


THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME


Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development

Measuring and Monitoring Transnational
Organized Crime within the framework of Sustainable
Development for the Post-2015 Development Agenda:
Goals, Targets and Indicators





A NETWORK TO COUNTER NETWORKS




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Goals, Targets and Indicators

January 2015



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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
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About the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

The Global Initiative (www.globalinitiative.net) is a network of prominent law enforcement, governance and development practitioners who are dedicated to seeking new and innovative strategies and responses to organized crime.

Nature of the challenge

The problem of organised crime is not new, but the scope, scale and spread of the phenomena is now unprecedented. It affects all countries, developed, middle-income and developing, as well as states beset by political instability and conflict. The impacts can be diverse, but the common feature is that organised crime negatively affects the life chances of ordinary people: it undercuts key institutions, damages the environment, distorts or impedes economic growth and it fuels conflict.

While there is growing consensus as to the rapid evolution and detrimental impact of organized crime, there is much less agreement around what constitutes an effective response.

Catalyzing a new approach

The Global Initiative was born from a series of high-level, off the record discussions between mainly (though not exclusively) law enforcement officials from both developed and developing countries, hosted by the International Peace Institute in New York in 2011-12. At these meetings, the founding members of the Global Initiative, many of whom stand at the front line of the fight against organised crime, illicit trafficking and trade, concluded that the problem and its impacts are not well analysed; they are not systematically integrated into national plans or strategies; existing multilateral tools are not structured to facilitate a response and existing forms of cooperation tend to be bilateral, slow and restricted to a limited number of like-minded states.

The result was a decision to create a new initiative: the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, which would seek to provide a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organised crime.

Analysis, Strategies and Response

Launched formally in New York in September 2013, the Global Initiative comprises a growing network of independent global and regional experts working on human rights, democracy, governance and development issues where organised crime has become increasingly pertinent.

The Global Initiative is an international civil society organisation, has an office in Geneva, Switzerland, a core Secretariat and a high-level advisory board. Through a range of channels, the Global Initiative seeks to project the expertise of its Network members outwards and to make it available to a broader range of stakeholders.

For more information please visit our website at www.globalinitiative.net or contact the Secretariat at: secretariat@globalinitiative.net.



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Table of Contents

List of Proposed Sustainable Development Goals to be attained by 2030..... 1


I. Introduction: Organised Crime as a Development Issue 3

Organised crime: a spoiler to development.....	3
Call for action from the development community.....	4
New tools and analytical frameworks.....	6
Objectives of the Report.....	7
Responding to organised crime.....	8

II. Addressing Organised Crime in Sustainable Development Goals 11

Goals at Risk	11
GOAL 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.....	12
GOAL 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.....	16
GOAL 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.....	19
GOAL 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.....	22
Targets at Risk	29
GOAL 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture.....	30
GOAL 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.....	34
GOAL 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.....	37
GOAL 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.....	40
GOAL 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries.....	44
GOAL 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.....	48

Development Impacts at Risk	50
GOAL 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere	51
GOAL 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	53
GOAL 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all	54
GOAL 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation	55
GOAL 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.....	57
GOAL 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.....	58
GOAL 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development	59
Annex 1. Indicator Tables	61
Goals at Risk	63
Targets at Risk	72
Endnotes and References	82



List of Proposed Sustainable Development Goals to be attained by 2030

Goal 1:	End poverty in all its forms everywhere	
Goal 2:	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture	
Goal 3:	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	
Goal 4:	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	
Goal 5:	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	
Goal 6:	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	
Goal 7:	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all	
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Goal 17:	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.	

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
GFI	Global Financial Integrity
HLP	High Level Panel
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IUU	Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing
NCMEC	United States National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OWG	Open Working Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SMART	Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound
TOC	Transnational Organised Crime
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNTOC	United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime
WHO	World Health Organisation



Ox cart at the riverside in Kyaukse city, Myanmar. Credit: topten22photo

I. Introduction:

Organised Crime as a Development Issue

Organised crime: a spoiler to development

The international community has become increasingly aware of the extent to which organised crime serves as a spoiler of sustainable development. This realisation has been enshrined in a number of seminal reports. In 2005, the report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom," which identified the challenges preventing the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), highlighted organised crime as one of the principle threats to peace and security in the 21st century.¹ The 2010 "Keeping the Promise" report of the Secretary-General recognised that in order to achieve the MDGs, there would need to be capacity to respond specifically to organised crime.² The World Development Report 2011 concluded that both conflict and organised crime have the same detrimental effect on development, resulting in 20% less development performance.³ As such, combatting organised crime and promoting greater economic and social resilience to its most deleterious impacts has become an integral part of the 2012 "Action Agenda" of the Secretary-General, as a priority for achieving a stable world.

While organised crime is not a new phenomenon, the spread, impact and forms of organised crime in the modern world are unprecedented. The effects of organised crime are being felt in fragile and developed nations alike, and in many parts of the world, organised crime creates the very conditions that allow it to thrive, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle of insecurity and diverted development.

In fragile states and in situations of peacebuilding and state consolidation, organised crime is an increasing threat. In a number of theatres, criminal groups and illicit flows have been proven to fund conflict and perpetuate

violence and insecurity. It is widely recognised, for example, that illicit trafficking and organised crime played a pivotal role in reducing the credibility of the government and financing armed groups that prompted the collapse of the state in Mali in 2011. More recently in Libya, organised crime and the armed groups that perpetrate it are having a decisive impact on the country's development, undermining transitions to stability, obstructing the functioning of central state institutions, holding the democratic process hostage, disenfranchising citizens and increasing the insecurity and life chances of communities.

Organised crime and related corruption have been seen to reach up to the highest levels of government and the state, impacting stability, governance, development and the rule of law. Even in what are considered strong and prospering states, organised crime has a serious corrosive effect. A number of recent studies in Africa, for example, have demonstrated that while much of the continent is admired for its active civil society and free media, there is a very real danger of internal decay as organised crime and the associated corruption undermine state institutions.⁴ Weaknesses in public and private structures can result in the diversion of resources away from critical infrastructure and governmental services, including the provision of health, education and social welfare.

Poverty and inequality are associated with increases in organised crime, not least in relation to human trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit goods, the production of illicit crops, and everyday extortion and bribery. Prominent examples of these insidious relationships are visible in Central and South America; South, West and North Africa; and areas of Eastern Europe, where a combination of drug cartels, transnational gangs, money laundering entities and public entities are colluding with critical effects on human security and development.

Moreover, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence of the myriad ways organised crime negatively impacts the environment, such as by destroying biodiversity, threatening key species, or reducing the sustainability of ecosystems. In dealing with fisheries and marine ecosystems, addressing the problem of large-scale illegal fishing has become more urgent than other research priorities. In fields like sustainable forestry, a substantial proportion of development assistance is being diverted through illegal logging. Drug trafficking has also been a cause of deforestation of large portions of the Amazon and the Isthmus of Panama.

Call for action from the development community

With organised crime having been proven to have a direct negative correlation to basic development goals, it is imperative that development actors begin to build capacity to recognise, measure and respond to organised crime within their sphere of work.

While organised crime's importance is recognised in the creation of Target 16.4 "*By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime*" is welcomed, what the findings of this study show is that the impact of organised crime on development is extensive and diverse. Organised crime cannot be viewed as a separate development challenge to be addressed in isolation. Rather, an effective response calls for the recognition that organised crime is an intrinsic element to a large number development challenge, and must be interwoven throughout broader development response frameworks. This is the response requirement that this paper seeks to address. The failure to account for and address fundamental aspects of organised crime will directly impede and perhaps threaten existing gains in social and economic development.

As the issue of organised crime expands beyond the sphere of justice and security into a mainstream development concern, the definition of those charged with responding to it needs to be similarly expanded. While political will, capacity building and engagement with state institutions remain essential, a range of other actors and stakeholders needs to be brought to the table. Criminal groups have shown impressive capacities to understand the value of legitimacy through economic and social means, and this needs to be matched by similar efforts by governments, civil society and the private sector.

To achieve a wider-buy in, sensitisation to organised crime and its impacts is still required for practitioners active in the development domain, as well as in related debates on conflict and fragility, human rights, health and the environment. The issue is neither well understood nor mainstreamed. Contributing to the limited response to date is that reality the development community lacks a rigorous framework around which to understand, analyse and respond to organised crime.

The renewal of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), as a universal development agenda, is a key opportunity to sensitise development actors to organised crime and ensure that it is built into the development lexicon, so that development actors are able to identify organised crime when it affects the achievement of their mandates. In addition, they should feel equipped to bring development approaches to bear to mitigate the impact of crime on human security, the environment and on development, and to address the root causes.

Defining Organised Crime

One of the key challenges in strengthening responses to organised crime comes in agreeing an acceptable working definition. Organised crime exists in many markets, in many theatres of the world, and can be undertaken under the guise of legitimate enterprises, semi-legal, state or para-state activities, as well as just in the criminal domain. To attempt to tackle an issue so amorphous becomes overwhelming and even impossible. The failure to achieve consensus on a definition, however, should not prevent the necessary responses from moving forward.

The UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) focused on defining a criminal group, rather than providing a definition of organised crime itself. According to UNTOC, an organised crime group is “*a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.*”⁵

To qualify as transnational organised crime, the act or group requires an international component. The UNTOC states that transnational organised crime covers not only offences committed in more than one State, but also those that take place in one State but are planned or controlled in another. Also included are crimes in one State committed by groups that operate in more than one State, and crimes committed in one State that has substantial effects in another State.

Within the context of this study, we are focusing on *organised crime*, not limiting the scope to transnational organised crime, and address the crime rather than the group. The definition avoids defining groups, as the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change noted in 2004, “organised crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more formal hierarchies,” and the increasingly prevalent range of cyber-enabled crimes can be effectively conducted by a single perpetrator.⁶ As such, in line with international norms, organised crime is defined as illicit activities undertaken that have a strong economic imperative and that are of “major significance”.

It is important to note that the standard of “major significance” is being employed and not “serious crimes”, which the UNTOC definition of organised crime adopts. UNTOC defines serious crimes as “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.”⁷ Thus, the seriousness of the offence is judged wholly by the judicial remedy, not taking into account the gravity of the criminal act or its impact upon society. In turn, it is possible under the UNTOC definition for crimes to have a detrimental impact on development goals, but not qualify as organised criminal activity as they are not punishable with a prison sentence of four or more years. However, as the focus of the study and the objective of the indicators is to measure the impact of criminal action upon society, the standard employed here is that the crime should result in an impact of “major significance”.

New tools and analytical frameworks

It is clear that to generate a strong response from the development community, a number of tools remain outstanding. Overall, indicators developed in the framework of organised crime control efforts are falling short in their capacity to reflect the multi-dimensional nature of the challenge. Current efforts to map, track and estimate the scale of organised crime are often derived from seizure data and arrest data and there has not been an effort to cross-reference to broader socio-economic indicators. Current approaches may allow a mapping of flows and crime trends, but it does not measure impact. Furthermore, seizures have become increasingly ineffective a metric, as the level of state complicity in some cases criminal markets orients around protecting the trade rather than prosecuting it.

There is also universal recognition that the analytical frameworks on which development programming is predicated is not accounting for the impact or actions of criminal groups. While a growing number of threat or risk assessment tools have been developed to account for serious, organised and transnational crime,⁸ these tend to be primarily for the benefit of the law enforcement community to control flows rather than mitigate the impact. Furthermore, current assessments are largely done at the national level or are strictly criminal threat assessments, focusing on assessing the nature and modus operandi of organised crime, rather than accounting for its impact on human security, state integrity, sustainable economic and social development, thereby failing to fully meeting the needs of policymakers. Consultations with development practitioners have indicated their need for a dedicated tool that accounts for organised crime within a broader political economy and conflict analysis would better serve effective strategic planning and programme design.⁹

In an accompanying report, "[Results Based Approaches to Organized Crime and Development: Input into the Post-2015 Development Agenda](#)" aims to support the development community in providing the results framework in which to identify and respond to organized in a development setting.

The report identifies five development impact areas, illustrated in the diagram below, in which organised crime arguably does the most damage. Under each of the development areas, the report provides a set of results matrices intended to serve as a guide to be used in developing the means of implementation around specific SDG goals and targets, underpinning the measures of the impact of specific forms of organised crime on development.



A second area earmarked as a priority by the High Level Panel report was to focus on illicit financial flows including a target to “reduce illicit financial flows and tax evasion, and increase stolen-asset recovery by \$x.” While illicit financial flows are, by nature, intended to remain covert, in many ways they are the most concrete and quantifiable of the indicators of organised crime. As the objectives of organised crime groups are quintessentially in the realisation of profits, the ability to launder the proceeds of crime into legitimate markets is a critical part of the criminal economy chain. Illicit financial flows have been valued at up to US\$1.7 trillion a year ¹⁰, most of which is derived from illicit trafficking in drugs, arms or people; the diversion of state funds (including natural resources, embezzlement, tax avoidance and corruption), and trade mispricing. The scale of illicit flows have, in some cases, been used as a proxy for the overall rate of organised crime, and are a useful indicator of the likely impact of organised crime on state capacity to deliver services. Despite the scale of illicit financial flows that have been registered, the overall global trade architecture has neither the policy framework nor the systematic protocols to engage. Furthermore, reducing organised crime to a mere financial metric reduces the many and varied forms of harm that are more than monetary.

Objectives of the Report

This report endeavours to demonstrate the extent to which organised crime is a cross-cutting spoiler to development in all its forms and to highlight the most pertinent ways that organised crime and criminal groups will prevent the SDGs from being achieved. Unlike other reports that have considered organised crime from a development perspective, this report is not looking at how development can impact crime, but to explore in greater detail how specific criminal acts and enterprises will impact on development. Rather than to get lost in the abstract, we have attempted, to the maximum extent possible, to give concrete examples of current criminal practices relevant to the achievement of specific SDGs.

Drawing from the substantive expertise of the more than one hundred members of the Global Initiative Network, the goals and targets proposed by the Open Working Group in July 2013 have been reviewed, and the criminal activities likely to impact directly on their achievement have been identified. While organised crime arguably does have a negative effect on all of the SDG goals laid out by the Open Working Group (OWG), in some cases the relationship is more causal and linear, and the impact more substantial. For this reason, we have triaged the goals as shown in the diagram below. The report is subsequently structured and colour coded to provide greater focus on those goals where the most urgent attention is needed.



Goals are divided into three categories defined as:

- **Goals at Risk:** The four development goals in the innermost concentric circle - health (Goal 3), marine environment (Goal 14); terrestrial environment (Goal 15) and peace and governance (Goal 16) - have been red-flagged as the primary SDG goals that are directly impacted by organised crime. In the case of each, the overall goal cannot be achieved if criminal practices are not addressed.
- **Targets at Risk:** The second tier, marked in orange, will fail to achieve some of the specified targets if organised crime is not addressed. The goals are still classified as directly impacted by organised crime threats. However, because only select targets identified under the goal are unattainable if criminal practices are not addressed, the goals are classed as "secondary". Goals falling under this category include: agriculture (Goal 2); gender (Goal 5); water (Goal 6); labour (Goal 8); inequality (Goal 10); and cities and settlements (Goal 11).
- **Development Impacts at Risk:** While organised crime has a number of visible direct impacts on development, a multitude of indirect threats impede the achievement of nearly all, if not every, development goal. The third tier of development goals, in the yellow zone, fall within this category. The goals will certainly be challenging to achieve in countries or regions where the influence of organised crime is high, but identifying and measuring causal linkages is more challenging. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are considerable interdependencies between the development objectives laid out by the various SDGs, and thus failing to make progress in one area will certainly constrain potential in another.

Accordingly, the first subsection in section **II. Addressing Organised Crime in Sustainable Development Goals**, analyses the how organised crime will explicitly limit the capacity to achieve entire SDG goals, namely in Health (Goal 3), the Environment (Goals 14 and 15) and in Governance, Justice and state integrity (Goal 16). The report then proceeds to analyse and discuss those targets whose achievement will be challenged if organised crime is not properly accounted for. Finally, the relationship of organised crime to the remaining proposed SDGs are considered.

Responding to organised crime

In exploring in detail the manners in which organised criminal groups, networks and activities hamper the capacity to achieve the proposed goals and targets laid out in the report of the OWG in July 2014, in addition to specific modes of implementation discussed within the context of the relevant goals, a number of key principles that need to be considered to address organised crime comprehensively and effectively. While the primary objective of the report is not to design a response to counter organised crime, it is hoped that by identifying key principles, development actors will be better equipped and have a stronger foundation to formulate appropriate responses.

In addition to the identification of key principles, the accompanying report, "[Results Based Approaches to Organized Crime and Development: Input into the Post-2015 Development Agenda](#)" can be utilised to identify and measure the success of responses in curbing the impact of organised crime on development in specific sectors.

Key principles identified include:

1. **Establish Appropriate International Legal and Policy Frameworks:** organised crime is classically considered to be a criminal justice issue, and while justice initiatives cannot be applied exclusively, it is important to have in place the necessary and sufficient legal architecture. This is particularly true in the conte of an increasingly globalised world, where criminal groups select the jurisdictions in which they want to operate based upon the relative laxity of their respective legal protocols. In this regard, a number of framework conventions come to the fore:



- a. The UN Convention against Transnational organised Crime (UNTOC) and its protocols, and the need for proper implementation and effective monitoring thereof. An additional protocol on environmental crime has been proposed.
 - b. The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), given the extent to which corruption undermines efforts to effectively fight crime.
 - c. The three major UN drug conventions.
 - d. Protocols and the capacity to counter money laundering and to enact asset seizure within the guidelines issued by the FATF.
 - e. Issue specific treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, CITES and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 2. Strengthening Prosecution Capacity:** In a number of key areas, a lack of capacity, political will or corruption has prevented the prosecution of organised crime. In these instances, structures need to be explored that would allow regional or international jurisdiction to be applied to transnational organised crimes. For example, officials could look to the model used to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, which could be adapted and piloted to address questions of illegal fishing, drug trafficking and other crimes, as well as the problem of closing down “criminal havens” that develop either by default or design.
- 3. Focused Strategies on Kingpins and Controllers:** Too often, efforts to counter organised crime are targeted at the foot soldiers and couriers of criminal goods. Indictments of controllers of criminal syndicates, and those who are often reaping the greatest profits, have gained little momentum even when their identities are apparent. Global strategies and international cooperation to target these controllers would serve as a more potent disincentive and disrupter of criminal economy chains than the relentless efforts to stem the tide of front-line agents. Asset seizure is a powerful deterrent tool in combatting criminal groups, given their motivations towards profits. Lessons learned from Mexico and Central America, however, show that these kinds of strategies need to be mixed with efforts to (re-)build the legitimacy of state institutions in vulnerable and affected communities.
- 4. Applied development approaches:** While organised crime serves as a spoiler to development, it must be recognised that development approaches will remain critical to a sustainable response to crime. The issue cannot remain exclusively in the domain of security and justice, but also requires efforts to undermine the political, social and economic leverage that organised crime groups have established by providing genuine, sustainable alternatives for communities. It should be acknowledged, however, that many in the development community feel that the basic tools to understand and analyse the phenomenon from a development perspective are lacking, and this needs to be addressed.
- 5. Insulate democratic processes:** The level of criminal infiltration into the state is one of the greatest challenges and most potent threats posed by organised crime to the modern world now and in the future. The need to apply greater transparency and accountability within the framework of multi-party democracies in all states, and to reduce the influence of illicit campaign funding, including in the developed world, should be a priority. Corrupt states whose interests do not prioritise maximising the development and security of their populations fundamentally undermine multi-lateral processes, and make genuine progress an overwhelming challenge.
- 6. Emphasise non-state actors:** Approaches to combatting organised crime have arguably been too state-centric, with insufficient recognition of the potential value of leveraging non-state actors, particularly civil society, as a means to create resilient communities. Non-state actors can be engaged in civilian oversight and transparency initiatives, in advocacy and prioritisation, in investigations and community policing, and

in service delivery. Criminal groups have shown impressive capacities to understand the value of legitimacy through economic and social means, and this needs to be matched by similar efforts by government. Positive examples from Brazil, the United States, and other jurisdictions can be brought to bear, working through local actors to combine security and development approaches in response to community priorities.

In line with the principles outlined above, indicators have been selected to show progress according in the following three areas:

- 1. Political will:** establishment of the appropriate legal, policy and strategic initiatives to address organised crime within the target. Indicators measuring political will, also known as structural capacity to combat organised crime, reflect key principle 1. Establish Appropriate International Legal and Policy Frameworks and key principle 5. Insulate Democratic Process. The infiltration of criminal actors into state infrastructure will hamper states working in the best interests of their citizens..
- 2. Prevention / Protection:** programmes are in place by multiple actors to prevent the crime, protect its victims and mitigate the impact on development. Especially important within the prevention / protection arena is that responses to organised crime cannot be limited to the state, but require broader buy-in from civil society, the private sector, etc. In this respect, key principle 6. Emphasise non-state actors is particularly significant.
- 3. Prosecution:** efforts are being made to prosecute the perpetrators of the crime. While development approaches are needed to combat organised crime, a strong criminal justice response also remains essential. Consequently, indicators include a focus area on prosecution, reflecting key principles 2. Strengthening Prosecution Capacity and 3. Focused Strategies on Kingpins and Controllers.



Women and girls are often the most vulnerable to organised crime. Credit: AndyVC



GOAL 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Organised crime will affect the achievement of Goal 3 in a number of direct ways, including through increased narcotic drug usage as a consequence of drug trafficking, the production and trafficking of falsified and substandard pharmaceutical products, and increased rates of tobacco usage due to illicit cigarette trafficking. Moreover, some countries have reported the infiltration of organised crime groups directly into the healthcare industry, and as perpetrators of health-care insurance fraud, which reduces the viability of the entire national health-care industry, and increases the costs of healthcare and health insurance for the general public.

The impact of narcotic drug use, in particular has put considerable pressure on the health systems of many countries in both the developed and the developing world, many of which are ill equipped to deal with the burden of drug prevention, treatment and care. The use of injecting drugs, such as heroin, cause in an increase in the rate of transmission based diseases such as HIV/AIDs and hepatitis, among others. This is particularly acute among certain populations: low income, marginalised and poverty stricken, lesbian, gay and transgendered communities, and prison populations. Furthermore, drug addiction is frequently linked to the recruitment and perpetuation of forms of human trafficking, in particular for sexual exploitation. Healthcare systems similarly struggle under the increased burden of dealing with the victims of violent crime, which frequently results from organised crime and drug trafficking.

Beyond the direct impacts, a multitude of indirect links can also be made. Increasing levels of grand corruption related to organised crime have resulted in weakened service delivery and the diversion of funds away from government programmes, including in the health sector. Similarly, the need to increase expenditure on security priorities to control organised crime, such as law enforcement and border control, can divert limited government



resources away from investments in social services like health and education. Other consequences of organised crime include health worker absenteeism. Underpayment of health workers, who may already have little incentive to abide by the rules and carry out their work, can result in increased levels of absenteeism, as well as the diversion of medical supplies onto the black market. In turn, the erosion of the health sector can diminish public confidence in the government as a whole.

Fragile, weak and developing states are particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of crime on health. As the recent report of the West Africa Commission on Drugs emphasised, health systems of weak states, such as those found in the West and Central African regions, are especially vulnerable to organised crime influences because they tend to be low in capacity, both in service delivery and in administration, and are loosely integrated and underfunded to start.¹¹ Moreover, the relationship between organised crime and health has proven to be cyclical with overall structural conditions such as weak and corrupt institutions, limited access to healthcare and education services combined with the fact that the regions are located along drug trafficking routes, facilitating the fast expansion of organised criminal activities in West and Central Africa.¹² Consequently, organised crime negatively impacts people's health by having severe consequences on access, quality, and effectiveness of health care services at various levels.

Relevant targets under goal

3.3: By 2030 end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases, and other communicable diseases.

Injecting drug use is one of the most prevalent causes of new HIV infections. As such, addressing HIV associated with injecting drug use is one of the key challenges in the health sector to ending the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that, on average, one out of every ten new HIV infections is caused by injecting drug use, and in parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, over 80% of all new HIV infections are related to drug use.¹³ A "Comprehensive Package" of interventions for the prevention, treatment and care of HIV among people who inject drugs has been endorsed widely by a range of UN bodies, including WHO, UNAIDS, the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, among others. The Comprehensive Package corresponds to the full implementation of the 2006 "Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS" endorsed by the General Assembly, and against which States have to report their progress.¹⁴

In tandem, falsified and substandard medicine produced and propagated by organised crime groups will have a direct, and highly detrimental, impact on the ability of the development community to achieve goals in the area of disease eradication. The production and trafficking of falsified and substandard medicines is an organised crime perpetuated by groups originating from a number of states, but disproportionately targeted at states in the developing world where regulatory capacity and consumer knowledge is low. The drug types exploited in these states are those in the greatest demand, of which anti-malarials are by far the most prevalent. Scientific studies in Asia have linked the prevalence of counterfeits to the growth in resistant strains of malaria,¹⁵ indicating clearly the extent to which organised crime is a direct threat to achieving target 3.3.

Despite estimates suggesting that 60% or more of medicine in vulnerable countries is falsified and profits from the trade may be in the billions, information on the scale of the problem is inadequate, and there are no global studies conducted. From as far back as 1988, the World Health Assembly has had resolutions targeted at the prevention and detection of the export, import and smuggling of counterfeit pharmaceutical products. These lay out a range of multi-sectoral actions that would promote the integrity of drugs and medicines, including inter alia building political will, strategic planning, capacity development, awareness raising and monitoring. However, a minimal amount of data is available and defining the extent of falsified medicines is difficult due to the great variety of information sources, making compiling statistics a difficult task. Furthermore, individuals falsifying drugs are extremely flexible in the methods they use to mimic products and prevent their detection.

Trafficking of falsified and substandard anti-malarials: Myanmar

Malaria is a major cause for concern in Myanmar, with the country reporting 20% of the region's malaria cases.¹⁶ Specifically, in the border areas of Myanmar there has been an increase in malaria cases and the remoteness of the areas make the disease hard to track as well as treat.¹⁷ Furthermore, the *P. falciparum* strain of malaria has developed a resistance to anti-malarial treatments, making the disease very dangerous, especially if the strains were to spread. In relation to falsified medicines, there is little knowledge regarding how to differentiate authentic from fake drugs, even amongst clinical and general practitioners.

With an estimated prevalence of counterfeit anti-malarials of 33%–53% in mainland SE Asia, the health impact on malaria morbidity and mortality must be considerable—but extremely difficult to quantify.¹⁸ It is believed Myanmar's northeastern trafficking routes – used to transport illicit timber, endangered wildlife, heroin and opium, and fake medicines between China and Southeast Asia – are also being used to traffic falsified medicine.

Despite the immense implications falsified drugs have on public health, since the first discoveries of falsified anti-malarials in 2000 there has been little action in the region, apart from surveys, warnings and educational films. A 2008 Study, *A Collaborative Epidemiological Investigation into the Criminal Fake Artesunate Trade in South East Asia*, not only recommends further research, but lays out what investments and partnerships will be vital in order to take an effective stand against organised crime and the falsified medicine trade. The authors stated that the involvement of INTERPOL was crucial as it bridged the gap between the health sector and national police agencies. Such a model of collaboration – criminal investigators, forensic scientists, physicians, and pharmacists – is recommended in future investigations. Additionally, the need for specialised evidence was found as a key element in the investigation.¹⁹

3.5: Strengthen prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol.

Perhaps the most widely recognised direct link between organised crime and health is the link between drug trafficking and increased drug usage. The 'spillover effect' has regularly been referenced by literature on drug consumption to explain what appears to be a rise in drug consumption related to the presence of organised crime flows. The "spillover" phenomenon takes place when the availability of drugs, low prices and proximity to the source in production and transit countries leads to an increase in local drug use. For example, in Benin – an increasingly important transit hub along cocaine trafficking routes – drug-related problems have been on the rise since the early 1990s and there is a growing market for hard drugs.²⁰ As in other regions of the world, increased drug consumption is reported to be linked to the practice of drug traffickers' paying in cash and drugs for storage rooms, packing and shipment centres, which fuels the accepted practice of using drugs as a "payment" method and in turn increases drug addiction.²¹ As noted above, drugs are used in payment across a range of illicit industries, including in sexual exploitation, human trafficking, extortion and bribery.

The illicit trade in tobacco products also has major impact on public health. The illicit flow is said to increase the number of smokers and their daily consumption rates, increasing the harmful use of tobacco products. Furthermore, there is substantial data demonstrating that counterfeit cigarettes contain higher levels of heavy metals (including lead) than legal products, and there are numerous reports that at least some counterfeit cigarettes contain faeces and other contaminants.²² The illicit trade in tobacco products also undermines the effectiveness of governmental smoking-related policies. According to the WHO, illicit trade "undermines price and tax measures for tobacco control; thereby increases the accessibility and affordability of tobacco products." This in turn has "adverse effects on public health and well-being, in particular of young people, the poor and other vulnerable groups." And this has "disproportionate economic and social implications on developing countries and countries with economies in transition."²³ Cigarette smuggling has been proven to fund armed criminal and terrorist groups, thereby perpetuating violence and conflict. The most notorious case is the Algerian

terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former leading figure in Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) also known as “Mr. Marlboro” for the extent of his involvement in the trade. The IRA in Ireland and Lebanon’s Hezbollah also have alleged links to cigarette smuggling.²⁴

3.7: By 2030 ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.

Sex trafficking and sexual exploitation, each forms of Human Trafficking, have a direct impact on the ability to achieve target 3.7. Sex trafficking exposes both the victim and their client to far higher health risks, and often bars women from accessing sexual, reproductive and health care services. In addition, sex-trafficking victims are put at high risk for HIV and AIDS, as are individuals who engage the services of sex-trafficking victims.

Modes of Implementation

The recommended response under Goal 3 is very limited, focusing only on reduction in tobacco consumption, and begs the question why other control mechanisms – such as ratification and implementation of the Drug Conventions and Protocols – are not put forth.

It is strongly recommended the tools utilised in achieving Goal 3 are expanded to include a broader array of issues and resources. In particular, within the framework of a goal to improve health and well-being, emphasis should be given to reducing drug trafficking and human trafficking, and enhancing the capacity of groups and communities vulnerable to these pernicious threats. A wide range of tools and resources exist both at the policy and programmatic level in this regard. There is also a wide range of lessons to be learned, and opportunities for capacity development through shared learning or south-south exchange should be encouraged.

In addition, it is recommended responses ought to contain strong prevention components. The UNODC estimates that for every dollar spent on prevention, at least ten can be saved in future health, social and crime costs.²⁵ A prevention based approach is mandated by the three international drug conventions and their subsequent protocols: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. In addition, the UNODC has established International Standards on Drug Use Prevention that provides a full set of measures to achieve a reduction in vulnerability and prevalence to drug use.²⁶

Specifically examining the prevention of tobacco use, studies have shown that high taxes are one of the most effective ways to reduce tobacco use, and in many regions illicit cigarette smuggling is more a response to weak regulation and law enforcement capability than to taxation. In addition, enhanced law enforcement capacity at local levels to identify and combat the illicit tobacco trade has also seen some success: in Bangladesh, effective on-ground enforcement over the last 5 years has reduced the share of illegal cigarettes in the market from 27% to 3%.²⁷ Public-private partnerships to better control branding, quality control and supply chain integrity would also be of benefit to prevent cigarette counterfeiting, and diversion of stock onto the criminal market. Awareness campaigns about the health risks and associated harms may further reduce demand. The comprehensive means of addressing the illicit trade in cigarettes are laid out in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which remains yet to enter into force due to an insufficient number of States Parties.²⁸

It is also important to note that in the area of counter medicines and illicit cigarettes, collaboration and engagement with the relevant private sector entities will be crucial. Managing the integrity of their supply chains, including enhancing security and monitoring at key transport nodes and along specific transport, would greatly improve the integrity of products and brands. In the case of counterfeit medicines in particular, making essential life-saving medications available in greater quantities would reduce the market demand for illicit products. However, it is worthy of note that aid supplies of medication and pharmaceutical products are an established target for theft and resale by criminal groups, perpetuating criminal markets and threatening the viability of public health initiatives.



Driftnets used in IUU fishing trap dolphins and cause mass over-fishing to the point that it is estimated 75% of the world's fish stocks are overexploited. Credit: stefanhalm



GOAL 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

The global fishing industry plays an indispensable role as a supplier of essential nutrition, and is critical to food security in many vulnerable regions around the world. It is also one of the world's largest employers: the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that nearly 180 million people are employed as fishers or in secondary industries relating to fishing activities.²⁹ Consequently, conserving fish stocks and enforcing sustainable fishing practices are major contributing factors to achieving development goals. Yet, criminal practices in the fishing industry represent possibly the greatest threat to the conservation and sustainable use of the marine environment, and thus is a significant, if not the most significant, obstacle to achieving Goal 14.

In 2005, the FAO's 2005 Review of the World Marine Fishery Resources concluded that "75% of the world's fish stocks are fully exploited, overexploited, or depleted,"³⁰ which they attributed largely to the practice of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The practice depletes fish stocks; destroys natural habitats, leading to species becoming seriously threatened; reduces biodiversity, which in turn causes imbalances among species; and adversely affects ecosystems. Such imbalances and depletion, in addition to threatening Goal 14, may lead to a reduction of human food sources due to a scarcity of fish, hindering the achievement of Goal 2 (ending hunger and achieving food security).

Approximately 50% of fish exports are sourced from developing countries, which are most at risk from illegal fishing.^{31,32} IUU fishing undermines legitimate fishing competition, adversely affecting the livelihoods and economies in coastal communities, thereby impacting goals on poverty reduction, and makes fisherman more



vulnerable to exploitation. Furthermore, poaching in endangered marine life, such as abalone, have reduced stocks to endangered levels, which makes them more valuable as a commodity, thus intensifying the attraction for organised crime syndicates.

Moreover, the fishing industry has been extensively linked to other serious organised criminal activities, with human rights abuses and environmental crime often going hand in hand. The United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking, an initiative in South East Asia, suggests that trafficking into the long-haul fishing industry exemplifies the worst cases of labour exploitation.³³ Incidents of crews including victims of trafficking is well documented. There is also evidence of widespread abuse of workers on fishing vessels, including accounts of seamen being thrown overboard and left to die.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing: Uganda

With several lakes in the country, particularly the large and fish-rich Lake Victoria, Uganda is Africa's biggest producer of fish; in 2011, the country exported some 32,300 metric tons of Nile Perch to Europe, along with large quantities of other fish.³⁴ Fish production has been steadily declining, however, with the total weight of fish caught in Lake Victoria dropping from 238,533 metric tonnes in 2005 to 183,824 metric tonnes in 2011.³⁵ Most analysts attribute the sector's struggles to "problems of over-fishing, non-compliance with regulations and inadequate control of catches, illegal transportation of fish to some [factories] and to neighbouring countries."³⁶ The illicit fishing is mainly conducted with seines, nets that do not conform to regulations, and other prohibited equipment.³⁷

The government has initiated programs to try to combat illegal fishing. In its 2010/2011 annual report, the Department of Fishery Resources stated that in order "to reverse the declining fortunes of the industry" and "to halt illegal activities," it is "focusing on strengthening controls of illegal fishing."³⁸ A department spokesman told a Ugandan newspaper in April 2014 that "border fish instructors have been deployed to...continue regular operations [against] illicit dealers as they await the Agriculture Enforcement police," a force which is still being set up.³⁹ Some Ugandans, however, say that the government's efforts are insufficient, pointing out the disparity between the government's outlay of Shs. 9.2 billion (US\$3.52 million) and the estimated Shs. 300 billion (US\$114.75 million) that illegal fishing costs Uganda every year.⁴⁰

Relevant targets under goal

14.4 by 2020, effectively regulate harvesting, and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics

By far one of the most neglected areas of environmental crime, illegal fishing is also probably one of the most extensive in geographical terms. A 2008 study estimated that the annual global IUU fishing catch was between 1126 million tonnes, which, according to the PEW Charitable Trust (PEW), "equates to more than 1,800 pounds of wild-caught fish stolen from our seas every second."⁴¹ In purely economic terms, this annual catch has been estimated at US\$1023 billion.⁴² As much as 30% of the total catch in some fisheries, as well as 50% of the landings in some ports, may consist of IUU fish.³³

The modus operandi of transnational and organised offenders are many and varied. Using multiple fishing vessels, altering the identification of ships, and transferring catches prior to an apparently legitimate landing are just a few methods employed to frustrate the monitoring and investigation of suspicious activity. Overcapacity in the world's corporate fishing fleets – many of the most significant perpetrators of IUU fishing are corporate – is a major driver of illegal fishing, and there are currently more incentives than disincentives to fish illegally.

Extensive IUU fishing risks creating a positive feedback loop: IUU fishing depletes fish stocks, which in turn forces regulators to increase catch limits. This places constraints on legitimate fishermen who follow the rules designed to preserve the health of the marine environment, thereby increasing the incentives and pressure for them to engage in IUU fishing.

A major hurdle to combatting the crime is that it is ultimately very difficult for markets to make the distinction between legal and illegally harvested fish, and so the incentives to fish illegally increase. As Liddick notes, “[I]egal and illegal fish are sold on the same markets, but legitimate fishers pay higher operating costs associated with licensing and overhead due to conservation and management measures...unfair competition from illicit operations may pressure legitimate outfits to cheat as well.”⁴⁴

Modes of Implementation

A great deal, if not the majority, of unregulated fishing occurs on the high seas. The high seas – or international waters – are difficult to patrol for jurisdictional as well as spatial reasons: they cover almost 45% of the planet. Responsibility is one factor, while jurisdictional and legislative difficulties make it difficult to prosecute vessels operating in international waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has wide jurisdiction as customary international law applicable to all states, but implementing arrangement for high seas fisheries, such as the Straddling Stocks Agreement, which deals with highly migratory species in international waters, remain on a ratification basis.⁴⁵ A comprehensive response ought to acknowledge and address the issue of non-territorial waters, enhance capacity for monitoring and reporting, and address appropriately mechanisms for prosecution across jurisdictions.


In tandem, the SDG highlight the following mode of implementation:

14.c ensure the full implementation of international law, as reflected in UNCLOS for states parties to it, including, where applicable, existing regional and international regimes for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by their parties.

A noted trend in fishing vessels engaged in criminal activities is that they are often registered in States that are unable or unwilling to exercise their criminal enforcement jurisdiction or that allow fishing vessel owners to remain anonymous through the registration of, for instance, shell companies as owners on the ship register. The lack of ownership transparency and the inability or unwillingness of some flag States to exercise their law enforcement jurisdiction undermines the criminal law enforcement of transnational organised crimes such as human trafficking and hampers the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in transnational organised criminal groups.⁴⁶

Effective implementation of policies in the area of IUU fishing also requires addressing the issue of flag states and making efforts to end the practice of flags of convenience. Where countries are unwilling to exercise their sovereign rights to control their coastal waters, alternatives need to be found through regional agreements to prevent and prosecute illegal fishing, as was the case with maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. An international or regional body that can prosecute in the cases of IUU fishing where the sovereign state cannot or will not take action is an option worth exploring, which can then also be used to address cases of IUU fishing in international waters.

Policies on subsidies and other incentives need to be carefully considered to ensure that fishing can be made a sustainable corporate enterprise without resorting to illegality. Greater oversight and efforts to reduce corruptions at ports, concerning the identification of illegal practices and the registration of over-fishing, are necessary. NGO investigations have been undertaken, and these need integrating into formal law enforcement systems until capacity levels are higher. Political pressure, including a review of subsidy policy, needs to be leveraged against corporate over-fishing, in order to change the incentive structure inducing illegal fishing. Finally, further study of and attention to the nature of the linkages between IUU fishing and other forms of organised crime, trafficking and exploitation would be beneficial.



In some countries in Africa and Asia, as much as 70% of timber logging is illegal. Credit: GreenLeaf



GOAL 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

To effectively achieve Goal 15, it is necessary to address environmental crime, one of the most damaging and economically significant fields of global criminal activity. Despite considerable international attention and action, environmental crimes are an increasingly rewarding activity for those who carry them out, and in the last decade environmental crime has escalated significantly in terms of variety, volume, and value. The involvement of criminal syndicates has become one of the greatest threats to the environment today.

While a broad range of activities fall under the umbrella of 'environmental crime' specific crimes, including, for example, the dumping of toxic waste or the illicit sale in ozone depleting substances, which are discussed elsewhere, directly impacting Goal 15 are illicit logging and the poaching of wildlife, discussed in relation to target 15.2 and target 15.7, respectively.

In addition to natural resources and cultural heritage, security, political stability, and national economies are threatened by the growing involvement of potent criminal syndicates in environmental crime. Environmental crimes affect human security in the form of conflict, erosion of the rule of law, and restricted access to essential

resources such as safe drinking water, food sources and shelter. In addition, as noted below in Goal 16, it has also become increasingly dangerous to be an environmental defender, as the extent of organised crime involvement in pillaging environmental resources for profit has raised the level of violence and militarisation. The loss of revenue and income thanks to increases in the illegitimate trade in natural resources also restricts economic development and exacerbates income inequality. At a local level, the involvement of elements of organised crime threatens communities and reduces opportunities to access sustainable and honest income, as crime crowds out legitimate ways of making a living.⁴⁷ Recent studies on the environment have all emphasised the need to acknowledge the severity of the problem and the extent of criminal involvement if the ecological goals are to be achieved.

Relevant targets under goal

15.1 by 2020 ensure conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements

15.2 by 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests, and increase afforestation and reforestation by x% globally

Serious organised crime in the forestry and timber industries is one of the most pressing environmental issues facing the global community. Illegal logging contributes enormously to deforestation. It deprives forest communities of vital livelihoods, causes ecological problems like flooding, and is a major contributor to climate change (see Goal 13 below). Driven by the low risks and high profits of a largely unregulated international market for cheap timber and wood products, illegal logging is threatening precious forests from the Amazon, through West and Central Africa, to East Asia.⁴⁸

The timber trade involves major crimes: not only illegal harvesting of forests, but also illegal acquisition of logging rights, failure to pay relevant taxes, illegal transportation and transshipment, usage of forged documents, mis-declarations at customs, bribery and corruption of officials, and a host of other financial and social crimes. Intimidation, human rights abuses, violence and even murder have all occurred as a result of the illicit trade in stolen timber. Responses to the issue of illegal logging must recognise the shared responsibility of ending the crime. While illegal logging itself may occur far from the public gaze in remote and largely uninhabited forests, it is a trade driven by demand for cheap timber in consumer markets in richer nations. Efforts to tackle the problem have been stymied by the lack of a coherent global regulatory framework, which creates circumstances under which timber deemed illegal in the country of origin can be sold onto the international market without hindrance.

15.5 take urgent and significant action to reduce degradation of natural habitat, halt the loss of biodiversity, and by 2020 protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species

15.7: Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna, and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products

Wildlife crime is at currently estimated to be the fourth-most valuable global illegal trade, behind illegal drugs, human trafficking and weapons trafficking.⁴⁹ Increasing demand in Asian markets for ivory and rhino horn, which are highly valued or considered to have medicinal properties, have led to a significant upsurge in poaching in the last two years, and incidents continue to increase at an alarming rate as the prices of these commodities continue to rise.⁵⁰ New poaching techniques have brought a historically unseen degree of professionalism and viciousness to wildlife crime.

It should be noted that the issue of poaching does not affect only species of charismatic megafauna such as elephants and rhino. Cheetahs, pangolins, cycads, abalone, lions and many others have become the prey of organised poaching networks. Some of these species are endangered or nearing extinction as a result.



Wildlife Poaching: Central Africa

Central Africa has been one of the regions hardest hit by the international illegal wildlife trade, witnessing unprecedentedly high rates of elephant poaching in recent years.⁵¹

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5,000 elephants have been killed in the past six years.⁵² 2011 and 2012 saw the highest registered levels of poaching and trading of illegal rhino horn,⁵³ and since October 2013 688 rhinos have been recorded killed in the region.⁵⁴ The elephant population in the Congo Basin in Central Africa has dropped 60 per cent in the last ten years and is at risk of extinction if this trend is not reversed.⁵⁵ Gabon is a special target for elephant poaching, and has lost nearly 20,000 forest elephants in the last 15 years; the tusks of Gabonese forest elephants are finer and marked with a pinkish colour, and hence extremely expensive.⁵⁶ Additionally, the poaching of several hundred elephants in Bouba N'Djida National Park in northern Cameroon is cause for concern. Despite a commitment between Cameroon and Chad to join enforcement efforts in 2011, poaching and the killing of elephants have continued.⁵⁷

In Central Africa, both elephant and black rhino populations are in critical danger from organised poaching. In 1989, high levels of elephant poaching prompted the ban of ivory imports globally. However, since then, and most recently in 2008, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has allowed restricted international sales of ivory. The rhino horn trade has pushed the Central African black rhino population to the verge of extinction.

The profits from wildlife crimes are known to directly result in violence, and have been connected not only to funding other forms of criminal activity but also to conflict groups. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon wrote that "poaching and its potential linkages to other criminal, even terrorist, activities constitute a grave menace to sustainable peace and security in Central Africa."⁵⁸ Multiple reports indicate that poaching is being used to finance organised crime and terrorist activities, and, in January 2014, the UN placed sanctions for the first time on wildlife trafficking and groups who perpetrate wildlife crimes in the DRC and Central African Republic.⁵⁹

Modes of Implementation

Key challenges to combating wildlife crime include differences in national legislation and generally weak punishments. There is an urgent need for policymakers and legislators to recognise the criminality that is driving much of environmental crime, and to have the issue formally designated and treated as a serious and organised crime. A number of NGO lobbyists now recommend that a dedicated environmental crime protocol be included under the UNTOC Convention.⁶⁰

While the international commercial trade of any parts of elephants and rhinos is prohibited almost universally, enforcement of these restrictions remains weak. CITES, an international agreement between governments that aims to ensure that international trade in wildlife and plants does not lead to their extinction, is a key legal instrument. However, the document provides only a framework to be respected by each government, while governments are urged to adapt and implement their own national legislation.⁶¹ Noncompliance with CITES reflects the lack of resources available to national governments, but also at times their lack of political will. For example, in Central Africa, Cameroon and the Central African Republic (CAR) have received failing scores for compliance; CAR has a substantial unregulated internal ivory and elephant meat market. Furthermore, enforcement tends to lag behind legislative initiatives and countries are not able to fully use the policy tools that are in place.⁶² Scarce data collection and analysis also impede the progress of intelligence-based law enforcement.⁶³

Most importantly, international wildlife crime is demand-driven, and needs to be addressed from the consumer side as well. Perceptions surveys and a better understanding of market drivers in key demand countries, coupled with targeted education campaigns, have proven effective in the past, and could have considerably more impact than just enhancing the securitisation of the response.



The presence of organised crime increases violence, erodes state institutions through corruption, and undermines the rule of law both in developed and developing states. Credit:kichigin19



GOAL 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

There is extensive evidence that confirms that the presence of organised crime significantly increases the insecurity and harm to civilian populations. There is similarly wide consensus that conflict and insecurity are major barriers to development. For example, all seven of the countries that are unlikely to meet a single Millennium Development Goal by 2015 are countries that have been affected by high levels of violence. Similarly, countries that experienced high levels of violence over the two decades between 1980 and 2000 were shown to have an average poverty rate 21% higher than countries with low levels of violence.⁶⁴ Criminalised environments and political systems have given rise to extreme levels of armed violence, destabilised states and fuelled the armed activities of insurgent, radical and terrorist groups.

The United Nations has consistently emphasised the critical importance of strengthening and consolidating security and justice in the context of the rule of law, as being a pre-cursor and necessary condition for achieving stable and peaceful societies. Ever since the UN Secretary-General firmly asserted in 2004 the “inextricable link” between security, human rights and development, the concept is now well entrenched in the rhetoric of international affairs.⁶⁵ Early debates came in the context of post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding, and recognised the need to create “capable states” able to provide “security, well-being and justice”, if vicious cycles



of conflict, poverty and human vulnerability were to be brought to an end.⁶⁶ More recently, the UN General Assembly affirmed that rule of law is fundamental to broader development goals:

*'We are convinced that the rule of law and development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development ...'*⁶⁷

The attainment of good governance, sustained security and access to justice is fundamental for the rule of law, and is the basis of interstate relations and the fulfilment of international obligations. They are arguably the cornerstones of effective and sustainable conflict prevention and resolution, respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the preservation and advancement of equal social and political rights, all of which serve as foundations of the principles of sustainable development. By contrast, crime, corruption and impunity threaten the legitimacy of the social contract, undermines the rule of law and slows, and perhaps even reverses, development progress.

Recent studies have shown how good governance and democratic processes have become very vulnerable to organised crime, particularly at the point of elections. This has impacts in the context of both developing and developed states. Infiltration into states and political processes has become a key goal for criminal groups, as globalisation has raised the stakes in terms of the potential benefits associated with criminal control over state resources while simultaneously providing new means of ensuring impunity for both criminals and corrupt political actors. The increasing role, power and influence of money in securing electoral success have increased the vulnerability of political processes to criminal manipulation.⁶⁸ Criminals, of course, are not meeting the compact of electoral office in providing social goods for the citizenship, nor are they substantially trying to influence the legislative process. Instead, the goal of criminal groups is to hollow out police and judicial institutions in order to facilitate their criminal enterprises. This is a situation with wide-ranging ramifications, not just for the legitimacy of democratic politics, but also for states' capacities to provide justice and the rule of law. To make matters even more challenging for development, the alignment of crime and politics further hinders women and marginalised groups, as they are less likely to be elected or stand for office in a context where there are high security concerns.

It has therefore become increasingly frequent to understand organised crime as a significant "external stressor" which undermines the capacity of key institutions and that leads to violence and conflict.⁶⁹ Within that framework, increasing the measures to deter organised crime, arrest key criminal flows and criminal controllers, and buffer those most vulnerable from its impacts on development, governance, justice, security, human rights and the rule of law must be urgent priorities.

While the recognition of organised crime and its role in inhibiting the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development is welcomed, the tactic of isolating organised criminal activity from other development goals and amalgamating different forms of organised crime together will likely be problematic in fully appreciating organised crime's impact on development and forming effective modes of implementation.

In recognising organised crime's impact on development, practitioners must work to understand and appreciate the pervasive and multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon. Organised crime manifests itself in a plethora of forms in theatres in nearly every corner of the globe. As such, organised crime cannot be viewed as a separate development obstacle to be addressed in isolation from other challenges and goals. Rather, an effective response calls for the recognition that organised crime is understood as an intrinsic element to nearly every development challenge, and must be interwoven throughout broader development response frameworks.

Moreover, by grouping different forms of organised crime together under single a target, the SDGs may not reflect the complexities of various forms of organised crime and illicit flows. For example, target 16.4 (By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows...) addresses illicit arms flows and illicit financial flows. While the illicit flows do

overlap in a number of ways, the two are distinct criminal phenomena with differing root causes, actors, actions, flows, geographic foci, and impacts development, amongst other differences. In turn, to achieve target 16.4, practitioners will require an understanding and response to two different criminal threats, which can also take on very diverse forms in various regions of the world, and will certainly require a different set of responses to combat them.

Consequently, by isolating organised crime threats from other development goals and conglomerating various forms of criminal activities and flows under single targets, it is difficult to adequately explore organised crime's impact on the goal and put forth sufficient and effective recommendations on modes of implementation.

Nonetheless, an attempt is made to fully capture the numerous obstacles organised crime poses to achieving Goal 16. Due to the diverse nature of organised criminal threats grouped under Goal 16, recommended responses are put forth under the relevant target, rather than clustered under the subcategory of Modes of Implementation, in an attempt to avoid confusion.

In the long term, a global strategy to counter organized crime is needed, which comprises a series of interlocking thematic and regional strategies. This will promote a more strategic, coordinated approach to counter organized crime by facilitating action at national, regional and international levels across a range of sectors and criminal markets. As this study demonstrates, the challenge is multi-faceted, with impacts across a range of domains from humanitarian, to developmental, yet there is currently no strategic platform that enables the kind of cross-sectoral, cross-regional debate and collaboration between the range of actors required to take forward a response.

Relevant targets under goal

16.1: tSignificantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

Policymakers and analysts have spent considerable energy trying to understand the complex interplay of factors that increase a given group's propensity to violence and conflict. The concept encompasses a wide spectrum of conflict, post-conflict, crime-related and ostensibly peaceful settings. In recent decades, the changed character and dynamics of armed violence in many war and post-war contexts is breaking down traditional distinctions between these categories. In some regions, violent drug and gang cultures display scales of violence and death that are comparable to those of open warfare.

There is little argument that the costs of armed violence are diverse and far-reaching. The 2009 Secretary General's report noted that armed violence "hinders the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and, more generally, social, economic, political and human development."⁷⁰

Globally, around half a million people are killed each year as result of intentional homicidal violence, and according to the UNODC's latest Global Homicide Report 2013, organised crime and the violence it perpetuates is a significant cause.⁷¹ The operation of illicit drug markets can also drive violence and homicide levels, often due to violent competition between rival groups or involved parties. In Central America and Mexico, which suffer from the world's highest homicide rates, 30% of murders are related to organised crime or gang violence. Honduras registers the highest rates of homicide in the world. Furthermore, the UNODC study showed that the use of illicit drugs also affected homicide rates, as the psycho-pharmacological effects of certain drugs, such as cocaine and amphetamines, are causally linked to violence.

Innovative efforts have been piloted in recent years to try to decouple organised crime and violence. In 2013, both El Salvador and Honduras experimented with "gang truces", intended to demilitarise the conflict between the drug gangs and the state and scale back the "war on drugs" rhetoric that has permeated responses to the challenges of drug trafficking in the last two decades.⁷² Regrettably, these initiatives have not achieved hoped-for levels of success. First, the truces only addressed one aspect of the gangs' threat to society—homicide—but did little to address their other criminal activities. Crime, kidnapping and extortion went on unabated throughout the period



of the truces, and may have even increased, as gangs were able to shift their focus away from violence and toward their other criminal activities. Furthermore, negotiations associated with the truces provided gangs with *de facto* political empowerment by increasing their leverage and bargaining power. Combined with the increase in revenue from other criminal pursuits, this increased leverage has translated into growing power and capacity to undermine the state and its institutions. Finally, the truce in El Salvador lasted barely a year. 14 months after the program began, the rate of murders in the country had returned to the pre-truce average of 16 per day.⁷³

There has been a growing body of analysis on the need to reduce the “militarisation” of the response to organised crime and to bring development approaches to the fore. In practice, though, such militarisation has gone up rather than down. Efforts to combat poaching and ivory trafficking in Southern Africa and East Africa, for example, have resulted in a massive increase of the level of weaponry on the part of both the poachers and the rangers. A number of countries are now deploying military units in national parks, as well as helicopters, drones and other armoured vehicles. The result has been an increasing loss of life: South African law enforcement personnel have killed nearly one hundred poachers in the last eighteen months, and at least 15 rangers have died the last two years in the “ivory wars.”⁷⁴ Overall, as an impressive report by Global Witness has observed, with the escalation of violence by criminal groups and the corresponding militarisation of the response, it has become increasingly dangerous to be a defender of the environment. Nor is this just an African issue. Three times as many people were killed defending land and forests in 2012 as in the entire previous decade. The largest number of such deaths occurred in Brazil, which registered 448 between 2002 and 2013.⁷⁵

16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children

Regrettably, organised crime is responsible for the abuse and exploitation of children in an extensive number of ways, including *inter alia* the trafficking of children for labour and for sexual exploitation, including online; the smuggling of minors; child soldiering, which is considered a subset of child labour; and the recruitment of children and youth into gangs or criminal organisations. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child confirmed that up until 2010, over one thousand children have died as a result of organised crime, and that the rate of child death appears to be growing exponentially.

The recruitment of children as agents of criminal organisations is also a growing problem. For example, reports have estimated that there are 30-50,000 children active in Mexican organised crime groups, and that they are employed in any and all capacities, from watchmen to assassins.⁷⁶ Children hold an appeal for criminal organisations because they are usually not suspected of criminal affiliation, but also because youth criminal justice law often presents loopholes for criminal groups to exploit.

Many countries have insufficient legislation to efficiently combat child pornography, which plays in the hands of criminal groups. Of 196 countries reviewed in 2010, only 45 were found to have legislation sufficient to combat child pornography, and 89 had no legislation specific to child pornography at all. This is particularly problematic at a time when the exploitation of children via the internet is burgeoning: in 2011, the United States’ National Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) found 17.3 million pornographic images and videos of children, a four-fold increase from 2007, and more recent assessments see this sharp growth continuing. Behind these images are real, vulnerable children who are victimised not only by the sexual acts depicted but also by the further distribution of their images. NCMEC’s data revealed that 83% of those arrested for child pornography had images involving children between the ages of 6 and 12; 39% had images of children between ages 3 and 5 years old; and 19% had images of infants and toddlers under the age of 3. The Philippines and Mexico are ranked as the top source countries producing and distributing child pornography, but the images and videos are sourced, produced and procured the world over.⁷⁷

The failure of criminal justice frameworks to properly account for the evolving nature of criminal behaviour and its impact on child protection is a repeated theme. Becoming truly effective at addressing the vulnerability of

children at the hands of organised crime groups will require multi-sectoral partnerships that span national and international law enforcement organisations. Additionally, judicial authorities must establish sustainable and efficient working relationships with the private sector in industries where children are vulnerable (see case study below), as well as with internet service providers and the telecommunications industry to ensure transparency of online transactions. Considerable sensitisation of policymakers and the mustering of political will for a strategic, proactive response by states and multilateral organisations will be crucial if we are to prevent organised crime from continuing to inflict deleterious impacts on children and youth.

Child Labour in the Chocolate Industry⁷⁸

The US\$102 billion global chocolate industry has a longstanding link to forced and child labour in the production of cocoa. West African countries supply more than 70% of the world's cocoa – Côte d'Ivoire alone accounts for 40% of the market. This industry is fuelled by the forced labour of an estimated 1.8 million children. Extreme poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities results in some families sending their children to work on cocoa farms. It is reported that some children are 'sold' to traffickers or farm owners, paying for a determined duration of labour. Children as young as 10 years then work for 12-14 hours a day with few breaks and insufficient water and nutrition. They are forced to carry heavy bags of cocoa beans across long distances and are exposed to pesticides and other hazardous agricultural chemicals without adequate protection. Almost every child on a cocoa farm displays scars and wounds from swinging the heavy-bladed machetes used to crop the plants.

Child trafficking for labour exploitation is practiced throughout the chocolate industry, even by some of the biggest and best-recognised brands. Complex supply chains make it challenging to detect these human rights violations. To comply with international labour standards and norms, such as the ILO convention 138 on the Minimum Age for Employment and the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, multinational corporations need to ensure that their suppliers are not involved in human trafficking and/or forced labour of children and adults. Companies should further implement monitoring systems, transparent procurement policies, regular auditing activities and training of the supply chain managers on how to detect human trafficking/forced labour or any other irregular incidents.

Thus far, however, there have been no significant steps taken to counter child labour or abusive labour practices in the chocolate industry. Capacity-building efforts like the International Cocoa Initiative, the World Cocoa Foundation and the Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy have added voices of concern, but have produced little in terms of tangible advancement. Although the industry could put an end to the use of child or slave labour by paying cocoa farmers a living wage, it seems that only through consumers' pressure will the industry change its supply chain management and procurement standards. But such consumer pressure has been slow in coming, despite strong advocacy and awareness raising campaigns by NGOs. Under current regulations, the consumer has no way to ensure that the chocolate he is buying was produced without the use of child or slave labour. There are a growing number of certification schemes that track whether companies are implementing the social and environmental standards that are critical to the creation of a sustainable cocoa supply chain. The cocoa produced in Latin America is mostly grown as organic product, which includes a fair payment for the farmers, and there have been no child or slave labour scandals like those in the case of West Africa documented thus far in Latin America. However, cocoa sold under the Fair-trade label accounts for only 0.1% of the market.

The chocolate industry is said to be growing at a rate of 80% per annum. This growth must not be sustained on the back of child exploitation. The problem of child and slave labour in the chocolate industry will only be eliminated through awareness and advocacy by the consumer, matched with real political will on the part of the corporations producing and distributing chocolate products.



16.4: By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime

Where the links between organised crime, violence and homicide are most clear is in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. There are at least 875 million firearms in circulation around the world, at least 650 million of which are in the hands of civilians.⁷⁹ 42-60% of all lethal violence—in both conflict and non-conflict settings—is committed with small arms.⁸⁰ The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons occurs in all parts of the globe, but is concentrated in areas most affected by armed conflict, violence and organised crime, where the demand for illicit weapons is often highest. Arms trafficking fuels civil wars and regional conflicts; stocks the arsenals of terrorists, drug cartels, and other armed groups; and contributes to violent crime and the unregulated proliferation of sensitive and potentially harmful technology.

Black market trafficking usually takes place on a regional or local level. Publicly available data suggests that the multi-tonne, inter-continental shipments organised by the largest-scale traffickers account for only a small fraction of illicit transfers.

According to analysis by the Small Arms Survey, among the most important forms of illicit trafficking is the ‘ant trade’—numerous shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large numbers of illicit weapons by unauthorised end users. Data analysed in the Small Arms Survey’s 2013 annual report indicates that thousands of firearms seized in Mexico are traced to the United States annually. These weapons are often purchased from gun shops in small numbers and then smuggled over the border. The resulting total of weapons trafficked into Mexico is large, and the violence levels are significant.⁸¹ This creates a challenge for efforts to control the illicit trade in small arms, as the global trend towards more open borders and greater volumes of legal trans-border traffic and trade will make this kind of low level smuggling harder to detect.

Analysts have argued that the UN-sponsored small arms process has been diverted away from controlling the proliferation of small arms at an individual level. Instead, they believe, attention has been increasingly focused on the “administrative” tasks of small arms marking and tracing, as well as the management of government weapons stockpiles.⁸²

In April 2013, the UN adopted a new Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which is intended to provide more effective regulation of the international arms trade and halt the flow of weapons to criminal actors in conflict and high-violence regions. With 181 signatories, the ATT has impressive momentum, it achieved the 50 ratifications required for the treaty to enter into force in September 2014.⁸³ This is a positive signifier of political will to tackle the arms trade, but the real work will lie in implementing the provisions of the treaty and addressing all aspects of the illicit arms trade, from the “ant trade” all the way up through to the large-scale “merchants of death”.

The issue of illicit financial flows is addressed in relation to Goal 10.

16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms

The linkages between organised crime and corruption have become increasingly deep and intricate. In a recent workshop hosted by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, participating experts emphasised that corruption is no longer a means to an end for criminal groups, but an end in itself: “there has been an increase in the scale of corruption, as well as its strategic importance, and the state is increasingly being used by criminal groups as a means to have an effective monopoly of violence.”⁸⁴ Corruption is undermining all efforts to counter transnational organised crime, with its capacity to bribe frontline offices and corrupt those at the highest levels of power. Corruption of government and distortion of governance serves to create impunity for criminal acts by undermining the legitimacy of the state and its institutions.

While corruption can take many levels and forms, in the nexus of criminality and governance, there are a number of manifestations that are particularly important. The first is to delink crime from politics. There are some formal mechanisms that have been piloted in various countries which can serve to sever linkages between political processes and criminal influence. Mexico has implemented a number of legal reforms to prevent the “empty chair” approach to politics, where those who hold office do so without the desire to govern. International oversight over key institutions can also support the institutional change required, but only if capacity transfer sufficient to allow the mechanisms to be sustainable in the long term is ensured.

A number of recent studies have emphasised the role of non-state actors and civil society in reducing corruption, raising awareness, and fostering public demand for more transparency and better service delivery. Independent, or civilian, oversight can support moves towards a more responsive set of state institutions. A free and active press can work to leverage public pressure to hold governments to account, and mobilise international attention. Promoting service delivery in communities vulnerable to crime can be key, as criminal groups can garner legitimacy locals’ eyes when the government is perceived to be absent, ineffective, or uncaring.

16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels


A long-term and sustainable solution to the challenges of crime and its impact on poverty, equality and development can only be achieved through the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. The role of organised crime in preventing the achievement of this goal is clear and widely discussed, yet the corruption of states is rarely acknowledged or accounted for. As this paper demonstrates, organised crime undermines state institutions across sectors, such as in the areas of environment, health, welfare and education, and further weakens state capacity to ensure the rule of law and provide security to citizens.

Positive examples of building accountability in state institutions exist across the world at various levels and in sectors. Many good practices exist, and these can be shared and replicated in other contexts. In the absence of strong states, civil society can play a compelling role.


Modes of Implementation

As stated earlier, an enormous range of issues and challenges has been conflated in this goal, which makes it challenging to define a meaningful programme for its implementation. Moreover, the building of strong institutions takes decades of work by generations of politicians and officials, particularly in the cases of states emerging from conflict. Nevertheless, recognising that organised crime is a significant external stressor on communities’ and states’ capacity to achieve longer-term visions of governance, security and development is a good first step.

Once the role of organised crime is recognised, the accompanying report, “Results Based Approaches to Organized Crime and Development: Input into the Post-2015 Development Agenda” aims act as a valuable tool to development actors in identifying and measuring the extent to which organised crime will serve as a direct spoiler to development goals. The matrices supplied in the accompanying report, intended to serve as a guide to be used in developing the means of implementation around specific SDG goals and targets, can be utilised to formulate, monitor and assess meaningful response programmes.



Targets at Risk



Goal 2:	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture	
Goal 5:	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	
Goal 6:	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	
Goal 8:	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	
Goal 10:	Reduce inequality within and among countries	
Goal 11:	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	



The counterfeiting of food, seeds and agricultural fertilizers exacerbates food insecurity. Credit: Gajus



GOAL 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture

Food security and hunger remain significant challenges around the world, with an estimated 800 million people suffering from a lack of food security as of December 2013.⁸⁵ At current rates of population growth, the world's population will grow to 9.6 billion people by 2050; in order to feed that many people, the world will need to produce 69% more food calories in 2050 than it did in 2006. Put differently, the increase in food production over the 44 years between 2006 and 2050 will need to be 33% greater than it was in the 44 years between 1962 and 2006.⁸⁶ The activities of organised criminal groups serve to make the production of enough food to end hunger and achieve food security even more difficult in two ways. First, criminal groups contribute directly to food insecurity by contaminating, counterfeiting, and adulterating food products. These activities lead to disease and death for consumers and have significant impacts on producers as well, with the effects felt most strongly in developing countries and low-income communities, which either lack strong food-safety control systems or cannot afford to buy safer, but more expensive, products.

Organised criminals also contribute to food insecurity and hunger in a less direct way. Genetic diversity among food crops and hybridised or modified seeds will be key in order to allow food production to continue to grow and meet increased demand. Climate change and its consequences for ecosystems and agriculture will only heighten the importance of seed diversity and adaptability. By counterfeiting, stealing, or otherwise tampering with seeds and agricultural products, organised criminals can disrupt this process. They thus serve as a threat to both the health and safety of the consumers of today and the food supply for those of tomorrow.



Relevant targets under goal

2.1: By 2030 end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.

Organised crime directly and negatively impacts the health and well-being of people around the world by substituting counterfeit and/or contaminated food for the safe and nutritious food stipulated in target 2.1. Counterfeiting of food occurs worldwide on a large scale. A report from the World Customs Organisation showed that in 2008, a sample of 70 of its 176 member countries seized 968,464 items of counterfeit beverages and 11,362,223 pieces of counterfeit food.⁸⁷ Between 2007 and 2009, Poland alone seized some 45,000 litres of counterfeit alcohol.⁸⁸ During the course of 2013, Chinese authorities investigated more than 43,000 separate cases of fraud related to foodstuffs or medicines, detaining some 60,000 suspects.⁸⁹ While the sheer number of incidents in China is quite large, other countries deal with food fraud at similar rates: authorities in the United Kingdom, whose population is equivalent to 4.7% of China's, investigated 1,562 incidents in 2013, or 3.5% of the Chinese figure.⁹⁰

Counterfeit food and beverages have direct, and often considerable, impacts on consumers as well as local and regional economies. In 2014, British officials warned that in certain parts of the United Kingdom, as many as 20% of all liquor stores could be selling fake alcohol that would put consumers at the risk of blindness or comas.⁹¹ A 2003 report from the Italian Federation of Food Industries, counterfeit food accounted for 18.6% of food products exported from Italy in 2002, with a value of €2.6 billion (US\$3.1 billion), and predicted that the value would rise to €5.4 billion (US\$7 billion) by 2006.⁹² In some cases, humans are not even the only ones directly harmed. In the winter of 2012-2013, beekeepers in the United States lost almost one-third of their bees, a potentially catastrophic event for American agriculture. A 2013 study suggested that one of the main contributing factors to the bees' decline could have been the use of fake honey instead of real honey, a common practice in the industry, which may be depriving bees of vital nutrients.⁹³

Contamination of Baby Formula: China

In 2008, a scandal broke in China surrounding the discovery that baby formula that had been contaminated with melamine, a chemical compound that can cause severe kidney damage. The scandal centred around Sanlu Group, which had been China's leading producer of milk powder and one of its largest dairy companies overall.⁹⁴ In order to conceal the fact that undernourished cows were producing milk that would fail to meet quality-control checks, Chinese farmers were adding powder containing melamine—which behaves like protein in laboratory testing—to their dairy products.⁹⁵ Dairy farmers from Hebei Province, where Sanlu was headquartered, told reporters that such practices were commonplace and tolerated by the company, despite its assurances to the contrary.⁹⁶

The impact of this revelation reverberated across China. Some 300,000 infants were hospitalised after being fed contaminated baby formula, and six died.⁹⁷ Chinese dairy products were recalled or banned in Bangladesh, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.⁹⁸ All told, over three million pounds (1.36 million kilograms) of contaminated milk powder were sold.⁹⁹ Two men were executed for their role in the scandal. Zhang Yujun, who sold over 770 metric tons of the powder, was convicted of "endangering public safety by dangerous means;" Geng Jinping, manager of a milk production centre, was convicted of distributing the contaminated milk. A total of nineteen others were given prison sentences, including Sanlu Group's chairwoman, Tian Wenhua, who received a life sentence.¹⁰⁰

Although the 2008 episode was the largest incident involving contaminated milk or milk powder in China, the country has endured several more such incidents in the years since. In January 2011, Chinese police detained 96 people suspected of distributing melamine-tainted powder from the 2008 incident that should have been

destroyed.¹⁰¹ “Unusual” levels of mercury were discovered in baby formula made by the Yili Group in June 2012, leading to a product recall.¹⁰² Six weeks later, food inspectors in Guangzhou Province found excessive levels of aflatoxin, a substance produced by fungi and mould that is one of the most carcinogenic substances known to science, in several different milk products.¹⁰³ In response to this succession of revelations, Chinese parents have apparently decided to look abroad to feed their babies: Australian retailers made international headlines in 2013 for rationing their supplies of baby formula, in response to overwhelming demand from Chinese visitors.¹⁰⁴

2.3: By 2030 double the agricultural productivity and the incomes of small-scale food producers, particularly women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets, and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment.

There are several ways in which organised criminals take advantage of small-scale food producers and farmers. The first is by counterfeiting or adulterating agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides. Counterfeit seeds can be devastating to farmers, who spend extra money to purchase seeds that promise high crop yields and end up, in some cases, with 90% fewer crops than what was advertised, if their seeds germinate at all.¹⁰⁵ Counterfeit fertiliser may contain harmful additives that are absorbed into crops; even if not, its lower effectiveness forces farmers to purchase extra fertiliser to obtain the same result as they would with a legitimate product. In Vietnam alone, for example, officials estimate that farmers spend an additional US\$400 million every year on fertiliser because of the ineffectiveness of commonly-available products.¹⁰⁶ Every year, farmers buy an estimated €4.4 billion (US\$5.7 billion) worth of fake pesticides, which can be harmful to humans and promote resistance to the active ingredients in legitimate treatments, in addition to potentially serving as ingredients in homemade explosives.¹⁰⁷

Organised criminals are also highly active in the production and distribution of counterfeit veterinary medicines. In some parts of the world, the size of the trade in counterfeit veterinary medicine approaches or even equals that of legitimate drugs. According to the International Federation for Animal Health, for example, the market for legal veterinary medicine in Africa is approximately US\$400 million annually, but the continent spends roughly the same amount on substandard, non-registered, and fake veterinary medications every year.¹⁰⁸ Losing livestock is a major concern for many farmers, and animal diseases can take severe tolls on farms’ bottom lines. Animal African Trypanosomosis, locally known as “nagana,” is a scourge of African cattle, and medicine for it is commonly counterfeited. Every year, nagana kills some three million cattle in Africa, causing economic losses estimated to be as high as US\$4.5 billion.¹⁰⁹

A final way in which organised criminals have direct negative impacts on small-scale farmers is by distorting the prices for crops, animals, and other farm equipment. The livestock market in Latin America provides a particularly good example of this. Colombia’s FARC rebels have long used livestock to launder the profits of their drug smuggling, buying up farms and cattle in large quantities and then selling them when in need of a cash infusion. The resulting rises and falls in land and livestock prices can prove ruinous for Colombian ranchers and meat producers, who cannot compete with the rebels’ purchasing power or weaponry.¹¹⁰ The story is similar in Guatemala, where ranchers with ties to criminal groups such as the Leones and the Lorenzanas regularly buy and sell pigs and other animals as a means of laundering illicit funds. According to Guatemala’s banking regulators, some 21 million quetzales (about US\$2.6 million) worth of “suspicious” livestock transactions was conducted in 2010.¹¹¹



2.5: By 2020 maintain genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants, farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at national, regional and international levels, and ensure access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge as internationally agreed.

Organised criminal activity has one other potential effect, albeit an indirect one, on the goal of ending hunger and achieving universal food security. As the world's climate changes and its ecosystems feel the effects, it is becoming more and more important to maintain the widest possible genetic diversity of seeds, in order to feed the greatest number of people in as many different climates as is feasible. Specialised research institutes have been established for the express purpose of diversifying seed stocks of staple crops like rice, wheat, and maize.

In order for this research to succeed, it is necessary for scientists to be able to track the seeds they distribute and plant, so that they can learn which varieties are suited to which environments. Seed counterfeiting and adulteration by criminals makes such work significantly harder. By mixing normal or counterfeit seeds in with the research strands, criminals render project results suspect at best, and entirely invalid at worst. Cases have also been seen of seed intended for planting being distributed as food.

Kashmir's Apple Crop

Apple farmers in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir have in recent years suffered increasing hardships as a direct result of organised criminal activities in the state. Agriculture is a lifeblood of the economy in Jammu and Kashmir. In 2003, the year of the state's most recent State Development Report, horticulture brought the state some 3 billion rupees (roughly US\$70 million at 2003 exchange rates) and employed over 500,000 families.¹¹² Apples are the single most important crop for the state, with just over 900,000 metric tonnes produced in the harvest year of 2001-2002.¹¹³

This export industry, vital to the sustainability of the Kashmiri economy, is threatened by two separate criminal challenges. The first is a price-fixing cartel, which forces growers to sell their crops to dealers for only a fraction of the market price paid in cities. Pre-harvest contractors and commission agents take advantage of a captive market to force producers to sell nearly at cost: "the Kashmiri grower is constrained to sell the apples at just Rs. 40 or Rs. 45 (US\$0.66-0.75) per kilogramme – Rs. 5 more than his production cost – but the consumer in Mumbai pays between Rs. 90 and Rs. 120."¹¹⁴

The second challenge involves substandard pesticides sold to farmers and then used in agriculture. The state of Jammu and Kashmir consumed Rs. 361 million (US\$6.5 million) worth of pesticides in 2012, 86% of which were used on apple trees.¹¹⁵ Many of these pesticides "are being used indiscriminately without considering scientific recommendations," and "the choice of chemicals/brand preferences are steered by traders and market functionaries."¹¹⁶ Local growers and distributors blame the Indian government for lax oversight and a lack of quality control, while the government says that such activity is beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.¹¹⁷ The pesticides have taken a serious toll on apple production in the state, with output dropping 50% in 2014.¹¹⁸

Modes of Implementation

Improving the capacity for regulation along the food chain will be essential to implementing successful policies in response to this goal. National food and drug administrations will require both additional budgets and capacity building for successful oversight and investigations. Regional entities can also be capacitated to compensate in the cases of weak or fragile states. Consumer awareness can be increased to apply pressure can be important in motivating efforts by the private sector to also manage the integrity and authenticity of their food products.



Women are highly vulnerable to organized crime groups, but can also be a powerful force to counter them.
Credit: Blue Moon



GOAL 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Organised crime poses both direct and indirect threats to achieving gender equality and gender empowerment. Directly, sex trafficking perpetuates violence against women and bars women from living a full and free life.

Indirectly, similar to conflict, organised crime has a disproportionate impact on women, with women the victims of violence, sexual assault and homicides perpetrated by criminal groups. This is particularly true in the so-called “Northern Triangle” of Central America, which has become one of the deadliest places in the world for women, as the region has grown in importance to the transnational drug trade.¹¹⁹ Even women engaged in organised crime often feel more perverse impacts than their male counterparts, as they tend to be very vulnerable, and thus more likely to be forced into high-risk work and to be sexually abused. Government crackdowns on drug cartels can also indirectly affect women: they can result in an increase of prostitution and sex trafficking as these industries present an alternative when governments place heightened scrutiny on drug trafficking.¹²⁰

In West Africa and the Sahel, the ‘shifting power relations and breakdown of social norms triggered by the engagement of young men in the trafficking industry are, in turn, having an impact on gender relations and increasing the vulnerability of women and children’, quoting forced marriages, prostitution, child sexual abuse, and mental health problems due to drug use as some of the increased vulnerabilities.¹²¹

In addition, the mass killing of women has been used as a terror tactic by organised criminal groups and reflects the excessive masculinity that is associated with the drug industry and other criminal chains. The use of women is often considered a mode of retaliation against the government for its crackdown on drug trafficking, or as a



threat to other criminal organisations. Drug trafficking seems to heighten the perception that women are easily disposable, and increased violence toward women creates an image that it is acceptable. Femicide destroys family structures, forcing children to grow up in an entirely unstable environment.¹²²

While the perpetration of organised crime is dominated by men, women can and do participate, both passively and actively. Though gender is the most influential determinant of criminality – even more so than a person’s socio-economic, educational or employment status – Margaret Beare notes that, ‘As with all types of crime, women’s involvement with organized crime is statistically low, but all indications are that it has risen slightly, with some women participating at higher levels or holding leadership positions.’¹²³ In the sex and human trafficking industry, women are often used as recruiters, guardians and controllers, or may control considerable portions, if not the entirety, of enterprises. Broadly speaking, however, the women entering into organised crime are often quite vulnerable, with no other viable income options. In addition, criminal groups have been increasingly bringing women into their ranks using force and threats.

Consequently, the impact of organised crime is felt deeply by female populations and, in addition to acting as a significant threat to achieving development Goal 5, it tears at the social fabrics of society, impacting a plethora of other development objectives.

Relevant targets under proposed goal

5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.

Human sex trafficking is the most common form of modern-day slavery, with estimates placing the number of females and children enslaved in the commercial sex industry in the millions. The magnitude of the problem can be overwhelming, with human sex trafficking witnessed in nearly every corner of the globe. The majority of sex trafficking is international, with victims taken from such places as South and Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, Central and South America, and other less developed areas, and moved to more developed ones, including Asia, the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. In tandem, developed countries, such as the US, not only face an influx of international victims but also have their own domestic sex-trafficking industries.¹²⁴

Traffickers represent every social, ethnic, and racial group. Various organisational types exist in trafficking. Some perpetrators are involved with local gangs while others are members of larger nationwide gangs and criminal organisations. Traffickers use violence, such as gang rape and other forms of abuse, to force the youths to work for them and remain under their control. In many cases, however, the victims simply are beaten until they submit to the trafficker’s demands. Traffickers often take their victims’ identity documents, including birth certificates and passports.¹²⁵

Sex trafficking threatens the security of vulnerable populations and promotes societal breakdown by removing women and girls from their families and communities. It also negatively impacts labour markets due to the loss of human resources and burdens public health systems. Furthermore, trafficking fuels organised crime groups that usually participate in many other illegal activities, including drug and weapons trafficking and money laundering.¹²⁶

Sex Trafficking: Eastern Europe

While sex trafficking occurs around the world, from Southeast Asia to the US, one of the most infamous sex trafficking source regions is Eastern Europe, where trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation has been estimated to be worth \$3 billion a year.¹²⁷ For example, human trafficking is a significant problem in Moldova, with an estimated 25,000 Moldovans trafficked abroad, of which ten per cent are children. Women are mostly sold into the sex trade, and for rural girls, high unemployment, widespread domestic violence and rampant alcoholism exacerbate the problem, making them more vulnerable to human trafficking than their urban counterparts. Victims are trafficked to Turkey, Russia, Cyprus, the UAE, and elsewhere.¹²⁸

The open borders policy within the European Union's Schengen zone has been described as "a gift to traffickers," permitting the movement of sex workers to go largely undetected by Interpol and the national Borders Agencies. Consequently numbers of trafficked workers have grown sharply, with a recent European Commission study suggesting an 18 per cent increase between 2008-2010.¹²⁹ Extensive legal experimentation is on-going in Europe – as it is in many other parts of the world – with many States having already legalised aspects of prostitution. Some have argued that legalised sex work facilitates the identification and prosecution of the aspects of the sex trade that are abusive or coercive.¹³⁰

Modes of Implementation

5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels

Classically, the responses to human trafficking are divided along the three P's: prevention, protection and prosecution. For the first, as with many organised crimes, the need for education, awareness-raising and efforts targeted at changing the socio-economic conditions that lead to trafficking are key to achieving a sustainable end to the practice of human trafficking, particularly for sex. Empowering women, providing sustainable economic alternatives, and addressing cultural perceptions about gender equality would reduce women's vulnerability to be trafficked.

To provide protection, addressing illegal and forced migration to prevent instances of sex trafficking is an important measure, though attitude is important here. Border control presents an opportunity to control illegal transit, but women being forcibly trafficked are almost universally victims of fraud or coercion, and should be treated as victims, not criminals. Support services, outreach and victim assistance are needed to combat all aspects of the sex trade to provide escape routes and options for women who have been trafficked.

Finally, improving the frameworks for prosecution and strengthening legislation and policy to hold traffickers accountable for their crimes is necessary in order to have an effect on traffickers.



*Corruption and criminal activity raise water prices by an average of 30% in developing countries.
Credit: Abdelhamid Kalai*



GOAL 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

Organised crime plays a significant role in achieving two of the key targets identified by Goal 6: universal access to safe drinking water, and combating the environmental, economic, and health-related consequences of water pollution.

Access to water is becoming an increasing concern around the world. From the Yemeni capital of Sana'a to the Central Valley of California, citizens of rich and poor countries find themselves facing the prospect of wells and reservoirs running dry without viable alternative options for potable water. Organised crime is both one of the causes of and one of the impediments to resolving these crises. By siphoning water illegally, criminals deplete water reserves without paying, depriving their compatriots of water while denying officials the resources needed to fight back. Moreover, violent criminal activity in drought-stricken areas, such as Sudan, severely hampers efforts to improve access to existing water sources.¹³¹

Organised crime facilitates the pollution of fresh water supplies, as well as ocean areas used by fishermen and tourists, by illegally disposing of industrial waste and other harmful chemicals. Across the globe, millions of tons of toxic substances such as arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, lead, mercury, and various industrial compounds and reagents are improperly disposed of in or near water supplies every year, resulting in serious long-term health consequences for local residents. By offering relatively cheap disposal services to companies, organised criminals earn billions of dollars annually, which they can then use to finance their other activities.

Relevant targets under goal

6.1: By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all.

Despite the fact that the Millennium Development Goal on water access was successfully met, as of 2012 some 780 million people around the world still lacked access to safe drinking water, a number that threatens to rise thanks to climate change, population growth, and myriad other factors.¹³² This scarcity, combined with the indispensability of water for human life, creates an opportunity for organised criminals to step in and profit.

There are few statistics available on the extent or value of criminal siphoning of, and trafficking in, drinking water. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that it is widespread and has a significant impact on affected communities. In Yemen, for example, prices for a 2,500-liter tank of water—enough to supply a household of four people for 4-5 days—jumped from 1,200 rial (roughly US\$5.60) to 10,000 rial (US\$47) during conflict between pro- and anti-government militias in 2011, as criminals took advantage of the chaos to siphon off substantial amounts of water.¹³³ According to a report by Transparency International in 2008, corruption and criminal activity raise water prices by an average of 30% in developing countries, with some residents in parts of Honduras paying as much as 40% more for water than Hondurans in less-corrupt areas of the country.¹³⁴

Water Siphoning and Trafficking: The Karachi “Water Mafia”

With 18 million people demanding over 4.5 billion litres of water every day, Karachi is one of the world’s largest and thirstiest cities.¹³⁵ Years of drought and a booming population, combined with the fact that the coastal city’s groundwater is too salty to drink without first being treated, have created a crisis situation for many of the poorest residents. Instead of connecting pipes directly to homes and businesses, the local water authority, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), maintains 12 large hydrants around the city, where water supply companies fill up tankers that in turn bring water to customers.

The system is plagued by corruption and crime. As of 2010, unlicensed companies and criminals operated at least 160 illegal hydrants, from which they siphoned off over 1 billion litres of water every day, or nearly 25% of the city’s demand.¹³⁶ Officials put the percentage of siphoned water even higher, with estimates reaching as high as 41% of demand.¹³⁷ Only about one-third of Karachi’s three million households are registered customers of KWSB-approved water companies, and just ten percent of the population regularly pays its water bill.¹³⁸

The result is that, as of 2010, Karachi residents were paying up to a quarter of their monthly income for their water, while the owners and operators of the illegal tankers earned as much as US\$43 million annually.¹³⁹ In the years since, as drought conditions have set in around Karachi and the sources of its water supply, the situation has undoubtedly only gotten worse. Major change is unlikely in the near future, thanks to political corruption and high-level protection for the criminals. In October 2013, for example, Karachi police released “key members of the water mafia” within hours of arresting them for siphoning water from illegal hydrants, following the intervention of a former police Inspector-General.¹⁴⁰

6.3: By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimising release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater, and increasing recycling and safe reuse by x% globally.

Organised criminal groups are responsible for the disposal of millions upon millions of tonnes of hazardous waste and other pollutants every year, an activity that has adverse impacts on human life far beyond the dumping site. The substances seep into groundwater and rivers, poisoning the people who then drink the water from these sources. Soil contamination can lead to food poisoning when people consume fruits and vegetables grown

in farms irrigated by affected water supplies. Plant and animal diseases can upset ecosystems and lead to the collapse of livelihoods and communities.

As they operate outside the law and therefore are not bound by time-consuming and expensive disposal procedures and regulations, organised criminal actors have long been attracted to the waste industry. The American Mafia in New York and New Jersey controlled much of the hazardous waste industry for New York City and the surrounding area for decades in the mid-20th century; today, the state of New Jersey has 134 federal toxic-waste clean-up sites and 16,000 other contaminated areas.¹⁴¹ In Australia, authorities estimate that nearly half a million tons of hazardous waste are dumped in Sydney alone every year, and the costs associated with cleaning it up total hundreds of millions of dollars.¹⁴² In some instances, the effects of toxic waste dumping are immediately visible and dramatic, as when the oil company Trafigura dumped tons of sulphurous compounds off the coast of Abidjan, the capital of Côte D'Ivoire, in 2006, sickening over 100,000 people.¹⁴³ Other times, the result is more insidious, as when repeated dumping of toxic waste off the coast of Somalia by Italian crime syndicates contributed to the death of important fish stocks and helped force local fishermen to turn to piracy to earn an income.¹⁴⁴

Toxic Waste Dumping in Italy by the Italian Mafia

For decades, the crime syndicates of southern Italy have been illegally disposing of large quantities of hazardous waste on land and at sea. The Camorra group, based in Naples, is widely acknowledged to be the most active syndicate in the industry, disposing of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of hazardous waste every year in the farmlands north of Naples. The situation has gotten so bad that a specific area, centred on Acerra, has earned two new nicknames. The first, "Triangle of Death," was bestowed in 2004, by *The Lancet*, a British medical journal, during a study into dramatically increased rates of cancer and reports of, among other oddities, two-headed sheep.¹⁴⁵ The second name, "Land of Fire," refers to the plumes of smoke coming from trash fires, commonplace in the area.¹⁴⁶ In addition to causing cancer and other health problems, the dumping has negatively impacted Italian food producers: in 2008, for example, sales of buffalo mozzarella cheese from Naples plummeted after dangerous levels of dioxins, a commonly-dumped chemical, were discovered by food inspectors.¹⁴⁷

The problem is not confined to the Naples area. In December 2013, Italy's national anti-Mafia prosecutor reported that authorities had discovered the Camorra illegally dumping toxic waste near the Tuscan town of Prato, 17 kilometres north of Florence.¹⁴⁸ In the northwestern Piedmont region, improper waste disposals from a dye-manufacturing plant caused local rivers to change colours, leading to public protests and the eventual shutdown of the plant.¹⁴⁹ Five years ago, in September 2009, former members of the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta publicly alleged that the syndicate repeatedly used explosives to sink ships filled with radioactive waste in the Mediterranean Sea off the Calabrian coast.¹⁵⁰

The profits reaped by the criminals are enormous. Estimates of annual profits from the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes in Italy range from €16-20 billion (US\$21-26.25 billion). The *mafiosi* enjoy protection from the highest levels of Italian politics: one Milan-based firm that played an important role in facilitating the transfer of waste to be dumped in the south, for example, was run by Paolo Berlusconi, vice president of the AC Milan football club and brother of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.¹⁵¹ Even for those who are convicted, the penalties are mild in light of the profits earned. The illegal waste disposal industry thus continues to grow, with two million metric tonnes of hazardous chemicals destined for illicit dumping seized in 2011 alone.¹⁵²



With an estimated 21 million people victims of forced labour, slightly over half of whom are women or girls, addressing human and child trafficking is an urgent priority. Credit: Miravision



GOAL 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

Three very lucrative and widespread sectors of organised criminal activity fall directly under the framework of Goal 8. The first sector is child labour, and forced labour more generally. Child labour remains a serious issue in many parts of the world, with an estimated 168 million children working in 2013, of whom 85 million work in hazardous jobs; in Sub-Saharan Africa, the ILO estimates that over 21% of all children work in some form or another.¹⁵³ While not all of these children are working for criminals or businesses connected to illicit activity, some of them are. The extreme case of the intersection between child labour and organised crime is the conscription of children by rebel armies or gangs to fight as foot soldiers.

The second sector, which overlaps to some extent with the first, is forced labour. Currently, according to ILO figures, 21 million people find themselves victims of forced labour, slightly over half of whom are women or girls. 19 million of these victims are being exploited by private-sector individuals or companies, for whom they generate around US\$150 billion in annual profits.¹⁵⁴ Domestic workers and those employed in the construction, agriculture, and entertainment industries are among the groups most vulnerable to falling into the trap of forced labour.

The third and final sector, which also overlaps with the other two, is the exploitation and abuse of migrant workers. Around the world, labour migrants face varying degrees of difficulty in exercising basic workers' rights. In some countries, labour laws facilitate what amounts to forced labour by allowing employers to retain foreign

employees' passports and requiring these employees to obtain permission from their bosses to leave the country. Recruiting agencies also play a major role in facilitating the exploitation of migrant workers and their entry into forced labour.

Relevant targets under goal

8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, eradicate forced labour, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms including recruitment and use of child soldiers.

The ILO's Minimum Age Convention (Convention No. 138), which has been ratified by 164 countries as of December 2012, calls on states parties to establish a minimum working age of 15, or 14 for underdeveloped countries, for normal work, and 18 for hazardous work.¹⁵⁵ According to the most recent ILO data, 167,956,000 million children aged 5-17 were victims of child labour in 2012, a decrease of nearly one-third from 2000's figure of 245,500,000.¹⁵⁶ Despite the drop, the figure means that in 2012, 10.6% of all children in the world between the ages of 5 and 17 fit the definition of child labourers. Just over half of these 168 million children—85,344,000 of them—were employed in "hazardous work directly endangering their health, safety and moral development."¹⁵⁷

There are several different economic sectors that rely on child labour in various parts of the world. Some 60% of all child labourers, or around 98 million children, work in agriculture, in conditions that range from working for a few hours a week without pay on their family's farm to being trafficked onto cocoa plantations in Ghana and spending 11 hours per day spraying plants with noxious pesticides.¹⁵⁸ Millions of children from all parts of the world suffer from sexual exploitation by private individuals and/or the pornography industry, many of whom were abducted, tricked, or otherwise coerced into their situations by organised criminals. In 2013, the ILO estimated that 300,000 children, some as young as 8 years old, were serving as soldiers in 30 countries, rarely of their own volition.¹⁵⁹

While organised criminals are undoubtedly responsible for some percentage of child labour cases, they play a much larger role in the plights of the 21 million victims of forced labour around the world. According to the ILO, "forced labour refers to situations in which persons are coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means such as accumulated debt, retention of identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration authorities."¹⁶⁰ The ILO estimates that 5.5 million of the 21 million forced labourers in the world in 2012 were children, and that over half of all forced labourers, some 11.7 million, lived in Asia.¹⁶¹

Forced labour is prevalent in many of the same economic sectors as child labour (which was addressed in more detail in Goal 16 above). In 2013, for example, scandals erupted surrounding revelations of Qatar's use of forced labour to build the stadiums and infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.¹⁶² Forced labour in the sex trade, including prostitution and pornography, generates enormous annual profits—up to US\$99 billion per year, or two-thirds of all the value produced by the world's forced labourers.¹⁶³ Beyond construction and sex, forced labourers can often be found in agriculture and even fishing: a UNODC report detailed myriad examples of forced labour on fishing boats, with workers forced to work up to 18 hours per day for months at a time and receiving little or no salary.¹⁶⁴

Colombia: Use of Child Soldiers by Rebel Groups

The Colombian FARC, along with other rebel groups in the country, has long been known to rely heavily on children and adolescents to make up a significant portion of its base of fighters. It is impossible to provide an accurate count of child soldiers within the country for several reasons, including lack of government presence in rebel controlled areas and uncertainty about whether missing children are serving as soldiers or facing a different fate. Colombia's Family Welfare Institute registered some 5,000 former child soldiers between 1999 and October 2013.¹⁶⁵ A 2012 report by Colombian professor and human rights activist provides widely-respected figures of no fewer than 18,000 children and adolescents serving in combat for rebel groups and no fewer than 100,000 others working directly for illegal armed groups in the informal economy.¹⁶⁶

Colombian children join the FARC for many reasons. In some cases, the rebels convince children to join by offering them adventure, excitement, and money, which children see as a marked improvement from their lives in rural villages. Forced conscription by kidnapping children or pressuring families to turn over their sons and daughters at gunpoint are also common tactics. The rebel groups find almost as much success recruiting children as they do in convincing adults to join: over 40% of the ranks of both the FARC and the ELN, Colombia's two largest rebel groups, were estimated to be under the age of 18 in 2012.¹⁶⁷

Life as a child soldier in a Colombian rebel group is extremely brutal. Children are routinely tasked with dangerous duties, such as installing land mines and transporting explosives, according to former child soldiers.¹⁶⁸ Girls, who make up over 40% of children kidnapped and forced into service by the armed groups, are often used for intelligence gathering; in the words of one former combatant, "no-one suspects a little girl. A little girl can transport money, weapons, [and] drugs much more easily."¹⁶⁹ Girls are also sexually exploited and abused, raped repeatedly and then forced to have abortions because of the groups' policies banning members from having children.¹⁷⁰ Unfortunately for the children involved, their servitude is often long, thanks to tight controls within the groups on deserters and the remote nature of group strongholds. The 2012 Colombian study cited above found that just over 50% of adult combatants in both the ELN and the FARC joined the group, whether by choice or by force, before the age of 18.¹⁷¹

8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments of all workers, including migrant workers, particularly women migrants, and those in precarious employment.

Organised criminal activities stand in the way of any effort to provide universal access to safe and secure working environments. Bribes paid to government officials, architects, and municipal authorities allow factories, offices, and homes to be built that fail to meet quality and safety standards. The consequences of shoddy construction and improper use can be devastating, as in the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh in 2013, which killed over 1,000 workers. Kickbacks and other criminal schemes also enable companies to mistreat their employees on the job, such as by denying them overtime pay, failing to provide proper safety equipment, or skipping preventive maintenance.

Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to such exploitation. Recruiting agencies often either charge hefty fees to candidates up front or deduct exorbitant fees from future earnings, which, when combined with low salaries and few benefits, leave many migrants in situations close to indentured servitude. For example, it is illegal according to Mexican law for recruiting agencies to charge candidates recruitment fees, and yet Central Americans looking to go from Mexico to the United States for work routinely pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars in recruitment fees, in addition to thousands more in visa costs, transportation costs, and other expenses.¹⁷² The fees can be even higher in other circumstances: Nepalis and Bangladeshis working at restaurants on an American military base in Iraq reported paying an **average** of US\$3,000 to recruiting agencies in order to secure their jobs, in addition to several hundred dollars to smugglers to bring them onto the base without obtaining official security clearances.¹⁷³



Exploitation of migrant workers frequently continues once they arrive at their destination. Employers often take advantage of linguistic and cultural barriers to deprive migrants of basic rights, confident that migrants do not possess the social or monetary capital to challenge them in court. Even if migrants do try to mount a challenge, many legal systems are stacked against them, allowing employers to confiscate passports and refuse to return them to migrants who desire to return home. The workers' lack of proper documentation and identity documents leaves them as essentially fugitives in their host country, unable to venture out of their workplaces freely for fear of being caught and potentially deported.

Canada: Exploitation of Hungarian Migrant Workers¹⁷⁴

In July 2014, Steven Blaney, Canada's Minister of Public Safety, announced the deportation of twenty members of the Hungarian Domotor-Kolompar crime syndicate. The deportation signals what Canadian authorities hope is the end of the largest human-trafficking ring in Canadian history. Ferenc and Gyula Domotor, two Hungarian brothers, arrived in Canada in 1998 and claimed refugee status. They were not alone in doing so: Canada was receiving so many applications for refugee status from Hungarians that in 2001 it imposed a visa requirement on Hungarian nationals. Before the requirement was imposed, though, and especially after it was lifted in 2008, the Domotors used loopholes in Canada's immigration regime to bring family members and associates into the country from Hungary and establish a criminal network.

In the 30 months between April 2008 and October 2010, the Domotor syndicate enticed over 20 young Hungarian men to come to Canada, promising well-paying jobs and an escape from Hungary's floundering economy. One of these men was Tomas, who was offered a job doing construction for a drywall and stucco company in Ontario. Recruiters told Tomas that he would be paid C\$4,000 (US\$3,675) per month. To make the offer even more attractive, Tomas's employers, who were fellow Hungarians working for the Domotor syndicate, arranged his flight and his paperwork.

When Tomas arrived in the southern Ontario city of Hamilton, however, his employers confiscated his passport and other identification documents, refusing to return them to him. The food was bad, the living conditions deplorable, and the hours long—as many as 14 to 16 hours per day, even in the middle of the winter. Tomas could not move around freely, given that he lacked any form of identification. Worst of all, the promised salary was never paid.

Finally, in October 2010, one of the Domotors' trafficking victims managed to call the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The call sparked a 10-month-long RCMP investigation, which culminated in the arrests of over 20 criminals, more than in any other single forced labour or human trafficking case in history. The convicts were held in Canadian prisons until their deportation in 2014. Tomas and the other victims, freed from their exploitative working conditions, have settled down in southern Canada with the approval of the Canadian government.

Modes of Implementation

There is a great deal that can and must be done to prevent human trafficking and criminal labour exploitation. Encouraging the ratification and implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, including its Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, would provide a much stronger national framework upon which to predicate justice interventions. Sensitisation and emphasis on corporate social responsibility for all companies, but in particular for key private sector entities that facilitate transnational employment - for example recruitment agencies - are important actors in the response, as are labour unions and industry standard lobby bodies. NGOs have long played a watchdog role in the area of labour standards, and this should continue. Raising consumers' awareness of the risks and consequences of trafficking for forced labour should be encouraged.



Organised crime and money laundering divert licit flows, dampen entrepreneurship and reduce sustainable and equitable economic growth. Credit: ChiccoDodiFc



GOAL 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries

It has become a truism that the growth of organised crime is facilitated by inequality. Criminal groups prey on inequality of all kinds: economic, social, political and legal, and turn it to their profit. In doing so, they exacerbate inequalities by diverting yet more resources and social capital into criminal hands.

While the effects of organised crime indirectly lay the foundations for inequality, in response to the framework laid out under the resultant goals from the OWG, then two areas come to the fore: illicit financial flows and facilitated illegal migration.

10.5: Improve regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen implementation of such regulations.

Organised crime and related corruption are major drivers of illicit financial flows, resulting in a negative spiral that negatively impacts economies and distorts financial markets. The crime of money laundering has a unique relationship with other forms of organised crime, as nearly all forms of illicit activity involve the laundering of money at some point. As such, the majority of criminals launder their profits in order to take advantage of their wealth in the formal economy. Money laundering has a severely corrosive effect on the socio-economic structures and illicit flows distort the operation of market transactions, create unstable interest and exchange rates and exacerbate inflation in countries where criminals conduct their business dealings.¹⁷⁵

In addition, illicit financial flows have a direct and negative impact of development, depriving governments of financial resources that might otherwise be invested in public goods such as health, agriculture, infrastructure and education. Illicit flows will therefore not only hinder efforts to achieve target 10.5, but also constitute a significant threat to all proposed SDGs. The financial implications of pursuing the SDGs are enormous, possibly greater than for the MDGs. While it is impossible to put a price tag on as-yet unconfirmed commitments, and estimates can only be very approximate at this stage, it is thought the SDGs will almost certainly require an investment of well over a trillion dollars per year.¹⁷⁶ Any money diverted away from licit financial markets has a direct impact



on national budgets, depriving nations of the funds necessary to implement the SDGs. For example, research undertaken by the NGO Global Financial Integrity found that the cumulative illicit outflows from Africa over the 30-year period from 1980-2009 was in the range of US\$1.2–1.4 trillion, vastly outpacing the net inflows from development assistance and foreign direct investment, which the authors estimate at only US\$62.2 billion.¹⁷⁷

Small countries and weak states are particularly vulnerable to money laundering, as the gains from illegal activities can provide criminal organisations with potentially huge economic power that may give them leverage over small economies. Generally, money launderers tend to seek out countries where there is a low risk of detection due to weak or ineffective regulatory capacity and anti-money laundering programs.¹⁷⁸ Real estate markets can be particularly vulnerable to illicit financial flows. Yet often there is a lack of appropriate internal control mechanisms, policies, and training and audit systems that allow organised criminal actors to obscure the true origin of funds and the identity of the beneficial owner of the property.¹⁷⁹ Remittances are also used as a tool to launder money. In addition, high unemployment, little foreign direct investment, and widespread informal economic activity can make states and regions susceptible to money laundering activity.¹⁸⁰

Combatting money laundering is a global effort, however, in which both developed and developing states have a role and a responsibility. Certain regional financial centres have become conduits for local money laundering. The popularity of regional financial centres to launder money indicates that development can come at a cost. As states build capacity, specifically in the banking and real-estate sectors, they become more vulnerable to money laundering activities. More developed nations offer criminals more secure banking institutions and economic systems to hold their money. Moreover, in countries with very small formal economic sectors, questionable financial transactions will draw much more attention than they would in a country with a much larger formal economy. The relationship highlights the phenomenon that development does not necessarily decrease opportunities for criminal activity, but rather changes the nature of the activities undertaken. A study of money laundering also demonstrates how an overemphasis on fragile states can underplay the important role more developed states and urban hubs play in regional organised crime patterns.

Illicit Financial Flows: The Philippines¹⁸¹

The seminal Global Financial Integrity (GFI) report *Illicit Financial Flows to and from the Philippines: A Study in Dynamic Simulation, 1960-2011* brings substantial insight to the subject of illicit financial flows and their impact on development. Billed as the most methodologically rigorous report that GFI has produced, it found that over the 52 years covered by the analysis, the Philippines witnessed some US\$410 billion in illicit flows. Mispricing of trade accounts for the bulk of these flows, accomplished by overpricing imports and underpricing exports, in addition to the underpricing of imports for the purpose of saving on customs duties and VAT taxes.

Interestingly, however, the GFI found that both illicit inflows and illicit outflows are harmful, draining money from the domestic Philippine economy, facilitating income tax and customs duty evasion, and depleting domestic savings. As such, it was conclusively determined that illicit outflows hamper sustainable economic growth in the country over the long-run. Interestingly, illicit financial inflows are perhaps an even bigger drain on the Philippine economy – 25% of the value of all goods imported into the Philippines goes unreported to customs officials. As taxes on international trade constitute 22 percent of total taxes in the Philippines, such widespread under-invoicing has a severely damaging effect on government revenues.

The report estimated that the Philippine government has lost at least US\$19.3 billion since 1990 in tax revenue due to customs duties evasion through import under-invoicing alone. Combined with an additional US\$3.7 billion in tax revenue lost through export under-invoicing, the Philippine government has lost at least US\$23 billion in customs revenue since 1990.

10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

With migration and development inextricably linked, migration is being labelled an integral part of the SDGs. Migration and the resources it generates in the form of remittances and diaspora investment can help address these global challenges. However, organised crime is arguably the greatest threat to achieving Goal 10.7, as smuggled migration has enormous impacts on migrants and states, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for those involved. In order to function as a human development enabler, migration requires cooperation at all levels, across borders and a variety of stakeholders.¹⁸²

Migrant smugglers take advantage of migrant populations across the globe, peddling lies and using false promises to encourage individuals to migrate. The result is increased risks to health and life and significantly greater risk of individuals falling victim to human trafficking. Currently, the two most potent migration flows being seen are the smuggled migration of children from Latin America to the US, and the flight of Africans towards Europe. Examining the Africa-Europe flow, it is estimated that 80% of journeys are facilitated by migrant smugglers and criminal groups. These actors provide a range of services such as transportation, fraudulent identification, corruption of border officials and settlement services.

Smuggled Migration: Africa to Europe¹⁸³

In October 2013, Italy captured international headlines when a boat carrying hundreds of asylum seekers sank off its coast, killing over 360 people. The incident reflects the tremendous increase in African migration to Europe in recent years, in part due to the Arab Spring. While Africans have been migrating to Europe for decades, the instability across North Africa and the Sahel, coupled with the erosion of Libya's capacity to control its own borders, has resulted in an unprecedented surge of migrants to Italy in recent years. This surge shows no signs of subsiding.

The decision to migrate may be fuelled by a multitude of motivations. Africa has the fastest population growth rate in the world, and although the continent is making momentous economic gains, it has broadly failed to translate these gains into sustainable livelihoods for its youth. Social and economic disparities, conflict, and crime in several countries throughout the continent, many Africans seek out new opportunities across the Mediterranean.

The cost of a trip to Italy averages several thousand dollars and may take years to complete, as migrants may remain in transit hubs along their route to work to afford the next leg of their trip. As a result, many migrants are "stuck" in towns along the way to the coast. In addition to exorbitant prices, migrants endure perilous conditions. As they make their way to the Mediterranean coast, migrants often travel in overcrowded trucks, facing starvation and thirst before even reaching the coast. Once they reach the Mediterranean, people are packed into boats set for Europe, often embarking without enough fuel to make it to Italy. All too often, migrants drown. If migrants do arrive in Italy, their reception is less than favourable. Many are sent back to Africa.


Modes of Implementation

In developing responses to smuggled migration, discourse has traditionally framed migration as a problem to be solved by fostering development in countries of origin. However, as argued in the report *Making the Case for Including Migration into the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda* international dialogue has begun to change course, recognising mobility as a component of development processes that present human development opportunities, as well as trade-offs and costs. This shift in perception is reflected in a slow but steady increase in facilitative rather than control focused policy responses to migration. Migration, therefore, calls for policies built on symmetrical partnerships around universal goals. In order to reap the benefits that come with migration while



at the same time ensuring the human development and social inclusion of those involved, countries will need to integrate migration into their national strategies and development plans and build international partnerships, including with non-state stakeholders.¹⁸⁴

Consequently, responses to achieve target 10.7 cannot focus solely on deterring migration, but also ought to encourage countries to evaluate and develop policies that better facilitate orderly and responsible migration. This will require better educating source communities on potential avenues for migration and the dangers of engaging in smuggled migration.



Urban violence perpetuated by organised criminal groups, and particularly gangs, is a major threat in numerous urban hubs. Credit: Dabldy



GOAL 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

While Goal 11 focuses on making cities inclusive, safe and resilient, organised crime is a potent force undermining the safety and human security of communities. Urban violence perpetuated by organised criminal groups, and particularly gangs, is a major threat in numerous urban hubs. In many of the world's major cities, law enforcement and social development have not kept up with the pace of urbanisation, allowing organised criminal groups to grow largely unchecked.¹⁸⁵

11.3: By 2030 enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacities for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries

Organised crime has a direct impact on public safety and achieving Goal 11. Latin America is a prime example of the impact organised criminal groups have on urban safety. Rates of violent crime are six times higher in Latin America than in the rest of the world. El Salvador frequently boasts one of the world's highest murder rates, and over 11,200 people were killed in drug-related violence in Mexico in 2010.¹⁸⁶

Neglect of organised crime's potential to overwhelm urban environments carries high risks. Cape Town, which has some of South Africa's highest rates of murder and drug-related crime, is a case in point.¹⁸⁷ The city witnessed 2,580 murders in 2013, a rate of just over 7 per day, of which 12% were gang-related; the latter percentage represented an increase of 86% over 2012.¹⁸⁸ Criminal practices have escalated and accumulated, making the Western Cape area a hub for illicit activity. Alongside local street gangs, criminal syndicates from China, Vietnam,



and Europe run thriving businesses in drug smuggling, wildlife trafficking, and many other illegal pursuits.¹⁸⁹ Local crime bosses reportedly harbour international hit men, particularly those of Balkan origin, fleeing from justice in their own countries.¹⁹⁰

When states are able to achieve “pacification” in areas previously held by criminal groups, new organised crime groups are likely to emerge. Often, criminal groups function as security providers, regulating theft, robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their rules and punishments for transgressions. The removal of the criminal gangs often results in a rise of street crime, and community fear. That has in fact been the case in both Medellín in the post-Don Berna order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.¹⁹¹

Modes of Implementation

The response to the crime epidemic in urban hubs has varied. Some Central American countries have adopted the so-called *mano dura* (iron fist) policies, criminalising membership in youth gangs and resorting to extensive imprisonment. However, the heavy-handed approach has not always ended returned results or offered a long-term solution. Concurrently though, past experience has suggested that a dynamic response is required, as light-handed responses and “pacification” may not be sufficient to achieve long-term solutions.


Some innovative efforts have been made to follow a more development-orientated approach within the context of highly violent urban environments. A recent publication by International Alert, for example, discusses using peace building responses in the framework of organised crime, and cites the efforts of Brazil to combine security and justice responses with the delivery of social services in key slum areas of Rio de Janeiro. Reductions in the number of bullets fired by police in each precinct and the number of people killed by stray bullets were taken as a measure of the approach’s success.¹⁹²

Indicators to consider in measuring strides taken to protect urban spaces from violence and insecurity related to organised criminal activity ought to consist of a combination of crime data, seizure data, and law enforcement indictments on typical organised crimes and homicides. Additionally, ordinary crimes such as kidnappings, unexplained arsons, and sharp changes in crime trends may also play a role in the indicator. In the specific case of homicide rates, special attention ought to be paid to homicides attributed to organised crime and unsolved homicides. For long-term change, recommended indicators and metrics to monitor and evaluate initiatives should revolve around increasing the effectiveness and accountability of justice and security systems.

Development Impacts at Risk



Goal 1:	End poverty in all its forms everywhere	
Goal 4:	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	
Goal 7:	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all	
Goal 9:	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation	
Goal 12:	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	
Goal 13:	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	
Goal 17:	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.	





*Organised crime gravely impacts the most vulnerable in society, the poor, the weak and the marginalised.
Credit: Nolte Lourens*



GOAL 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Organised crime has a substantial, multi-faceted impact on the first of the sustainable development goals: to end poverty in all its forms, everywhere.

The greatest impacts of organised crime are universally on the most vulnerable in society, on the poor, the weak and the marginalised. Research has long shown that countries and communities beset by high-levels of organised crime get caught into poverty traps due to corruption, extortion and the diversion of public investment.¹⁹³ Crime strategies such as protectionism, price fixing and money-laundering distort local and national markets, crowding out legitimate sources of livelihood, reducing incentives for investment and entrepreneurship, and thus reducing economic growth.

Criminal groups generate poverty: corruption determines the misuse of governments' resources by diverting them from sectors of vital importance such as health, education and development. Poor people are therefore deprived of economic growth and development opportunities. The price of public services rises to the point that economically deprived people can no longer afford them. As a consequence, the poor become poorer and more vulnerable, and inequalities increase.¹⁹⁴

Analysis has also shown that poverty increases citizens' vulnerability to crime. Most victims of smuggling and human trafficking are poor, prepared to take risks in order to achieve sustainable livelihoods. The argument has also been made that poverty increases the propensity that individuals will engage in criminal behaviour: farmers from developing countries produce illicit crops because they are not able to create a sustainable alternative; youth without legitimate livelihood opportunities seek opportunities in criminal gangs or trafficking enterprises

for the wealth that they provide. Thus, organised crime and poverty become a self-perpetuating vicious cycle, one allowing the other to thrive.

1.5: By 2030 build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations, and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters


It is not irrational to consider organised crime, drug trafficking and illicit financial flows as economic shocks or external stressors that increase the vulnerability of the poor. Most often, the discussion about building resilience to organised crime is held in a framework of reducing the violence that tends to be linked to criminal behaviour. Violence is strongly and clearly correlated to the drugs industry, for example, and control of drug distribution networks have contributed to significant levels of violence in key countries along the transit route. In the current displacement crisis from the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, criminal violence has been cited as the primary motivator triggering migration. From many countries in Central America, as well as Mexico, families are driven to leave their homes, land and livelihoods to enter situations of chronic poverty, in permanent internal displacement or as refugees or asylum seekers in neighbouring states in an effort to escape criminal gang cultures and death threats.

Similarly, as the strength of the connections between organised crime, state fragility and conflict become apparent, the need to find sources of resilience for the poor and the vulnerable against these threats becomes more compelling. The extent of the evidence that draws a causal link between organised criminal acts such as the illicit drug trade; illicit financial flows and the international trade in conflict resources and violence and conflict is increasingly established. These criminal flows have been used to fund insurgencies in a range of contexts, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC and Myanmar. Funding from illicit activities has also been proven to fund violent extremism and terrorism in a number of theatres, which, by its very definition, is designed to provoke insecurity and vulnerability in the general population.¹⁹⁵

Modes of Implementation

While many of the strategies that will mitigate the indirect impacts of organised crime on poverty reduction goals are to be found as direct targets elsewhere (for example, migration has been addressed in Goal 10, and violence and conflict in Goal 16), it is worth noting that civil society has proven to be instrumental in strategies to promote community resilience, reduce violence, increase cohesion and address corruption and crime.

Building the capacity of civil society to serve not only as an organ for service delivery and social protection in the absence of the state, but also as a source for social mobilisation, dialogue and accountability, has been potent in combatting the negative impact of organised crime and corruption. New technology and media tools offer unprecedented opportunities to engage with citizens at an individual level, and to engage them in processes of ensuring community security, building peace, consolidating the legitimacy of the central state and promoting ownership of their economic and social development. Promoting and protecting a free and independent media has also been demonstrated to be important in ensuring that longstanding corruption, impunity and criminality are not allowed to perpetuate.





*Organised crime and the development of criminal cultures negatively impacts on access to education.
Credit: karelnoppe*



GOAL 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all

Organised crime and the development of criminal cultures have been shown to have negative impact on the access and attendance of children and youth in education.

In many cases the determination of the impacts of organised crime remains a subjective process; the lack of hard data makes it difficult to measure exactly what is at stake. At the same, however, considerable evidence suggests that the impact of organised crime on communities and societal structures is decisive and increasing. Organised crime impacts negatively on family, community and religious social structures, and can have a pernicious effect on individuals' perception of their life chances. In situations such as these, the commitment and incentives to invest in long-term education for themselves or their families are drastically reduced.

As an illustration, reports from states in North Africa and the Sahel suggest that the accumulation of wealth by young traffickers has created a cadre of newly wealthy, armed and influential groups of predominantly young men, who are operating outside of traditional societal structures in an environment of high risk.¹⁹⁶ A number of international reports have identified the growth of a "violent drug culture" in which youth shrug off traditional hierarchies, invest little in education and enjoy the profits of their illicit trade.¹⁹⁷ The risks are particularly prevalent in countries where access to education and to legitimate, sustainable livelihoods are weak, and thus trafficking potentially offers the only viable income generating opportunity. Similarly, experiences in Latin America have shown that the high prevalence of drug related violence can also serve as a deterrent to education, even when educational opportunities exist, as parents are unwilling to send their children to school. Schools have been proven to be a recruiting ground for violent and criminal gangs, though conversely they also offer an opportunity to educate children and youth away from gang membership.¹⁹⁸

As has previously been noted, a secondary impact of organised crime is that it diverts government resources away from investment in social services, through a combination of corruption, reduction of government revenue and a prioritisation towards security priorities. As a consequence, organised crime undercuts the ability of society to build state institutions, deliver services and develop educational systems.

Despite the detrimental impacts organised crime may have on education, it is also very hard to capture the impacts using metrics. The harm organised crime has on families and communities is difficult to capture and largely limited to anecdotal evidence, and not enough study is done. However, it is important to understand the impacts and the challenges organised crime presents to achieving development indicators, for which education plays a key part.



*Smuggled fuel is both a result of and a threat to our capacity to ensure affordable energy for all.
Credit: Matthew Herbert*



GOAL 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all

While organised crime does pose a direct or indirect threat to nearly all the SDGs, the relationship between organised crime and modern energy is much more tentative. Links that can be made relate to deterred investment into renewable energy infrastructure and oil bunkering.

Deterred investment is not limited to renewable energy infrastructure. In general, it is harder to justify long-term commitments in environments of high crime, as investors face corruption and the risk of investments being diverted. Consequently, foreign investors are often not inclined to invest in countries that suffer from high levels of organised criminal activity, which are also often those in the greatest need of developmental assistance. This indirectly impacts efforts to develop energy resources, dissuading investment and consequently hindering communities' ability to access modern energy.

The phenomenon is not limited to investment in energy infrastructure; rather, it can influence any business decision. In relation to the SDGs, deterred investment can also be an obstacle to achieving Goal 9 ("Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation"), as investors may be disinclined to invest in large-scale infrastructure projects in countries that face high levels of organised criminal activity.

Turning to oil bunkering, organised crime can be an impediment to ensuring that local communities have access to affordable and reliable energy sources. Using West Africa as an illustration, while piracy in the Gulf of Guinea used to be limited to oil siphoning and bunkering by groups with low-level capacity, it increasingly consists of well-coordinated, professional and often violent attacks targeting commercial shipping vessels and their crews. With political pretence lost, pirates no longer limit themselves to politically significant areas, a development which helps to explain the rapid expansion of piracy into the territorial waters of Nigeria's neighbours: Benin, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Gabon. Moreover, the increase in maritime activity has deterred shipping in the region that has had a direct impact on economies.



Container ships in the port of Hong Kong. Credit: cozyta



GOAL 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation

In the past decade, spurred by globalisation trends and innovations, the global economy has doubled in size and throughout this growth. Major infrastructure points have stood as the gateways to world trade, and in turn international development. Ports in particular have played an especially pivotal role with over 90% of worldwide cargo moved by containers stacked on transport ships since 2009.¹⁹⁹

However, the growth in the world economy has been matched – if not surpassed – by the growth of illicit activities and global criminal markets. In 2011, the World Development Report estimated the value of revenue accruing to organised crime to be as high as \$3.3 trillion, and approximately one tenth the value of global GDP.²⁰⁰ The majority of criminal activity stems from the sale of illicit, counterfeit, or contraband goods across the world. Thus, while ports and other infrastructure points stand as gateways to the licit world economy, they also serve as hubs for illicit trade, trafficking and smuggling.

In this regard, organised crime constitutes a significant indirect threat to achieving target 9.1: Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all, and prevent crime.

Major trade infrastructure are very vulnerable points in criminal economy chains and are very prone to the efforts of criminal groups to infiltrate, control them and subvert them. Airports and maritime ports are especially susceptible to organised criminal flows due to the high volume of traffic continually transiting through the points. Cybercrime is also playing a growing role, as organised criminal groups are employing new technologies to exploit infrastructure transit points. There are a number of examples where organised crime groups have actively infiltrated critical infrastructure, such as ports, and aviation and telecommunications facilities, to facilitate criminal activities. Criminal penetration into, and control of, trade infrastructure and natural resource facilities not only serves as a revenue source, either

through theft of produce or protectionism, but can also give criminal groups unprecedented influence and capacity to impact or counter state consolidation in the long-term. This has been clearly demonstrated in Libya, where militia groups have used blockades and control over airports, oil refineries and ports to hold the government to ransom.²⁰¹

Illicit Trafficking Through Seaports: Italy

The sheer volume of international maritime container traffic (approximately 420 million containers shipped annually), sophisticated and often ingenious concealment methods, along with the diverse routings adopted by illicit drug traffickers and other smugglers, invariably makes successful interdiction difficult. Seaports are notoriously difficult and at times dangerous places to work, and law enforcement structures are often hampered by a lack of resources, inter-agency mistrust, complex port processes and systems, and other factors which are purposefully exploited by criminal organisations.

One such port is Gioia Tauro Harbour, in the Reggio Calabria region in Southern Italy. The harbour is the busiest and largest container terminal in Italy and the Mediterranean Sea, ranked 39th²⁰² in the world port rankings for container traffic in 2010 and 7th in Europe. However, the presence of the 'Ndrangheta, one of Italy's most powerful crime syndicates, in the region has meant that criminal activities have been a feature of the port since its inception. Press articles indicate that from the beginning, the managers of Gioia Tauro Harbour were asked to pay a kickback for each transhipped container as a "security tax." In 2008, Italian investigators suggested that as much as 80% of Europe's cocaine traffic from Colombia passed through Gioia Tauro Harbour,²⁰³ a suggestion given credence by the huge quantities of drugs confiscated at the port during various law enforcement operations. The port is also thought to be involved in the trade of illegal arms.

A 2008 report of the Italian Antimafia Commission²⁰⁴ reported that "the entire gamut of internal or sub-contracted activities is mafia-influenced, from the moment of distribution and forwarding to customs control and container storage." Consequently, "it actually eliminated legitimate competition from companies not influenced or controlled by the mafia in providing goods and services, performing construction work and hiring personnel." As the internationalisation of 'Ndrangheta activity went in parallel with the construction of Gioia Tauro Harbour in the 1990s, there is little doubt that organised crime enjoyed a bonanza as a result of the port's construction and operations.

The impact of organised criminal activity at Gioia Tauro Harbor clearly extends far beyond its own immediate reach, as the port serves as a major hub for both licit and illicit economic trade within the global economy. The difficult history and controversial future surrounding Gioia Tauro make the port an excellent illustration of negative role that criminal organisations can play in efforts to improve global infrastructure for development.

A second point to note is that public procurement and infrastructure development have long been magnets for organised crime and corruption, given the sheer scale of the economics involved. For example, in 2010, the EU spent a total of €2.406 trillion (US\$3.12 trillion, or approximately one-fifth of EU GDP) on public works, goods and services.²⁰⁵ This did not include significant infrastructure projects. A recent study by NUPI, a Norwegian policy institute, document the ways in which organised crime groups insert themselves into the procurement process, leading to corruption and diversion of resources. It also highlighted that this is one area where the common perception of "criminal underworlds" can obscure the reality of "the many criminal activities performed by members of the 'upper-world' organisations, all the respectable ones."²⁰⁶

Thus, while high-quality, sustainable and resilient infrastructure is a critical component to enabling global trade and development, it must be recognised the same infrastructure that enables legitimate trade will almost definitely be exploited by criminal groups as well. SDG responses ought to acknowledge the indirect threat from organised crime and respond appropriately in order to ensure transparency, accountability and oversight, thereby increasing the chances of achieving the last component of target 9.1: "focus on affordable access for all and prevent crime."





Our capacity to ensure sustainable consumption will need to address the criminal practices of toxic waste dumping, and criminal infiltration into public procurement. Credit: Dwight Smith



GOAL 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

The linkages between organised crime and sustainable consumption and production are important, but generally fall under the headings of specific issues discussed elsewhere in this report. organised criminals by themselves do not dictate consumption and production patterns, but rather influence the conditions and incentives that in turn shape such patterns. Two good examples of this—toxic waste dumping and criminal infiltration into public procurement processes—relate to targets in Goal 12, although they are discussed in more detail under Goals 6 and 9, respectively.



Environmental crimes, such as toxic waste dumping, the illicit sale of ozone depleting substances and illicit logging may contribute to climate change. Credit: Luis Louro



GOAL 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Similarly to Goal 7, which focuses on ensuring access to modern energy, the inter-linkages between organised crime and Goal 13 are more tenuous than those between organised crime and other goals. Indirect impacts can be seen in the impact organised crime has on social structures and investment in local economies, which may impede efforts to combat climate change. In addition, environmental crimes such as toxic waste dumping, the sale of ozone-depleting substances, and illicit logging may contribute to climate change - up to one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions stem from deforestation, of which the major cause is illicit logging.

However, while indirect influences organised crime may have on climate change can be identified, the threats are much more closely related to other goals, specifically Goal 15. Accordingly, examining and combating organised crime within the context of Goal 15 will likely shrink the potential hurdle organised crime poses to achieving Goal 13.

The linkages between environmental crime, climate change and migration have also been highlighted for some time, and have been recognised as a threat to human security and development. Environmental push and pull factors, such as a rising water levels and drought, are forcing people to cross borders. Where they cannot do so legally, they will do so through the existing networks of migrant smugglers, which in turn further enriches criminal groups (addressed previously in Goal 10). This nexus of environmental degradation, climate change and irregular migration is a vicious cycle that will seriously undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development.





Bringing sustainable development, peace and human security will require a global partnership. Credit: pashabo



GOAL 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

Much of the framework of the debate around organised crime has been highly securitised and confrontational, where states stand caught within the mutual accusation of shared responsibility, and as noted in Goal 16, corruption has further polarised the challenge. There has been some critique that the existing multilateral frameworks are not always sufficiently inclusive or allow space for innovative approaches and experimentation. Greater space needs to be made for the states most affected by the deleterious impact of organised crime to engage in research, analysis and policy making. Debates around organised crime also require a much broader range of stakeholders to be present and engaged: greater involvement of the private sector and civil society need to be brought to bear, in order to be genuinely effective and sustainable.

Relevant targets under goal

17.6: Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation, and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, particularly at UN level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism when agreed


While access to technology, specifically the Internet, can significantly advance development goals and facilitate cooperation between states, communities and individuals, it also brings new challenges and vulnerabilities. The

Internet has fundamentally changed the nature of organised crime. It also evolves quickly, fostering the growth of traditional forms of organised crime while simultaneously creating an entirely new generation of illicit activity.

The Internet enables criminal groups and actors to connect with international partners in ways they were previously unable to, building global criminal networks. It also breaks down the linkages between perpetrator and victim, creating challenges for legal jurisdictions and police. Proxy servers and digital currencies create almost complete anonymity for online transactions, further complicating matters

Given its rapid evolution, the Internet remains vastly under-regulated, and, as the discussion on online sexual exploitation highlighted in Goal 16, there is a paucity of effective legislation designed to respond to the increasing sophistication of Internet enabled crime. There are no clear obligations imposed on internet service providers, and the technology involved is growing increasingly complex, quickly outstripping the technical capacity of law enforcement institutions. The result is that in the area of cybercrime, the responsibility for security has shifted from the state level down to individuals. Another effect of cybercrime is that compensation offered to victims for digital crimes is often negligible, while its impact on their privacy and human rights can be considerable. Companies have borne the brunt of cybercrime's global economic toll, which has in turn damaged the economic viability.

In a forward-looking discussion on technological enablers, therefore, it is essential to address the threat of cybercrime and the need for enhanced security in the cyber domain. Attempts to achieve target 17.6 will require multi-lateral efforts to develop appropriate safeguards and responses that acknowledge the need for new approaches to combatting organised crime.



Annex 1. Indicator Tables

Even as the development community comes to terms with the recognition that organised crime is a development concern, the scale of the problem is wide-ranging. In many cases, the determination of the impacts of organised crime remains a subjective process, making it difficult to understand exactly what is at stake and measure the consequences of interventions. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime intends to fill these gaps and align research on this area with on-going processes and multilateral discussions on the new framework for the SDGs.

The objective of Annex 1 is to provide a sampling of outputs and indicators that are crime sensitive and would measure both the impact of organised crime on the achievement of the goal, and its targets, as well as the progress towards those goals. In preparation for the OWG discussions, a number of UN specialised agencies or dedicated NGOs prepared focused discussion notes that justified the inclusion of the specific goal, and in some cases provided indicators for their measurement. This report builds on the extensive research and advocacy already assembled including indicators where provided, or is drawn from established good practice. Here, we seek

In serving as guide, it must be recognised this is not an exhaustive list of indicators and the indicators may need to be readjusted to meet the needs of stakeholders. For example, indicators are written to measure the impact of organised crime at the international level, and will need to be adjusted to be applicable at the national level.

In selecting indicators, there is a need to go beyond traditional statistical measures towards a more comprehensive measurement that looks at the capacities of various actors, including inter alia the states, the objective situation, and people's perceptions. Ideally, results matrices will comprise of a bundle of indicators, in the right combination that presents a balanced and accurate picture of the impact the crime is having on development, and ideally progress made. Indicators that may be utilised include:

- **Capacity Indicators** include structural indicators, those which help in capturing the acceptance and commitment of the State to undertake measures in keeping with its obligations to combat organised crime through legislation and policy, and process indicators – those which help assess a State's efforts, through its implementation of police measures and programs of action, to transform its obligations to combat organised crime into desired results.²⁰⁷ In the matrices provided below and conscious effort has been made to focus on capacity indicators, as these are the most widely available and offer the greatest level of reliability of the indicator types.
- **'Objective' Situation indicators** are 'statistical measures of actual societal situations. For example, 'objective' situation measures would measure how many criminal offenders were arrested or how many victims of trafficking were rescued in a given time period. However, due to organised crime's clandestine nature, this type of indicator is difficult to obtain with the requisite degree of accuracy to contribute to measures of the impact of organised crime.²⁰⁸
- **Public Perception indicators** assess the public's perception of the impact and whether an improvement is occurring. Due to a lack of quantitative data and 'objective' situation indicators, people's perceptions on development and organised crime act as a proxy for quantitative data. Furthermore, public perception indicators allow for the juxtaposition of organised crime as a metric against other state indicators such as state fragility and poverty, making the debate more accessible to the non-law enforcement crowd and bringing to the table critical development actors who must be part of future responses.

Indicators may be proposed and selected on the basis of their applicability in international or specific national contexts; the data availability and measurability of the relevant indicator, and the ability to demonstrate a progression. Within the context of these requirements it is important to consider both targets for which indicators

are well established, for which data are readily available and related methodological issues largely resolved, and which have high relevance at the global level, as well as considering those targets for which measurement approaches, indicator data and methodologies are not currently available or under development.

It is hoped the results matrices will facilitate the upcoming efforts of the OWG to establish quantifiable targets, and indicator sets can be developed that may be used to assess the impact of organised crime, as well as how to better respond, at both the national and global levels, for the final set of SDGs.

For further guidance including on implementation modalities, it is highly recommended the stakeholders utilise the Global Initiative against Transnational Crime's accompanying report, *Results Based Approaches to Organized Crime and Development: Input into the Post-2015 Development Agenda*.

Goals at Risk



GOAL 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Target 3.3: By 2030 end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases, and other communicable diseases

Indicators of Political will

Number of States ratifying all drug conventions and protocols without reservation

Source: Annual report of the INCB

Number of States with an official national strategy, which includes partnerships with civil society, to combat the trafficking and use of injecting drugs

Source: National reporting, NGO reporting, media reporting

Number of States who have ratified without reservation all relevant international protocols relating to falsified and substandard pharmaceutical products

Source: WHO, international actor responsible, national records

Number of States which have established specific import procedures (this may include designation of ports of entry for imported pharmaceutical products) and standard operating procedures and guidelines for pharmaceutical drug inspectors

Source: National reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States who have introduced and implemented the "Comprehensive Package" for injecting drug users.

Source: UNODC

Number of public-private partnerships engaged in injecting drug prevention campaigns

Source: National and NGO reporting

Percent reduction in the number of transmissions of HIV/AIDS due to sharing of needles

Source: National health registers

Number of public-private partnerships engaged in campaigns informing communities of the danger of falsified and substandard medicine and how to protect themselves

Source: National and NGO reporting

Percentage of import transactions in which importer has obtained a certificate for drugs that complies with the WHO Certification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products moving in International Commerce

Source: Importer reporting, WHO

Percent decrease in individuals seeking repeat treatment for diseases whose treatments are often targeted by counterfeiters (such as malaria)

Source: Hospital records, insurance company claim records

Percent decrease in death rates for diseases for which effective treatment exists

Source: National health ministries, WHO data, Global Fund data

Indicators of Successful Prosecution:

Percentage increase in the proportion of law enforcement officials, by State, trained in recognising and responding appropriately to drug trafficking

Source: National law enforcement records

Number of perpetrators of drug trafficking, in particular injecting drugs, arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of States that have created agencies or specialised units within existing food/drug regulatory authorities dedicated to combatting the production and trafficking of falsified and substandard medicine.

Source: National records

Number of perpetrators of producing and trafficking falsified and substandard pharmaceutical products arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
Source: National criminal justice records

Target 3.5: Strengthen prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with official national drug control strategies and institutions which are granted appropriate powers enshrined in legislation
Source: National legislation, national budget, national reporting

Number of checks and controls undertaken annually by drug enforcement agencies
Source: National legislation and regulatory schemes and annual reporting

Number of States with legislation criminalising illicit cigarette production and trafficking
Source: National legislation

Number of States with comprehensive multi-sectoral national tobacco control strategies, plans and programmes developed and implemented in accordance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Source: WHO, national reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percentage increase in the number of drug prevention, treatment, and care programs and facilities.
Source: National healthcare records/budgets, See HIV Law Commission library: <http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/resources-centre/elibrary>; UNODC TreatNet

Increased budget expenditure on public-awareness campaigns to prevent narcotic use
Source: National budget, communications ministries, national media, watchdog organisations

International funding available to support efforts to reduce demand for illicit drugs
Source: WHO, UNODC, ODA records, national budget

Percent decrease in usage rates for narcotics and other illicit drugs, particularly among youth
Source: UNODC data, INCB data on consumption of narcotics

Number of cooperative public-private sector partnerships to increase awareness of the risks of smoking and the identification and use of illicit tobacco products
Source: WHO, national and industry reports

Number of countries who provided or received financial or technical assistance (be it through unilateral, bilateral, regional, subregional or other multilateral channels, including relevant regional and international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organisations and financial and development institutions) for the development and strengthening of multisectoral, comprehensive tobacco control programs
Source: WHO, National reports, Non-governmental organisation reporting

Number of countries which developed, transferred and/or acquired technology, knowledge, skills, capacity and expertise related to tobacco control
Source: WHO, National reports, Non-governmental organisation reporting


Number of campaigns and lobby programmes by private sector and/or civil society lobbying for the full ratification and implementation of the Tobacco Control Convention
Source: WHO, NGO and industry reports

Estimated public deaths and illnesses attributable to cigarette use in the population; disaggregated by those who smoked illicit cigarettes if possible
Source: WHO, National reports, Non-governmental organisation reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of regional bodies and States achieving harmonisation and alignment of drug control strategies
Source: UNODC, regional reporting

Number of perpetrators of drug trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
Source: National criminal justice records



Number of States with a focal point for tobacco control, a tobacco control unit, and/or a national coordinating mechanism for tobacco control, established or reinforced and financed
 Source: WHO, national legislation and reporting

Number of perpetrators of illicit cigarette production and trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
 Source: National criminal justice records

Target 3.7:

By 2030 ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes

Indicators of Political will

Number of States ratifying all international human rights treaties relevant to the elimination of sex trafficking, including those tangentially related, without reservation
 Source: UN records, national reporting

Number of States with a national strategy or action plan for eliminating sex trafficking, including coverage, data collection and dissemination program.
 Source: National reporting, watchdog organisations

Number of cooperative frameworks between States to prevent sex-trafficking
 Source: National reporting, watchdog organisations

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of rehabilitation centres, by State, for victims of sex trafficking.
 Source: National and non-governmental organisation reporting

Number of registered or active NGOs and full-time equivalent employment involved in the prevention and protection of women against sex trafficking
 Source: National reporting, NGO reporting

Percentage increase in number of healthcare workers certified and qualified to provide physical and mental care to victims of sex trafficking
 Source: Records of national health ministries and organisations focusing on the sex industry

Percentage increase in budget expenditure on public-awareness campaigns informing populations, especially women, of the dangers of sex trafficking and how to protect themselves
 Source: National budget, communications ministries, national media, watchdog organisations

Number of public-private collaborations to protect communities and populations vulnerable to sex trafficking.
 Source: Governmental and non-governmental public reports

Proportion of victim-survivors of sex trafficking who received assistance, compensation and rehabilitation services
 Source: National records, NGO records

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of sex trafficking reports received, investigations made, and victims rescued, by State
 Source: National justice records, watchdog organisation reports

Number of perpetrators of sex trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
 Source: National criminal justice records



GOAL 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting, and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with national legislation that addresses in an effective manner all aspects of IUU fishing. (National legislation should address, inter alia, evidentiary standards and admissibility including, as appropriate, the use of electronic evidence and new technologies.)

Source: FAO, national legislation and reporting

Number of regional, bilateral, and/or multilateral agreements addressing in an effective manner all aspects of IUU fishing

Source: Regional and international reporting, NGO reporting, media reporting

Number of States and/or regional organisations utilising The Oceans Compact, or other guide to regulating maritime activity, to strengthen the implementation of UNCLOS

Source: UN reporting, national and regional reporting

Number of States that have adopted appropriate trade-related measures, consistent with the WTO, that deter IUU fishing. This includes stock or species-specific trade-related measures to reduce or eliminate the economic incentive for vessels to engage in IUU fishing

Source: WTO, national legislation and reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percentage increase of market share of fish subject to managed-catch regimes

Source: Consumer groups, market research surveys, environment and food ministries

Number of countries and private and international partners monitoring and collecting data on fishing

Source: FAO, national reporting, NGO reporting

Number of alternative sustainable livelihoods options offered in littoral nations, by State

Source: National and NGO reporting

Percent increase in national funding for necessary material, equipment and supplies, as well as logistic support, for governmental units charged with enforcing fishing regulations.

Source: FAO, National reports, Non-governmental organisation reporting

Number of States with comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing from its commencement, through the point of landing, to final destination

Source: FAO, national reporting

Number of trainings annually conducted with persons involved in IUU fishing MCS operations

Source: National reporting

Number partnerships between the state, civil society, and corporations with the aim to prevent corporate IUU fishing

Source: National and NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of cases brought under UNCLOS for illegal fishing

Source: UN-Legal Affairs (UNCLOS Secretariat)

Number of perpetrators of IUU fishing adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number and frequency of major ports visited and inspected by inspection teams charged with inspecting fishing fleets.

Source: National reporting, media reports



GOAL 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

Target 15.7: Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna, and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products

Indicators of Political will

Number of States who ratified and fully implemented the UN Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

Source: UNEP reporting

Number of States who have established or continue to support environmental protection agencies with appropriate powers enshrined in legislation

Source: National legislation, national budget, national reporting

Percent increase in budget expenditure on combatting fauna and flora crimes, particularly in relation to budget expenditure on development/alternative livelihood initiatives

Source: National budgets and reporting documents

Number and the strength of international partnerships, evidenced by bilateral and multilateral agreement with other governments and with international organisations such as UNEP and INTERPOL.

Source: UNEP, INTERPOL, international and regional organisation reporting, national reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of public-private partnerships engaged information campaigns in source countries, aiming to prevent poaching

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of information campaigns in destination countries aiming to decrease demand for illicit fauna and flora products

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of States with strategies for risk mitigation and alternative livelihoods for communities and species where flora and fauna crimes are prevalent

Source: UNEP, UNODC, regional and national reporting, non-governmental organizations

Number of animals whose populations have suffered from poaching progressively moved into less-critical categories on IUCN's Red List

Source: IUCN Red List

Percent decrease in number of environmental activists killed and injured annually, by State

Source: National reports; media; international reports

Percent increase in funding for animal rehabilitation programmes, aimed at species targeted by poachers

Source: UNEP, UNODC, regional and national reporting, non-governmental organizations

Percent increase in funding for forest rehabilitation programmes

Source: UNEP, UNODC, regional and national reporting, non-governmental organizations

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of poaching and other forms of flora and fauna crime arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Proportion of law enforcement officials, by State, trained in recognising and responding appropriately to fauna and flora crimes

Source: National reports; international reports (UNEP/INTERPOL/UNODC/NGOs)

Number of illicit fauna and flora products seized and destroyed

Source: EU-TWIX and other such databases, national and international police forces



GOAL 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

Indicators of Political will

A global strategy is in place to counter organized crime, which provides an overarching framework under which to facilitate the development of interlocking and coordinated national, regional and international responses across a range of sectors and criminal markets.

Source: United Nations, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

Number of States with appropriate legislation enacted, or revised where necessary, criminalising all forms of violence relating to organised crime. This may include stand-alone provisions with more severe penalties for violent action when it is related to organised criminal activity.

Source: National legislation

Number of States that have formed national and local strategies for armed violence prevention and reduction

Source: National reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent increase in national investments, by State, aimed at armed violence prevention and reduction programs.

Source: National budgets

Number of public and private programmes offering assistance and livelihood alternatives to individuals, especially youth, vulnerable to becoming involved in organised criminal groups

Source: National reporting, NGO reporting

Number of States with national strategies in place to provide protection to victims of conflict and armed violence related to organized crime

Source: National legislation and regulatory frameworks, international and regional reporting

Number of States with national strategies in place to provide protection to victims of conflict and armed violence related to organised crime.

Source: National legislation and regulatory frameworks, international and regional reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of offenders committing violence related to organised crime that have been arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of States and international partners monitoring and collecting data on prosecutions of violence related to organised crime

Source: National and international reporting

Target 16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and all of the Optional Protocols thereto without reservation

Source: UN Secretariat

Number of States that have implemented and regularly enforce legislation setting a minimum working age and age-appropriate limits on hours worked

Source: Legislation, media reports, NGO and UN investigations



Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent increase in the number of children involved in alternative options to work (schooling, after-school activities, sports, etc.), by State

Source: Governmental and non-governmental records and reporting

Number of public-private partnerships engaged in information campaigns in source communities, designed to prevent child trafficking

Source: National and NGO reporting

Percent reduction in the number of children associated with armed violence, organised criminal groups, and non-state armed groups

Source: International reports and oversight

Increased spending and staffing for DDR programs in regions children are known to fight

Source: DDR organisations' budgets and annual reports

Increase in number of private sector entities (businesses, corporations, individuals, etc.) committed to fair labour practices

Source: Business reporting, national reporting, non-governmental agency investigations

Number of media outlets, disaggregated by State, with the capacity to report on cases of labour trafficking

Source: Media reporting, NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of cases received, investigated and prosecuted involving the abuse, exploitation trafficking, and all forms of violence and torture against children, by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of perpetrators of child trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of cases of international cooperation received, investigated and prosecuted involving the illicit activity of labour/recruitment agencies, adoption agencies, etc., by State

Source: National records, reports by national and international watchdog groups and industry associations

Target 16.4: By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organised crime

Indicators of Political will

Number of States to ratify and fully implement the UN Transnational Organized Crime convention (UNTOC) and its protocols.

Source: UNODC

Number of States to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty without reservation

Source: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

Number of States that have implement standardised licensing requirements for all exporters of SALW

Source: WTO, other intergovernmental/regional bodies, national economic ministries

Number of States that have ratified the International Terrorism Finance Convention without reservation

Source: UN, United States Department of State INSCR

Number of States which have achieved at least 0.5 on Financial Secrecy Index Indicator #14 (adherence to 3 or more international financial transparency conventions)

Source: Tax Justice Network

Number of States that have created intergovernmental and regional partnerships to fight money laundering


Source: Media reports, official press releases

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States with local, national and/or regional focal points to coordinate efforts to stop SALW trafficking at their respective levels

Source: UN agencies, regional intergovernmental bodies, national police forces and ministries, media reports

Number of public-private partnerships to help victims of SALW, by State <i>Source: National and NGO reporting</i>
Percent increase in the number of people and organisations/agencies monitoring restorative and retributive justice <i>Source: National justice records and budgets</i>
Creation of an international monitoring body charged with verifying the efficacy and thoroughness of destruction of outdated or seized SALWs, as well as training national monitors to do the same <i>Source: UNODC or other international agency with oversight responsibilities</i>
Percent increase in ODA specifically earmarked for combating violence within developing countries <i>Source: ODA statistics from donor and recipient countries</i>
Number of States with civilian oversight and reporting mechanisms in place to report on illicit financial flows and trade mispricing <i>Source: World Bank, NGOs, national and industry reporting</i>
Number of States which have created intergovernmental and regional partnerships to fight money laundering <i>Source: Media reports, official press releases</i>
Number of public-private partnership to combat money laundering and promote business transparency <i>Source: World Bank, NGOs, national and industry reporting</i>
Indicators of Successful Prosecution
Number of perpetrators of SALW trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State <i>Source: National criminal justice records</i>
Number of perpetrators arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for committing financial crimes or engaging in illicit financial flows, by State <i>Source: National criminal justice records</i>
Number of States that have established money-laundering and asset-seizure protocols <i>Source: Reports and rankings from FATF, Egmont Group, and regional associations</i>
Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms
Indicators of Political will
Number of States that have ratified the UN Convention against Corruption without reservation. <i>Source: UN Secretariat, UNODC</i>
Frequency by State, regional, and international organisation relevant legal instruments and administrative measures are evaluated to determine their adequacy to prevent and combat corruption <i>Source: National and regional reporting, UNODC</i>
Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection
Number of States with specialised national bodies in place, with the necessary independence and sufficient resourcing, to combat corruption <i>Source: National reporting</i>
Number of States with practical anti-corruption training programmes in place, and frequency of trainings <i>Source: National legislation and reporting</i>
Number of civil society coalitions, lobby-bodies to advocate for and denounce cases of corruption <i>Source: National, NGO reporting</i>
Number of incidents of official collaboration between States, regional and international organizations to promote and develop measures to combat corruption <i>Source: National, regional and international reporting, UNODC</i>



Number of countries and international partners monitoring and collecting data on corruption related to organized crime

Source: Transparency International, National reports

Number of mechanisms through which citizens can report corruption, by State

Source: Transparency International, national reporting

Number of States with robust protection from all forms of retaliation for whistleblowers who report corruption related to organised crime

Source: Transparency International, national reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Value of assets seized or frozen in relation to corruption, by State

Source: National justice records

Number of individuals arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for corruption offences, by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of instances of international cooperation or mutual legal assistance in transnational corruption cases relating to organised crime

Source: National justice systems, police records

Target 16.6:

Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that have improved their World Governance Indicators scores

Source: World Bank

Number of States that have improved their overall Rule of Law Scores

Source: Transparency International

Number of States which ban anonymous donations to political parties and candidates

Source: National and regional reporting, non-governmental organisations (watch-dog organisations), IDEA

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States with an electoral party system that provides voters an effective range of choices when voting for government officials

Source: IDEA, NGO reporting, national media, national and regional reporting

Number of public-private partnerships to increase citizen oversight of local governance

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of countries that solicit—and, when warranted, act on—input from civil society in the process of developing and approving national budgets

Source: National reports of organisations consulted, corroborated by reports from the organisations themselves

Number of States with effective external communication systems in place allowing for open communication with the private sector

Source: National, non-governmental organisation, and private sector reporting

Number of States assessed as having a free press

Source: Freedom of the Press Ranking, NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Percent increase in finance provided to institutions enforcing political finance regulations, by State

Source: IDEA, national budgets

Number of perpetrators of illicit political financing and strategic violence arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of States and international partners monitoring and collecting data on illicit political financing and strategic violence

Source: IDEA, Transparency International, national reports

Targets at Risk



GOAL 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture

Target 2.1: By 2030 end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that have passed legislation criminalising food fraud and counterfeiting, including established and publicised definitions of food fraud and counterfeiting

Source: UN and/or regional bodies, police forces

Number of States with a national policy on food safety and consumer protection, including a measure of the length of time frame and geographic coverage of such policies

Source: National legislation and reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent reduction in number of recorded deaths and incidences of food poisoning relating to adulterated food, by State

Source: National health records

Increase in budget allocated to national and regional food and drug administrations, by State

Source: National budgets

Number of public-private partnerships to educate communities on the dangers of food fraud and counterfeiting and how to protect themselves

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of food certification schemes in place with cooperation from public-private entities.

Source: International and regional reporting, national reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Percentage increase in expenditure on, and staffing of, trained food crime units within national regulatory and/or investigative bodies, by State

Source: Budgets of relevant organisations

Number of INTERPOL red notices issued in cases relating to food and agricultural crimes

Source: National justice systems, police records

Number of perpetrators of food fraud and counterfeiting arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Target 2.3: By 2030 double the agricultural productivity and the incomes of small-scale food producers, particularly women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets, and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that have criminalised the counterfeiting or adulterating agricultural inputs and veterinary medicines

Source: National legislation and reporting

Number of States with regulatory frameworks in place to monitor the price of crops, animals, and other farm equipment

Source: National reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent reduction in the gap between actual and potential yields, disaggregated by gap due to contaminated or adulterated agricultural products where possible, by State

Source: Survey data, economic agencies, national records



Number of States with improved performance on the food production index and livestock production index, specifically relating to removing contaminated, counterfeited and adulterated agricultural products from the market where possible

Source: World Bank, survey data, economic agencies, national records

Number of public-private partnerships to educate farmers on the dangers of counterfeit and adulterated agricultural products and how to protect themselves

Source: National and NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number and amount of fines paid by corporations prosecuted for distributing illicit food or agricultural products, by State

Source: National justice systems, police records, industry reporting

Number of individuals arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for contaminating or adulterating agricultural products, by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Target 2.5:

By 2020 maintain genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants, farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at national, regional and international levels, and ensure access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge as internationally agreed

Indicators of Political will

Number of trade agreements and policies in place regarding the production, distribution and consumption of "verified" food and agricultural products.

Source: WTO, World Bank, national industry reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States whose intellectual property frameworks extend to genetically modified organisms and other biological or agricultural inventions and innovations

Source: National legal codes

Number of States who have achieved the Millennium Seed Bank's goal of storing specimens of 25% of the world's plant species by 2020, and 40% by 2030 within their jurisdiction

Source: Millennium Seed Bank

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Quantity of counterfeit seeds, fertiliser, and other farming products removed from circulation, by State

Source: Survey data, economic agencies, consumer groups

Number of prosecutions and convictions for producing and/or knowingly selling contaminated, counterfeit or adulterated food and agricultural products, by State

Source: National justice systems, police records



GOAL 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Target 5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with a national strategy or action plan for eliminating sex trafficking. (Reporting ought to include coverage of strategy/plan, data collection, dissemination program, etc.)

Source: National reporting, watchdog organisations

Establish and extend international protocols and protective regimes for sex workers and victims of sex trafficking, with the aim of achieving universal protection and ratification

Source: Records of UN agencies and relevant regional and intergovernmental bodies

Number of cooperative frameworks between states to prevent sex-trafficking

Source: National reporting, watchdog organisations

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of public-private collaborations to protect communities and populations vulnerable to sex-trafficking.

Source: Governmental and non-governmental public reports

Percentage increase in number of healthcare workers certified and qualified to provide physical and mental care to victims of sex trafficking, by State

Source: Records of national health ministries and organisations focusing on the sex industry

Number of public-private partnerships engaged in information campaigns in source communities aiming to prevent sex trafficking

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of registered or active NGOs and full-time equivalent employment involved in the prevention and protection of women against sex trafficking

Source: National reporting, NGO reporting

Number of rehabilitation centres for victims of sex trafficking

Source: National and non-governmental organisation reporting

Proportion of victim-survivors of sex trafficking who received assistance, compensation and rehabilitation services, by State

Source: National records, NGO records

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Percentage increase in complaints and reports of sex trafficking investigated and adjudicated by the national human rights institution, human rights ombudsperson or other national mechanism, by State

Source: National reporting, watchdog organisations

Number of perpetrators of sex trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records





GOAL 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

Target 6.1:

By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all

Indicators of Political will

Number of States who have criminalised the siphoning and trafficking of water

Source: Secretariat of the Basel Convention, national reporting

Number of multilateral cooperation agreements in place between nations, governing the use of water and dedicated to preventing water theft

Source: National and regional reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent budget increase to support national and bi- or multilateral water-sharing initiatives, by State

Source: Media reports, national/municipal spokespeople

Percent (or absolute) increase in national and municipal investment in pipes, hydrants, treatment facilities, and other water-related infrastructure, by State

Source: National and municipal budgets, industry publications, media reports

Number of public-private partnerships increasing civil oversight of water resources

Source: National and NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of water siphoning and trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of States who regularly enforce licensing requirements for water supply companies with relevant local and/or national authorities

Source: National legislation, municipal codes, media reports

Target 6.3:

By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater, and increasing recycling and safe reuse by X% globally

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with an improved ranking on the Basel Action Network International Toxic Progress Report Card (ratification of the Basel Convention — together with the Basel Ban Amendment; the London Convention Protocol; the Rotterdam Convention (1998); and the Stockholm Convention)

Source: Basel Action Network, Secretariat of the Basel Convention

Number of countries who use and/or accept the Notification of Movement document forms of the Basel Convention in the control of trans-boundary movement of wastes.

Source: Secretariat of the Basel Convention, national reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percentage increase of treated wastewater, by State

Source: Local/national water utilities

Number and size of toxic waste seizures that would have been disposed of illegally

Source: National police records; environmental protection data; INTERPOL data; NGO investigations

Number of public-private partnerships engaged in information campaigns educating consumers on how to protect themselves from toxic waste dumping

Source: National and NGO reporting

Percentage increase in international aid, either monetary or material, dedicated to assisting countries in combatting illicit toxic dumping

Source: Donor budgets, media reports, national reporting

Number of bilateral, multilateral, and/or regional partnerships established to patrol on land and sea as a deterrent to illegal dumping

Source: Secretariat of the Basel Convention, national and regional reporting

Percent increase in the amount of international, regional, national, and local investment in technology and facilities for the proper disposal of hazardous materials

Source: Budgets of relevant agencies, media reports

Number and frequency of reports on the environmental effects of illicit toxic waste dumping on animals, vegetation, surface and ground water, air and soil quality, etc.

Source: Secretariat of the Basel Convention, national reporting, non-governmental organisations

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of illicit toxic waste dumping arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of States who have created and maintain of secure, anonymous hotlines for reporting potential instances of illicit disposal of hazardous chemicals

Source: Local, national, and/or private agencies

Number and size of fines or other penalties levied for illegal disposal of toxic chemicals

Source: Media reports, national justice systems, watchdog agencies



GOAL 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

Target 8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, eradicate forced labor, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms including recruitment and use of child soldiers

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that have ratified ILO Conventions No. 182 on the worst forms of child labour and No. 138 on the minimum age for admission to employment and work without reservation
 Source: ILO

Number of States which have passed legislation criminalising child labour and setting a minimum working age and stipulating age-appropriate limits on hours worked
 Source: Legislation, media reports, NGO and UN investigations

Number of DDR programmes working on conflicts in which child soldiers are known to fight which have integrated child welfare components
 Source: DDR organisations' mandates and strategies, media reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent increase in national budget committed to preventing forced child labour and giving children and families in vulnerable communities alternative income and activity options, by State
 Source: National budget

Number of sensitisation campaigns conducted on forced child labour with relevant actors
 Source: International oversight, national reporting

Percent increase in the number of children involved in alternative options to work (schooling, after-school activities, sports, etc.), by State
 Source: Governmental and non-governmental records and reporting

Number of public-private partnerships increasing community awareness of the dangers of child exploitation and trafficking
 Source: National and NGO reporting

Increase in number of private sector entities (businesses, corporations, individuals, etc.) committed to not engaging in forced child labour
 Source: Business reporting, national reporting, non-governmental agency investigations

Number of media outlets, disaggregated by State, with the capacity to report on cases of child labour trafficking
 Source: Media reporting, NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of labour trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
 Source: National criminal justice records

Number and size of fines or other penalties levied against companies which employ illicit child labour
 Source: Media reports, national judicial systems, watchdog organisations

Target 8.8: Protect labor rights and promote safe and secure working environments of all workers, including migrant workers, particularly women migrants, and those in precarious employment

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with legislation in place criminalising forced labour and establishing minimum labour standards
 Source: National legislation and regulatory frameworks

Number of States that ratified all relevant ILO Protocols without reservation.
 Source: ILO and UN reporting

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States providing access to social benefit programs that provide alternatives to seeking informal or precarious work

Source: National legislation and regulatory frameworks, national budgets

Increase in number of private sector entities (businesses, corporations, individuals, etc.) committed to fair labour practices

Source: Business reporting, national reporting, non-governmental agency investigations

Number of public-private partnerships created for prevention.

Source: NGO reports and investigations, national reports

Number of public-private partnerships aiding victim-survivors of forced labour

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of media outlets, disaggregated by State, with the capacity to report on cases of child labour trafficking

Source: Media reporting, NGO reporting

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of cases received, investigated and prosecuted involving the illicit activity of labour/recruitment agencies, adoption agencies, etc.

Source: National records; reports by national and international watchdog groups and industry associations

Number of perpetrators of forced labour arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of INTERPOL red notices issued involving forced labour practices

Source: National records, reports by national and international watchdog groups and industry associations

Number of reporting and help-line services in place for the identification and protection of victims of labour trafficking, forced labour, and/or unfair or unsafe working conditions and practices

Source: National reporting, NGO reporting





GOAL 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries

Target 10.5: Improve regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen implementation of such regulations

Indicators of Political will

Number of States with systems in place enabling the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information

Source: FATF compliance

Number of States which license and monitor agencies and service providers within their jurisdictions who specialise in the creation of shell companies

Source: National legal codes, international regulatory bodies, media reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number of States which have established a Financial Intelligence Unit, with sufficient resources to carry out assigned tasks

Source: Media reports, national budgets

Number of States with civilian oversight and reporting mechanisms in place to report on illicit financial flows and mispricing.

Source: World Bank, NGOs, national and industry reporting

Number of studies and analysis on international financial flows and illicit outflows

Source: World Bank Stolen Assets Recovery database, Global Financial Integrity, NGOs.

Percentage increase in foreign investment that does not transit through tax havens

Source: Watchdog organisations (e.g. ActionAid, Global Financial Integrity)

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of financial crimes, in particular trade mispricing, arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State

Source: National criminal justice records

Number of shell companies and other corporate manoeuvres designed to obscure financial flows and profits successfully identified, prosecuted and shut down

Source: International conventions and protocols, national justice records, media reports

Amount recovered by states as a percentage of estimated value lost to trade mispricing

Source: World Bank Stolen Assets Recovery database, Global Financial Integrity

Target 10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies

Indicators of Political will

Number of States that ratified the Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants to the UNTOC Convention without reservation

Source: UNODC reporting

Number of states with comprehensive anti-smuggling and/or related legislation enacted and implemented that entitles victims to comprehensive protection

Source: National legislation and regulatory frameworks, international and regional reporting

Number of international migration and/or border agreements facilitating safe and lawful migration for legitimate purposes

Source: Mobility agreements that protect migrants' rights; free-movement or open-border systems (e.g. Schengen)

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Number, and capacity, of legal clinics and/or non-profit organisations in destination countries dedicated to informing migrants of their rights and representing them in court if needed, by State
Source: Media reports, NGO reports

Percentage of law enforcement and border officials trained in identification and migrant rights
Source: UNTOC Implementation, National reporting

Reduction in percentage of employers hiring illegal migrants
Source: Business surveys


Enhanced capacity of the media to report on cases of migrant smuggling
Source: Regional reporting, non-governmental organization reporting

Percent reduction in price and time frame between licit and illicit migration options
Source: National and regional security data (e.g. Frontex)

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Number of perpetrators of smuggling of migrants arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State
Source: National criminal justice records

Percentage of judges and prosecutors adjudicating cases of asylum and migration, by State, who have received sensitisation training
Source: National reporting, NGO reporting





GOAL 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Target 11.3: By 2030 enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacities for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries

Indicators of Political will

Number of States which have formed national and local strategies for armed violence prevention and reduction in urban hubs

Source: National reports

Number of States which have reformed prison facilities and policies so that organised crime ringleaders/kingpins are unable to continue to direct their activities from behind bars

Source: National prison services, police forces, media reports

Indicators of Effective Prevention and Protection

Percent increase in national investments aimed at armed violence prevention and reduction programs

Source: National budgets

Number of public-private partnerships providing youth alternatives to engaging with organised criminal groups (school activities, sports, work opportunities, etc.)

Source: National and NGO reporting

Number of urban hubs which have incorporated social-welfare components and experts into all major anti-gang units of urban police forces

Source: Police budgets and statements, media reports, community associations

Indicators of Successful Prosecution

Proportion of law enforcement officials, by urban hub, trained in responding appropriately to violence related to organised crime

Source: National reports

Number of individuals arrested, adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for committing organised crime-related violence, by urban hub

Source: National criminal justice records

Percentage of arrests for the organised crime related violence that result in convictions, by urban hub

Source: National crime statistics

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
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