policy discussions?

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

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