



**THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME**

Speak Truth to Power:

*Reporting on Organized Crime, Corruption and
Governance in West Africa*

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Introduction

West Africa is a region reputed for its multi-dimensional fragility, where widespread poverty, inequality and under-development are exacerbated by environmental degradation, conflict, terrorism, corruption, high-level capital flight, impunity, organized crime and illicit trade.

In a precursor to this report, a study published by the Institute for Security Studies, “People’s Perspectives of Organized Crime in West Africa and the Sahel,” described a situation in which citizens felt increasingly distanced from the state, which provides little in the way of service delivery or opportunities for development, and where, in an absence of legitimate livelihoods, a long-standing reliance on informal trade has led to a growing illicit economy that is eroding traditional ways of life and community structures. In essence, the study found that for key states in West Africa and the Sahel, sitting along the cocaine route to Europe, crime was warping the core principle of democratic process: instead of earning popular trust through legitimate economic and social policies, the path to power was being found by securing revenue through criminal practices, thereby setting in place a self-reinforcing, vicious and negative cycle of poverty, crime, corruption and disenfranchisement. This dynamic is creating a growth of community level-violence, religious fundamentalism and fuelling extremist and insurgent groups that are prompting instability across the region (Reitano & Shaw, 2014).

Whilst canvassing people’s perceptions of organized crime and its impact, the study also sought the views of their views on how to turn back the negative cycle. The participants identified an independent media and free civil society as one of the most potent tools to address the rule of law and democracy deficit that they were experiencing (Reitano & Shaw, 2014). This is reinforced by global best practice in good governance, and countering corruption, which finds that a strong and independent media is globally recognized as an essential bulwark against the growing inter-dependence between crime and corruption, as well as being a cornerstone of sustainable development (UNESCO, 2005). At the same time, attacks against journalists and media institutions are one of the first warning signs of compromised or repressive state.

It was thus a policy conclusion of the study that reinforcing the capacity of independent media to report with integrity on crime, corruption and governance would add value to developing a culture of accountability within the framework of the rule of law in West Africa. It would also protect human rights and foster a culture of civic engagement. Responding to this, the Institute of Security Studies, in partnership with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, and financed by the National Endowment for Democracy, organized a week-long capacity building seminar in Dakar, Senegal, for eighteen independent journalists from eight countries in West Africa and the Sahel. The objective of this initiative was to sensitize those journalists who have a track record in investigative reporting on governance issues in the broader region, to build networks to promote cross-border collaboration on investigations into transnational crime and insecurity, to develop mentoring relationships with international media, and to build skills and protect the safety of those engaged in this dangerous endeavor.

This report reviews the continued importance of this endeavor, and summarizes some of the issues and challenges identified by the participants of the seminar in successfully responding to what they saw as a vocation: investing crime and corruption, promoting governance, and holding governments to account for the well-being and security of their citizens.

The Intertwined Threat of Crime and Corruption in West Africa

Corruption and organized crime are closely related and often feed off each other. In order for organized crime to thrive, corruption involving government officials is key. In most forms of organized crime, government officials from low-level to high-level positions will be targeted. In countries where the rule of law and the state is weak, organized crime often implicates officials at the highest levels, right up to the President.

A human trafficking or illegal drug market operation will target customs officials and local governments. A drug trafficking operation may target police and customs officials. Because they have the most contact with organized crime, police will often be targeted in order to get information on investigations, stop/hinder investigations, or protect illicit operations. Members of the judiciary can also be targeted for a variety of reasons, including rigging of tenders and lenient sentencing. Political corruption is organized crime's strongest weapon and by paying bribes to judges, financing elections and candidates, they can operate with impunity.

Similar relationships of "collusion" can exist with officials in private companies and organized crime. Companies produce and procure goods diverted to illegal markets such as counterfeit goods. Money laundering usually involves lawyers and real estate agents. The trafficking of smuggled goods often involves company staff, salespeople, transporters, loaders, and port officials. The private security and construction industries often serve as cover for organized crime, or provides the muscle that protects illicit activity.

West Africa has a high prevalence of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illicit trade in a range of natural resources, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom and cybercrime. This is partly attributed to weaknesses in governance and security, but also to a series of demographic and socio-economic drivers. Over 70 per cent of the region's estimated 300 million people are under the age of 35 (World Bank, 2014). The vast majority have limited education and are unemployed, or are working in the informal economy, which has been estimated to represent the majority of gross domestic product (GDP) and as much as 90 per cent of total employment in francophone West Africa (Benjamin & Aly Mbaye, 2012). It has been argued that lack of employment opportunities or reliable income put youth in precarious positions where they have a propensity to involvement in the illicit economy, as well as a greater vulnerability to some of its most pernicious effects: drug use, human smuggling and participation in serious crime, robbery or militia groups, among others (Alemika, 2013).

In the region, these illicit trades and criminal economies are being facilitated by widespread corruption at all levels. One of the dominant conclusions of the West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD) was that illicit trafficking was reshaping relationships between and among political and security actors, the citizenry, and the business community, both within national borders, but also between them (WACD, 2014). Historians have put forward that the way that statehood in West Africa was defined in the post-colonial period created a strong symbiosis between governance and illicit resources, though the roots of many illicit economies long pre-dates independence (Ellis, 2009). This was further exacerbated during the Congo Wars, which allowed the deep entrenchment of criminal actors trafficking arms and providing financing for the perpetuation of conflict, and incentivized violent militia groups to secure access and control of illicit resources (Shaw & Reitano, 2013).

One of the most damaging phenomena, however, is the extent of corruption that can be

seen at the highest levels of the state. Post-colonial leaders in West Africa exploited the prevalence of informal economies and cross-border trading and trafficking by debilitating formal bureaucracies and markets and governing instead through patronage systems constructed off the back of their abilities to control informal markets. International intervention and external assistance provided few incentives to ensure good governance, strong state institutions or broad-based economic policy. Instead, resources and political office distributed through clientalism has created a number of highly volatile or autocratic, kleptocratic regimes, which have now become characteristic of the region (Africa Progress Panel, 2013). Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema ruled for 38 years before he died; Lasana Conté was President of Guinea for 24 years before his passing in 2008; Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore held Presidential office for 27 years before he was deposed in a coup in 2014, and Gambia's President Yahya Jammeh, is entering his 20th year in office. Alternatively states have suffered from incessant civil wars and constant coups, Guinea Bissau has seen 14 different acting heads of state during 42 years of independence. The lack of international censure of either of these two models of weak governance has created a crisis of statehood, where governments act with impunity (Shaw, 2012).

Each of the regimes cited above, as well as a number of others, have been implicated in resource diversion and capital flight in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Reitano, 2015). Either to seize power or to consolidate it, the extent of high-level involvement in illicit trade and drug trafficking is widespread in West Africa, and consistently touches all of the ECOWAS states to varying degrees. Despite West African people continuing to struggle with crippling poverty, low socio-economic indicators and growing inequality, West African leaders have used everything from the extractive industries, natural resources and foreign aid to stay in power and fight off challengers. As recently as February 2015 a national report found that the Sierra Leone could not account for a third of Ebola funds between May and October 2014 (Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2014). The extent of illicit financial flows (IFFs) from West Africa have been estimated as being the highest of any region on the continent, including the oil rich states of North Africa (HLP, 2015).

The WACD found that political office is critical to facilitating drug trafficking across the sub-continent, and that traffickers were easily able to connect with people of influence both utilizing and creating informal social networks that allow them to access or co-opt the formal security apparatus where necessary. Participation in trafficking offers political, military, and business leaders windfall profits with which to conduct electoral and military campaigns and feed patronage systems, and in return, they use the power of their office to provide protection or even assistance to traffickers. This trickles down to every step in the supply chain of criminal economies, implicating not only political structures, but also the justice system, national security infrastructures from law enforcement to customs and border control, to key community and religious leaders (WACD, 2014). Thus, one of the principle, and arguably the most damaging features of West Africa, is the way that criminal organizations are mirroring the licit existing power frameworks, and exploiting advantageous positions close to official power to gain benefits and opportunities for illicit activities (Goudsmid, Mancini, & Vanegas Canosa, 2012).


Journalism: A Profession Under Fire

Freedom of the press is the cornerstone of democracy and good governance, as the freedom of journalists to report and comment is strongly correlated with the public's right of access to knowledge and information and this is the foundation for transparency and accountability (UNESCO, 2005). It serves as a platform for discussion of a range of issues relating to governance and development, and contributes to citizen empowerment. The right to freedom of expression is enshrined within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, which includes freedom "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers".

In working to counter corruption and crime, the media has a two-fold role to play. A active and vibrant news media, providing conventional reporting on a daily, weekly or monthly news cycle, is critical for sharing information with the general public and for serving as a forum for public debate. It is complemented by investigative journalism that strives to uncover hidden information or find deeper meanings behind the news. Investigative journalism involves detailed and ongoing research, it is open-ended and happens independently from the news cycle. In an optimal scenario, quality investigative reporting alerts the public to dangers and wrongdoings, and a free press catalyzes swift action by governments and law enforcement to rectify the wrong (UNODC, 2014). As a participant from the workshop explained, "*An investigative journalists is a soldier*". Great investigative journalism exposes links between businesses, public officials and/or organized crime, and explains how those ties negatively impact on the public, human rights and development issues.

The risk and the challenge to journalists reporting on these topics is that corruption touches those with power and influence; organized crime is by nature covert, well resourced and violent, and the people who carry out illicit activities want to avoid detection. In fragile states, they are often better armed, better paid, and better organized than the police, so they are seldom caught and there is little information on their activities and where state institutions are compromised, they are seldom brought to justice. In these contexts, the risks to journalists and the media are great, and the results, if any, can be ephemeral (Shaw & Kemp, 2012).

Globally, it has become more dangerous to be a correspondent covering governance, politics and crime than it is to work on a war zone, and journalists have increasingly become the canary down the mine for poor governance. According to the data kept by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), of the 1120 journalists that have been killed for their work, the topics they were covering were politics, war, corruption and crime (CPJ, 2015).



In the last year, the most dangerous places to be a journalist are in South and Central America, some Arab and North African states and Eastern Europe. In the Americas, organized crime groups openly persecute journalists and media outlets, threatening them and their families, whilst terrorizing their followers through social media (Southwick, 2014). In the Middle East, as the increasingly tainted waters of the Arab Spring have bifurcated into repressive governments or virulent violent extremist movements, both regimes are targeting journalists as a way to suppress dissent or communicate fear (RWB, 2014).

While conditions for the media in West Africa has yet to reach the proportions of these two troubled regions, there have been a number of notorious murders of journalists, which illustrate the risk to local journalists, whilst at the same time often highlighting pivotal relationship between governance and press freedom. Two cases that have become synonymous with impunity in West Africa are the murders of Norbert Zongo in Burkina Faso in 1998, and Deyda Hydara in 2004 in the Gambia. Zongo, the editor of a newspaper *L'indépendant*, was brutally killed in his own car which was subsequently set on fire. At the time of his death he was investigating a murder of a driver that would have implicated officials close to former president Compoare (Keita, 2010). Hydara was the owner of a private newspaper *The Point*, headed the Gambian journalists union and was the correspondent of *Agence France Presse* and Reporters without Borders. He was shot dead in his car, apparently for a campaign he was leading against new restrictions to press freedom (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2014). In both cases, investigations into their deaths were obfuscated and no perpetrator was brought to justice.

There have been 8 high profile murders of journalists in Nigeria in the last two decades, with journalists reporting on politics, crime and corruption gunned down by masked assailants, often in their homes or communities, in the presence of their wives and children, in order to ensure the potency of the message (CPJ, 2015). There have been a string of high profile cases where journalists have been jailed, killed or disappeared in the Cote D'Ivoire (RWB, 2013). Most recently, in November 2013, *Tomorrow Magazine* editor Désiré Oué was murdered in unclear circumstances, as was journalist Sylvain Gagnetaud of *Radio Yopougon*, and a leading member of the Organization of Côte d'Ivoire Professional Journalists, in May 2011. (RWB, 2011). In 2004, a French-Canadian journalist, Guy-André Kieffer, who had been investigating illicit activity in the national cocoa industry, was abducted at a meeting scheduled with a member of the then-President's family. He was never found, nor was his death confirmed, despite repeated international campaigns (CNBC News, 2012). In 2005, Harry Yansaneh, the acting editor of the independent daily *For Di People* in Sierra Leone died

two months after being beaten up by thugs apparently acting on the orders of a senior politician (UNESCO, 2005).

In the majority of states in the region, the media operates under seriously restrictive conditions. Only three of the ECOWAS countries, Senegal, Benin and Ghana are classified as having a free media by the NGO Freedom House (Freedom House, 2014). Journalists are regularly threatened, imprisoned and blackmailed and pressured to reveal their sources. Of the sixteen journalists who participated at the workshop conducted under this project, twelve of the participants – more than two thirds of the total – had been arrested at least once. One well-reputed investigative journalist from Mali was unable to attend the workshop as he was detained and imprisoned the day before he was scheduled to depart.

Participants cited numerous occasions where media houses are prevented from publishing certain stories, publications are seized and programmes are banned. The journalists in the workshop reported that their editors are frequently bribed or threatened to suppress certain stories. In Guinea in August 2013, for example, soldiers in the president's personal security detail assaulted and closed a privately owned radio station for its coverage of local protests against a presidential visit, then beat several journalists associated with the station over the next several days (Freedom House, 2014).

Currently, only six of the fifteen ECOWAS countries have Freedom of Information legislation, and in fact, in recent years, a number of countries have passed laws reducing the freedom of the press and restricting the profession. The increasing prevalence of Internet access, and concomitantly of cybercrime, in West Africa has been used as justification for increasing the ability for surveillance and control over internet use. In 2013, Gambia proposed an amendment to its information and communications act, making "spreading of false news against the government or public officials" a crime punishable by up to 15 years in prison or a fine of 3 million dalasis (≈\$80,000) (RWB, 2013). More subtle forms of repression can be obscured in legal and regulatory frameworks, such as the imposition of high taxes to open a broadcast or press outlet, levying fines on "offending" media outlets, raising the barrier to get a press card by introducing stiff educational requirements, and manipulating the advertising market (UNESCO, 2005).

The threat of growing terrorist movements in West Africa and the Sahel has been used as justification for placing restrictions on freedom of speech and increasing censorship of the media, under the purported interests of national security. In the last year, more than a dozen arrests and prosecutions of journalists were carried out in Nigeria, under the anti-terrorism and public incitement laws, though none have yet reached a conclusion or conviction (Freedom House, 2014). In 2012, as the central state in Mali sought to regain control of the North, there were an unprecedented number of journalists were illegally detained and tortured by the military and Islamist militants. Interviews with the deposed former president and rebels were forbidden by the junta, and the national broadcaster was stormed by the military in April (Freedom House, 2014).

The efficacy and integrity of the media has also been undercut in less overt, but more insidious ways. As organized crime infiltrates media companies and governments, it becomes increasingly difficult for journalists to avoid being manipulated by corrupt officials keen to use them as spokespeople or mouthpieces. As a study by the journalism watchdog, Reporters Without Borders, observed, "Under threat and with limited resources, the media often end up restricting themselves to just quoting official sources." (Reporters without Borders) In places like Guinea Bissau, long dubbed Africa's first "narco state", it is no

surprise that journalists would rather write and print propaganda for political parties or government officials than risk their lives investigating the drug trade, which has co-opted the government at the highest levels.

In the face of these challenges, the media need to shore up their own credibility and improve the standards of journalistic practice. A strong, independent and integral media will place significant emphasis on the need for ethics, accountability and accuracy that distinguish professional investigative reporting from an increasing number of online and social media sites that often publish information without the depth and context such efforts require (UNODC, 2014). National media could adopt appropriate codes of conduct and institute self-regulatory mechanisms that would obviate the need for government-imposed regulation. Yet, for many reasons, this is an uphill struggle.

Globally, this is a not an easy time to be an investigative journalist. In the Internet era, where most online content is free, many media organizations are being forced to change their business models to survive. Today's 24/7, high-volume news cycle values new content over in-depth, quality long-form reporting. There are fewer resources available for serious journalism, and even less for time-consuming and costly investigative projects. Increasingly, even the most well-respected international news organizations use sensationalist, celebrity-driven news rather than quality investigative reporting to build their readership bases, and rely on syndicated news content, public relations copy and government-issued press releases to fill their pages and websites (New York Times, 2014). The growing sophistication of organized crime and money laundering, also using Internet-enabled technologies to provide anonymity, skip jurisdictions and collaborate effortlessly across borders places these forms of illicit practice even further beyond the scope of the 24-hour news cycle. This makes it even more difficult for journalists to embark on time-consuming and dangerous investigations in today's rapid turnover, digitized media world where funding for any rigorous journalism is scarce (Hervieu, 2011).

Paradoxically, *more* resources, *more* skills and *more* safeguards are required by journalists to investigate and expose organized crime and corruption – the exact opposite of the conditions and trends sketched above.

Speak Truth to Power: strengthening the capacity of independent media in West Africa

Despite the increasingly unfriendly and dangerous landscape, not to mention a rapid-cycle online media environment that does not lend itself to expensive and time-consuming investigations, the role that the media can play in addressing governance, countering impunity and revealing criminal practices and corruption is manifold and critically important, and is deserving of the support of the international community.

There are a number of reasons for hope. The recent public health crisis triggered by the Ebola outbreak demonstrated how a trusted, respected media can also pay dividends in enabling broader development objectives. At the height of the Ebola crisis, it was community radio stations in Guinea that were effective in outreach and educating the population. Despite station budgets pieced together from advertising and support from foreign donors, rural radio stations are increasingly being seen as the most effective means of disseminating information and raising awareness to remote populations that are largely illiterate and lack access to other forms of media (Tinti, 2014). Even in the much-vaunted criminalized state of Guinea-Bissau, the media, in partnership with a strong civil society consortium partnered to monitor media coverage during the 2014 election campaigns to determine its neutrality and integrity.

How then, are the conditions for a free, strong and independent media created and sustained in West Africa, and specifically, how can those individual journalists courageous enough to undertake investigative reporting on issues of politics, corruption and crime be protected?

One of the key aims of the Global Initiative and the Institute of Security Studies in this project was to build effective media and civil society networks to counter organized crime. This includes sensitizing journalists to the signs of organized crime and corruption around them, equipping them with tools to investigate these crimes and doing so in ways that minimize the risks and dangers to themselves and others victimized by organized crime and corruption.

One of the principle benefits of journalists, and other components of civil society, is that they are not curtailed by national borders in the same way as the forces of law and order. Instead, they too can harness the tools of today's organized criminals – cross-border collaboration, new information and communication technology – to conduct their investigations into these criminal networks and illicit practices.

1. Build the capacity of Journalists

As discussed, journalists, particularly in poor countries with weak institutions and corrupt regimes, are fighting an uphill battle to succeed in a challenging profession. In the words of one participant, *“it isn't easy for a journalist to wake up and say they are an investigative journalist who specializes in organized crime.”*

Only two of the participants at workshop had received formal training as a journalist, the rest had learned their trade on the job. Even with the most experienced journalists, learning some of the basic techniques of mapping a story, or discussing the principles of ethical reporting and protecting sources provided immediate benefit.

Another area where specific skills building was appreciated was in the use of modern

communication tools and social media. Less than 15 per cent of the participants used Twitter, Facebook etc. as a tool to conduct investigations or a platform build networks. With a growing amount of information contained online, internet-based research is undoubtedly a useful addition to old-fashioned shoe-leather investigative reporting, which can lower the costs and time spent on individual investigations. It is a easy way to connect to sources, or to build collaborative networks with other journalists.

While Internet penetration in the region is low, it is growing exponentially. The Internet is therefore quickly becoming a viable alternative space for publishing stories. In Nigeria alone there are 60 million Internet users, and *The Premium Times* (an online only Nigerian newspaper) receives 200,000 hits a day. The average newspaper sells 50,000 copies per week at best, and the region is saturated by small, local newspapers that have limited circulation. For example, Guinea alone is estimated to have as many as 200 individual newspapers (Freedom House, 2014). There are a growing number of established platforms for publishing stories online, which would allows stories to reach a larger, more diverse audience, projecting the important issues outwards to an international audience.

Participants concluded that supporting the establishment of journalism schools, or even a regional center for independent investigative journalism, which could provide capacity building, serve as a basis for the building of regional networks, and even perhaps offer accreditation for local journalists in the region, would be a valuable endeavor.

2. Empower female journalists.

It is by no means unique to West Africa, but women are drastically under-represented in the news media, particularly on topics of politics, governance, justice and security. A study of the US news media found that by a nearly 3 to 1 margin, male front-page bylines at top newspapers outnumbered female bylines in coverage of the 2012 presidential election. Men were also far more likely to be quoted than women in newspapers, television and public radio (WMC, 2014). Considering the smaller number of women in the media in most societies and the special pressures they often face, much needs to be done to promote gender equity within the profession.

Female journalists play an instrumental role in increasing the inclusion of women in the media, and the issues that impact on them, and Africa lags behind all other regions worldwide in terms of the share of news stories reported and presented by women. A 2010 study by the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) reviewing 14,000 news sources in 108 countries found that when women do make the news, it is as “stars” (i.e., celebrities, princesses) or as “nobodies” (i.e., women on the street, neighbors, eyewitnesses); women are almost four times as likely as men to be identified by family status, as wife, daughter, mother, etc.; and even on topics like gender-based violence, men get 91 per cent of the print space or airtime (GMMP, 2010).

In the context of issues of politics, corruption, crime, and on important social issues, an important motivating factor for women to become investigative journalists is to expose wrongs in society that may not always be given the same priority by men. However, in countries where women do not enjoy the same rights as men, being an investigative journalist can be extremely difficult. Women are undoubtedly more vulnerable to sexual assault, which can deter them from the profession. For example, in 2009, four journalists in Sierra Leone who had been investigating the practice of female genital mutilation were abducted and intimidated, including by forcing one of the four to walk naked in the streets (RWB, 2009). Efforts can and should be made to encourage more female journalists into the

profession. Female journalists lack sufficient female role models to mentor them, to reduce this kind of abuse and stigma.

3. Diversify funding sources for independent journalism

The pressures on the industry as a whole, and the lack of funding to investigative journalism outside of the news cycle, have placed critical strain on the capacity of journalists in West Africa to conduct these forms of investigation. Lack of funding also increases the propensity of local media outlets to be prepared to sell their integrity to corrupt officials. Increasing and diversifying funding to the media in West Africa, and in particular for independent journalism is important. There are a growing number of alternative funding models that are being developed to support investigative reporting, including crowd-funded platforms, which could be customized or focused on providing grants or support to West African journalists.

There are a limited number of already established grants programmes for journalists in Africa, but these have largely been dedicated to the Anglophone community. The number available to the Francophone and Lusophone communities is far more scarce. Should such a fund be created, an important feature would be to ensure fact-checking and verification of stories, and editorial support, as these would both enhance the quality of the final product, but also provide valuable opportunities for learning in the process.

4. Facilitate the development of cross-border networks

New models to promote investigative journalism are being developed. Journalists are collaborating with each other across the globe like never before. Technology is enhancing the ability of journalists to collaborate across borders to follow stories in remote pockets of the globe in new, cost-effective and timely ways. As more information goes online, investigative journalists are able to harness new technological and communications tools like never before.

As organized crime goes global, so cross-border collaboration between journalists, media outlets, and those offering technical assistance, such as computer programming experts, has taken off. There are now many investigative journalism organizations that frequently collaborate with journalists in other countries and offer support and advice to those working with fewer resources in developing countries. This wider collaboration can help ensure the safety of journalists investigating organized crime.

5. Censure attacks against journalists

As noted, attacks against journalists and efforts to suppress the freedom of the press are the first warning signs of governance challenges, with a commensurate impact on broader security and development objectives.

Regional organizations and the international community need to do more to monitor the local media in West Africa, to identify and protect those reporters who are choosing to report on the difficult and dangerous topics of crime and politics, and to bolster those independent media houses who pioneer this type of work. Reproducing key reports to a wider audience by syndicating in internationally recognized media and online platforms would shine a greater spotlight on crime and corruption issues, and help to mobilize international pressure to address crime or corruption. Finally, the international community could consider using media freedom as an indicator of governance and development, censure those governments suppressing media freedom, and hold governments in West Africa, to account via conditionality or other means, to ensuring a free, vibrant and engaged media sector.

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